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Preface
We both began to work with Rüdiger in 2005/6 starting as early career-researchers at
the Chair of Southeast Asian Studies in Passau, where Rüdiger had been a full professor
since 2004. During the following years, our lives were strongly affected and inspired by
both – Southeast Asia and Rüdiger Korff, our PhD-supervisor and mentor, whose net-
work of friends and colleagues spread all over Germany, Southeast Asia, and beyond.
Within this edited volume, we tried to bring together many of the scholars who worked
together with Rüdiger over the past decades. Accordingly, this volume comprises con-
tributions from Rüdiger’s friends and colleagues from Germany, Southeast Asia and
India; from the early beginnings of Rüdiger’s own academic career to the most recent
collaborations, displaying the whole range of his interests and research topics.
Throughout his academic life, Rüdiger has actively shaped and advanced the disci-
pline of Southeast Asian Studies. A rather marginal field in Germany, and thence occu-
pying a marginal position in German academia, area studies in general, and Southeast
Asian Studies in particular, have often been criticised for appropriating and construc-
ting certain areas, which are not perceived as such by those living in these regions.
Rüdiger Korff contributed to overcoming such container-like thinking by propagating
an emic approach to Southeast Asia. Combining critical theory (from the Global North)
with emic reconstructions of meaning, while closely cooperating with academics from
Southeast Asia and beyond, Rüdiger Korff succeeded in establishing the field of con-
temporary Southeast Asian Studies as theoretically informed and empirically based
discipline. Being a sociologist of development and urban sociologist with a focus on
Thailand, Rüdiger has always shown great interest in the interface of urbanism and
globalisation, analysing local encounters with global developments.
This collection of essays in honour of Rüdiger Korff reflects his multiple fields of ex-
pertise.The first two introductory chapters outline the book’s theme of rural and urban
transformations in particular (Padmanabhan), while discussing the development, me-
rits and shortcomings of the academic field of the sociology of development in general
(Neubert).
A great body of Rüdiger’s publications deals with questions of the urban, focusing
on social creativity and locality (chapter by Kurfürst), public spheres (chapter by Sa-
tur), and people’s self-organization (chapter by Vogel and Rothfuß). Always taking in-
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to account that the rural and the urban are deeply interconnected, his academic vita
also comprises explorations into the highlands of Mainland Southeast Asia (MMSEA-
Region). In the BMBF LILAC project, Rüdiger combined his research focus on ethnicity
with studies in agricultural development and biodiversity (chapter byWehner). Later, he
extended his interest in urbanism to include small and medium-sized towns (chapters
by Le and Warnk), a field still constituting a research gap in urban studies. His long-
term experience in field work inThailand has deepened Rüdiger’s knowledge ofThai de-
velopment and politics (chapters by Sasiwonsaroj, Husa, Wohlschlägl and Nelson). In
recent years, he developed an interest in media and communication (chapter by Hahn
and Munkler), particularly inspired by the work of Manuel Castells. Having been a visi-
ting professor to the National University Malaysia (UKM), Rüdiger collaborated closely
with colleagues from UKM on questions of ethnicity and nation-building in Malaysia
(chapter by Shamsul). Extending his research area well beyond Southeast Asia, Rüdiger
established collaborations with scholars from India within the scope of the Urban Self
Project (chapters by Sumathi and Pandiaraj). While his research has always been con-
cerned with contemporary developments, Rüdiger invariably added a historical dimen-
sion to his analyses. The last section of the edited volume therefore assembles chapters
on the history of Southeast Asia with a focus on Myanmar and Cambodia (chapters by
Hellmann, Thant, and Kolnberger).
We would like to express our thanks for his guidance, his always keeping his office
doors wide open and his support whenever we struggled. As he once put it, you cannot
accomplish a PhD without some sort of suffering. Luckily, we found an inspiring and
motivating environment at the Chair of Southeast Asian Studies, enabling us to over-
come any obstacles in the process of acquiring a PhD. Always up for new ideas, Rüdiger
supported us greatly in shaping our scientific and analytic minds as well as learning
to ask adequate questions, while advising us to continuously query the recent state of
affairs.
Together with the Chair’s soul, secretary Christa Gottinger, he succeeded in crea-
ting an environment of friendly exchange and collaboration within an international
and gender diverse team. For his retirement, we wish him happiness, good readings
and good rhythms – as Rüdiger is also an admirer of good music. Thank you, Rüdiger,
for your kindness, support, and academic inspiration!
Transformations
Navigating the urban rural frontier in Yogyakarta
Martina Padmanabhan (Passau)
The rural–urban dichotomy seems a quintessential feature of modernity and ongoing
processes of modernisation. While at the first glance, the characteristics of rural and
urban areas appear to be clear-cut and mutually exclusive, further empirical probing
calls into question this black-and-white, woodcut-like representation.
This essay is a musing on experiences of navigating the fringes of the city of Yogya-
karta on Java on a motor scooter during a 10 month period of residency in Indonesia.
The dialectical analytical approach is inspired by the conversations during the ride to
school with my 9 year old son Jacob1. The daily trips from our rented house through
the suburban traffic allowed us to observe, discuss and analyse the rapid changes we
could see taking place along the route.The topic of rural–urban relations and signifiers
frequently came up in our discussions. Jacob’s commentaries drew on his life-worldly
connotations and experiences of rurality and urbanity acquired in Lower Saxony and
lower Bavaria in Germany. My perspective on the fluid land- and cityscapes we en-
countered along our way was informed by Lefebvre’s theory of urbanisation and Tanja
Mölders’ critical reflections on the links between gender, place and nature.
In what follows I first briefly outline these two conceptual frameworks and provide
some background information on the history and culture of Yogyakarta. I then trace
our journey in chronological and spatial order, starting from our house and ending at
Jacob’s school. At each of the places described along the way, I reflect on what they reveal
about societal relations to nature in this rapidly growing metropolis.
The constitutive emergence and decay of urbanity and rurality
Urbanisation and globalisation are central drivers of changing patterns of life-worldly
sense-making (Schmid, 2005). Rapidly changing configurations of space and time, lin-
ked to particular places, demand theoretical conceptualisation from a social science per-
spective.Henri Lefebvre’s theory of the production of space (1974) constitutes a powerful
tool for describing and analysing processes and phenomena of urbanisation, and their
1 All names have been changed.
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effects on society at different scales (from the private sphere, via the city, to the global
scale) (Elden, 2002). Lefebvre was trained as a philosopher before turning to sociology.
His reflections on the rapid spread of cities and the loss of life-worldly qualities that
this entails led him to conceptualise the all-encompassing influence of industrialisation
as a process of deruralisation (dépaysanisation or Entländlichung).
For Lefebvre (1991), urbanisation affects both the city and the rural, following a pro-
cess along a space-time line that leads through a sequence of stages from the rural to
the modern industrial city. His central thesis is that in an urbanised world neither ‘the
urban’ nor ‘the rural’ exist, but rather different urban configurations. His perspective
is a dialectical one, emphasising large-scale processes of change arising through the
interplay of opposing forces, but without neglecting the entanglements that are en-
countered along the way. His reasoning draws on the historical example of the urban
development in Europe, a topic that is closely interlinked to the Enlightenment andmo-
dernity, as well as with their dark underbelly, colonialism. He predicts the dominance
of urban social fabric over rural existence, reducing villages to the status of folklore and
tourist attractions. At the same time the proliferation of holiday homes and associated
infrastructure and consumerism converts the rural into a part of this urban fabric. His
image of all-encompassing urbanity in space and time, nevertheless leaves pockets of
rurality (ruralité) within the urban mesh, where seasonality and, in his diction, “nature”
survive (Lefebvre, 1971). In Lefebvre’s conceptualisation, the political city is the starting
point of urbanisation. The expropriation and accumulation of surplus value produced
in rural societies provides thematerial basis for the concentration of administrative and
military power in urban areas, as well as for the flourishing of art and culture. The di-
vide between the urban and the rural thus reflects a division of labour in both material
and intellectual spheres.This vision of a privileged centre surrounded by periphery that
is increasingly marginalised and under its control displays striking similarities with the
governance pattern of mandala states in Southeast Asia (Dahm, 1999: 174).
The commercial city emerges out of the political city, as trade in commodities in-
creasingly dominates city life and moulds the configuration of urban space. Instead of
political meeting places, markets dominate the city centre, as a meeting place for the
exchange of goods. Land tenure becomes less important as a source of power than the
control of money. In rural areas, instead of producing for the landlord, people produ-
ce for the market. The rural loses the last vestiges of its autonomy and turns into the
‘environment’ surrounding the city.
In a final step, Lefebvre sees the industrial city emerging in amore or less evolutiona-
ry manner from the commercial city. The transition from manufacturing to industrial
production breaks open the historical city and creates an agglomeration of social spaces
moulded by corporative power and reflecting the associated division of labour. Com-
pared to the commercial city, the industrial city has a less purely ‘urban’ character: the
monstrous spread of urban areas leads to the dissolution of the historical city and the
emergence of a rural-urban duality, in which the distinction between rural and urban
becomes blurred. Lefebvre (1991) goes so far as to describe the industrial city as ‘anti-
urban’. From a Marxist perspective, he postulates a shift away from conflicts defined
by the categories place and time towards a more fundamental conflict embracing the
whole of society.
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To what extent is this Eurocentric, historically grounded understanding of urban
development relevant to the situation of cities in non-European countries, such as the
‘royal city’ of Yogyakarta, in the 21st century? Lefebvre’s concept of the dialectical neu-
tralisation of the antagonism of the rural and the urban will be familiar to anyone living
through the rapid changes that are taking place in Indonesia and across the developing
world. Lefebvre pictures the urban as exploding and spreading over the whole country.
This is not the idea of a synthesis of both elements, but rather a violent process of rup-
ture, in which urbanisation not only destroys the rural but also dissolves the ‘urban’ as
this term was historically understood.
Equally relevant for residents of modern cities like Yogyakarta is the concept of
urbanisation as a phenomenon encompassing the whole of society; one that not only
affects every location, be it rural or urban, but is also part and parcel of every societal
transition, influencing ideas, actions and lifestyles. As Schmid (2005: 26) points out,
Lefebvre implicitly postulates a dialectical relation between epistemological develop-
ment and societal change.
Lefebvre is of course aware that the singular chronology he proposes based on the
historical case of Europe is an ideal representation of a complex, uneven process. Dif-
ferent places and times become settings for ‘negotiation’ between rurality and urbanity,
which —for the time being— continue to coexist. This give rise to what Lefebvre calls
societal space-time configurations, in which rural, industrial and urban formations or
‘continents’ overlap. These overlaps are critical phases and zones, transitional spheres
of abrupt and, for those involved, often painful change. In this essay I postulate that the
fringes of modern-day Yogyakarta exemplify one such virulent interface. I apply Lef-
ebvre’s conceptualisation of urbanisation to gain insights into the changes —observed
from the top of a scooter— taking place over space and time.
The questionable nature of rurality
While Lefebvre focuses on urbanisation, Tanja Mölders (2017, 2018) is interested in the
“nature of rurality”. Building on insights from social-ecological research, she reflects on
the spatial dimension of the societal relations through the lens of the dialectical concept
of societal relations to nature (Hummel et al., 2017). She notes that, in contemporary
discourse, ‘nature’ as a category is most often a material and symbolic expression of
agrarian production and conservation areas. The term ‘rurality’ appears difficult to de-
fine, since it is a hybrid concept that contains elements of the urban as well as the rural.
Nevertheless, both categories immediately connect to notions of space and place. She
argues that enriching this discourse with the central social notion of gender is a pro-
ductive move that allows linkages, both epistemological and ontological, to be drawn
between the categories gender, place and nature.
Mölders (2017) postulates rurality as a material-symbolic relation that penetrates
the urban-rural continuum. From this perspective, rurality is seen as the product of
dynamic processes, in which practices, trajectories and their interaction give rise to
changing configurations of place and space. This vision rejects the compartmentalisa-
tion of rurality into materialised matter and cultural-symbolism. When the material
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and the social are thus merged and conceptualised as a single space, not only human-
nature relations, but also power and gender relations emerge as analytical categories
for understanding the hybrid nature of rurality.
Rurality is thus an imagined space; it emerges through diverse performative prac-
tices, which together co-create the urban-rural difference (Mölders, 2017). Mölders
identifies three other performative practices that question this construction of rurality:
“Doing gender” engages with gender as both a socially constructed and an opera-
tional category. Dominant heteronormativity is not reduced to symbolic-discursive
attribution; rather, the focus is on the material conditions shaping gender relations.
“Doing nature” participates in the societal construction of nature and resists the idea
of nature as being opposed to or existing outside of society. This insight helps to
unravel naïve assumptions about women being ‘closer to nature’. It shows how the
‘naturalising’ of women serves to disguise gender based power relations. Finally “doing
rurality” interrogates gender relations in the countryside, revealing ‘pastoral’ images
as being intimately bound up with the continuity of patriarchal structures, giving rise
to constructed images of rural masculinity and femininity.
Mölders’ emphasis on performance brings Lefebvre’s sweeping historical overview
down to earth and grounds the life-wordly activities of the actors taking part in the
changes he describes. Her focus on interactions is a reminder that changes occurring
in one sphere cannot be understood in isolation: the material cannot be divorced from
the symbolic; nor the urban fabric understood in isolation from the social fabric and,
in particular, gender relations. These insights inspired me to follow the connections
leading from the sights and sounds of daily life in Yogyakarta to explore the wider, often
momentous changes affecting the urban social fabric, and their impacts on material
conditions in far-away places.
Yogyakarta: between the mountain and the sea
The royal city of Yogyakarta lies on the Indonesian island of Java between the moun-
tain and the sea. The city has evolved around the Sultan’s palace, the Keraton, located
half-way between the volcano Mount Merapi to the north and the Indian Ocean to the
south. The Sultan is not only the governor of this Special Province, the only city in In-
donesia still ruled by a monarchy, but also the spiritual leader of the people of Central
Java (Dahm, 1999: 174). As Sultan and ruler, his sphere of influence is located at the in-
tersection of the worldly and the spiritual world and guarantees the link between them.
This is symbolised in close relationship between the male spirits on the volcano, Mount
Merapi and female spirits of the sea, ruled over by Njai Roro Kidul, the Queen of the
Southern Seas (i.e. the Indian Ocean). According to legend this powerful goddess of the
ocean married the founder of the Mataram kingdom in the 17th century (Schlehe, 2008)
and continues to watch over the Sultan, his state, and his people (Selosoemardjan, 1962:
18).
Culture and religion thus provide not only social order, but also constitute a symbo-
lic being-in-the-world. As myth they explain both human relations and the interaction
of humans with transcendent beings and nature. The individual, society, nature and
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cosmos are all connected and, ideally, in harmony with each other (Magnis-Suseno,
1981). Outbreaks of the active Volcano Merapi, earthquakes (Widiyantoro et. al., 2018)
and accidents at sea are considered to be messages directed at the political elite from
the spiritual world to warn against decline of morals, exploitation of nature, or fail-
ure to offer ritual sacrifices. Thus the Sultan depends on nature and the cosmos for
legitimation of his traditional status of political and spiritual leader.
Traditional Javanese society was homogenous; political life revolved around the
court and displays of loyalty to the Sultan. The late Dutch colonial period initiated a
period of rapid change.The emergence of a bureaucratic class shaped by formal educa-
tion led to a decline in the status of the nobility, while the intelligentsia functioned as
the liaison between the European rulers and their Javanese subjects (Selosoemardjan,
1962: 144). Later, the city of Yogyakarta played a prominent role in the struggle for inde-
pendence and from 1946 to 1948 was briefly the capital of the new Republic of Indonesia
(Vickers, 2003). Modern Yogyakarta is renowned as a centre of arts, culture and higher
education. Notwithstanding this ongoing process of modernisation, popular loyalty to
the Sultan remains high and continues to play an important role in maintaining social
stability.
The Sultan’s special status is embodied in the layout of the city of Yogyakarta. The
Keraton occupies a preeminent position at the centre of the town. Two large squares
(alun-alun) located at the north and the south end of the palace compound are connected
byMalioboro Street, a ‘royal road’ that forms a cosmological north-south axis. (Keilbart,
2018).The modern city can be roughly divided into the parts south and north of the Ke-
raton.The south is a flourishing centre of the arts, especially traditional art forms such
as wayang, batik and dance.The north is shaped by the presence of institutions of higher
education and also of luxury hotels (Hyatt, Ambarukmo, Sheraton,Marriot), malls (Am-
barukmo, Hartono, Jogja City, Sleman City) apartments, and gated perumahan, which
are still growing in number. Higher education has actually declined in comparison.
It houses the campus of Gadjha Mada Universitas, Indonesia’s most prestigious uni-
versity, and many other private academic organisations. The northern city is home to
large numbers of students, academics and professionals, as well as growing numbers
of working class families making a living from the informal economy.
Methodological approach: transecting the city
Between August 2017 and June 2018 I spent a sabbatical year at the private catholic uni-
versity, Atma Jaya Universitas Yogyakarta, where I coordinated a joint research project
(www.uni-passau.de/en/indorganic/) and engaged in my own research. I was accom-
panied by my son Jacob, who had his 9th birthday during our stay. Our home during
this period was in the municipality of Sleman. Although Sleman, whose official name
is Sleman Regency, extends to the summit of Merapi, it is now effectively an extensive
northern suburb of Yogyakarta.While I was atmy office in the north-east of Yogyakarta,
just inside the ring road that encloses the historical city, Jacob attended an international
school further out towards Merapi, close to the northward extension of Palagan Street.
Throughout our stay, we travelled almost daily back on forth between our home in Con-
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tong Catur, close to the bus terminal, an ironically calm place surrounded by ever-in-
creasing private traffic. I came to consider this routine of shuttling the boy helicopter-
like to school as a repeated transect. I became aware of how what we saw and heard on
our regular ride through the rapidly changing urban-rural landscape was telling diffe-
rent stories of place.This is similar to what Gibbs (2014: 211) calls site-work, when walks
through contested places and meetings with informants form the stimuli for responses
to place. Gibbs talks of such walks as “experiences in belonging” (2014: 214), through
attachment to place and becoming enmeshed in stories that are told about it by people
met along the way. Thus our daily journey became an opportunity to engage in a mode
of investigation that was new to me, from which new insights emerged, informed by
my ongoing research into organic farming (Schreer and Padmanabhan 2019) and Jacob’s
encounters in school and in the neighbourhood.
From the very beginning we knew that, for us, Yogyakarta was a place to pass
through, as our period of stay was finite and fixed in advance. The notion ‘passing
through place’ encapsulates our way of belonging the city, one not based on fixity or lon-
gevity, not permanent, but vital nonetheless. Our rides back and forth to our temporary
home provided a lens throughwhich we could view relationships between places, people
and the more-than-human world (Gibbs, 2014: 216). The interactions with neighbours,
shopkeepers, services and participants in traffic were motivated by our need for sense-
and place-making, and these interactions dominated our conversations along the road.
Interestingly, rurality and urbanity were the central topic of our conversations from the
very beginning. In what follows I trace our outward journey in chronological and spa-
tial order, starting from our house and ending at Jacob’s school. At each of the places
described along the way, I reflect on what they reveal about the different dimensions of
spatial, societal, and economic relations to nature.
Mixing different people: Townhouse
Our rented town house sits in the middle of a little compound, comprising of 10 similar
single-story concrete buildings, to create a small block. Each house is surrounded by
a tiny garden, sporting decorative flowering frangipani trees, smaller than the front
yards typically used to park cars or the scooters that are the most popular means of
transportation among themiddle class.The alleys between houses are neatly paved with
cobblestones, installed by the investor who built the compound. In the rainy season, the
little street between the houses turns into a river, carrying along quantities of plastic
garbage. Much of this plastic will end up in River Eloprogo, classified as one of the
twenty most polluted rivers in the world (Asean Post, 2019) Our immediate neighbours
are families, either Javanese or Peranakans of Chinese descent. The latter typically lead
a secluded life, a legacy of the long history discrimination against them, both under
colonial rule and since independence. Their well-guarded houses speak of caution in
the face of continuing prejudice. By contrast the activities of the Javanese families often
spill out onto the street. Many families also rent out rooms to members of the huge
student population in the area. Our days start when we are woken by the sound of
the Morning Prayer, the first of five daily prayer times, coming from the local mosque
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close by. Immediately afterwards, regular as clockwork, the jamu lady arrives on her
motor scooter to deliver one her herbal concoctions (jamu) to the Javanese lady next
door. The jamu lady is knowledgeable in Javanese healing traditions (Beers, 2001) and
supplies freshly prepared herbal mixtures to her regular customers, selecting those that
are appropriate to treat their ailments from her many bottles on the rack of her motor
scooter.
The townhouses are part of a larger residential area, whose diversity in class finds
tangible expression in the layout of the housing.The townhouses provide secure housing
in the city to wealthier families, as well as somemore affluent students, whose presence
reflects the proximity of the academic higher education institutions. The townhouse
area is not gated off; it is a busy thoroughfare for local people passing through the
neighbourhood. Despite this, it still feels somewhat like an island, surrounded by the
neighbouring kampong, where working class families live in brick bungalows, intersper-
sed with a few traditional Javanese houses constructed of intricately designed wooden
panels. A few owners of these bungalows have plans to add an upper floor, (revealed by
the concrete reinforcing rods sticking up out the roof), but most of these remain ‘under
construction’ for a long time.
Many people in the kampong find employment in the informal services sector. For
youngmenwithout education, the online service provider Gojek (Ford andHonan, 2017:
276), whose rapid expansion across Southeast Asia recalls the success of Uber, provi-
des access to unregulated and highly competitive employment. Little shops and service
agencies like laundries are also a common sight and in most cases are evidence of the
industriousness of the women of the house – every housewife in the kampong dreams of
running a small business.We take our clothes to one of the laundries to be washed.They
can be seen hanging out to dry on the streets of the kampong — where, on one special
day, they witness the marriage of our laundry woman. Next to the mosque and under
its charge are a kindergarten and a pesantren (Islamic boarding school), which cater for
the children of working class families in the kampong. The children of our townhouse
neighbours commute, like Jacob, to other schools further afield.
The cultivation of wild beauty
When opening my own locked gate to roll out the motor scooter in the morning, I meet
the Javanese lady Nani, who has already watered the street and her plants, enjoyed
her jamu drink and chatted with the jamu lady – all activities I unintentionally und
unconsciously witness through the street noises and interspersed with the sound of
her singing coming through the open windows. Later the day her pembantu (servant)
will sweep the street and hang up the washing in a quiet corner of the paved alley way.
When I was looking for somewhere to live, my first encounter with this pastoral sight
of fresh laundry hanging in the public space of the street was the decisive moment that
convinced me to opt for this particular neighbourhood. While the garden of our town
house turned out to be of concrete covered up with a thin layer of earth —we found
out when trying to plant bananas— our neighbour Nani’s front yard is covered in all
kinds of lush greenery. While almost all Javanese households —be they rich or poor,
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at the motorway or in the kampong— decorate their homes with potted plants, hers
are exceptional. She specialises in growing orchids, which she also sells and are held
in high regard. During the 10 months we spent in the neighbourhood, I could observe
her little front garden and the orchids hanging from wire trellises. During this period,
the ultimate status symbol of the middle class, the car, was sold —to finance a medical
emergency in the family—but therebymaking space in front of the house for a reception
area for the customers who came to buy these rare plants with their beautiful flowers,
as her business of trading in orchids expanded. Her husband used to work in Coca-
Cola bottling plant, but when we arrived had recently joined the fast expanding textile
industry in Yogyakarta as a clerk.
While a home garden of potted plants, if possible combined with a little pond, is
an essential part of the ideal Javanese home, it also reveals much about contempora-
ry human-nature relations. Nature is tamed (by being potted) and cared for. Women
and men alike tend the plants after long days in the office and keep them watered and
fertilised. Poor people recycle tins and pots to grow decorative plants around their ho-
mes.The orchids propagated andmeticulously cared for by Nani around her townhouse
originate from the forests of Kalimantan or Borneo. Traders deliver the plants to her
doorstep, the bounty of plant hunting expeditions undertaken in forests of Kaliman-
tan2, an hour’s flight away. These highly appreciated, aesthetic plants, each different
species requiring different humidity and handling to mimic its natural habitat, have
to be imported from one of the so-called Nusantara or outer islands. For a long time
Indonesia has been identified with Java by the independence movement, and especially
under Suharto. Java is considered the centre, and other islands the periphery. In this
vision, Yogyakarta functions as the cultural centre of Central Java. However, to main-
tain the performance and display of harmonious human-nature relations in the space
of the Javanese home, central items of appreciation must be imported from Kaliman-
tan. The beauty of rare and exotic orchids adds to the enjoyment of the person who
looks after them and enhances his or her status, as a visible display of harmonious re-
lations to nature at the front door. However, this phenomenon can be read as a sign of
crisis of societal relations to nature. The wilderness of Kalimantan and its presumed
rurality must be tamed and brought into the urbanity of the townhouse to re-enact the
balance between the individual, the community, nature and cosmos. This veneration
of adorable nature is made possible by a commodification of exotic flowers uprooted
from the wild to meet consumer demand from an affluent middle class, as a means
of mitigating their overwhelming material urbanity through possession of a culturally
appropriate and fashionable expression of rurality.
The different modes of employment of this husband and wife give an insight into
the contradictory drivers middle class families are dealing with. On the one hand, the
food-industry exemplified in Coca-Cola, the husband’s previous employer, is reshaping
eating habits and the provisioning of food, catering to a consumer society that enthu-
siastically embraces malls and convenience products. The textile industry, his current
employer, exemplifies the export sector, which since the Asian Crisis of 1997 has been
2 The Indonesian part of Borneo, the largest island in the Indonesian archipelago.
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seen as the key to achieving continuous economic growth and guaranteeing the econo-
mic well-being of consumers. On the other hand, the Javanese longing for a harmonious
relationship to nature and cosmos leads to the import of wild orchids from the outer
islands, while the island of Java suffers from vanishing forests, traffic congestion and
increased pollution.
Constructing and reconstructing life worlds of Nusantara
Putting on our helmets and, if it is pouring with rain, tent-like gold and silver ponchos,
we start our two-wheeler and drive to the end of our crisply paved alley to face the
bungalow of our landlord and landlady across the street. They bought our townhouse
to rent it out, and keep an eye on us, their tenants, on their regular walks to and from
the mosque. Ibu Mar is a retired secretary, who used to work for the accounting de-
partment of a mining company. Her husband is still employed and has a fly-in-fly-out
job as a technician at an open-cast lignite mine in Kalimantan. Two of their sons are
already settled in Jakarta, while their youngest son still lives with them at home. Like
women in the kampong, and my neighbour Nani, our industrious landlady Mar has her
own business, which she is eager to expand, selling premium ice-cream of a Singapo-
rean brand on the door step to passing school children (and exhausted working mums).
Using my down payment of the whole year’s rent for the house as is customary, busy
construction work started at their house soon after we moved in. Walls are being torn
down, doors moved, and the house remodelled to accommodate both the necessary car
and the expanding ice-cream business (although while we were there we always went
to the back door to get our cold lump of sweetened fat). During our stay, more of our
rent money and their time were invested in marrying off the last son, and laying on a
splendid reception attended by more than 1000 guests.
Facing our landlord’s house, we may either turn left or right. If we turn right, we
pass bungalows and small residential estates. The street is lined with trees and full of
animals: hens looking after their chicks, beautiful cocks showing off, cats moving ste-
althily about and occasionally a pure bred dog. Javanese ladies in informal batik dresses
with their hair uncovered feed the animals. Alongside well-kept gardens and fenced ve-
randas, some plots lie fallow, covered with dense undergrowth and wild banana trees.
Jacob calls these semi-wild areas ‘chicken forests’ as these animals can be seen dashing
in and out as we pass by, slowed down by the ‘sleeping policemen’ that cross the street.
Chicken are an important part of the local diet and kept for consumption of their flesh,
with chicken feet considered a special delicacy. Cocks are cherished as pets to be admi-
red or as fighting cocks.The fowl run in and out between the well-kept town houses and
the neighbouring chicken forest. These patches of semi-wild greenery help maintain a
pocket-sized social-ecological system that is a remnant of home gardens in rural areas
in times gone by. In addition to the poultry, young men like to keep racing pigeons or
songbirds, which are fed and catered for with utmost attention and presented at shows
and races at weekends. The young men can often be seen on motor scooters with the
birds in cloth-covered birdcages worn like rucksacks, a sight that encapsulates the love
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of nature in Javanese culture, as an aesthetic object to be tamed, cultivated and cared
for.
If we turn left, we go down a narrow street, lined by larger, multi storey houses,
interspersed with smaller, older dwellings. Here a bamboo pendopo hut has been erected
as accommodation for the communitymembers or paid guards who take turns to watch
over the neighbourhood at night. The pendopo is equipped with mats to sit on and chat,
and a kentongan slit drum made of wood to call for reinforcements in case of trouble.
Decorations and small personal items help turn it into a convivialmeeting place formale
members of the community. At present they are watching over the construction site of
a new mosque opposite. With three stories planned, the building is going to more than
the usual tiled prayer room, and a placard outside the building site proudly proclaims
the construction of rooms for meetings and classes. Financed by generous donations
from Saudi Arabia and local benefactors, this building under construction displays the
growing influence of wahhabi Islam in Indonesia. With its investments in educational
institutions, and orthodox interpretation of the Koran, wahhabi Islam challenges the
Javanese tradition of syncretism, in which Islam is combined with local beliefs as well as
Buddhist and Hinduist influences. As the density of mosques increases, affluent urban
women display their commitment to orthodox notions of Islam by wearing the hijab,
stockings and gloves. This is a break with tradition, since Javanese women used to go
uncovered, and often still do in the vicinity of their houses and home gardens.
Hot and coal, ice and cold
After the daily decision to either watch the animals or the progress on the construction
site, we re-enter the main street, which takes us meandering up the constant slope past
a brickyard. Under the roof of corrugated iron and palm leaves, men mix lorry loads
of finest volcano sand mined further up the slopes of Merapi with cement, moulding
bricks, gutters, grids and other products to meet demand from the booming construc-
tion industry. The sun hardens the products quickly and they are stacked up in piles,
fromwhere they are sold off as fast as they can bemade. Trucks deliver loads of volcanic
ash, mined from accumulations deposited higher up the mountain after the last major
eruption of Merapi in 2010 (Widiyantoro: 2018). This eruption killed the royal guardian
living on the slopes and altered the course of several rivers.Merapi is the constant source
of worry, but also provides airborne fertilisation. Throughout the year the volcano can
be seen puffing out ash, and this constant low-level activity is interrupted now and
again by lava bursts and minor earthquakes. The citizens of Yogyakarta deal with this
immanent danger and source of prosperity on their doorstep by mythologising human-
nature relationships and developing seismographic early warning systems. The never-
sleeping builders obtain concessions via dubious channels to harvest the volcanic sands
wherever they can be found, to feed the city’s insatiable hunger for housing and desire
for urbanity, which is best expressed in concrete. Corruption and tolerance of illegali-
ty leave the way clear for unregulated resource extraction, regardless of environmental
externalities, as nothing is allowed to stand in the way of urban development.
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After passing the brickyard, we have to stop at an intersection. While watching the
balletic antics of the self-employed traffic policeman and waiting for him to give us
way, we have ample time to study the billboards advertising the newly opened hard-
ware and appliance store. The store is trying to sell wall-mounted wash basins, under
the brand nameWASSER, to replace the traditional bak mandi, the deep square-section
bath which is used to store water for washing and as a reserve in case of shortages. We
turn left to leave the main road in front of the fenced entrance of a gated community,
the embodiment of ‘anti-kampung’ and one of thousands of secluded and serviced re-
sidential compounds for the affluent middle class springing up all over Indonesia, but
especially here on the fringes of the city.
Further up on our way to school, on the main road up the slopes of Merapi towards
the resort town of Kaliurang, we pass the fenced-off area of the large transformer stati-
on that converts the electrical energy supply to household voltage. The street alongside
this large industrial area contains none of the usual small shops or warungs offering a
cup of strong Javanese coffee, and even the mobile fruit vendors seem to avoid the area.
People in cars and on scooters accelerate past the area and rush by as if nothing is to
be seen or done.The transformer station is a giant that is vastly visible, but at the same
time unseen and cut off from the organic urban fabric of the city. Unnoticed, it car-
ries out its vital work of providing the city with the constant supply of electricity that
residents expect and now take for granted, enabling fast internet connections, street
lighting, ice boxes, air conditioning and the increasingly popular online services from
banking to food ordering.
The transformer is the last stage in the process that converts lignite extracted from
the far away forests of Kalimantan into energy in the form of electricity.The huge open-
cast mines operating in Kalimantan (Großmann, Padmanabhan and Afiff, 2017) extract
vast amounts of low-grade brown coal, not only to supply the energy needed to meet
the Indonesian state’s ambitious economic growth targets, but also to sell to the equally
voracious economies in India and China.The goal of development defined as economic
growth overrides concerns about the effects of fossil energy on climate change. These
concerns are still rather intangible, though increasingly perceivable in changing wea-
ther patterns. In Kalimantan though, the environmental impacts of deforestation, the
large scale removal of the earth’s surface, and the noise and dust caused by transporta-
tion of vast quantities of lignite are all too apparent (Langston, 2019). Massive amounts
of groundwater have to be pumped out of the deep holes, changing the hydrology over
an area much larger than the mine itself. Runoffs from the mining process contaminate
drinking water supplies. Indigenous Dayak groups on the island are fighting for their
property rights, asserting their ancestral land tenure rights (adat) against the state’s
claim to own the land as the successor to the colonial government (Großmann, 2019).
At these far away frontiers, hidden from the eyes of travellers, a vastly different con-
ception of human-nature relations and manifestation of rurality makes possible the
performances of energy-hungry urbanity. City dwellers can turn on their electrical ap-
pliances without having to experience the environmental pollution or witness children
drowning in the abandoned mines (Maimunah, 2019).
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Consumerism and change at the urban-rural frontier
Where at the beginning of our stay was a fruit vendor and juice shop is now a mobi-
le phone dealer. We enter Jalan Damai, a street that follows the contours of Merapi, a
dominant presence although still 20 km away. The street is densely packed with urban
eateries that even extend into the side lanes. Alcohol consumption is rare, replaced by
conspicuous consumption of strong coffee and heavy smoking as markers of masculini-
ty. Urban hipsters, most often than not tattooed, frequent the currently most fashion-
able restaurants. Culinary styles, ranging from Japanese and Korean to the posh coffee
parlours, change fast as restaurants open, close, and reopen. Like the food, the interior
decoration is constantly renewed and remodelled to provide new stylish locations for
Instagram-likable selfies. Cafes decorated with nostalgic phones with rotary dials offer
free Wi-Fi to cosmopolitan professionals and aspirational students, who can travel the
world with no more than a smartphone and some discrete culinary adventures. Passing
through these enactments of urbanity, we finally turn into a small lane.
To the left, a single row of two-storey houses is guarded by a lonely watchman in
full attire; to the right an abandoned open-air restaurant. Both have seen better days.
Leaving the constant stream of vehicles and scooters behind, bumping over the speed
breaker, we slow down. In the distance, we can already spot the school building. This
is the moment when Jacob leans forward, closely watching as the houses pass us by,
giving way to fields. Counting down metre by metre, he exclaims: Now…now…we are
entering the countryside! In his perception, the imagined border between houses and
field clearly marks the frontier between the urban and the rural. Daily this scene is re-
enacted and, as we pass fields and tree nurseries, we witness the changing seasons on
the fields. What started as a paddy field, with farmers planting the bright green rice
seedlings, will later turn into a cornfield.The men and women working the land usually
arrive by foot or on top of old-fashioned bicycles, wearing the conical hats as protection
against the sun, in sharp contrast to the bare-headed drivers dropping off children from
air-conditioned cars.
Jabob’s private international school caters to cosmopolitan Indonesians, mixed
Indonesian-Western families, a Korean diaspora in the furniture industry, and the
occasional academic like myself. It capitalises on the scenery provided and produced
by the pocket of rurality in which it is located. The birds, the air and the scents of
the nearby fields enter the open schoolyard and add to the feeling of carefully curated
well-being. Adjacent to the field, where we watch the agricultural cycle unfold during
the year, and opposite to the parking lot, a warung with the telling name kampong
Java is sitting. The kiosk serves Javanese food, which is not to be found in any of the
posh places along the main road, and only locally produced drinks. Constructed by
reassembling the wooden panels of traditional houses, and furnished with wooden
Javanese furniture, the warung is a conspicuous display of Javanese rurality that is
intended to contrast with the surrounding areas of urbanity. In the back garden,
decoratively arranged wooden pendopo provide attractive settings for rendezvous and
Instagram shots. The staging of rurality, using accessories of village life as props,
turns the rural into folklore and, as such, a component of the urban social fabric. The
backdrop is provided by sight of people engaged in manual labour on the land, and the
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planting and harvesting of the food crops, signifiers of a remaining pocket of rurality
within the vast urban sprawl.
Farewell
When it was time to take leave and return to Lower Bavaria, I wanted to recommendmy
pembantu,Mbak S., to a family living close to school. Before we left,Mbak S., who always
arrived by bicycle, sometimes with her son or one of her daughters, wanted to invite
us to her house. One Sunday, we followed her, walking in hitherto unknown direction.
After a long walk, we took seats at a terrace in the kampong and she offered us fruits
and drinks. Only after a while, I realized this was not her house; hers was the makeshift
hut in the backyard, where she lived in one tiny room with her family. The place where
we were sitting was for her use by courtesy of her neighbour. She told me that the
household close to the school where I had thought she might be able to work was too
far away for her to travel to every day. The urban poor enable urbanity in townhouses,
but are restricted by mobility to rural patterns of life despite deruralisation.
The frontier between the urban and the rural in Yogyakarta is demarcated more
or less clearly by the situatedness of actors, the configuration of the landscape and
the re(enactment) of place-specific human-nature relations. When riding through Yo-
gyakarta on our motor scooter, we experienced physical space defined through spatial
practice. We encountered imagined concepts, expressing the social dimension of the
urban life world, manifested as spaces of representation (Elden, 2002: 30). We unders-
tood how ‘doing nature’ in urban zones also takes place, unseen, in rural zones, in a
process of connection and disconnection, as ordinary plants and animals from far away
sites acquire new symbolic meanings in the content of urbanity.The life-worldly rurali-
ty of planting a field acquires a new meaning, beyond the simple production of food, as
counterpoint to the urban fabric, in the context of all-encompassing urbanity. Everyone
in Yogyakarta participates in the daily enactment — visible and invisible, imagined and
performed — of human-nature relations. ‘Doing gender’ intersects with class, religion
and age and plays out differently in each setting. Women and men navigate the various
and sometimes mutually exclusive enactments of feminity and masculinity according
to the stratified norms of Javanese society, in which one can still catch glimpses of the
court culture of years gone by. But just as the mandala state faded into history, today
the spheres of cultural influence of the Sultan are shrinking further – though he is go-
vernor for life with executive power – as Indonesia embraces modernity. Doing rurality
and doing urbanity in the contemporary setting of Yogyakarta is manifested, spatial-
ly, in some areas as a more or less painful transformation and in others as ignorant
coexistence. Through the two dialectic lens of a Lefebvrian perspective on space and a
social-ecological critique of societal relations to nature, the road trip through the frin-
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Sociology of development:
sociology, development studies or already dead?
Dieter Neubert (Bayreuth)
Abstract
The term ‘sociology of development’ refers to the existence of a more or less clearly
defined sociological sub-discipline which emerged in the 1950s and 1960s.The sociology
of development increasingly became a part of the interdisciplinary field of development
studies, which for a long time was caught up in the debate on the ‘grand theories’ of
modernisation and dependency. Exhausted by this theoretical debate which did not
reach a conclusion, sociologists working on the Global South re-invented the sociology
of development in the 1980s with an ‘empirical turn’. However, the discussion on post-
development started at the same time, and this critical viewwas later supported by post-
colonialism. Sociologists working on the Global South participated in all these debates
and quite a few became outspoken critics of the development concept, while others still
carry the flag of sociology of development against all odds. This leads to the question
whether the sociology of development still exists as a sub-discipline, or whether there
are just a few institutional artefacts left, such as sections in sociological associations,
which provide a playground for elderly scholars who still live and work in yesterday’s
world.
Introduction
Social change and modernity are crucial topics of sociological classics. Especially the
works of Durkheim and Weber focus on processes of modernisation with a wide-angle
perspective that includes pre-modern societies. They develop their theories to analyse
the change from pre-modern to modern societies. In their books they refer to available
knowledge on societies in all parts of the world, and include historical and socio-an-
thropological findings. However, this openness and inclusiveness lost importance, and
during the further development of sociology the core topic of the discipline became the
modern societies of Europe, and later also of North America. Sociology is often unders-
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tood, or least practised, as the study of modern industrialised societies, with a focus on
the North Atlantic. This includes processes of change related to industrialisation and
the change to post-industrial societies.
When sociology became more diversified after World War II, one of the new sub-
disciplines that emerged was the sociology of development. It gained importance from
the 1960s onward, and brought together researchers interested in social change in the
developing countries, the then popular term for the Global South. Sociological associa-
tions founded sections or research committees for development sociology, and since
then it has been part and parcel of sociology. In contrast to most other sub-disciplines,
the core topic of these sections or research committees, development, is now under
scrutiny. It is questioned whether the development of the Global South is still an ade-
quate field of research, because the whole concept of development is at stake, and the
sociology of development is criticised as a typical example of the arrogance of theories
from the North that ignore views from the South.1
The question is whether there is still something like development sociology, or whe-
ther there are just a few sociologists doing development studies while development
sociology is already dead, and only formally alive because nobody has yet decided to
dissolve the more or less useless sections or research committees in sociological asso-
ciations. To answer this question, we will give a short overview of the history of the
sociology of development, review the post-development concept and the critique of the
term development and the consequences of this critical debate, and discuss the post-
colonial critique. Against this background, we can re-visit the role of the sociology of
development and the label ‘sociology of development’ in the light of the new concept of
‘Global Sociology’.
I am well aware that such an enterprise is much too big to be discussed in detail in
a short article; this chapter is also written with a certain German and African Studies
bias. To develop my argument I have chosen the format of an essay. I will shorten and
simplify the different positions presented here and refrain from a detailed analysis of
the literature.2 I know that this will trigger criticism but this will not determe, especially
if it leads to a general discussion of the role of development sociology.
The history of sociology of development
When the sociology of development emerged in the 1960s, it was closely connected to
the newly emerging interest in the societies of the Global South and their ‘development’.
The notion of development was first politically expressed in the famous speech by the
1 It is remarkable that despite the existence of research committees or sections in sociological as-
sociations, there is no article on “development sociology” in the English version of Wikipedia. The
articles in the French and German versions are very short compared to other contributions related
to sociology. Despite the contested reliability of Wikipedia articles, this is an indicator that socio-
logy of development is not part of the current field of popular and scholarly knowledge that is of
wider interest.
2 I will draw on earlier overviews by Neubert (2003), Schrader (2010) and Dannecker (2013) that
include also further references.
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American president Truman when he proclaimed the need for a “bold new program for
making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas” (Truman, 1949). At that time, the
sociology of development was more or less closely linked to the then dominant theo-
ries of modernisation (e.g. Inkeles and Smith, 1974; Rostow, 1971; Smelser, 1973) and
to debates on development policy. The first publications and edited volumes included
contributions by sociologists from different sub-disciplines. However, step by step, the
sociology of development became a new field of research and sociologists interested
in the field started to work on theories of development and on different areas in the
Global South. Topics of interest were processes of modernisation of society, questions
of political change, urbanisation, changes of economy with regard to agriculture and
industrialisation, new forms of association (especially trade unions), changes in family
life, and a debate on the new elites, to name just a few of themost important themes.The
theoretical debate intensifiedwhenmodernisation theory was contested by dependency
theory. Dependency theory, as developed by Latin American economists (Prebisch, 1962;
Singer, 1949), was soon adopted in the social sciences, and in sociology of development
in particular (e.g. Amin, 1976; Arrighi and Saul, 1973). The main point was a critique
of international capitalism, with reference to theories of imperialism, class analysis,
analysis of expropriation of the ‘Third World’, and analysis of the development of ‘un-
der-development’ (Frank, 1966) or of the ‘modern world system’ (Wallerstein, 1974, 1980,
1989). For more than a decade, the sociology of development engaged in the debate on
grand theories.
Both camps, modernisation and dependency theorists, based their position chief-
ly on theoretical contributions, with some statistical data and general observations to
illustrate their main arguments. Modernisation theory was still quite close to develop-
ment policy, and they often combined their findings with recommendations for policy
programmes. Dependency theory led to different conclusions, like a claim for radical
policy changes under the heading of ‘self-reliance’: development should be based on ca-
pabilities, with dissociation from the worldmarket and its capitalist expropriation.This
goes together with a more socialist understanding of development, sometimes with a
particular twist, as in the case of Julius Nyerere’s “African socialism”. In this theoretical
and programmatic debate, there were only a few studies that were based on detailed
empirical research. However, even when the findings contradicted the theoretical ap-
proach, authors often tried to stretch the theory to accommodate their contradictory
findings (e.g. Leys, 1975).
These competing theoretical approaches shared an important commonality. Their
notion of development was closely linked to economic development and industriali-
sation. This included the question of inequality in the countries of the Global South,
but with different answers. Conventional development policy based on modernisation
theory hoped for a ‘trickling down’ of wealth. Dependency theory was often linked to
socialist models of economy and society.
In the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, sociology of development was close-
ly connected with new interdisciplinary fields, area studies and development studies,
which contributed to development policy.The dominant theoretical debate on the grand
theories (modernisation vs. dependency) did not reach a conclusion, and leftmore ques-
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tions open than it solved. Especially the camp of Marxist dependency theory became
more and more differentiated, with new grand theories like Wallerstein’s world system
approach, and became engaged in internal conflicts (Foster-Carter, 1978). In the end, the
theoretical debate led to a stalemate (Menzel, 1992) and many protagonists lost interest
in carrying on. While some sociologists completely lost interest in the Global South,
others made an empirical turn (Neubert, 2001). Empirical findings, often based on field
studies, were seen as the starting point for a more nuanced analysis not influenced
by theoretical assumptions. This led at the same time to a re-invention of sociology of
development with a clear sociological perspective in contrast to the still vivid field of
development studies. As a consequence of the empirical turn with its interest in field
studies, sociology of development moved closer to social anthropology. Some scholars
became interested in the transition of the former socialist bloc, and joined political sci-
entists in transition research. As in the sociology of development, these studies were
also based on empirical data, and widened the regional perspective of the sub-disci-
pline. Against this background, the sociology of development was re-established with
three main components:
Sociology of countries of the Global South and the former socialist bloc with close links to
area studies. New topics of research included ethnicity, democratisation, civil socie-
ty, conflict studies, gender, urban sociology, business activities, local knowledge, land
grabbing, and globalisation. In the case of transitional countries, topics such as the
introduction of a market economy or changes in labour relations attracted interest. So-
ciological area specialists often worked on several of these topics. Compared to other
sociological sub-disciplines, development sociologists still had a sociological genera-
list’s view of society. This was not intentional but a consequence of the limited num-
ber of sociologists working on the Global South (including researchers from the Global
South).
Sociology of development policy as a new field in development studies. It focused on the
development industry with the different aid organisations and administrative struc-
tures from a critical perspective.
Sociology of processes of development and change. Researchers in this field were, and still
are, interested in processes of change, but aremore open to empirical findings.The new
point of orientation was the notion of globalisation. This included an interest in global
and transnational processes, but also a view from below, with an interest in agency in
the context of globalisation.
All three components of the sociology of development re-connected in different
ways to general sociological debates in diverse sub-disciplines. At least in some ca-
ses, findings, concepts and middle-range theories from the sociology of development
also reached the general sociological debate. Examples are the concept of ethnicity or
the notion of ‘glocalisation’ (Robertson, 1995). At the same time, the level of interest in
more general sociological theories was relatively low in the sociology of development.
Interestingly, the more recent debates on reflexive modernity or multiple modernity
developed separately from development sociology. Even when the term ‘multiple mo-
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dernity’ (Eisenstadt, 2000) attracted some interest among scholars in the sociology of
development, it did not trigger a wider theoretical debate.3
Post-development and the critique of the development concept
Like the critique ofmodernisation theory, amore radical reaction to the debate on grand
theories came from Latin American scholars (often teaching in the US). It started with
Escobar (1995, 2010) and others followed (e.g. Esteva et al., 2013; for an overview, see
Ziai, 2004, 2010). They pointed to the second common feature of the grand theories:
the economic notion of development as industrialisation. They doubted that this un-
derstanding could be transferred and applied all over the world. They underlined the
fact that this notion of development is an invention of the Global North, made directly
after the Second World War following the Truman speech. According to the post-deve-
lopment critics, the dream of world-wide improvement of living conditions became a
nightmare. In the end, the alternatives to the original modernisation theories, such as
dependency theory, were bound to the notion of development according to a Western
understanding. According to this view, the biggest part of the world is not developed,
or under-developed, and needs to be helped to follow the Western path of develop-
ment. The seemingly self-evident notion that ‘development’ is similar to ‘progress’ sets
the path to be followed in all parts of the world. The consequence is that the world is
divided into ‘developed’ and ‘developing countries’. The latter are deficient, weak and
in need of support. Against this background, the development industry promises a so-
lution for a problem that has been invented by the development industry itself. People
who were able for ages to care for themselves are now marked as poor, needy and even
helpless. At the same time, their control over their resources is contested by capitalist
development measures that interfere with established communal ways of controlling
and using resources. Even in those cases where development aid is based on well-mea-
ning intentions and benevolence, the ‘target groups’ are reduced to their assumed needs
and presented as reliant on help and support. This is obvious in the debate on ‘Third
World Women’ who are characterised as victims of oppression (Spivak, 1999). This links
the post-development debate to the post-colonial debate. People in the Global South
appear in these debates as passive and are mainly described via deficits that are a con-
sequence of the assessment of their living conditions against the benchmark ofWestern
development.
The post-development critique underlines that the Global South cannot be seen as
a reservoir of tradition and backward thinking, as assumed by modernisation theories,
and often in development policy. People and societies in the Global South are dynamic
and they create social movements that express their local aims in respect of change.
Often this includes a critique of capitalism,most obvious in cases of ‘land grabbing’, and
in the replacement of subsistence and smallholder production by capitalist agriculture
and inclusion in the capitalist world market. All in all, post-development theory de-
constructs the notion of development andmarks a clear distinction fromWestern ideas
3 One of the few exceptions is Korff (2016).
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of knowledge creation.This is combined with a plea to respect and use local knowledge,
and local aims in respect of change. This goes far beyond the idea of self-reliance and
socialist concepts of development (such as African socialism), because they are linked
to Western patterns of industrialisation.
Themost popular protagonists of the post-development concept still come from La-
tin America, but they are supported by Indian scholars (Rahnema and Bawtree, 1997).
This offers a link to the post-colonial debate that originated from Indian cultural stu-
dies scholars which will be discussed later. Post-development is not a closed theoretical
approach, but the common ground for a radical critique of theWestern notion of indus-
trial development and of the development industry. It involves the more or less vague
notion that social movements in the Global South express the local understanding of a
good life (Escobar, 2007). The reference to local knowledge and local notions of change
relate very well to the environmental and ecological critique of development, debated
inside development studies and in the North in general.
Together with more conventional critical studies of the development industry with
its international and national organisations, the scepticism in respect of the notion of
development has gained more and more support from social movements in the North
that criticise globalisation and the world wide domination of capitalism. These mo-
vements are still active (e.g. Attac, Occupy) (Daniel in print; Graeber, 2012; Walk and
Boehme, 2002)). Once the post-development critique gained the attention of the wider
public, at the latest in the 2000s, ‘development’ became a non-word. From this critical
perspective, development was, and still is, more or less identified with modernisation
or naïve industrialisation, an expression of Western hubris and colonial arrogance. It
is seen simply as an out-of-date concept.
Consequences of the post-development critique
The loss of interest in ‘development’ is only partly a result of post-development cri-
tique. In the early years of the sociology of development, there was a certain optimism
that scholarship could contribute solutions for development. Typical basic problems
and challenges to development were widely described and analysed. At the same time,
the high expectations in respect of development policy were disappointed, and there
was a growing awareness that there are no simple solutions. Development is not just
a technical challenge, and processes of change are intertwined with policy processes
and international economic processes. The grand theories proved inadequate for exp-
laining or understanding processes of change in a single comprehensive framework.
Thus, questions of development policy were seen as a matter for political analysts but
not as a topic for systematic sociological research.The notion of development attracted
less scholarly interest and to some sociologists it seemed outdated. Research on the
transition of the former socialist bloc also lost its attraction. New topics gained impor-
tance, especially globalisation. Today, sociologists who are still interested in the Global
South, or transitional countries, use their knowledge of particular areas and countries
and adopt the perspective of other sub-disciplines, such as political sociology, urban
sociology, social structure and others.
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In the realm of development policy, however, the notion of development is hardly
questioned. Despite growing scepticism in the scholarly discussion, the concept is still
used and accepted as a label in development studies. This is not just a consequence
of ignorance in respect of the scholarly debate. In the countries of the Global South,
in policy and in everyday life, the notion of development is omnipresent. If the local
perspective is relevant, then development is still an issue in the empirical field.Themain
critique of post-development comes from development studies which miss alternatives
provided by the post-development concept. The reference to social movements in post-
development theory sounds fine. But what is the particular consequence? Development
studies also promotes and studies participative approaches (Hickey and Mohan, 2004;
Mikkelsen, 2005; Neef, Friederichsen and Neubert, 2008).These authors show that local
communities do not all work together for the same purpose, but are often engaged in
conflicts, some supporting radical change while others oppose any alteration of the
status quo. Discussions of social movements ignore these conflicts. The questions are
whose voices are expressed, who decides at the local level? Post-development theory has
had the effect that local concepts are at least considered as alternatives for development.
The most well-known ‘local’ concept is ‘buen vivir’ (living a good life), originating
from post-development studies in Latin America. ‘Buen vivir’ represents an alternative
to the ‘foreign’ concept of development. It defines a good and desirable life according to
a local perspective not dominated by the development system. It includes material well-
being (food, housing, health), and culturally specific ideas of community, with access to
resources for subsistence and smallholder production. The notion of living in harmony
with nature, and thus an element of ecology and sustainability, is also important. It
promotes a society based on solidarity with strong local communities and participation
in the economy and in politics for a group that is usually marked as ‘the poor’. It expres-
ses the goals of social movements, and influences political decisions, especially in the
Andean states of Latin America (Caria and Domínguez, 2016; Gudynas, 2011; Vanhulst
and Beling, 2014).
Sometimes, other concepts are also presented as local alternatives, such as the South
African ‘Ubuntu’. However, ‘Ubuntu’ is less elaborated; it is a political catchword rather
than a strategy (Matthews, 2018). A deeper look into ‘buen vivir’ shows that there are
similarities in the concepts of basic needs or secure livelihoods, both part of the more
recent development policy debate. At least for poor people, the improvements aimed at
are similar to classical development ideas. Even the strategies for change on communi-
ty level resemble the strategies of development policy, especially the above-mentioned
participatory approaches. However, they do not solve the questions of how to regulate
conflicts over local priorities and aims, how to protect minorities, or how to deal with
micro-nationalism or notions of village autochthony. At the level of practice, ‘buen vivir’
and other concepts are caught in a trap where that any change or non-change is linked
to crucial political decisions and power questions: who decides for whom, and whose
interests are pursued? Thus, the dilemmas of development policy and practice are also
significant in respect of alternatives to development.
We should not overemphasise the similarities between development policy and
post-development ideas. In development policy, we find a wide range of political aims,
from a radical liberal capitalist market approach to ideas of local participation and
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goals of equality. In post-development, the radical critique of liberal globalised capita-
lism is a common ground. Thus, post-development still challenges the mainstream of
economic development policy.
The post-colonial critique
The post-colonial critique is the other pronounced and radical opposition to conventio-
nal social science and thus also to the sociology of development.The origins of post-co-
lonial critique are as old as post-development theory. However, it reached sociology and
the sociology of development much later. One reason for this is that the post-colonial
critique was first articulated by Indian literature scholars.The starting point is that the
cradle of Eurocentric science is enlightenment and modernity, both of which were de-
eply linked to colonialisms and colonial thinking (Mohanty, 1988; Spivak, 1999). Claims
of the universalism of science ignore its Western roots. Western notions of moderni-
ty are imposed on the whole world. According to post-colonial thinking, this amounts
to ignoring particular contexts and local perspectives. There are obviously similarities
to post-development here, but post-colonialism is a fundamental critique of science in
general. This concerns not only the view from the North that is taken as ‘the’ only view,
but also the dominance of Northern scholars and Northern scholarly institutions which
patronise the debate. Gender studies was one of the first fields in social science to take
up the post-colonial critique. Sociology in general reacted much later. One important
example is the book by Gurminder Bhambra (Bhambra, 2007) which triggered a wider
debate in sociology on post-colonial ideas.This includes another element of critique that
refers to the entanglement of North and South. The histories and the ‘development’ of
the North are closely linked to colonialism. Bhambra also criticises Eisenstadt’s widely
discussed thesis of multiple modernities, usually understood as the critique of a sim-
plifying notion of modernisation according to the Western model. She underlines that
the notion of multiple modernities still ignores the colonial enforced relationships.This
points at the entangled histories of North and South as part of colonisation (Randeria,
2006).
The post-colonial critique has also reached the sociology of development, and led
to a similar rejection of a separate analysis of the Global South. Inequality needs to be
analysed from a global perspective (Boatcǎ, 2015). From a post-colonial perspective, the
sociology of development is just a henchman of the normative hegemony of the political
and economic interests of the North and the continuation of colonial ethnocentrism. At
first sight, this links with dependency theory. But dependency theory is based on a kind
of container model of separate societal entities and fails to challenge the basic Western
idea of modernity, including industrialisation.
The first conclusion to be drawn from the post-colonial critique is that there is a
need to provincialise Europe (Chakrabarty, 2000), or rather the North Atlantic with
North America and Europe, as the dominating empirical fields that fuel sociological
research and understanding. Another conclusion is that theories must be developed in
the South detached from Northern scholarly thinking (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2012).
Whether this is possible, and what kind of theories might be developed in the South, is
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still an open question. If we think this to the end, it would lead to scholarly theories that
are always linked to particular contexts.This means a consistent plea for relativism.The
post-colonial debate points in a more radical way than the post-development debate to
shortcomings in theory and in epistemology in general. Questions of social change are
not in the focus of the debate. However, both post-development and post-colonialism
require a new way of thinking. Even for those who do not accept the post-colonial con-
clusions, it would be too simple to ignore the critique completely. It reminds us that a
simple one-to-one transfer to other contexts of categories and theories developed for
particular cases in Europe or North America will inevitably lead to shortcomings and
simplifications and misunderstandings. The question is, what is the consequence for
sociology? The relativist position would mean the end of comparative study and thin-
king, and even studies reaching beyond one context might be impossible. Obviously,
the larger part of sociology does not follow this path.
Re-visiting the ‘sociology of development’
Development studies as an interdisciplinary field of research is still stable, either via
inclusion in development policy or as a critical view on development policy. But socio-
logy is no longer prominent in these debates. This part of the sociology of development
seems to be dormant.
Both critiques – post-development and post-colonial – are directly relevant to the
sociology of development, because it is closely linked to the notion of development,
while the theories and concepts it uses come from the North and have been applied to
the Global South (or to transitional countries). Together with the more or less accepted
end of the grand theories, and disappointment with regard to development policy, the
notion of development has lost its attraction for scholars. Even though some topics
from the sociology of development have been taken up in various other sociological sub-
disciplines, the sociology of development in its former shape is hardly visible anymore.
The sections or research committees still exist, but development topics are no longer at
the centre of their work. Somemay even ask,what is the raison d’être of these committees
or sections? The topics discussed there could be discussed by other committees and
sections, where research on countries of the Global South or transitional countries is
now also considered.The sections and research committees devoted to the sociology of
development may be seen as institutional artefacts used for different purposes. They
are also a field of experimentation, with topics relating to societies in the Global South,
or particular topics from other sociological sub-disciplines. It seems that mainly older
scholars push the topic of development. Does the sociology of development represent a
former world that ignores current scholarly debates? If so, is this a problem?
At least one development in sociology may be seen as a success and not as problem.
The Global South is now increasingly included in general sociological thinking. Sociolo-
gy no longer focuses exclusively on the industrialised or post-industrial countries of the
Global North. Seen from afar, this situation is comparable to the 1950s and 1960s when
the Global South was a topic for general sociology.This is still true today with reference
to the limited interest in the Global South as a topic in the different sociological sub-
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disciplines.The difference is that today there is much greater in-depth empirical know-
ledge of countries counted as belonging to the Global South, including awareness of the
post-colonial critique with regard to entanglements under the conditions of former co-
lonialism, globalisation and transnational relations. Despite the critique of Eurocentric
sociological concepts, the debate on the transferability or the development of such con-
cepts has just started.
In the understanding of radical post-colonial thinkers, general theories that reach
beyond a particular context are impossible. Another option, especially in sociology, is
a new sensitivity to the transfer of concepts, and the development of concepts that can
be adapted to fit various contexts.This could be the starting point for a global sociology
based on the classics (Weber, Durkheim), with one important difference: awareness of
colonialism and a fundamental scepticism towards modernisation as the teleological
goal of development.
There are already examples of this understanding. It started with gender studies
that integrated from the beginning studies from the Global South and the Global North.
The discussion in development sociology started already in the 1970 (Boserup 1970; for
more recent developments see Dannecker 2010). In science and technology studies ba-
sed on actor-network theory, the Global South is a field of research, as at least some
studies on Africa show which refer to the translation of concepts or travelling models
(Behrends et al. 2014; Czarniawska and Sevón 1996). Another field where sociology has
developed an interest beyond the Global North is neo-institutionalism with its concept
of a ‘world society’ or ‘world polity’ (Drori et al., 2003; Meyer et al., 1997). This approach
argues that the seemingly universal socio-political structures do not dominate simply
because of their functionality, but are linked to patterns of international legitimacy set
by the countries of the Global North. The concept of ‘de-coupling’ helps to understand
and conceptualise the still existing wide variety of day-to- day political practices (e.g.
Helbardt, Hellmann-Rajanayagam and Korff, 2012). From a similar perspective, actor-
centred institutionalism builds a bridge between studies of settings in the Global North
(Scharpf, 1997) and settings in the Global South (Long, 2001). Both debates link very well
with the (former) sociology of development policy and critical analysis of development
projects and programmes (Elwert and Bierschenk, 1988; Sabbi, 2017). Another example
is the current middle class debate triggered by economists that is being critically re-
flected on by sociologists and anthropologists in the Global South (Daniel et al., 2016;
Darbon and Toulabor, 2014; Kroeker et al., 2018; Melber, 2016; Wieman, 2015). This cri-
tical re-assessment of the transfer of class concepts to the Global South may lead to a
more nuanced understanding of the analysis of social structure in general.
All these approaches have at least one commonality: they link theoretical thinking
with empirical findings from the South and try to widen the perspective of sociology
in general. As a consequence of the post-colonial critique, the question of post-post-
colonial scholarship and science turns up in literature studies (O’Connor, 2003) or in
education (Luke, 2005). The post-postcolonial claim refers to the post-colonial critique
but does not give up theorising and searches for ways to develop categories that face the
challenge of contextuality and try to overcome the limitations of Eurocentrism. These
changes may build a bridge to a new term currently being discussed in sociology: ‘global
sociology’. One element of this is the idea that sociology needs to consider the global
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entanglement of social processes and thus focus on global problems, global structures
and global changes (Cohen and Kennedy, 2012). This global sociology goes beyond the
criticism of globalisation and lays the foundation for sociological research that does
not only refer to one quarter of the world (the Global North or the North Atlantic) but
includes the larger part of our world which is changing even more dynamically. This
widened perspective overcomes the simplifying division into Global North and Glo-
bal South, which always has an undertone of modern, developed, industrialised, post-
industrialised versus less modern, less developed, less industrialised or not yet post-
industrialised. There is no doubt that we need a global and inclusive perspective, but
we still need to solve the problem of developing adequate categories and concepts that
can be applied in radically differing local contexts. To tackle this challenge, we need a
newmethodology, we need to develop and adapt concepts created for the Global North,
so that they are capable of analysing the empirical variety we are facing. This will be
an important task in the future: creating a sociology that combines a global and a local
perspective at the same time.
One possibility is to take seriously the old distinction between etic and emic con-
cepts (Pike 1967). Pike presents different ways to describe behaviour.Oneway is to follow
the perspective of the respective context and culture and to use the terms and points
of view of members of that culture. His model here is phonemics, or analysis of the
meaningful sounds in a particular language. This is the ‘emic’ (phonemic) perspective.
The other – opposite – way is an abstract description from outside that claims univer-
sal validity across different cultures. His model here is phonetics, a system that can be
used to describe the sounds of all human languages.This is the ‘etic’ (phonetic) perspec-
tive. Berry, a comparative psychologist, uses this distinction and shows how to develop
etic concepts via a multistage process (Berry, 1969). Concepts developed in a particular
context tend to represent emic views. To come to an etic view, these concepts need to
be confronted with different contexts. We may add that they also need to be confron-
ted with open or hidden hegemonial claims and power differences. To include these
findings, the concepts need to be revised, extended and re-formulated in a more abs-
tract way to include different views. With the inclusion of more and more different
contexts, including power differences, this leads to a ‘derived etic concept’ that relates
to real empirical findings and is applicable and useful in different contexts. If we take
this as model, the question is not so much whether we theorise from the South or from
the North, but how we develop our concepts and theories across different parts of the
world.This also applies to transnational and global entanglements, because they operate
in different ways in different parts of the world. This transnational and global dimen-
sion is another contribution to considering rationality as an important element that
constitutes our reality. In the framework of this kind of global sociology, the former
development sociologists with their particular knowledge of areas outside the Global
North are no longer representatives of a sub-discipline, but sociologists with different
kinds of empirical knowledge.
However, the critique of the dominance of Northern scholars, and even more of
Northern research institutions, still holds true. Even when sociology involves colleagues
from the Global South (whatever definition we apply), this does not guarantee an equal
footing, because more often than not the funds for joint research come from the Global
36 Dieter Neubert
North. When scholars from the South and Southern institutions have the same oppor-
tunities as those from the Global North, this will be a big step forward.This wouldmean
that Southern scholars and research institutions would be able to carry out studies of
contexts in the North. However, we should not overstretch this idea. Inequality as part
of our globalised world will not be overcome by better organisation of research, mo-
re resources for Southern institutions or scholars, and new epistemological concepts.
We may improve our methods of analysis, but this will not change real inequalities.
Finally, we need to be aware that in sociology the interest in empirical data collected in
the Global South, and the willingness to question established concepts based on new
empirical findings, is still limited. This kind of ‘global sociology’ is a goal, or a research
programme, rather than an established reality.
Let us assume this global sociology really exists: is this the end of development
sociology? Yes and no! ‘Yes’, because all empirical studies by development sociologists
would fuel this wide concept of global sociology. The particular field of sociology of the
Global South would no longer exist if all parts of the world were included in sociological
debates. All sociologists would be ‘area specialists’, whether for Europe, North America,
Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Africa, South America, or different countries, such as the
USA, Canada, Russia, Germany, Kenya, Burkina Faso, Chile, Mexico, Syria, Iran, India,
China, Bhutan, Indonesia, etc. All places of research would be provincialised, while at
same time being globally entangled. Sociology will then acknowledge that all sociologi-
cal knowledge is contextualised and that extra steps are needed to derive etic concepts
and insights. Sociologists working on the (former) Global South would participate in
particular sociological discussions in the respective sub-disciplines. A side effect would
be that with the end of the sociology of development, those sociological generalists who
work on a variety of topics across sociological sub-disciplines, still to be found in the
sociology of development, would no longer exist.This is something one may regret, but
it simply reflects the differentiation of sociology.
There is also the answer ‘no’ as a reaction to the question of the end of the sociolo-
gy of development. Development as a societal issue is still at stake in many countries
of the Global South. Critique of the concept should not lead to ignoring this part of
public debates and real policies. The sociology of development policy and the develop-
ment industry is still a sociological topic. This includes accepting the normative load of
the concept of development and the discussion and analysis of the different aspirations
and notions of development. In a more general way, development is still linked with
the question of social change and the question of modernity, following not the simple
understanding of modernisation, but the idea of reflexive modernity in the sense pro-
posed by Giddens (Giddens, 1990), or second modernity as suggested by Ulrich Beck
(Beck et al., 2003). The question as to how societies change under the influence of the
capitalist economy, technological changes and conflicting social and political ideologies
is still at stake, and needs theoretical and empirical analysis.This is a core topic relating
to all societies in the world, and this question has definitely come back to Europe and
North America. The sociology of development as the sociology of processes of societal
change is still an important topic. It involves a critical analysis of the actors who try to
influence and organise change everywhere in the world, whether in the Global South
or in the Global North. But this topic needs a fundamental re-orientation. Changes in
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the Global South cannot be analysed on the basis of the more or less open assumption
that they are just a consequence of change in the Global North. We need to include a
global perspective in this field of research that takes into account the entanglements of
all parts of the world, especially as the already blurred distinction between the Global
South and the Global North is likely to become more and more unclear. This sociolo-
gy of development might be re-named as the sociology of global change, but the basic
question that is addressed remains the same.
Global sociology does not yet exist as a general orientation in sociology and we do
not know whether it will really come. What is clear is, that we need sociologists from
all parts of the world with knowledge and competence in respect of areas beyond the
North Atlantic. If we give up denominations in sociology that are related to areas and
topics that reach beyond the mainstream, then global sociology might never become a
reality. Sociology would return to a restricted understanding of societies based on the
view of a small part of the world where the majority of well-established and funded
research institutions are based, the Global North.
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In Vietnam, people are increasingly concerned about the absence of food standards and
the danger this poses to their families’ health. In Hanoi, urbanites are in search of clean
and safe vegetables. Using results from fieldwork in Hanoi, this paper presents three
strategies urbanites use to ensure food safety in the fresh produce they eat. They rely
on trust-based strategies, when maintaining their daily practice of buying from local
vendors or receiving their fresh food supply from relatives and friends residing in the
countryside. In addition, urbanites are increasingly cultivating herbs and vegetables at
home in roof top gardens or on fallow urban land. From the analysis of these strategies
two main arguments are developed: First, by embedding the supply with fresh produce
in social relationships and growing food at home urbanites actively shorten agricultural
wholesale commodity chains. The value of vegetables and herbs in urban Vietnam is no
longer solely determined by the monetary exchange value, but is assigned with a social
exchange value. Accordingly, the paper argues that the commodity of fresh vegetables
is being taken out of its commodity sphere, thus signifying the beginning of a process
of singularization (Kopytoff, 1988). Second, by cultivating fresh produce in the city ur-
banites creatively employ the urban built environment and thence the materiality and
materials that the city has to offer. The paper concludes that this identifies an affirma-
tion of urban life and urbanites’ “social creativity”, their willingness to improve their
living (Korff, 1991: 15), by dealing with the challenges and contingencies of the city.
Introduction
Access to food, water, shelter and air are major preconditions for living in the city, like
anywhere else. They constitute what Parnell and Pieterse (2010: 148) in their discussion
of the ‘right to the city’ refer to as ‘basic or 1 st generation human rights’. However,
particularly the first right of access to food has only recently moved into the analytical
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focus of urban studies (Morgan, 2015). The ‘urban food question’ (Morgan, 2015) is of-
ten linked to the topics of food deserts (e.g. Weatherspoon et al., 2015; Whelan et al.,
2002) and food security (e.g. Barthel et al., 2015; Crush, 2014; Morgan, 2015). The for-
mer frequently being linked to the cities of the Global North and the latter to cities of
the Global South. In particular, discussions on urban gardening have largely considered
access to produce in terms of economic and social justice, affordability or sustainabi-
lity (Mendes, 2008; Tornaghi, 2014). So far, food safety, the concern for the products’
origin, and the usage of chemicals in food processing has hardly been discussed in the
context of Southern cities, where more and more consumers, in particular a rising ur-
ban middle-class, are concerned about the absence of food standards and the danger
this poses to their families’ health.1 This paper presents urbanites responses to these
perceived dangers with empirical reference to urban Vietnam. In Vietnamese cities re-
sidents, particularly members of the urban middle class, are increasingly in search of
‘clean and safe vegetables’ (rau sạch, rau an tòan) (Kurfürst, 2019).
Using results from fieldwork in Hanoi, this paper presents two strategies urbanites
use to ensure food safety in the fresh produce they eat:
• Attaining fresh produce through trust-based relationships, such as buying from
local vendors or producers
• cultivating herbs and vegetables at home in roof top gardens or on fallow urban
land.
Although widely adopted, these strategies cannot guarantee urbanites’ provision with
safe produce.2 Therefore, the presented research is interested in people’s social con-
structions of what they perceive to be clean and safe vegetables and how they ascribe
new values to a well-known and usually cheap commodity. From the analysis of these
strategies two main arguments are developed: First, urbanites actively shorten agricul-
tural wholesale commodity chains in order to ensure food safety. By re-embedding the
economic exchange into social relationships of trust and cultivating food at home, the
value of vegetables and herbs in urban Vietnam is transformed. The value is not solely
determined by the monetary exchange value, but is assigned with a social exchange va-
lue, as well. The paper concludes that the commodity of fresh vegetables is being taken
out of its commodity sphere, signifying the beginning of a process of singularization
(Kopytoff, 1988). The paper’s arguments follow from literature on the role of trust in
economic relationships (Evers, 1995; Figuié et al., 2019; Gerber et al., 2014; Horat, 2017)
and on the production of value (Graeber, 2001; Kockelman, 2012; Kopytoff, 1988). Se-
cond, the paper follows Korff ’s (2018) definition of the city as an innovative milieu, in
which solutions can be found. By planting their own vegetables and herbs at home or
on fallow urban land, urbanites creatively employ the urban built environment to attain
1 For an exemption see the edited volume Food Anxiety in Globalising Vietnam by Ehlert and Faltmann
(2019).
2 For example, the interviewed gardeners were not concerned with the origin of the soil and the
seeds they used to grow their own food, nor did they worry about the degree of air pollution in the
city.
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food safety. Accordingly, the practice of urban gardening represents urbanites’ “social
creativity” (Korff 1991: 15) in dealing with the everyday challenges and contingencies of
the city.
This research is drawn from fieldwork conducted between September 2014 and Oc-
tober 2015 in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. The data were gathered using qualitative
methods: interviews and site-visits at gardens. The sections on the creation of trust
through face-to-face interactions, rural-urban supply and urban gardens are based on
semi-structured and narrative interviews with urban consumers of fresh produce, ur-
ban gardeners and market vendors at the local Yên Phụ and the larger wholesale Long
Biên market. Additionally, expert interviews were carried out with Vietnamese histori-
ans and social anthropologists.
Agricultural commodity chains and food safety in urban Vietnam
The rising awareness for food safety in Vietnam goes hand in hand with an increasing
mediatization of society. Newspapers, television and online fora increasingly report
about food scandals and food poisoning, particularly with respect to the usage of agro-
chemicals in agricultural production. As 35-year-old Hà puts it “Everyone knows about
food poisoning. Farmers use fertilizers and pesticides (…) It is everywhere, in themedia,
the newspaper. They run tests and explain that vegetables are contaminated.”
For example, a study from 2012 conducted in eight provinces with 1050 vegetable
samples showed that 51.24% contained too much pesticides according to WHO stan-
dards and 47% comprised exceeding amounts of nitrate and heavy metal substances.
Another study of the Hanoi Medical University found that 72% of the 660 vegetable
samples collected in Hanoi and Nam Dinh had E. coli bacteria (The Anh et al., 2012).
In 2015, the Vietnam Food Administration reported 171 cases of food poisoning. Food
poisoning and food scandals affected 5,000 people with 23 deaths (Vietnam Plus, 2016).
Figuié et al. (2019: 152) conclude:
“No sooner than the Vietnamese modern agro-industrial sector emerges, than it al-
ready shows characteristics of late modernity such as large-scale food scandals associ-
atedwith new technologies (hormones, pesticides, etc.) or the influential role ofmedia
in the food system.”
Accordingly, the concern about clean and safe produce has become an integral part
of urban dwellers’ everyday life: when friends and co-workers meet for lunch at small
restaurants, when parents buy fresh products at local markets, or when families dine
together, they all discuss the origin of the vegetables and the safety of the food. In other
words, ‘clean and safe vegetables’ has evolved as an urban idiom. It is an urban idiom
and at the same time the hyperreal (Baudrillard, 1978). In fact, Ha’s quote shows that
the images of ‘clean and safe’ produce have lost their referents. The symbol of ‘clean
and safe’ increasingly replaces the ‘real’ safe food that is ideally not contaminated with
agrochemicals, such as pesticides, herbicides and fertilizer. This symbol is interpreted
quite differently by the multiple actors involved in the urban food question. It is against
the background of the hyperreal that the strategies presented in the following need to
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be analysed. They are not to guarantee clean and safe food in instrumentally rational
terms, but they do represent people’s social constructions of what they imagine to be
clean, safe, and fresh foods.
Vegetables and herbs are an integral ingredient of every Vietnamese meal (món
ăn). Every dish is accompanied by cooked leafy greens and a plate of aromatic herbs
and lettuce. According to Avieli (2012: 27) “greens are essential, contributing to several
dimensions of the meal: nutrition (adding fiber, vitamins and minerals), texture, color,
fragrance and taste”. Accordingly, vegetables and herbs are sold at almost every street
corner, as well as in supermarkets. Particularly seasonal greens are easy to afford, even
for households with low incomes. For example, a bundle of fresh herbs in 2015 cost
4,000-6,000 VND (0.15-0.23 Euro). Consequently, it is not the access to fresh produce
that poses a problem for urbanites, but the uncertainty about the products’ quality and
origin.
Tracing agricultural commodity chains in Northern Vietnam, Gerber et al. (2014)
found that particularly the vegetable commodity chains are highly diversified.Over two-
thirds of vegetables consumed in Vietnam’s capital originate from Hanoi’s peri-urban
region, while the rest is imported from the highlands in Southern Vietnam around Đà
Lạt or from China. Much of this produce is exchanged at one of the city’s four ma-
jor wholesale markets. From there it passes on to restaurants or neighborhood markets
with the remainder being sold bymobile street vendors (Gerber et al., 2014).The comple-
xity and diversity of such commodity chains means that the tracing back of agricultural
products to their sites of origin is a difficult task for consumers. Particularly difficult
is the generation of information on environmental impacts. Bolwig et al. (2010) note
that environmental impacts of value chains, such as pesticides, additives and chemi-
cals used in food processing and cleaning, may be triggered at one place, but can well
reach beyond the area of origin. These environmental problems are often related to ac-
tivities in a particular node of a value chain, that is the point in the value chain, where
a product is exchanged or undergoes a major transformation or processing, e.g. pro-
duction, transportation, or storage (Bolwig et al., 2010).3 As a result, consumers find it
increasingly difficult to decipher the nodes and segments of value chains, facing a great
amount of uncertainty, when purchasing fresh produce.
In his theory of social reflexivity, Giddens (2001) argues that the notion of risk needs
to be put alongside trust. Trust is required in order to cope with the increasing inse-
curities and risks in a globalized world. Trust implies having confidence in abstract
systems and institutions such as in contracts or authorities for food regulation. Whe-
re such regulations or the monitoring thereof are missing, social capital has become
an important resource to draw on (Horat, 2017; Koh, 2006). Gerber et al. (2014) show
how social capital helps to overcome institutional gaps in agricultural wholesale com-
modity chains in Northern Vietnam. Due to shortcomings in the regulatory framework
and monitoring of the commodity chains, the actors in these chains need to rely on
relationships of trust with their business partners. Such relationships of trust evolve
3 Bolwig et al. (2010: 175) differentiate between ‘nodes’ and ‘segments’ of global value chains. A
segment connects two nodes. For example, a segment exists between production and export or
import and retail.
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between wholesale traders and local vendors, sellers and end consumers etc. Here, the
reference to social capital ensures the smooth functioning of economic transactions at
each node of the agricultural commodity chain. Accordingly, social capital is maintai-
ned as a “collective property resource” (Korff and Rothfuß, 2009: 363), in an environment
where abstract systems of regulation or control seem to be missing or are not trusted.
For consumers the building of relationships of trust with sellers is a way to reduce the
uncertainty they are confronted with in the anonymous agricultural commodity chains
(Dannenberg and Kulke, 2014). Accordingly, many Hanoians maintain their daily prac-
tice of buying directly from local and street vendors in the city or in the countryside or
receive boxes of fresh produce from rural residents they trust in. This (re-)embedding
of economic processes in social networks is not a characteristic limited to traditional
societies as suggested by Polanyi (1977), but occurs each time markets expand (Evers,
1995).
Such re-embedding of food supply in social relationships also transforms the va-
lue of the usually cheap and easy affordable commodity. In Toward an Anthropological
Theory of Value Graeber (2001: 1-2) differentiates between three definitions of value:
First, value is what makes a meaningful difference. Second, value can be measured by
the willingness to give something up for something else. Third, value is what is desira-
ble and good. In the light of food safety, the symbol of ‘clean and safe’ is exactly what
makes a difference, when buying or receiving vegetables and sets them apart from the
usual fresh produce sold at themarket. Furthermore, the index ‘clean and safe’ is exactly
what makes the vegetables desirable and good. The second definition of value is based
on the logic of equivalence.The idea that “equivalence of value should turn on geometric
ratios” (Kockelman, 2012: 12) is based in Aristotelian thinking. Drawing upon Aristotle’s
conceptualization of value, Marx (1867) defines value as a relation between people me-
diated by a relation between things (Kockelman, 2012). Kopytoff (1988) adds to this that
the social relations of the production of a commodity determine its value.The empirical
cases presented in the following illustrate that value is determined not only by the social
relations of production but by the social relations of exchange, too.
The following section discusses the state’s attempt to attain control and to assign
responsibilities for food safety in the segments of agricultural commodity chains. The
empirical data hints to citizens’ distrust in the control andmonitoring system stipulated
by the state. This discussion is followed by one on the rise of supermarkets, which are
promoted by the state as warrantors of food safety. Again, this state initiative does not
receive much acceptation by urban consumers.The main part of the paper, divided into
two empirical sections, then investigates urbanites’ strategies to ensure food safety.
The state’s attempts at food safety
During the last decade, the Vietnamese government has undertaken diverse efforts to
establish a control system along the segments of value chains. Already in 1995 the go-
vernment introduced the “safe vegetables” program. The program comprised training
as well as technical support for farmers to improve themanagement of irrigation water,
fertilization, as well as the application of pesticides (Mergenthaler et al., 2009).
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The current legislation consists of two laws, onemore generally targeting the quality
of products and goods and the other directly addressing food safety. According to the
2008 Law on the Quality of Products and Goods, manufacturers and traders are held
responsible for the quality of their products, while the overall control of the quality of
goods, including food products, is assigned to the Ministry of Science and Technology.
The 2011 Law on Food Safety establishes the rights and obligations of organisations and
individuals with respect to food safety, the business conditions to ensure food safety
and the advertising and labeling of food products, etc. The overall responsibility for
the testing and enforcement of food safety is assigned to the Ministry of Health, the
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the Ministry of Industry and Trade
(Van Nguyen, 2014).
Even before the passing of these laws, two important decisions were made in 2007,
the year cholera reappeared in Hanoi.The government and the municipality both iden-
tified the lack of hygiene and awareness of the careful preparation of food as the main
cause of the outbreak. Therefore, immediately after the outbreak, the municipality of
Hanoi started public awareness-raising campaigns. In the same year, the Prime Minis-
ter signed Decision 149/2007/QĐ-TTg. Among other measures the program sought to
ensure food hygiene and safety in producing, preserving, and processing agricultural
products. Furthermore, the program particularly aimed at ensuring street-food hygie-
ne and safety. With respect to agricultural production, Decision 102/2007/QĐ-BNN of
the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development further defines the legal utilization
of fertilizers. The decision supplements 155 fertilizers that can be produced, sold and
used in Vietnam (Bo Nong Nghiep va Phat Trien Nong Thon, 2016). Although this legal
framework exists, most citizens complain that producers’ and suppliers’ adherence to
the regulation is not properly monitored.
For modern retail outlets, the government has additionally introduced a certificate
for vegetables. The certificate testifies that vegetables are produced in line with the
national regulations on the production of safe vegetables (Wertheim-Heck et al., 2014).
Overall, the presented policies aim at the promotion of supermarkets, and the reduction
of local markets and street trade.
The first big supermarkets were built in Hanoi around the turn of the millennium
in the two central districts of Hòan Kiếm and Hai Bà Trưng. One was established in
the upper floor of what was then the first shopping mall of Hanoi, Tràng Tiền Pla-
za, another in the basement of the Hanoi Towers at Hai Bà Trưng St, which is where
multinational companies and international donors are located. By 2005/6, larger super-
markets had already emerged at the Southern urban fringe such as Big C in the district
of Thành Xuân and later Metro in Hòang Mai District. These supermarkets had a two-
fold appeal for consumers. First, their modern outer appearance and sanitized interior
appeared to promise hygienic and healthy products. Second, the storage racks offered
global products that until then had hardly been available in Vietnam. Going shopping
in the supermarket became a sign of distinction and of status. The ascribed value of
distinction was equaled by a monetary value that made these goods only affordable to
particular social groups with high enough incomes.
Yet, the purchase of goods in supermarkets cannot be simply reduced to forms of
“conspicuous consumption” in Veblen’s (1899) terms. On the contrary, supermarkets of-
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fer a wide array of everyday products that urban dwellers need for their daily food sup-
ply. In particular, in the New Urban Areas (NUA) of Hanoi, supermarkets are often the
sole provider of fresh products. For example, in 2005, the inhabitants of the then quite
recently built NUA of Ciputra and Trung Hòa Nhân Chình found themselves in a di-
lemma: On the one hand, they could not afford to buy in the supermarkets because the
goods there were too expensive. On the other hand, purchasing fresh products from
local markets or street vendors in the area was not an immediate option since they we-
re just not available in the neighborhood. The NUA had been built on agricultural land
lacking a generic infrastructure such as local markets (Labbé and Boudreau, 2011). Su-
permarkets were the only places to turn to. Interviewees explained that they would still
purchase vegetables, fruits, meat and fish from the local markets in their old neighbor-
hoods, which they had left for a higher quality of life in the condominiums or villas of
the NUA.
The promotion of supermarkets also affected the system of established urban mar-
kets. The ‘Decision of the Prime Minister Approving the Program on the Development
of Marketplaces until 2010’ promulgates the upgrading of marketplaces in urban areas
and the construction of supermarkets (Gerber et al., 2014). Big markets that had been
the economic center of the city for centuries were torn down, making space for new
large-scale developments such as supermarkets and shopping malls (Endres, 2014; Ge-
ertman, 2011). Most of the old markets occupied urban land of high economic value. An
example is Chợ Cửa Nam, the origin of which dates back to Hanoi’s role as royal city.
The royal citadel was surrounded by a rectangular wall with four gates in the direction
of the cardinal points. In front of the gates, permanent and periodical markets were
held (Logan, 2000). Cửa Nam, translating into Southern Gate, was one of these gates,
where markets were periodically held. In 2010, right in time for Hanoi’s 1000th anni-
versary, a new commercial center opened on this site. In the basement of the 13-stories-
high-rise building a supermarket offers vegetables, meat, fish and beverages, while the
remaining floors are used as office space and car park. However, many of the upgraded
markets remain empty and are generally not accepted by urban consumers.
Catering to the demand for safe and clean fresh produce, a new shopmodel has evol-
ved in Hanoi. So-called safe foods shops (cửa hàng thực phẩm an tòan) are mushroo-
ming all over the city. These privately owned shops actually fill the gap between the
anonymous purchase in supermarkets and the personal interaction with traders at the
local markets.The shops all carry a big green logo saying ‘safe foods’.The label frequent-
ly comes with a photo displaying a beautiful basket of fresh vegetables and fruits and
sometimes meat. Although the logo and photo suggest some form of standardization
and certification, most shop owners seem to interpret the label of safe foods quite dif-
ferently. For example, the safe foods shop at Yên Phụ St. in Tây Hồ District only offers
imported goods.These goods comprise fresh produce fromNew Zealand, Italian Barilla
noodles and German Haribo. Vegetables, fruits and meat are packed in plastic and kept
in the refrigerator. The vegetables carry a label indicating that they are imported from
New Zealand, yet without any specifications and labels from New Zealand. By contrast,
the safe foods’ shop in the NUA Linh Đàm, located approx. 8 km south of the city center,
is run by an elderly woman. Her portfolio is not as diverse as the one at Yên Phụ. She
does not sell any imported fresh products at all. Asked about where her vegetables come
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from, she answered that she receives them from suppliers in her home province Nam
Định, one hundred kilometer south of Hanoi. Likewise, there is no label indicating the
safety of food, except for her verbal insurance.
Consequently, the labeling of food – be it verbally or indexically - has become an im-
portant marketing point. The idiom and hyperreality of clean and safe vegetables has
opened up a space for negotiation and for marketing, as diverse providers seek to cater
to the demand for safe fresh produce.The idiom is even appropriated by street vendors
in Hanoi. At 5 pm, the peak of the rush hour, a street vendor offers her commodities
in a small basket on the road side in Hanoi’s Ancient Quarter with a green sign indica-
ting ‘safe vegetables for sale’. The adoption of the label by street vendors is particularly
interesting since authorities have blamed street trade for the lack of hygiene and for
creating health hazards. Indeed, since the 1990ies, the municipal authorities have con-
ducted several attempts to eradicate street trade from the urban landscape (Koh, 2006).
When cholera broke out again in Hanoi in the winter of 2007, street vendors, who were
deemed unscrupulous and profit-oriented and thought to be unhygienic in their food
preparation practices, were publicly blamed as purveyors of the disease (Lincoln, 2014).
Shortly thereafter in 2008, the municipality of Hanoi ordered a ban on street trade in
64 streets of the city center (Kurfürst, 2012; Turner and Schoenberger, 2012). However,
so far this policy has not yielded the desired results. Instead of finding themselves in
decline, streets markets have mushroomed in Hanoi. Rather than turning to the pro-
moted supermarkets, urban dwellers seem to stick to their daily routine of buying from
street markets (Gerber et al., 2014; Wertheim-Heck et al., 2014). In fact, the census by
Wertheim-Heck et al. (2014) shows that 95% of the total vegetable consumed in the city
of Hanoi are exchanged at local markets or through street trade, and only 2.3% of the
vegetables are traded in supermarkets and convenience stores. 40-year-old Nam says:
“Even in the supermarket you cannot be sure that the products are clean and safe.” Ac-
cording to him, the state label is not a warrantor of food safety since the regulation
lacks a proper control and monitoring system.
This asynchronous development of the promotion of supermarkets as warrantor of
safe foods and the persistence of local markets argues for a lack of trust in the national
certification system and private wholesale regulations on food safety. In other words,
the attempts at standardisation have yet to result in the construction of trust among
consumers. Meanwhile in an effort to respond to this uncertainty, urbanites have deve-
loped different strategies that are built around personal relationships based on trust.
Buying local: creating trust through face-to-face interactions
At local markets and between mobile street traders and the consumers, the economic
exchange is embedded in a social relationship of trust. The sensory experience of being
able to touch, smell or even taste the fresh produce increases trust between the seller
and buyer (Figuié et al., 2019; Mele et al., 2015).
Through the daily face-to-face interactions at the market, sellers and buyers create
“bridging social capital” - social relationships with people different from oneself but
acting in the same social field (Putnam, 2000: 20). Consumerswill usually buy particular
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goods from different stalls, depending on recommendation from others and their own
experience of the quality of goods offered at the market stalls. If the quality of the
produce is low, consumers will know whom to blame.
Truth be told, people buy little from supermarkets, this has yet to be developed.
By contrast, the market is close to the home, it is more convenient. People will buy
from stalls where they know the vegetables are safe (Anh, 28 years old, translated from
Vietnamese).
Buying local, can also mean buying directly from the producers in rural areas. Again
“farmer shopping” is a form of consumption solely based on trust as consumer actual-
ly do not have any information on the actual farming practices (Wertheim-Heck and
Spaargaren, 2016: 659). Important is the reference to the countryside that is considered
a purveyor of safe and fresh produce (Kurfürst, 2019: 223). The idea that ‘rural’ pro-
duce is clean and safe, moreover, appears to be a driving force, when urbanites attain
their supplies with agricultural products from kin or friends residing in the countryside
(Kurfürst, 2019; Wertheim-Heck and Spaargaren, 2016). Such an appraisal of trust-ba-
sed relationships and the countryside hint towards the different evaluative techniques
urbanites apply to assess food safety. They maneuver between utility-based and value-
based evaluative techniques, the former referring to instrumental rationality, and the
latter to value rationality (Weber, 1978). The instrumental values underlying preferen-
ces for one agricultural product over another might be tied to price, certification, or
the products’ origin (such as being imported from New Zealand or Germany). In con-
trast, value rationality implies that “the relative desirability of two options makes sense
because of some aesthetic, ethical, or religious ideal. Such ideals make unconditional
demands on us, and we value them for their own sake, independently of our prospects
for success” (Kockelman, 2012: 193). The evaluation of those agricultural products that
are delivered directly from the countryside as clean and safe appears to be value-based.
It is informed by the prevalent imagery of the countryside in Vietnam as being less pol-
luted than the city (Gillen, 2016; Fuhrmann, 2017). Of course, the adoption of different
evaluative techniques can result in a discrepancy between what is rationally defined as
safe foods (degree of contamination with agrochremicals or bacteria) and what is per-
ceived to be clean and safe (rural origin, trusted seller). Likewise, Ehlert and Voßemer
(2015) note that customers tend to draw on different kinds of knowledge, such as ratio-
nal information on food quality or emic constructions of what is believed to be fresh
food.These different evaluative techniques are also at stake in the context of urban gar-
dening. Although cultivating vegetables and herbs in a highly polluted environment in
the city of Hanoi, still the home-grown produce is valued for its safety.
Grow at home: roof top gardens and urban green
Apart from attaining fresh produce from trusted persons, vendors or kin in the coun-
tryside, the cultivation of vegetables and herbs at home has become a common strategy
among the city dwellers, particularly the urban middle-class, to attain clean and safe
produce. Urbanites grow food on rooftops, balconies, in recycled fruit boxes and milk
packages as well as on fallow urban land. The so-called tube houses (nhà ống), which
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can be found throughout urban areas in Vietnam, have a very narrow front, with often
only one room per floor, but several floors. In fact, the horizontal style of houses was
changed into a vertical one.The upper floor of most houses has multiple functions.This
floor often consists of two parts. The inner space is foremost used as the space where
the ancestors are worshipped on a small altar. By contrast, the outer space comprises
a small rooftop terrace, on which the house’s facilities such as the reservoir for fresh
water and the air conditioning are located. With the striving for clean and safe food
this outer space, is increasingly used to cultivate vegetables and herbs (Kurfürst, 2019).
These spaces of cultivation signify the house owner’s wealth.The building of large roof-
top gardens has become a sign of social and economic distinction as the following three
cases illustrate.
Anh and Hoa live together with their two children and a female house-keeper in
a spacious 5-storey house with a roof top garden in Bắc Từ Liêm, an urban district in
the western part of Hanoi. They own a private business in the health sector. The of-
fice is located on the first floor. On the 2nd floor, the family’s socio-economic status
is displayed through a big TV screen, a large aquarium, and the wall decorated with
souvenirs from abroad such as a plate with the Eiffel Tower in Paris and a miniature Taj
Mahal. The family’s bedrooms are situated on the 3rd floor and the kitchen is installed
on the 4th floor. The 5th and last floor is divided into an inner space with the ancestors’
altar and an outer space consisting of the roof-top garden. The house maid, who refers
to herself as “the main vegetable cultivator”, names the different kinds of vegetables
and herbs she grows here: garlic, onions, chilies, chive, and different kinds of cabbage,
tomatoes, and leafy greens that are used to cook the soup that is served with almost
any Vietnamese dish (canh). To cultivate the fresh produce, she creatively employs di-
verse materials such as ceramic pots, in which ornamental trees are usually grown, old
polystyrene fruit boxes from the market as well as cut up water bottles hanging upsi-
de down. Asked about her motivation for gardening, she answers that she likes to grow
vegetables for relaxation and to reduce stress. Of course, she uses the home-grown pro-
duce to cook the meals for the children, but she buys additional ingredients from the
local Đồng Xa market.
Lan, is a 38-year old lecturer. She lives in a house in the Thành Trị District, a desi-
gnated rural district of Hanoi. Lan uses many of the open spaces in her house to grow
vegetables as well as medicinal herbs, utilizing diverse materials such as fruit boxes and
ceramic pots to grow the greens. In the courtyard of her house, she even keeps chicken.
She gardens not only because she is concerned about safe vegetables but also because
she enjoys the beauty and fragrance of the plants. Being a working mother, she cannot
keep up with the gardening on her own. That is why her aunt, who moved from her
rural hometown to live with her in Hanoi, assists her.
Vân Anh lives together with her husband and two children in a generic housing area
in Hanoi’s Southern Thành Xuân District. The area is characterized by the typical small
alleys that become narrower the deeper one gets into the housing area. In contrast to
the usual tube houses, Vân Anh’s houses has three spacious floors of approx. 50 sqm
each. The kitchen is located on the first floor. The second and third floors house the
family’s bedrooms.The garden is located on the roof top. It occupies an area of approx.
50 sqm. Vân Anh explains that her family completely rebuilt the house two years ago. It
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was then that they decided to build a roof-top garden. The planting beds are made of
concrete. To fill them, they ordered three soil transporters. This weight requires a spe-
cific structural analysis of the house and thus a superior building material than usually
applied when constructing houses in Vietnam. In their rooftop garden, Vân Anh and
her husband grow tomatoes, garlic, potatoes, beans, kohlrabi etc. to such an extent that
they are completely self-sufficient. “Last year we had 2 dozen kilos of tomatoes”, she
says displaying a photo of her harvest on her mobile phone. She likes to garden for fun
as well as to prepare her own food. Nonetheless, she still continues to buy additional
supplies such as fruit from the neighborhood market. In sum, urban subsistence pro-
duction is no longer limited to the urban poor as previous research on Southeast Asian
cities (Forbes, 1996; Mc Gee, 1967) suggests but is increasingly being conducted by an
emergent urban middle class that can afford the construction of a roof-top garden and
the personnel to look after the greenery.
Commoning: filling urban green with meaning
In many better-off housing areas, such as Bắc Từ Liêm and the Tây Hồ District, public
spaces and wasteland are appropriated by individuals to cultivate their own food. Bắc
Từ Liêm is an area that rapidly urbanized within the last ten years, now consisting of
spacious one family houses with a dominantly middle-class population. Previously, the
area consisted mainly of paddy fields. Today many families grow chilies, lemons, garlic
and rau ngót Nhật (Dicliptero chinensis, a leafy green used to cook soup) in ceramic
pots or recycled fruit boxes on the streets and sidewalks in front of their houses.
The Tây Hồ District, bordering the West Lake in the North West, used to be famous
for its plantations of đào/quất, the traditional Vietnamese Lunar New Year tree. Yet,
since the 1990s, great parts of the former agricultural land have been transformed into
building land. Today it is a district popular among the better-off and expats living in
Hanoi. The area is characterized by spacious one-family houses in walled compounds.
In some streets, such as Đặng Thai Mai Street, a number of nurseries are still witness
to the land’s former usage. From Đặng Thai Mai Street, a small private street leads into
a dead end that is surrounded by newly built one family houses. A designated flower
bed of 15x3m is located right in the middle. In October 2014, the lot lay idle except for
some palm tree seedlings. In between the seedlings, residents had planted egg plants
and morning glory. A woman taking care of the vegetables declared the vegetables as
clean and safe. According to her, only the people living in the immediate neighborhood
had access to the land. One year later in October 2015, the urban green on the lot had
become quite dense. Interviewees residing in the area explained that the lot is managed
by themunicipality,which plans to beautify the lot with greenery.While the land is lying
idle, the residents of the neighborhood use the land to plant vegetables.This temporary
usage of fallow land for gardening is a very common practice in Hanoi. Individuals
occupy construction land in order to grow vegetables. Often a development plan already
exists. Yet, as long as the constructions have not started, this kind of interim usage is
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tolerated by the authorities (Kurfürst, 2019).4 That is how urban dwellers make use and
sense of the urban green surrounding them. By planting greenery, urbanites literally fill
fallow land with meaning. Access to the land and the permission to harvest are subject
to the social control within the neighborhood.
Here the people living in the area grow vegetables. This is state land, but it is not
used. There is a plan to plant flowers on the lot, but it has not yet been realized. That
is why the people cultivate the land. Everyone who likes to can use the lot (Qùynh, 58
years old, Tây Hồ District, translated from Vietnamese).
This is what Harvey (2012) refers to as the social practice of commoning. “This prac-
tice produces or establishes a social relation with a common whose uses are either ex-
clusive to a social group or partially or fully open to all and sundry” (Harvey, 2012: 73).
The relationship between the social group and this aspect of environment that is regar-
ded as a common ought to be non-commodified, and thus outside the market logic.
Such non-commodified usage of waste land for cultivation in Hanoi once again hints
towards the bypassing of agricultural commodity chains and thus towards the de-com-
moditization of vegetables.
Conclusion
The idiom and hyperreality of ‘clean and safe vegetables’ signifies urbanites’ fear of con-
suming fresh produce that is contaminated with chemicals. Urbanites respond to these
anticipated dangers of eating in diverse ways. Since the national food regulation is not
trusted, they adopt trust-based strategies, such asmaintaining the daily practice of buy-
ing from local vendors, and receiving boxes of fresh produce sent to the city by relatives
and friends residing in the countryside. Additionally, urbanites grow vegetables and
herbs for their own consumption in rooftop gardens in the private space of the home
or on urban wasteland, which is collectively used to cultivate food. From the analysis
of these strategies two main arguments were developed: First, by re-embedding their
food supply into relationships of trust, the urbanites systematically shorten agricultural
wholesale commodity chains in particular and global commodity chains in general. To
put it in Kopytoff ‘s (1988) terms, this indicates the beginning of a process of decommo-
ditization and singularization. Commodities are singularized by pulling them out of
their usual commodity sphere (Kopytoff, 1988). For a long time, the monetary value of
vegetables and herbs used to be equivalent to the availability and cost of their produc-
tion. Since much of the fresh produce is easily grown in Vietnam, or the neighboring
countries, it is quite cheap and thus affordable to many urban households. Yet, by cul-
tivating vegetables at home or obtaining them directly from rural areas, urbanites have
entered a process of selection, selecting between what they consider safe and unsafe
foods. In this process of selection both instrumentally rational and value rational eva-
luative techniques are applied. Consequently, the process of selection is accompanied
4 Le Huu Viet and Tra Giang (2014) report of the development of so-called ‘mini’ gardens in the NUA
of Trung Hòa Nhân Chính, Nam Trung Yên and Định Công.
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by the process of significance as new meanings (Kockelman, 2012), such as the value of
safety, are ascribed to the fresh produce.
According to Kopytoff (1988) the onlymoment the commodity status of a thing is not
in question is the immediatemoment of exchange. In their study of transactional orders
Parry and Bloch (1989) differentiate between two spheres of exchange activities: a short-
term cycle, comprising e.g. commodity exchange, and a long-term cycle, “concerned
with reproduction of the social and cosmic order” characterized by reciprocity (Parry
and Bloch, 1989: 2). While the purchasing of vegetables would correspond to exchange
in the short-term cycle, the exchange via kin and friends as well as gardening would
need to be considered in the long-term exchange cycle. The commodity of vegetables
and herbs is no longer exchanged based solely on a monetary value but also based on
a social value ascribed to it. Urban gardeners provide home-grown fresh produce as a
gift to family and friends, while using it to prepare food for their families and friends.
Second, in the light of food safety, urban residents provide solutions to the problems
they are confronted with in urban areas. To attain what they regard fresh and safe vege-
tables and herbs they creatively employ the spaces and materials the city offers them in
their home or their immediate neighborhood. Accordingly, the creative employment of
diverse materials and the urban built environment to grow food demonstrate urbanites’
social creativity in dealing with the challenges and contingencies of the city.
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Divisoria Night Café: Showcase of Public Space Renewal
in Southeast Asian Urban Context
Luzile Satur (Passau)
This study deals with festivals manifested as the Night Café in the Southeast Asian City
of Cagayan de Oro (CDO), Northern Mindanao, the Philippines. From 2003 until 2013,
Mayor Vincente “Dongkoy” Emano together with the city councillors enacted Ordinance
Number 8920-2003 that established the weekly Night Café in the public space of Divi-
soria.TheNight Café offered leisure and entrepreneurship activities. Vendors and other
informal sectors converged to provide dining, shopping and entertaining activities. It
strengthened the informal economy through the generation of employment and liveli-
hood. The Night Café also symbolised CDO as the ‘City in Blossom, Bloom and Boom.’
The activities and symbolism showcased renewal of public space; however, they were
solely intended for economic consumption. This paper argues that the renewal process
utilised cultural references to advance economic interests.Thus, this paper aims to trace
the main civic actors, key drivers and the role of the city government in conceptualising
the Night Café.
Introduction
Public spaces in Asia, especially in Southeast Asian cities, are characterised as “plura-
listic with visible chaotic disorder” (Lim, 2014: 220). The phenomenon is attributed to
the extreme rate of the region’s urbanisation. Asia and Pacific displayed a 2.3 per cent
rate of urbanisation in 2014; it is higher than the 2 per cent global rates (UN- Habi-
tat & United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 2015).
In Southeast Asia, the rate of urbanisation grows at 2.8 per cent; correspondingly, 47
per cent of its population lives in cities (Department of Economic and Social Affairs &
United Nations, 2014). Similarly, in the Philippines, 48 per cent of its population lives
in urban areas. In the southern Philippines, the region of Northern Mindanao has two
Highly Urbanized Cities (HUCs), including CDO with an entire urban population of
675,950 (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2003).
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As CDO is the capital city of the province and region, the city possesses significant
roles in the development of the area. CDO serves as the centre for education, adminis-
tration, commerce and industry. As a result, CDO maintains high annual revenues. To
demonstrate, the city garnered Php 2,108.23 million (estimated 35million euros) of ope-
rating income in 2013 (Commission on Audit, 2014). The city’s rapid urbanisation and
economic growth complement the festivalisation vis-à-vis endured disorganisation in
the streets and public spaces.
The most important public space in CDO is Divisoria. The weekly festival of the
Night Café took place in Divisoria for a decade from its establishment in 2003 until its
abolishment in 2013.TheNight Café altered the landscape of Divisoria through gentrifi-
cation.The aim of the process was primarily for financial benefit. In the end, it resulted
in contestation and eventual elimination.
This narrative first elucidates the framework of the study that utilises Lefebvre’s
three-dimensional space. It then examines the crucial function of the city administra-
tion and the actors involved in the dispute. Lastly, it reviews the outcome following the
abolishment of the Night Café.
Three-Dimensional Space of Divisoria
The study of Divisoria is framed within Lefebvre’s conceptual triad
“consisting of three elements: representations of space, or “conceived space,” which
for my purposes includes not only the drawings and images produced by the designer
but the material manifestations of those designs in the built environment (i.e., urban
form); representational space, “lived space” or the symbolic values produced by the
inhabitants; and spatial practice, “perceived space” or the ways in which spaces are
used. These elements are not independent, and it is the interaction between them
that results in the production of space.” (Goonewardena et al., 2008: 269)
To elaborate, conceived space, “serves as an organising schema or a frame of reference
for communication, which permits a (spatial) orientation and thus co-determines ac-
tivity at the same time” (Goonewardena et al., 2008: 37). In concrete terms, urban plan-
ning of CDO incorporates schemes for Divisoria. In particular, the Framework Plan for
City of Cagayan de Oro (1972: 20) explicitly designed Divisoria as a “Pedestrian Shopping
Mall.”
In lived space, or spaces of representation, “the material “order” that emerges on
the ground can itself become the vehicle conveying meaning. In this way, a (spatial)
symbolism develops that expresses and evokes social norms, values, and experiences”
(Goonewardena et al., 2008: 37). Divisoria is full of symbols from the monuments to the
giant streetlamps. The symbols are integral to the daily life of the locals. The symbols
are also embedded in the city’s three historical periods—Spanish, American and post-
World War II.
The third element of perceived space
Divisoria Night Café 59
“designates thematerial dimension of social activity and interaction. The classification
spatial means focusing on the aspect of simultaneity of activities. Spatial practice, in
analogy to the syntagmatic dimension of language, denotes the system resulting from
articulation and connection of elements or activities.” (Goonewardena et al., 2008: 36)
The Night Café significantly reflects spatial practice where the users of space or actors
perceived various activities for their own advantage. Furthermore, the triangular di-
mension of space is supplemented by other scholars who specialise in Southeast Asia
such as Evers, Korff, Lim, Lee and Kurfürst among others.The insights of these specia-
lists are integrated into the analysis of the contestation of Divisoria.
Historical Symbolism of Divisoria
Divisoria sits at the core of the city’s Población or Central Business District. Its import-
ance has remained since the early twentieth century up until the present time displaying
the city’s history while also acting as a repository of everyday life for the locals.
Divisoria is a Spanish term that refers to a dividing line. Divisoria originally served
as a fire breach dividing two areas in the población. To avoid conflagrations, the revolu-
tionary leader and town mayor, Tirso Neri, spearheaded the establishment of Divisoria
(Montalvan II and Fortich, 2004).
Divisoria sits between two major tree-lined streets with six ‘islands’ or blocks situa-
ted between the parallel roads. The western end is bounded by the Cagayan River; the
eastern end bounded by Xavier University-Ateneo de Cagayan. The islands exhibit mo-
numents of Filipino political figures, namely, Jose Rizal, Andres Bonifacio, Justiniano
Romulo Borja and Ramon Magsaysay. Other symbolic reminders, such as the remains
of the local fighters in the Filipino-American War, are buried underneath the monu-
ment of Andres Bonifacio. The amphitheatre, now demolished, Kiosko (stage), benches
and trees offer venues for entertainment and recreation.
The monuments, buried remains, and fixtures in every island of Divisoria equate
to urban symbols. Kurfürst (2012:14) considers that, “urban symbols are public sym-
bols.” They convey meanings as symbols in public spaces (Kurfürst, 2012; Nas, 2011). To
a greater extent, Lefebvre analyses symbols in the production of space as integral in
spaces of representation or representational space.
“This concerns the symbolic dimension of space. According to this, spaces of represen-
tation do not refer to the spaces themselves but to something else: a divine power,
the logos, the state, masculine or feminine principle, and so on. This dimension of the
production of space refers to the process of signification that links itself to a (mate-
rial) symbol. The symbols of space could be taken from nature, such as trees or promi-
nent topographical formations; or they could be artefacts, buildings, andmonuments;
they could also develop out of a combination of both, for example as ‘landscapes’.”
(Goonewardena et al., 2008: 37)
Divisoria eventually serves as a business district that connects several commercial
pedestrian streets together. The prominence of the place rose when
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“[b]y the 1920s to the 1930s, all the big commercial establishments were in main av-
enue Divisoria, tree-lined and traversed by horse-drawn tartanilla and American auto-
mobiles. There was the large Paradies store, the Japanese, Chinese, and Indian shops.
The Cagayan de Oro Hotel, and the Plaza Hotel. A 1938 visitor to Cagayan described
Divisoria as a place of ‘mercantile chatter’.” (Montalvan II and Fortich, 2004: 97)
Divisoria is not only typified as a vital commercial area but also
“a symbol of the town’s progress during the American period, more so it was a pic-
ture of her migrant microcosm and an echo of Cagayan’s colonial and revolutionary
past. Divisoria represented the dominance that Cagayan’s migrant class had reached”
(Montalvan II and Fortich, 2004: 98).
The symbols and symbolism of Divisoria prevail over historical periods. Korff (1993: 230)
postulates that, “Due to the relative persistence and immobility of spatial structures,
they play an important role as “facts” for the invention of tradition. The tradition is
easily and convincingly verified by reference to remains from history.” Divisoria is in
essence a historical landmark.
Divisoria within CDO Urban Plans
Divisoria possesses a significant component in the urban plans of CDO. As a conceived
space, Divisoria conforms to the purpose of urban designers. As claimed by Lefebvre
“Conceived space refers to “representations of space” by planners, architects, and other
specialistswhodivide space into separate elements that canbe recombined atwill. The
discourse of these specialists is oriented toward valorising, quantifying, and adminis-
tering space, thereby supporting and legitimating themodes of operation of state and
capital.“ (Goonewardena et al., 2008: 137)
Urban planning in CDO started with the appointment of Maximo Suniel as the first
city mayor in 1948 (Along, 1950). By 1952, city zoning was determined to put order in
the erection or renovation of infrastructures (Minutes of the Municipal Board Series
of 1952). In the same year, the Committee for City Planning and Beautification was
instituted to promote cleanliness and, at the same time, cooperation between citizens
and city legislators. Two years later in 1954, the third city mayor—Justiniano Romulo
Borja spearheaded the creation of the city’s urban planning board.
In 1963, the CDOCity Planning and Development Board was given authority to plan,
study and recommend suggestions for the urban development projects. An official map
of CDO together with zoning and subdivision ordinances, public improvement plans,
health and sanitation, as well as building codes were formulated. A special provision
included Mayor Borja’s initiative to appoint private citizens to participate in the plan-
ning board.The appointed citizens represented civic organisations, schools, labour and
women’s groups.
Community participation coupled with visionary leadership was demonstrated
when Divisoria won the first prize in the Plaza Category National Committee Beauti-
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fication Contest in 1962 (Mindanao Star, 1963). This award prompted Divisoria to gain
nationwide prestige. Furthermore, this national recognition brought a new height of
success to CDO due to the inclusion of community members in the city planning.
Recognition was achieved because
“the community has a greater share in the design of their physical spaces. Develop-
ment planning then becomes less prescriptive, modifies to become a more enabling
process whose main role is to nurture the necessary conditions for a larger group to
work together to plan the city. The city then becomes a place where citizens’ assets are
acknowledged, co-opted and potentials maximised.” (Lee et al., 2014: 220-221)
Divisoria’s reputation above the nation’s other plazas attracted foreign urban specialists
whose views added stimulus to urban plans. Craig Whitaker, an American Peace Corp
Volunteer assigned in CDO, articulated the usefulness and significance of Divisoria.
“There is no question of the park’s centrality. If one says to a friend that he’ll meet
him themiddle of Cagayan de Oro, that same friends know that he means somewhere
along theDivisoria. This centrality gives a focus to our city. It is the point towardswhich
parades march, people wander on evening strolls, and in which rallies, meetings, and
open-air radio programs are held. In short, because it is a “place” and is centrally located
it is the point in the city to which almost all public activities gravitate. It has a life of its
own.” (Whitaker, 1966: 8)
Divisoria exemplifies qualities that makes it distinct as a space for aesthetical and prac-
tical functions. According to Whitaker (1966: 8), Divisoria is perfectly suited to the idea
of Louis I. Kahn, a prominent American architect, who conceptualises that, “the centre
of the city is a place to go to and not through.” Likewise, Zukin (1996) and Sennett (1992)
equate public space to a meeting point or melting pot of various activities. Given these
points, Divisoria is portrayed as
“an absolutely necessary part of our downtown urban fabric. Its importance can be
measured simply by saying that it is a place. To describe it we can stretch our imag-
inations a little and call it an outdoor room, a long large sized room that has no ceiling
and whose walls are the buildings which line it on either side of the street. Once we
look at the Divisoria in this light we can see also the streets which lead into it as hall-
ways or corridors to the room.” (Whitaker, 1966: 4)
Finally, Whitaker emphasises that Divisoria fits the ideal concept of a park in an urban
landscape. He highlights Divisoria where it stands in the foreground; while the rest of
the city sits in the background of the schema.
“The park sits as a quiet hub to the rest of the city which is spinning around it (this
effect is certainly heightened by the continuous stream of one-way traffic around it).
It is as if someone places a giant thumbtack in the centre of our city to pin it to the
landscape then started turning the rest of the city around it.” (Whitaker, 1966: 8)
The theory, definition, and discourse of Divisoria as shown by Whitaker, conforms to
the paradigm of Lefebvre.
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“representations of space give an image and thus also define a space. Analogous to the
paradigmatic dimension of language, one spatial representation can be substituted
by another that shows similarities in some respects but differences in others. Repre-
sentations of space emerge at the level of discourse, of speech as such, and therefore
comprise verbalised forms such as descriptions, definitions, and especially (scientific)
theories of space.” (Goonewardena et al., 2008: 37)
Designs for Divisoria continued with the completion of the Framework Plan for the City
of Cagayan de Oro in 1972.The Framework Plan turned out to be the critical juncture in
the city’s planning schemes. The advent of the 1970s signalled a swift economic trans-
formation of CDO. Commerce and industry dominated the economy of the city since
it was promoted as the ‘Gateway to Northern Mindanao’ (Architects, Urban Designers
and Regional Planners, 1972: 5).The city’s industrialisation was boosted through speedy
construction of infrastructure projects that included power and water supplies, roads,
public transportation as well as seaports (Satur, 2009).
The city’s reputation as the business hub in the Northern Mindanao region paved
the way for designing Divisoria into a Pedestrian Shopping Mall where “improvements
will be made tomould a leisurely atmosphere conducive to shopping. Kiosks, in all sorts
of variety will be constructed on the Mall with designs regulated within the frame of
the Urban Design Concept” (Architects, Urban Designers and Regional Planners, 1972:
20).
The economic development of the city prompted a re-interpretation of the symbolic
meaning of Divisoria.The design to convert Divisoria into a mall brings forth, “archety-
pal public spaces of modernity” (Zukin, 1996:188). In effect, the planned transformation
signals “symbolic economy” (Zukin, 1996: 265).Themodern design of Divisoria confirms
that, “symbolic economy is determined by growth in cultural consumption and its in-
dustries” (Kurfürst, 2012: 148). It is further determined that
“the symbolic economy features two parallel production systems that are crucial to a
city’s material life: the production of space, with its synergy of capital investment and
cultural meanings, and the production of symbols, which constructs both a currency of
commercial exchange and a language of social identity. Every effort to rearrange space
in the city is also an attempt at visual re-presentation.” (Zukin, 1996: 24)
The Framework Plan not only advances the city’s economic prospects, but it also “em-
bodies a community’s vision” (Architects, Urban Designers and Regional Planners, 1972:
75). The Framework Plan primarily considered the participation of urban dwellers. As
Lim (2014: 22) notes, “How the city can be perceived is by the intensity of active parti-
cipation of local urban citizens.” The contribution of the locals, ordinary as it may be,
allows redefinition of the symbolic economy of public spaces in the city (Kurfürst, 2012;
Lefebvre, 2003; Zukin, 1996). For these reasons, the designs for Divisoria “are geared
towards attracting tourist-oriented activities in the area without forgetting the needs
of local residents and shoppers for a better place to shop and relax” (Architects, Urban
Designers and Regional Planners, 1972 20).
Community participation also extends to the vendors in Divisoria. The Framework
Plan aimed at “expanding the scope of vending within the park without sacrificing sa-
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nitation or cleanliness” (Architects, Urban Designers and Regional Planners, 1972: 20).
Therefore, the conception of Divisoria with the inclusion of informal sectors reveals
how, “real public spaces ought to have the capacity to provide for the full extent of the
public, in any given society, from the very wealthy to the wretched” (Wee, 2014: 193).
Figure 1: The Divisoria Renewal Plan in the Framework Plan
From Urban Designers Associates, Inc. (1972). Framework Plan for the
City of Cagayan de Oro. Quezon City, Philippines: Urban Designers Asso-
ciates, Inc, p. 24. Copyright permission from Ramir M. Balquin, Officer-
in-Charge of the City Planning and Development Office, 2019.
Unfortunately, the effort to implement the design for Divisoria came to a halt and
Divisoria was never converted into a Pedestrian ShoppingMall.The reason is attributed
to the political crisis that the country, including the city, experienced in the period of
Martial Law from 1972 until 1986. Nevertheless, Divisoria prevailed as the hub of the
city without substantial alteration.
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There were two major urban plans following the period of Martial Law. In 1991, the
Cagayan de Oro-Iligan Corridor Master Plan was conceived primarily to facilitate agro-
industrial development in the region of NorthernMindanao.TheMaster Plan was based
on amacrostructure encompassing nineteenmunicipalities and two cities (Louis Berger
International Inc., 1991). For this reason, plans for Divisoria were not given attention.
Nine years later in 2000, the Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) was launched un-
der Mayor Emano. However, the CLUP proposed no rectification for Divisoria. Rather,
the CLUP merely recognised Divisoria as part of the built-up area in the Major Urban
Node (City Land Use Coordinating Committee of Cagayan de Oro, 2000). Although both
plans missed out community participation, Divisoria nevertheless remained an unalte-
red microcosm of the city. Divisoria maintained its traditional symbolic meaning as the
primary public space in the city, however, not until the advent of Night Café in 2003.
On balance, the lack of community planning provides an avenue for new forms of re-
interpretation of public space in the city.The conception of the Night Café re-interprets
the symbolic meaning of Divisoria.
Key Drivers in the Conceptualization of Night Café
Élites define and redefine images of the city (Evers and Korff, 2000; Kurfürst, 2012).The
Cagayan de Oro City Council (2003), with the approval of the mayor, created Resolution
Number 5779-2003 declaring CDO as the “City in Blossom, in Bloom and in Boom.”The
élites supported the legitimation by citing well-grounded socio-economic factors. Ac-
cordingly, the resolution outlined satisfactory peace and order conditions, continuous
foreign investment, the spread of multi-million infrastructural projects such as brid-
ges, public markets, bus terminals, malls and residential subdivisions as determinants
of the city’s economic prosperity. It highlighted the “average growth rate of investment
over a 5-year period from 1997 to 2002 of 6.14 percent and Php 8.54 Billion worth of
investments poured in 2002 alone” (Cagayan de Oro City Council, 2003). In addition,
the established image of CDO as the “Gateway to Northern Mindanao” (Cagayan de Oro
City Council, 2003) was reinforced in the resolution.
The élites, who are the authors of the resolution, ultimately decided on how CDO
was portrayed. The portrait of the ‘City in Blossom, in Bloom and in Boom’ appertains
to “urban constructions” by “an urban ideology of élites” (Evers and Korff, 2000: 17).
The ‘blossoming, blooming and booming’ (Cagayan de Oro City Council, 2003) of CDO
are “cultural strategies that initially represented the results of economic development
turned into strategies aimed at stimulating economic growth” (Zukin, 1996: 280). The
construction of the images of CDO by élites, coupled with the growth of investments
and infrastructural programmes, are the key drivers in furthering economic prospects
as manifested by the establishment of the Night Café.
Divisoria Night Café 65
Role of City Government in the Conceptualization of Night Café
Mayor Vicente Emano originally conceptualised the Night Café in order to find a viable
solution to informality. Emano approached vending as a “phenomenon to be mana-
ged” (Recio and Gomez, 2013: 177). The mayor’s “vision is power” (Zukin 1996: 257) is
transparent in the streets of Divisoria. Emano envisioned a venue where hawkers could
exhibit commodities on weekends (Palmes-Dennis, 2013). In offering an alternative for
the marginalised sector in the city, his idea was supported by the city councillors who
articulated and converted it into a statute.
The city council created Ordinance Number 8920-2003, which legitimised the es-
tablishment of the Night Café in September 2003. The ordinance defined the Night
Café as a regular weekend festivity, open to the public, specifically in Tirso Neri and RN
Abejuela Streets in Divisoria, from seven in the evening until two in the morning. The
Night Café permitted vendors to operate under the 2003 Cagayan de Oro City Revenue
Code. Correspondingly, the ordinance laid down the rules on the set-up, lay-out, food
and beverage preparation, services, sanitation and waste disposal (Cagayan de Oro City
Council, 2003a).The city government, headed by the mayor and dominated by his allies
in the city council, took on the role of legitimising the Night Café.
The legitimisation of theNight Café uncovers “changes in the configuration of élites”
(Evers and Korff, 2000: 17).Themayor, together with the councillors, envision a renewed
CDO.The Night Café symbolises the renewal of the city. Therefore, the reconfiguration
by the city government “imply re-definitions of the meaning of the city and urban “re-
construction” so that the new social and symbolic demands are satisfied” (Evers and
Korff, 2000: 17).
Renewal of Divisoria
The physical renovation of Divisoria started a year after the installation of the Night
Café. The Cagayan de Oro City Council (2004a), through the issuance of Resolution
Number 6864-2004, endorsed the designation of Divisoria as a ‘Business-Tourism Park.’
The resolution-initiated guidelines in coordination with the City Tourism Board, Pu-
blic Works and on Commerce, as well as the private organisation of local businessmen
known as Cagayan de Oro Chamber of Commerce and Industry Foundation, Incorpora-
ted (Oro Chamber). Moreover, the resolution recommended the installation of lollipop
lights (giant, multi-coloured lamp posts), permanent toilets, a dancing fountain, and
paving stones on footpaths. Ultimately, it “aimed at reviving Divisoria’s old glory days”
(Cagayan de Oro City Council, 2004a).
Renewal is manifested not only through re-interpretation of image but also by ar-
chitectural alteration. Architecture, as Eco (2005: 194) articulates, “is an act of commu-
nication, a message, of which the parts or the whole can perform the double action
of every communication, connotation and denotation.” The new objects and fixtures in
Divisoria refer to architectural parts or symbols that communicate new meaning.Their
installation connotes that the Night Café in Divisoria symbolises “blossoming, bloom-
ing and booming” of CDO.
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Zukin (1996: 263) observes how “Culture is often reduced to a set of marketable
images.” “City in Blossom, in Bloom and in Boom” and “Business-Tourism Park” are
merchantable images. These images, combined with marketable symbols such as the
lollipop lights, are then utilised as cultural references to reinforce economic interests.
The Oro Chamber partnered with the city government to foster profit-seeking interest
through the renewal of Divisoria. In other words, “people with economic and political
power have the greatest opportunity to shape public culture by controlling the building
of the city’s public spaces in stone and concrete” (Zukin, 1996: 11).
Figure 2: The Night Café
Copyright permission from Melvin Fortun, 2019.
Contestation
Power in public space does not totally belong to the élites. It is important to realise that
spatial practice is evident in Divisoria. Zukin (1996: 11), succinctly addresses that, “pu-
blic space is inherently democratic.The question of who can occupy public space, and so
define an image of the city, is open-ended.” Various actors participate in public spaces
and indeed partake in the contestation of public space. Kurfürst (2012: 62) posits, “Cities
are socially constructed and therefore politically contested. Conflicts between different
groups are likely to arise about the shape of the landscape.This stems from the fact that
a “unitary culture” does not exist.” In the context of urbanism in Southeast Asia, Evers
and Korff (2000: 6) make the case of “the struggles of different actors, who are trying to
shape the city in a conscious effort, or who simply put their stamp on the city through
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their everyday life within it.” In the case of the Divisoria Night Café, the actors can be
categorised into four groups: vendors/informal sector, mayors/city government, local
citizens and the private-business sector. The following sections discuss the contestati-
on.
The Vendors/Informal Sector
As soon the Night Café began, vendors installed makeshift stalls, chairs, tables, grills
and patio umbrellas in the streets where locals, as well as tourists, gathered to eat,
drink, and shop. They grilled meat and seafood especially for low-and-middle-income
consumers. They displayed assorted goods such as imported second-hand apparel (i.e.,
Ukay-ukay), pirated DVDs, domestic pets and other affordable everyday products. The
Night Café was equally open to the services provided by masseurs, henna tattoo artists,
prostitutes and band players. By and large, the activities provided by the informal sec-
tor were for economic consumption. To interpret precisely, the Night Café advocates a
culture of selling. Zukin (1996: 12), contemplates that, “culture is a system for producing
symbols, every attempt to get people to buy a product becomes a culture industry.”
After several months of operation, the vendors began violating the rules in the ordi-
nance. Firstly, the vendors did not follow the prescribed schedule. The rules stipulated
that operations started at 6:00 p.m. and ended before 3:00 a.m. However, in reality,
the vendors set up their stalls earlier than 5:00 p.m. and their operations ended after
3:00 a.m. Secondly, the vendors who sold dry goods occupied the islands. Thirdly, the
garbage disposal system was not followed. Worst of all, liquor was made available to
minors, particularly the students coming from nearby schools and universities.
The city government responded to these violations by amending the rules. First, Or-
dinance Number 8948-2003 issued prohibition on the use of the islands to the vendors
and also restated the precise opening times (Cagayan de Oro City Council, 2003c). Se-
cond, Ordinance Number 9008-2003 regulated the use of umbrellas; vendors were only
allowed to erect umbrellas when rain occurred (Cagayan de Oro City Council, 2003b).
Thirdly, Ordinance Number 9372-2004 prohibited the sale of alcoholic drinks to minors
below the age of eighteen (Cagayan de Oro City Council, 2004).
Despite the amendments, official regulators assigned in the Night Café lacked the
capacity to implement the guidelines. The violations continued to escalate. As a result,
the Night Café elicited reactions from the locals.
Local Residents
The issue of the Night Café divided the locals into opposing sides and neutral parties.
The various groups highlight either the advantages or disadvantages of the Night Café.
Supporters of the Night Café sympathise with the vendors, reasoning that vendors
are part of the locality and contribute to the economy. To demonstrate, a mango vendor
profited as much Php 3,000 (60 euros) per night from the Night Café; in contrast, she
earns only up to Php 700 (14 euros) per night without the Night Café (Interview with
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Street Vendors, 2016). In short, the Night Café generated a livelihood and employment
for the underprivileged.
The Night Café brought pride and uniqueness to CDO; it was the “trademark of
CDO”, (Pagapulaan, 2016) as articulated by a former barangay councillor. The advoca-
tes further claimed that the Night Café revitalised Divisoria because it promoted local
tourism. In effect, the city government achieved its goal of renewing Divisoria.
On the other hand, the opponents of theNight Café complained of several problems.
First, drunken customers desecrated monuments of local heroes (Alegre, 2013); they
urinated on the statue of Andres Bonifacio that is also the burial site of soldiers from
the 1900 Battle of Macahambus when Filipinos defeated the Americans. The result was
that urine combined with vomit on the streets, walls, fixtures, and other monuments to
fill the air with a stench. Second, as there was no proper water supply, the vendors did
not follow sanitation rules. Instead, they stored pails of water in the streets to be used
for dish and hand washing. In addition, piles of garbage were left on the streets and,
every night after the market ended. Divisoria was plagued with filth. Third, the loud
music from live bands disrupted classes in the university adjacent to Divisoria. Fourth,
the closure of two streets, Tirso Neri and RN Abejuela, two main thoroughfares of the
city, caused a traffic jam that lasted for hours, with the congestion affecting all drivers
and passengers. Fifth, the opposers to the Night Café claimed it to be an event where
crime and prostitution flourished. Moreover, a female prostitute earned as much as
Php 5,000 (100 euros) per night during the Night Café; in contrast, she collected a mere
Php 300 (6 euros) per night in the absence of the Night Café (Interview of Prostitutes,
2016). Given these concrete points, “limitations of the administration allow the market
to emerge as the dominant mechanism for the structuration of urban space” (Evers and
Korff, 2000: 13).
One of the locals argued that a “plaza is not for business” and stressed that the Night
Café was not a “food centre” (Interview of Local Residents, 2016). Instead, he proposed
to find ways of establishing a proper venue and alternatives for the vendors. The Night
Café could be transferred to another public space such as the rotunda. Lastly, the locals
suggested the need for stricter enforcement of rules to maintain sanitation.
Private-Business Sector
It may be noted that at the beginning, the private-business sector organisation in the
city, otherwise known as the Oro Chamber, coordinated with the government to endor-
se the Night Café. However, the group later denounced the weekly event. Oro Chamber
members who own commercial establishments in the private spaces of Divisoria com-
plained of decreasing sales since the traffic congestion discouraged clients. When the
Night Café ended in 2013, the president of the Oro Chamber announced, “We are happy
to receive reports from our members on sales improvement” (The Mindanao Current,
2013). Surprisingly, the occupation of vendors in Divisoria adversely affected the profits
of private enterprises. Thus, the renewal of Divisoria produced a paradoxical effect on
legitimate enterprises.
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Another private entity, the Xavier University-Ateneo de Cagayan, equally detested
the presence of the Night Café. Students inside classrooms across Divisoria lost con-
centration due to the loud and constant music. The university further criticised the
negative influence the Night Café had on the undergraduates in terms of encouraging
an unhealthy lifestyle. By and large, the private sectors opposed the negative effects of
the Night Café as it encroached on their private spheres.
The Mayors
The Night Café ultimately became a political issue in the 2013 mayoral election. It trig-
gered a contest between the two leading candidates: the incumbent Mayor Emano, and
Oscar “Oca” Moreno. Both contestants shared similar educational and political track re-
cords. Both were former provincial governors of the Misamis Oriental province where
CDO is the capital city with Emano governing from 1986 to 1995 and Moreno from 2004
until 2013.
Although both Emano and Moreno possessed public charisma and originated from
influential political clans, they differed in vision and agenda. On the one hand, Emano
remained with his program to continue the Night Café and promote the slogan “City
in Blossom, in Bloom and in Boom.” On the other hand, Moreno’s campaign centred
onHapsay nga Panggobyerno (Orderly Governance). In other words, Moreno aimed to re-
establish order in the streets and within city government. The election was a close race
with Moreno winning over Emano by a thin margin.
Immediately following his victory, Moreno mobilised the programme Hapsay Dalan
(Orderly Streets). Moreno eradicated the Night Café with his first Executive Order 001-
2013. The Oro Chamber then supported the new program to clean up the city’s streets.
Specifically, the Oro Chamber agreed with the official order to eradicate the vendors
in Divisoria in order to regain income. The informal sector was immediately alarmed
and threatened by the sanction. The impact of the sanction can be summed up by the
following:
“Daghan kaayo nawad-an trabaho, nanga pasmo, nanga boang ang uban na giwala
diretso nawala gi taga-i ug trabaho.Muramigmga kawatan, kriminal” (Many lost their
jobs and starved. Somewhose livelihoodswere abolished abruptlywithout prior notice
and without any job prospects went crazy. We were like thieves, criminals) (Interview
with the Leaders of the Association of Massagers in Divisoria, 2016).
The afflicted further lamented
“Na apektohan gyud mi pila ka bulan. Nangita mi aha maka pamaylo ug kwarta para
makalingkawas. Nag ampo gyud mi sa Ginoo na malouy si Mayor [Moreno] na taga-
an mi ug lugar” (We were affected for several months. We tried to find ways to borrow
money in order to survive. We prayed to God that the Mayor [Moreno] would pity us
and find a space for us) (Interview with the Leaders of the Association of Massagers in
Divisoria, 2016).
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Notwithstanding the complaints, themayor intensified the implementation of the sanc-
tions. The Night Café was prohibited for the reason that “it was a tragedy” (Moreno,
2016).The mayor reiterated the point that “There was tremendous traffic, bad smell and
even criminality” (Moreno, 2016). He further rationalised his decision to close the Night
Café by commenting “What happened was that the Night Café—that the intention of
making Divisoria a cultural place had been abused by too much commercialism. The
Night Café became a nightmare” (Moreno, 2016). Nevertheless, the mayor agreed the
Night Café had been a “good idea in the beginning” (Moreno, 2016).
The following evaluation summarises the contest between the two mayors:
“Kung samasa,medyo epektibo si Emano kay daghanman pobre nakapahimulos; Pero
kung koan lang may katungod sa kahapsay, mas epektibo si Moreno kay naka baton
man ug kalinaw” (For themasses, Emano is quite effective since many of the poor ben-
efitted [from Night Café]; however, if we refer to orderliness, Moreno is more compe-
tent because peacefulness [on the streets] was achieved) (Interview with a Disabled
Vendor and Toilette Fee Collector in Divisoria 2016).
Emano may have had the best intentions for both the marginalised and the privile-
ged. The Night Café served the informal sector on one hand, while, on the other hand,
the slogan ‘City in Blossom, in Bloom and in Boom’ fulfilled the promotional needs of
the private-business sector. In spite of the success of the Night Café, the weak imple-
mentation of rules and regulations encouraged disadvantageous consequences for all
stakeholders.
The contestation between the political élites proved who could dominate over the
public space in the city. Importantly, it must be recognised, that the winner depends on
support from business élites. For some time, Emano retained domination because the
Oro Chamber supported his vision of furthering economic interests through cultural
references. Evers and Korff (2000: 13) stress “The rationale for the production of space
is its exchangeability and the profitable usage of space, while the administration tries
to develop the cities following the rationality of their plans.”
Then again, Emanomight have underestimated the business élites and instead over-
estimated his influence on the masses. The moment Emano lost the support of the
business élites, the momentum shifted to Moreno. Oro Chamber’s approval of More-
no illustrates the shift in control. Therefore, the partnership of political and economic
élites ultimately controls the city. Evers and Korff (2000: 11) encapsulate the idea that,
“Cities are made and experienced by the people. Not in a harmonious cooperative effort
but through conflicts between those dominating and imposing their understanding of
the city on those dominated.”
Alternative Spaces
The dissolution of the Night Café pushed displaced vendors to seek other avenues, such
as the semi-public spaces at Paseo del Rio, or, what is commonly known as the rotunda.
The rotunda is a roundabout where one can drive around its perimeter road and occu-
pies an estimated area of 10,000 square meters. This land had been donated to the city
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government by the prominent family of Dr. Jose Golez and Rafaelita Golez (Cagayan de
Oro City Council, 2000). The family then initiated the step of renting out the rotunda
to provide an alternative venue after the Night Café ended. The vendors paid minimal
rental fee to the city government. The experiment succeeded for some time, particular-
ly during fiestas and the Christmas season; nonetheless, it ultimately proved infeasible
because of its inaccessibility (Escobar-San Juan and Pastrano, 2016).
Centrio Mall opened a night market, Mercato de Oro, within its indoor garden,
months after the closure of the Night Café. Mercato de Oro was modelled after Mercato
Centrale at Bonifacio Global City/BGC (Ayala/Centrio Mall, 2013) in Makati city. The
Ayala family corporation owns both BGC and Centrio Mall, along with its emerging
business park. The two establishments are located in the central business districts of
their respective cities.Most importantly, both business centres embody the “small urban
spaces,” like privately managed public parks that can be refashioned to project an image
of civility (Zukin, 1996: 44).The two commercial spaces exhibit the “monopolistic formal
players in a globalizing economy” (Recio andGomez, 2013: 177) since their spaces contain
global brands, shops, hotels, offices together with condominiums. BGC and Centrio
Mall project “an image of global power and influence” (Shatkin, 2005: 591). In short,
both commercial hubs exhibit artificial public spaces exclusive to wealthy clients.
Mercato de Oro replicated the Night Café by following a similar weekend schedule:
Fridays and Saturdays from 4:00 p.m. until 3:00 a.m.This new night market promoted
the selling point: “The Night Food & Lifestyle Market of Northern Mindanao” (Ayala
and Centrio Mall, 2013). Mercato de Oro then used the pineapple icon, a trademark
of Northern Mindanao, where the Del Monte Philippines Corporation has the largest
pineapple plantation in the country.The night market promised to offer arts, crafts and
food at reasonable prices, along with free live music. Mercato de Oro accelerated the
end of the Night Café; however, it excluded those vendors who could not afford the
rental of mall space. The privatisation of urban spaces by the entry of malls erodes the
claim of the vendors to public spaces (Shatkin, 2005). Yet, for the most part, Mercato
de Oro was a failed alternative due to the exclusivity of its customers.The night market
in Centrio Mall quickly faded owing to exclusive artificiality.
After the unsuccessful attempts in the rotunda and Centrio Mall, the mayor sought
another alternative and contemplated relocating the hawkers to Isla de Oro (Moreno,
2016). The city planners, however, noted that the planned relocation was discussed in
the previous years by the heads of the local private business sector (Escobar-San Juan
and Pastrano, 2016). Most importantly, the devastating effects of typhoonWashi on Isla
de Oro in 2011 must be seriously considered, as the area has been declared a no-build
zone. The hawkers could face the risk of disastrous floods.
Conclusion
None of the alternative public spaces offers a solution to the needs of the informal
sector. The vendors face the challenges of accessibility in the rotunda, affordability in
Centrio Mall, and security in Isla de Oro. Notwithstanding the spatial challenges in the
informal sector, the masseurs, after their vehement protest, have managed to remain
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legally in the westernmost island of Divisoria. Moreno allowed exemption for the mas-
seurs because of their work ethic, including their adherence to sanitation standards and
general reserved demeanour. In contrast to the vendors, the masseurs occupy and leave
their area without waste because they are equipped with only chairs and massage kits
consisting of oil/lotion, wooden reflexology tools, towels, and disinfectant. In contrast
to other vendors, the masseurs desist from using or making loud music (Interview with
the Leaders of the Association of Massagers in Divisoria 2016). In conclusion, the ac-
tors from the informal sector prove the ‘idea of public space cannot be guaranteed as it
can only be gained through struggle and contestation’ (Wee, 2014: 23). The appeal of the
masseurs convinced Moreno. Thus, they regained their rights and won the confidence
of the mayor. Kurfürst (2012: 110) stresses “Urban landscapes are socially produced; they
are the outcome of processes of negotiation between diverse social actors.”
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Shifting Landscapes - Shifting Cultures
in Xishuangbanna, Southwest China
Stefanie Wehner (Passau)
Though relatively small in size, Xishuangbanna (Banna) displays an astonishingly high
degree of cultural and biological diversity. This fact has always made Banna attractive
and special, but also vulnerable to external attention, interests and interventions. Geo-
graphically and politically wedged between the powerful empires of Burma and China,
the Buddhist kingdom struggled to keep its independence from the time of its founding
in the 13th century. The Dai, the ruling class of the feudal state settled and dominated
the lowlands while various ethnic groups followed relatively secluded and independent
ways of life in the remote and topographically challenging uplands. From the 19th cen-
tury, Banna came increasingly under the influence of the Chinese Empire and later on
the Republic. After 1950, Banna lost its remaining spheres of sovereignty and was ab-
sorbed into the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Soon, it became integrated into the
national and global economy as a supplier of natural resources and was also the target
of ambitious projects of civilization, modernization and development implemented by
the Chinese state.
Over the last decades, the face, function and structures of the social and physical
landscape of Banna have completely changed. Arguing on the premise that space is pro-
duced and transformed within and through social relations, I will discuss these changes
along with the concept of the paddy line and the rubber line – socio-ecological boundaries
defining and dividing the landscapes and local societies. This article is closely based on
the author’s dissertation (Wehner, 2011) and extensive fieldwork that was undertaken
between 2006 and 2010.
Banna’s Ecological Features
To comprehend the human and social landscape of Banna requires a basic understan-
ding of its environmental and physical conditions. Overmany centuries, livelihoods and
land-use techniques have become highly adapted to the diverse local environment. In
its physical geographical features and historical configurations, Banna can be regarded
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as part of the mountainous mainland of Southeast Asia, and environmental factors still
directly and indirectly influence recent economic and social development. Nestled bet-
ween 21 and 23 degrees north and 99.5 and 105.5 degrees east along the Tropic of Can-
cer, Banna is in many aspects a transition zone that supports a high degree of biological
and cultural diversity. Annual mean temperatures range from 22°C in the lower areas
to around 16°C in higher altitude areas of Western Banna. Average rainfall amounts
to 1400 mm per year (with microclimatic variations). Between May and October, the
south-western monsoon from the Bay of Bengal brings hot, moist air masses whereas
the months from November throughout March are practically free of rainfall. Howe-
ver, annual precipitation is increased during the dry season by about 145 foggy days,
which are crucial for the native tropical vegetation (Zhu, 1997). Banna’s topography is
diverse, with altitudes ranging from 450 m to 2500 m above sea level (asl). With the
foothills of the Himalayas running from north to south, the landscape features rugged
mountains and steep valleys. One of the most striking features is the Lancang Jiang or
Mekong River, which winds through Banna from north to south and is fed by tributaries
from twenty watersheds. The flat valley basins, which cover only 5% of the terrain, are
limited in area but of outstanding importance for human settlement and agricultural
development (Li et al., 2007: 1734).
The Banna region has the highest biodiversity in China; although it covers only 0.2%
of the country’s total landmass, it is home to 5000 species of higher plants (16% of those
found in China), 102 species of mammals (22% of those found in China) and 427 species
and subspecies of birds (36% of those found in China) (Zhang and Cao, 1995: 229). This
diversity is owed to Banna’s location as a transition zone for flora and fauna between
tropical Southeast Asia and subtropical/temperate China. As an old cultural landscape
with a long history of settlement, it also hosts a high degree of cultural and agricultural
diversity.
Banna: Land of a Thousand Paddy Fields and Beyond
Chinese chronicles mention human settlements in the area about 200 BC. However,
considering the settlement history of the wider region of Southeast Asia, it is likely that
settlement dates back even earlier (Zhu, 1992: 3). The largest and so far most dominant
group have been the Dai Lue, who came from the North to settle in the fertile valleys,
driving other groups into less favourable environments in the hillsides. In 1181 AD, the
Dai kingdom of Banna was founded, and the area became an autonomous political enti-
ty. Paddy rice cultivation that had flourished for centuries in the fertile valleys of Banna
allowed surplus production and thus facilitated the development of social stratificati-
on and political organization. Besides the dominant people of the Dai Lue, many other
ethnic groups settled in the mountains of Banna. These peoples, some semi-nomadic,
were hunters and gatherers with little to no political organization beyond the village
gate and little internal social stratification (Kunstadter, 1967)
From a socio-ecological perspective, the advent and expansion of the Dai saw the
emergence of the paddy line. The concept of the paddy line helps us to understand how
social and cultural processes interrelate closely with the physical environment (Weh-
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ner et al., 2014). The paddy line can be described as a socio-ecological boundary that
divided the kingdom of Banna into two spheres: the areas subject to paddy cultivati-
on and the non-paddy cultivating areas. Determined mainly by environmental factors
such as topography, water availability and temperature, groups with different cultural
characteristics developed and co-existed.
Below the paddy line, in the valleys of the Mekong and its tributaries, the Dai peop-
le established a feudal Buddhist kingdom with a certain degree of centralization and
the development of “urban” centres. The consequent transformation of tropical rain-
forests and wetlands into permanent paddy fields resulted in a very strong impact on
the natural environment. The first shift had taken place from an untamed and almost
unused environment to a cultural landscape with the strong management institutions
necessary for the complex task of wetland rice cultivation.
Above the paddy line, the mountainous areas were home to non-Dai groups, such as
the Lahu, Akkha, Yi, and Bulang (Kunstadter, 1967), whose livelihoods depended less on
permanent agriculture andmore on hunting, gathering and shifting cultivation. Becau-
se these groups were spread over mountainous Southeast Asia and parts of Southwest
China, their political and social stratification was limited to within the village commu-
nity. Interaction beyond the village area was mainly limited either to marriage between
people of the same ethnic group from different villages or to trade and exchange of
goods (Walker, 1999). As in other areas of mountainous Southeast Asia, the terrain was
rugged, difficult to access, heavily forested and extensively used.With a low population
density, the area remained under forest cover, and although pristine forests were some-
times encroached on, long fallow periods allowed the regrowth of biologically diverse
secondary forests.
Albeit to a much lesser extent than at present, Banna of the past was divided by
the paddy line with the wild, untamed and not formally regulated landscapes of the
mountainous areas on the one hand and the orderly and legible irrigation landscapes
of the valleys under the direct control of the Dai.
The Emergence of the Rubber Line
The advent of Chinese rule over Banna brought a total change in political-economic
terms; as one of the few subtropical areas in the PRC, Banna attained strategic im-
portance as a rubber cultivating area. From the 1950s on, rubber plantations encroa-
ched on Banna’s more or less pristine forests, facilitated by the collectivization of land
throughout the republic. State farms were established, staffed mainly with deployed
military and Han Chinese farmers, and later with young urban Han Chinese during the
Cultural Revolution. About 200,000-300,000 young people – some forced, some highly
ideologically motivated –were sent during the Youth to the Countryside campaign to labour
on the plantations of rural, backward and uncivilized Banna (Jianchu et al., 2005).
Radiating out from the 11 state rubber farms of lowland Banna, rubber cultivation
spread into Banna’s lowland landscapes, building pockets of modernity. On the sta-
te rubber farms, technological knowledge was applied to create legible and productive
landscapes for rubber cultivation,which was a resource of strategic importance in deve-
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loping and modernizing industry and economy in the young PRC. The impact of these
rubber colonies went far beyond land-use change.
Migrants brought their culture and lifestyles to the state rubber farms. The Han
Chinese lifestyle was considered modern, in contrast to the backward and traditional
culture of the local people from ethnic groups. As Sturgeon (2010: 323) points out, in-
migration and the introduction of the state rubber farms led to “a spatial manifestation
of social hierarchy”, with Han people clearly on top. Those spaces of modernity soon
reached beyond the gates of the rubber farms into the rural capital of Jinghong, where
an influx of Han Chinese started to alter the formerly Dai-dominated urban structure.
In the early 1980s, a period of decollectivization and economic liberalization brought
a completely new dynamic to land use in Banna. The local communes were dismant-
led and local farmers received land-use titles for small-scale farming. Hitherto mainly
involved in farming food crops for subsistence, local smallholders were encouraged to
diversify and invest in rubber trees. State-extension services propagated rubber ex-
pansion on the farms of private smallholders in areas below 700 m (asl) (Grötz, 2016).
Driven by increasing national and international demand, a diffuse expansion of hevea
brasiliensis started from the ever-growing pockets of the state farms.
In the 1990s and early 2000s, poverty alleviation programmes were implemented
by the central government, such as the Slope Land Conversion Programme (Grain for
Green) during the Go-West Campaign, which started in 2001. Local farmers converted
land used for shifting cultivation into rubber plantations, pushing the elevation limit
to well above 1000 m asl, which is beyond the ecological limits for hevea brasiliensis
in these latitudes. By 2016, almost 100,000 households from over 1,000 villages were
engaged in rubber cultivation (Xu and Yi, 2015: 803).
Sequences of aerial or satellite images clearly show that the 5-hectare rubber pockets
of the state farms in the 1950s became a carpet of more than 300,000 hectares by 2014
(Min et al., 2017). Rubber now covers about 20-25% of Banna’s total land area. Banna, an
old cultural landscape in terms of morphology, vegetation and function is not as homo-
genous a landscape as it was in the past. Divided roughly by the rubber line, we can now
observe at least three different cultural landscapes, each with its own ecological, soci-
al and economic morphology and characteristics. First, the “legible” landscapes of the
lowlands (Scott, 2009), which have mainly turned rubber monocultures, have lost much
in terms of biological, agro-biological and land-use diversity. Even under smallholder
farming systems, perennial cash crop plantations have replaced shifting cultivation and
forest systems. Cash crop cultivation has diminished the significance of rice cultivation
and rice subsistence. Lowland landscapes have turned static and have little flexibility
left for land-use change.
The second type of cultural landscape lies in the upland areas above the rubber line,
which have also undergone far-reaching transformations. However, neither face nor
functionality has changed completely in those upper, less accessible parts. Despite the
intensification of land use and introduction of cash crops, the landscape hasmaintained
some of its important features of dynamism and flexibility and still supports diverse
farming practices and land-use patterns.
The third landscape type could be described as urban, and includes the city of Jing-
hong, followed by Mengla and Menghai, which all have a tendency to intensive ho-
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rizontal and vertical expansion; from 1976 to 2015, those three cities multiplied their
demand for space from about 15 km² to almost 200 km². From a remote and laid-back
town on the banks of the Mekong River, Jinghong developed, or rather was developed
into a sparkling and exotic tourist gateway to Southeast Asia. Hotels, restaurants and
sights of interests, including Southeast Asia’s largest Buddhist temple complex, were
constructed. In 2013, Banna received more than 2.7 Mio. tourists (Neo and Pow, 2015).
As part of the Go-West strategy, huge sums were invested in Jinghong from the late
1990s, with local and regional governments striving to increase and diversify tax reve-
nues and generate employment. Not only the urban centres but also rural areas and
infrastructure increased the demand on the landscape: in the case of townships and
villages from about 6 km² to 115 km² in the same period (Cao et al., 2017: 8). Albeit not
the focus of this article, it is worth mentioning that urbanization and the development
of the tourism sector have repercussions on the surrounding rural areas; for example,
urbanization increases demand for agricultural and non-timber forest products, and
tourism acts as an employment motor and a magnet for the under-employed youth
from rural areas.
Institutional Changes in Land-use Regulations and Practices
Having described changes on a physical level, this article will now focus on the un-
derlying socio-political processes that triggered or facilitated change in land-use and
landscape. These processes were driven by institutions, which can be best described
using Scott’s (2008: 48) definition:
“Institutions consist of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities
that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour. Institutions are transported by
various carriers – culture, structure, and routine – and they operate at multiple levels
of jurisdiction.”
At the constitutional level, the area was subdued over the last seven decades by two ma-
jor transformations, or rather institutional ruptures. During theMao era,many institu-
tions were abolished to make way for “modern” communist regulations and structures,
the most prominent example of which was the introduction of the People’s Commu-
ne. As Shapiro (2001: 67) points out “Ideas would unleash raw labour to conquer and
remould nature”, destroying institutions that ensured a certain level of efficiency and
sustainability in economic and ecological terms.
Then, during the 1980s, responsibility for agricultural production returned to the
household level and the flow of money, goods, ideas and people became increasingly
liberalised. However, responsibility for land use in a wider sense remained beyond the
individual or the local level. Rather, land-use regulations increasingly became an issue
of strategic concern. Even more intensively than during the first decades of communist
rule, space was turned into a commodity, and its produce – rubber and other cash crops
or electricity from the hydro-electric plants – was fed into national and international
markets (Korff and Wehner, 2009).
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Landscapes and spaces in Banna are currently under an increasing amount of pres-
sure, triggered by the advent of actors with a plethora of different interests and inten-
tions. Land-use policies, rights and access to land are negotiated and influenced by an
increasing number of actors, often with completely diverging interests, such as local in-
dividuals and administrators, business people and state agencies from different levels
of administration.These diverging interests mostly stake their claim in a spatial sphere
by claiming space and triggering a change in land use. Put simply, we can find three
main groups with interests and aims that sometimes overlap but are more often con-
tradictory: small- and large-scale investors, ranging from local business people to state-
owned companies; government-driven poverty reduction schemes; and international-
and state-driven environmental protection schemes (Wehner, 2011).
Institutional Change on an Operational Scale
The described integration of Banna into national and global networks had two simul-
taneous but rather contradictory effects on the development of land-use institutions:
homogenisation and heterogenisation. We will look at the change in land use by focus-
sing on two villages that lie on different sides of the rubber line. As a methodological
framework, Ostrom’s Institutions and Development Framework (IAD) helps to analyse
and understand the structures, actors and activities that shaped landscapes and liveli-
hoods in Banna (Ostrom, 2005; Wehner, 2011).
Mandian and Xiao Nuo You Shan Zhai:
Only 25 Kilometers Distant, and yet Worlds Apart
Mandian (MD), an old Dai village, and Xiao Nuo You Shan Zhai (XNY) are located re-
spectively at about 800 m asl and 1200 m asl. Whereas MD has had road access since a
state rubber farm was established in the vicinity in the early 1960s, the all-weather road
to XNY was still under construction in 2013.
Both villages were only a handful of bamboo and thatch houses in the 1960s, with
limited cultivated land in their vicinity and surrounded by native forests (Grötz, 2016).
The villages and their surroundings took different paths of development, despite simi-
lar institutional settings concerning land use. When land use is categorised according
to Ostrom’s IAD framework of human-environmental interactions as irrigated land,
dryland and forest land, it becomes evident how livelihoods and landscapes developed.
The Heart of the Southeast Asian Cultural Landscape: Paddy Cultivation
Paddy fields in both the lowlands and the uplands have been subject to the green revo-
lution propagated by state agencies. In the 1980s, hybrid varieties replaced a plethora
of local rice varieties and required the input of chemical fertilizers and pesticides. Alt-
hough some of the old varieties that had adapted to the highland climate survived in
XNY, in MD only small patches of glutinous rice for consumption on festive days have
been kept. Historically, paddy rice cultivation demanded a high level of cooperation wi-
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thin the village, and the maintenance of the irrigation systems and transplanting and
harvesting of rice were traditionally tasks shared between households working mutual-
ly. Mechanization of paddy cultivation, which occurred especially in the lowlands, led
to higher labour efficiency but also to less need for mutual support, thus weakening the
social fabric of the moral economy as a foundation of Southeast Asian societies (Scott,
1977).
The fact that animal husbandry, especially of buffaloes, went into a strong decline
might appear negligible at first sight; however, the impact on the livelihoods of a certain
part of the population is significant. Taking care of animals and herding buffaloes were
the responsibility of senior villagers, so though being released of this responsibility
might be a blessing for some, for others it represents a loss of value and meaning. More
than just a farm animal, buffaloes provided fertilizer and fuel, gave financial safety as a
tradable good and played an important role as a status symbol and in cultural practices
and rituals (Rousseau and Sturgeon, 2019).
Despite the introduction of modern farming technologies, paddy cultivation is still
a prevalent feature of the landscape. Under the nationwide LandManagement Law revi-
sed in 1998, conversion from high-class agricultural land (such as irrigated paddy land),
at least by individual leaseholders, is prohibited (Ding, 2003).Thus, the area of irrigated
land has remained relatively stable, and remote sensing analysis suggests that paddy
area in Banna did not decline between 1976 and 2015 (Cao et al., 2017).
The example of MD, however, shows how local interests are overruled from above.
Farmers faced the expropriation of almost 15% of their fertile paddy areas because the
land was reallocated to build a resettlement village to accommodate those whose village
was flooded during the construction of the Jinghong hydro dam, one of the dams along
the Mekong cascade, (Wehner, 2011).
Because the introduction of hybrid varieties allowed rice productivity to exceed the
subsistence level, some of the paddy fields are leased to external producers. Investors
from other counties, or even provinces, lease the land to cultivate fruit and vegetables
on an individual and short-term basis. Though this practice certainly adds to income
diversity, the long-term benefits are not clear. Considering that almost 20% of China’s
agricultural land is already polluted (Chen et al., 2014), farmers run high risks of losing
control over the health of their soils since it is not easy to regulate the use of farm
chemicals by contractors with short term interests.
Implementation of land-use regulation makes clear that irrigated land is a major
factor in the food security of households in the community. The tenure for paddy fields
is not as secure as tenure for other land use classes; to endow every villager with a
local hukou (local resident-ship) that provides at least the minimum of paddy field for
subsistence, tenure is rededicated from time to time (Grötz, 2016).
In XNY, exemplary of other highland areas, paddy cultivation remains a more sub-
stantial part of agriculture due to the higher degree of subsistence. Morphological and
climatic conditionsmean that paddy cultivation in the uplands has undergone less tech-
nological change than in the lowlands because small terraces in steep terrain limit me-
chanization, and vegetation growth is limited to 6 months between May and October.
Because of a general lack of cash income, upland farmers cultivating fields in these en-
vironmentally less favourable conditions tend to apply fewer chemical fertilizers and
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pesticides, and hence the margins of increased expense on farm chemicals remain re-
latively minimal. Another feature of paddy cultivation in the uplands is the distance
between fields and settlement.While most paddy fields in MD surround the settlement
in close proximity in the relatively wide valley bottom, many of the rice terraces in the
highlands are located in steeper valley bottoms and at the lower reaches of the valley
slopes to provide access to the water resources.This means long travelling distances (up
to two hours walking) to the fields, which draws heavily on the time budget.
Shift and Shape: Dryland and Shifting Lands Disappearing
Also typical of the landscapes of mountainous Southeast Asia in the Mekong region are
the mosaic patterns of dryland and shifting agriculture.The Chinese government made
great efforts to put an end to shifting agriculture; both to end non-sedentary forms of
livelihood and for environmental reasons. Shifting cultivation/swidden agriculture was
made the scapegoat for the destruction of natural forests over the last decade but has
found some rehabilitation lately (Alcorn and Royo, 2015; Cairns, 2015).
Nevertheless, this land-use type has been affected by conversion, both in the upland
areas and even more so in the lowlands, leading to significant changes in livelihood
and the environment. In MD, as in all other lowland areas of Banna, areas that were
used for dryland agriculture of annual plants with or without fallow periods or grazing
have been dedicated to another use, namely rubber plantations. Agricultural production
since has been limited to rubber and rice. Production of corn as a food and fodder crop
has ceased, and grazing land for livestock is no longer available.
Situated close to a state rubber farm,MD village was among the very first villages to
come in contact with the rubber economy.After the household responsibility systemwas
introduced, the government and the state farms massively propagated the expansion of
rubber cultivation. In relatively favourable climatic conditions, the financial benefits of
rubber became evident rather promptly, and after emanating from a trial area of about
3 ha in 1984, rubber plantations now cover all arable land except paddy fields. Even the
tea plantations that villagers had cultivated for decades were transformed into rubber
plantations (Wehner, 2010).
Since the transformation from subsistence tomarket economy, the village ofMDhas
one of the highest cash incomes per capita, with a far-reaching socio-cultural impact.
This includes a change in food habits, dependence on an external food supply, housing
and altered workloads, working schedules and tasks.
In XNYZ, perennial rubber plantations have not encroached on the flexible dryland
areas. However, as in other upland areas of Banna, the Sloping Land Conversion pro-
gramme, the Grain for Green programme and the ban of slash and burn practices all
led to the introduction of permanent or perennial cultivation practices (Xu, 2006). Tea
plantations were recovered and expanded, including newly introduced mixed-cropping
systems (Leshem et al., 2010). Bamboo plantations were introduced with the Menghai-
based bamboo factory as a reliable buyer and processor of construction material. Fur-
thermore, the area given over to tea plantations was expanded, both those owned by
local villagers as well as those owned by external investors. In 2008, hemp was introdu-
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ced as a new cash crop. Grown as a resource for fibre production, hemp is, like bamboo,
purchased by the regional processing plant in Menghai. This state-owned enterprise
manufactures fabrics for the national market, including fabrics for the People’s Libera-
tion Army. While receiving intensive technical and financial support from government
extension services, individual households adopted the new crop quickly. To facilitate
the transport of bamboo and hemp to the markets in Menghai, a former jungle path
connecting XNY to the westward villages was upgraded to a gravel road, improving
access to the villages and towns in Menghai County.
From the macro perspective, landscapes of the uplands have not changed as pro-
foundly as landscapes of lowland Banna. Even though the uplands are still predomi-
nantly void of perennial cash crops, agricultural innovations nevertheless have had a
significant impact on local socioeconomics and ecology. The cultivation of ecologically
well-adapted upland rice and corn varieties, once the backbone of local grain subsis-
tence, was cut back, with a loss in food sovereignty and agro-biodiversity. On the other
hand, the structure of the local, monopolistic sales markets for hemp and bamboo and
the demand for seeds and farm chemicals have increased the dependency of local far-
mers. Though XNY has a relatively large amount of land per inhabitant, pressure on
ecological systems of the dryland areas has increased beyond the input of farm chemi-
cals and exogenous seeds. As local farmers report, the swidden-cultivation circle has
drastically altered, allowing for much shorter fallow periods, or even none at all, and
the effect of this change on the biodiversity and subsistence opportunities that swid-
den landscapes normally provide has been detrimental. Swidden agriculture systems
in Southeast Asia provide rich agro-ecosystems hosting hundreds of species of plants,
fungi and animals, many of them collected by swidden cultivators to provide food, me-
dicinal plants and other materials (Kunstadter, 1967; Rerkasem et al., 2009). In Banna,
research found that villagers use more than 70 plant species from their fallow fields for
direct use, diversification of their house gardens or for sale (Fu et al., 2003). Especially
in the more remote areas of Banna, traditional medicinal plants and food supplement
from wild plants still play a big role, as Ghorbani et al. (2012) point out.
From Holiness to Homogeneity: Forests in Banna
Seemingly untouched, native and wild forests are definitely a land cover of the past.
Primary forests remain intact only in a few areas of Banna, like the core zones of nature
reserves.
Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) statistics on forest cover in China do not
show severe forest loss, but rather an increase of forest cover. However, because these
statistics do not discriminate between natural forests and tree plantations. Thus they
do not reflect the profound transformation in quality. This includes, for example, the
severely diminished degree to which rubber plantations provide biological diversity,
erosion control and carbon storage capacity, their negative impact on the macro and
meso-climate and other declines in the eco-system services provided by natural forests
(Hu et al., 2008). However, research shows that forest transformation is reaching new
peaks. Between 1988 and 2003, “Rubber plantations in Xishuangbanna showed a linear
increase, while at the same time, natural forests showed a linear decrease. From 1999 to
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2010, expansion of rubber plantation and decline of natural forests accelerated drama-
tically” (Zhai et al., 2017: 151). Particularly, forested areas suitable for rubber plantations
were converted to rubber, including areas within protection zones (Sarathchandra et
al., 2018).
However, the forest areas around XNY close to the Naban Nature Reserves Core Zo-
ne were not converted. Quite the contrary, in the area of this highland village, natural
regrowth of natural forest area occurred and, at least theoretically, the use of the fo-
rests is strictly regulated. Villagers are entitled to collect timber for construction and
firewood and also to collect non-timber forest products. Especially bamboo-shoots and
funghi, namely the Mu-Er mushroom, are marketable products sought after by tourists
and inhabitants of Jinghong and other urban areas. Although, as Ghorbani et al. (2012)
point out, this puts pressure on the remaining forest ecosystems, the appreciation of
forests in XNY prevails, certainly also fostered by the support and educational efforts
of the nature reserve extension staff.
In the lowlands, the picture is an entirely different one. InMD as well as in other Dai
villages nearby, rubber plantations have completely replaced natural forests. Apart from
the loss of natural forests as a base for material resources mentioned above, forests have
lost their meaning asmetaphysical spaces in every-day and ritual life, as has beenmani-
fested in the desacralization of the relationship between humans and the environment.
Culturally intrinsic to all ethnic groups, the bond between people and nature went well
beyond the environmental space as a base for food, medicines and housing. Within the
last decades, propagated firstly by the ideological claims of the cultural revolution and
later on by capitalistic market-driven ideologies, the environment has lost its former
meaning and importance as a spiritual space, for example the Dai Holy Hill Forests as
“the place where gods live, (…). Any violence and disturbance for plants and animals in
the forest will be punished by the gods” (Hongmao et al., 2002: 707). While the Holy
Hills of the Dai are the last remnants of conservation throughout Dai villages in Banna,
there are none inMD village. Determined by the LandManagement Law and the dictate
of cash crops, monocultures shape the village-scape of MD, resulting in orderly rows of
rubber trees and hybrid-rice terraces.
Shifting Landscapes: Shifting Cultures
Below the rubber line, everyday life has become better. Secure housing in concrete buil-
dings, best described as Neo-Dai architecture, have replaced the quaint traditional tim-
ber-and-brick constructions. Cash income allows the purchase of modern household
appliances and vehicles, at least a motorcycle if not a car. As pointed out before, food
patterns have changed from subsistence to a market-based diet, with the exception of
rice. Not only have consumption patterns of food changed, also an integration of consu-
merism has taken place. Dai lifestyle has become similar to everyday life in other parts
of the PRC. After decades of poverty and shortages, consumerism has become a domi-
nant force in Chinese popular culture (Jacka et al., 2013). Consumption patterns are only
one side of the coin of economic prosperity, the other is the mode of production. Fossil
fuel-free subsistence farming in an environment of agricultural diversity has been re-
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placed by a monoculture cash crop for the world market. As Sturgeon (2012) points out,
rubber is a completely generic product. There is no linkage along the supply chain, no
attachment between producer, product and post-production or the consumer. In other
words, the car mechanic in Shanghai will certainly not bear Banna’s undulating rubber
hills in mind while changing his tyres. This can be interpreted as a profound alienation
from the production base. However, in the local discourse being a rubber farmer is seen
as modern and progressive and the economic status that allows an improved standard
of living is perceived as a positive development (Wehner, 2011).
Returning to the landscape level, rubber monoculture and despiritualization have
profoundly reduced the potential for promoting tourism. A huge gap exists between
the exoticized imaginary Dai landscapes consisting of pristine forests, lush paddy fields
and historic Dai architecture and the reality of rubber plantations and Dai-ized con-
crete houses. For example, the Mandian waterfall, a popular site for individual tourists
in the 1990s, has lost its attraction since the surrounding forests have disappeared and
changes in meso-climate and hydrology have reduced the waterfall to a trickle during
most months of the year.Themodern Dai rubber landscape does not leave much oppor-
tunity to develop types of tourism, for example ethnic tourism that caters to individual
tourists and travellers, which could have facilitated the re-introduction of traditional
cultural practices (Chen, 2014).
In the case of the upland communities, development has been less rapid and less
profound.Quality of housing and living standards have increased steadily on a less steep
curve, as has the intensity of land-use transformation. Farming at the subsistence level
is much more prevalent compared to the rubber-based village economies. Integration
into the national and world market has only partly taken place, using a range of cash
crops, which is less lucrative but also less volatile to external drivers. Since there is still
little surplus income after meeting basic demands in farming supplies and basic house-
hold goods, consumerism has not yet become a reality. The glitzy world of middle- and
upper-class urban China remains a dream (or nightmare) delivered into the households
by Chinese soap operas on TV or on an infrequent trip to the urban centers of Banna.
Themost important cash crop is tea, a plant endemic to the region, which has found
worldwide appreciation over the last decades. The ancient tea horse road once linked
Banna and Southern Yunnan to Tibet and other parts of Asia (Fuchs, 2008). Somewhat
neglected during the Mao period, a long-standing tradition of tea cultivation was re-
vived in the early 2000s when the first studies on its health benefits were published.
Since 2008, the name Pu-Erh tea is protected and can only be used for fermented tea
of Camilla sinensis var. assamica that is produced and processed in Yunnan. China-
wide and increasingly on the international scale, Pu-Erh tea produced in the region
offers wide opportunities for tourism and regional marketing. In Jinghong and Meng-
hai, streets are lined with numerous tea shops, offering the whole range from cheap
to high-end premium tea. Unlike rubber, tea has the potential to be an authentic pro-
duct that includes the opportunity for an emotional connection: the producer of tea is
proud of his traditional and esteemed product and the buyer is proud of an authentic
and precious product, which might evoke images of bucolic Yunnanese landscapes du-
ring the process of buying and consuming (Sturgeon, 2012). Producing tea and other
cash crops is not the only land-use activity that distinguishes this upland village from
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the rubber areas: as mentioned earlier, forests around the village were saved and could
recover. The villagers, living close to the core zone of the national nature reserve, have
become aware of the multi-faceted value of their forests and have developed an attitude
of stewardship.
Scott (1998) suggests a differentiation between the visual and functional order of
a landscape. The order of the rubber landscapes has been changed both visually and
functionally: rubber landscapes are homogenous, formalized and legible, and the vil-
lage economies are tightly linked to international markets and influenced by Chinese
culture. In contrast, the upland landscape retains some of its mosaic-like and unor-
derly appearance, and in its functionality the upland landscape is more heterogeneous
and flexible. Despite the intensification and expansion of monoculture, upland land-
use systems allow much more flexibility and more room for local decision-making on
land use. The combination of cash and subsistence production renders upland farmers
less affluent but possibly more resilient to external influences.
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The moral space and the logic of collective
self-organisation of domestic workers in Chennai, India
Johanna Vogel (Bonn) & Eberhard Rothfuß (Bayreuth)
Abstract
Our overarching contribution in this chapter is the claim that a shared “moral topogra-
phy” (Taylor, 1994) of lower classes can create forms of collective ‘consciousness’ which
may lead to collective action. In order to establish that a shared moral topography is an
incremental prerequisite for creating practical spaces for self-organisation, the chap-
ter outlines Charles Taylor’s concept of morality, “moral topography”, “moral space and
actions” as well as the concept of “identity”. Empirical data show that the moral topo-
graphy of domestic workers in Chennai (Tamil Nadu, India) is characterized by a shared
meaning and collective experiences of injustice. Further empirical evidence demonstra-
tes that due to this common understanding of injustice, domestic workers in Chennai
start organising themselves informally and establishing trade unions. Through self-or-
ganisation, domestic workers meet a demand for social security which the state fails to
provide.
The fieldwork of this qualitative study was conducted within and funded by the Eu-
ropean Project FP7-PEOPLE-2010-IRSES “URBANSELF - A North-South-Network on Urban
Self-Organisation and Public Life in Europe, India and China” (2011-2014) which was scien-
tifically coordinated by Prof. Dr. Ruediger Korff. We would like to share this academic
achievement with him, in honour of and appreciation for years of fruitful and contra-
dictory discussions – including those on administrative and financial issues that some-
times proved to be exhaustive and ‘painful’ – during our joint endeavour, URBANSELF.
Introduction – What was URBANSELF about?
Cities are transformers of development processes (Braudel, 1992; Korff, 2003), and given
the ambivalent nature of development, they not only become centres of problems, con-
flicts and tensions but also form innovativemilieus (Hall, 2000). Accordingly, cities con-
tinuously create new ways of coping with changing circumstances through social and
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pragmatic creativity (Joas, 1996). This requires new perspectives on urban planning and
urban governance. Traditionally, expert-based urban planning has defined the ‘correct’
technical solutions. Yet lately, this technical-rational approach has come under question
worldwide, and scholars instead emphasise the role of citizens in problem identifica-
tion and solution. This alternative approach is not seamless, however. It creates other
problems regarding, for example, the extent to which citizen participation is integrated
into the planning of the urban future. Usually, citizen participation happens through
political representation. Thus, it is politicians or influential political office-holders that
decide what plans shall be made, what visions are to be followed and how these should
be implemented (e.g., decisions about scarce resources).
URBANSELF - A North-South-Network on Urban Self-Organisation and Public Life in Eu-
rope, India and China was funded by the European grant programme FP7-PEOPLE-2010-
IRSES from 2011 to 2014 and built on existing contacts of cooperative research and
knowledge exchange.1 The objective of URBANSELF was to bring together and integra-
te competences on urban processes in Europe, India and China with a specific focus on
urban self-organisation and how this may contribute to the development and enhance-
ment of public dialogue within and between the three participating areas. URBANSELF
intended to strengthen the North-South dialogue and strengthen the role of civil society
within Europe, India and China. In the “urban age” (Davis, 2006), cross-border know-
ledge exchange is particularly significant as urban problems are increasingly becoming
global challenges.
Driving transformation in governance, policy and politics has aimed at enhancing
the role of citizens and their self-organizing capacities.This has been achieved through
the rise of organisations that enable the articulation of interests and concerns as well as
the creation of socioeconomic practices. In this process, urban governance had to colla-
borate with citizen-based organisations. As supporting self-organisation is crucial for
such a transition towards real citizen participation, self-organisation has been seen as
necessary for urban sustainability. The key objective of URBANSELF was, therefore, to
understand these forms of organisation through comparative discussions and to trans-
fer knowledge of existing research on European cities and rapidly growing (mega-)cities
in India and China. This then allowed us for empirically founded theoretical conclusi-
ons which in turn provided the basis for identifying innovative approaches to urban
challenges from an actor-oriented perspective.
Some conceptual thoughts on urban self-organisation
Self-organisation is an approach which seeks to understand notions of social norming,
social learning and social change within communities or groups, and their locally de-
veloped forms of organising and acting in response to locally, nationally or globally en-
countered and constructed problems. Processes of self-organisation fundamentally de-
pend on the prevailing political system and the quality of labour laws. Self-organisation
is more likely to be successful in democratic political systems in which labour laws have
1 See https://cordis.europa.eu/ project/rcn/99659/reporting/en.
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a legislative basis. Essentially, self-organisation is a way of representing processes that
institutionalise the social relationships derived from a variety of local networks (Atkin-
son, Hasanov, Dörfler, Rothfuß & Smith, 2017). Thus, it is achieved through encounters
– perhaps of a serendipitous nature – that lead to the identification of mutual interests,
positions and relations (Mayntz, 2006; Ostrom et al., 1999). These interactions initially
generate trust derived from individual relationships. Over time and through further in-
teractions, they transform into collective forms of (moral) trust articulated actions that
create “collective intentionality” (Hasanov & Beaumont, 2016) or “joint intentionalities”
as Messner and Weinlich (2016: 18) would express it.
Self-organisation could also be regarded as a form of cooperation. Cooperation can
be conceptualized as horizontal (i.e., among actors having the same social position) or
vertical (i.e., among actors from different social positions). Messner, Guarín, and Haun
(2016) have identified seven factors that make cooperation on a global level more likely:
reciprocity, trust, communication, fairness, mechanisms of enforcement, reputation
and we-identity. Similarly, on the micro level self-organisation might be more likely to
emerge when facets of these factors are fulfilled in one or the other way. A constitu-
ted ‘we-identity’ can be regarded as the joint moral framework that creates the basis
of self-organisation. This is not to say that self-organised collectives act ‘anarchical’ as
they have to institutionalise some of their procedures, though they always try to uphold
a certain ‘fluidity’ and openness of social processes and internal innovation to prevent a
“social death” (Atkinson, Dörfler & Rothfuß, 2018).This process of self-organising is of-
ten connected to the concept of charisma.With the rise of an organisation, the charisma
of the founder(s) is stabilised and routinised (or “veralltäglicht”, see Weber, 2000) and
incorporated into the organisation. Enhanced coordination and cooperation allows for
differentiation and specialisation within the organisation, which in turn strengthens
the potential for strategically pushing certain interests (Castells, 1983).
On the urban sphere, self-organisation is crucial for the functioning of cities and
the creation of coping strategies. Self-organisation provides multiple benefits and re-
duces costs for the people as well as the administration. For instance, through self-help,
housing is provided, especially in specific informal quarters of the Global urban South
where the weak state is not able to deliver this service. In addition, recycling and was-
te treatment is organised informally and the city is supplied with cheap resources for
informal trade, food production, labour, etc. (Korff and Rothfuß, 2009). This improved
social cohesion results in an increase in social control which translates into less exter-
nal control. The self-organised, functioning community is itself a resource (or social
capital) for its members that provide mutual support, and thereby, economic and social
security. Social capital is increasingly taken into account, but as a personal asset.
Against these perspectives on social capital, there is a need for research on social
capital as a “collective property resource” (Ostrom, 1991). In fact, social capital is pro-
duced through the ability of collectives to create new patterns of social relations and
patterns of organisation – that is, through social creativity. Thus, in self-organisation
social capital is maintained as collective agency through a process by which a social-
ly cohesive collective maintains itself (Rothfuß and Korff, 2015). Neighbourhood, joint
working and collective activities are means through which multicultural tolerance is
established. Multiple social relations and interdependencies amongst inhabitants de-
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veloping out of work, trade, neighbourhood, kinship or friendship become stabilised
through organisation. This is particularly the case when the addressed problems re-
quire collective action. In such cases, self-organisation is connected to territorial defi-
nitions and demarcations of a collective, defined as a “locality” (Korff, 2003). Localities
neither resemble administrative districts, nor closely knit communities.What defines a
locality are the local organisations that have the capacity to define and maintain spatial
boundaries (Berner & Korff, 1995).
“Moral space” – Our theoretical entry point
Our focus on the geographies of ‘doing ethics’ situates our theoretical approach as part
of the ‘moral turn’ in human geography (Valentine, 2005; Smith, 1997). Moral geogra-
phies are commonly divided into meta-ethics, descriptive ethics and normative ethics
(Matless, 2000). This refers to the ways in which the connection between humans and
their social environments mirror and (re)produce moral conduct (Philo, 1991). Moral
geographies shed light on the closeness to and distance from people in existential need
as an important intersubjective parameter in the moral philosophy of care (Korf, 2006;
Barnett and Land, 2007). Assumptions in moral geographies are often conceptualized
as the plural of a given moral rule or ethical principle, and socially approved codes of
conduct (Setten, 2004).
This approach is distinct, as it conceives moralities as continuously constituted
through social, material and spatial relations. Within this framework, we examine the
contemporary processes of ‘doing ethics’ of domestic workers in Chennai, the relational
processes through which moralities emerge in a “moral space” (Taylor, 1989), highlight-
ing the immanence of ethics in daily practices (Lambek, 2010).We intend to hermeneu-
tically understand the moral lifeworld of ‘ordinary people’ who create their own history
and geography of ‘tactics’ (i.e., the ‘differential space’ in a Lefebvrian sense) under condi-
tions they have not chosen themselves (De Certeau, 1984; see Rothfuß and Vogel, 2013).
We hereby refer to Charles Taylor’s argumentation that the dimension of morality
is not something which simply overlays human action but is rather something which is
inherent to the human existence per se (Breuer, Leusch, and Mersch, 1996: 184). Taylor’s
claim is that human subjectivity has a “moral” dimension because of its non-contin-
gent connection to frameworks of strong value” (Abbey 2004: 43). Taylor defends the
thesis “that doing without frameworks is utterly impossible for us; otherwise put, that
the horizons within which we live our lives and which make sense of them have to in-
clude these strong qualitative discriminations” (1989: 27). He postulates that humans
always interpret the world that surrounds them and attribute sense to the social reality
through their subjective horizon of experiences. Consequently, all human matters can
only be described in the context of such a horizon of meanings. Human actions take
place within a “moral space”, because all human actions are the result of moral evalua-
tions. According to Taylor, moral space is “a space in which questions arise about what
is good or bad, what is worth doing and what not, what has meaning and importan-
ce for you and what is trivial and secondary” (1989: 28). He assumes that humans live
in a space of questions to which their framework-definitions are the answers. These
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answers allow humans to position themselves within the moral space and decide what
meanings things have for them (Taylor, 1989: 29).Moral space is different in each culture,
and though it has collective effects within each, it can also be individually interpreted.
Indeed, Hartmut Rosa describes Taylor’s moral space as a “space of cultural meaning”
(1998: 182).
Moral topography describes moral space, its nature, property and conditions. It
maps the criteria which help decide how to orient oneself within a given moral space
(Taylor, 1989: 28-29). Taylor refers to “knowing one’s way around amoral space” as identi-
ty; humans who know their identity knowwhat is right or wrong.Hence, the connection
Taylor draws between orientation and identity becomes clear (Taylor, 1989: 28). As an
inherent part of human existence, morality is interlinked with human actions which
means that a normative dimension underlies human actions, practices and structures.
Humans always attribute social meaning to their actions. Consequently, they only act
if the action makes practical sense to them (see Bourdieu (1998) “sens pratique”). Ac-
cording to Taylor, this sense is characterized by “strong values”; human beings evaluate
their actions based on principles concerning how “good” or “bad” something is (Breuer
et al., 1996: 184). Taylor further argues that humans position themselves in line with the
perceived “good” (1989: 47).
Socio-spatial inequality in Chennai
With 8.7 million inhabitants, Chennai is India’s fourth largest urban centre and one
of the hot spots of India’s automobile and information technology (IT) industry (Go-
vernment of India (2015a); Government of India -Ministry ofHomeAffairs (2014). Chen-
nai is also the capital of Tamil Nadu, the most urbanized state of India, with 48.45% of
the population living in cities (Sivakumar, 2011).
The country has experienced rapid processes of urbanization since its independence
in 1947 (Bohle and Sakdapolrak, 2008: 12). This extreme urban growth has led to in-
creasing inequalities which are spatially expressed and materialized in slum areas. The
number of slums is strongly linked to income per person as well as level of industria-
lization and employment opportunities in a city (Bohle and Sakdapolrak, 2008: 14). As
explained in the United Nations Human Settlements Programme report, “slums result
from a combination of poverty or low incomes with inadequacies in the housing pro-
vision system, so that poor people are forced to seek affordable accommodation and
land that become increasingly inadequate” (2003: 10). Though a universally accepted
definition of “slum” does not exist, the United Nations Human Settlement Program-
me identifies the following attributes: lack of basic services (e.g., sanitation facilities,
drinking water, waste collection systems, electricity, surfaced roads, etc.), substandard
housing or illegal inadequate building structures, overcrowding and high density, unhe-
althy living conditions and hazardous locations, insecure tenure (irregular or informal
settlements), poverty and a minimum settlement size (2003: 11).
Almost one third (28.5%) of Chennai’s population lives in slums. Chennai’s economic
growth and development havemainly been facilitated though the IT industry. As a result
of population growth and real estate speculation, land has become increasingly scarce
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and many poor people have been pushed to live in slum areas (Bohle and Sakdapolrak,
2008: 15). In their empirical study on Chennai, Bohle and Sakdapolrak demonstrate
the wide distribution of slums throughout the city, implying that the middle classes
and the poor live side by side. A higher density of slums is located in the poorer north
of Chennai as well as in the less secure and marginalized territories along riversides,
canals and railways (2008: 15).
The Indian census from 2011 provides a statistical overview of the living conditions
of households in Indian slums (Chandramouli, 2014). This census is applicable for the
interviewed domestic workers in Chennai, all of which were living in slum areas.
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The data in Table 1 show that the very basic facilities for living are fulfilled for a
great majority of slum dwellers: over three-quarters of the slum dwellers live in perma-
nent houses, 70% live in their own house, 74% have access to tap water, 90% have access
to electricity, 94% have a kitchen facility inside and 80% have some form of bathing
facility. This confirms that the overall living conditions for slum dwellers have impro-
ved. However, the data also shows that there is still room for improvement. Only 36%
of the slum households have a connection to a closed drainage system and 34% still
have no latrine. The data also give evidence of the accessibility to consumer products:
around 70% of the households in slums own a television, around 73% have a telephone
and around 40% have a bicycle (Government of India, 2015b). These numbers provide
a general outline of the lifeworld of slum dwellers in India which is also applicable for
the living conditions in slums in Chennai where domestic workers usually live. All of
the domestic workers that have participated in the study sample “Maids and Madams
– Negotiating Inequality in Urban Chennai” (Vogel, 2018) were living in slum areas.
The moral topography in the everyday lives of domestic workers in Chennai
The remainder of the chapter examines the case study of maids in Chennai based on the
empirical evidence obtained within the PhD project “Maids and Madams - Negotiating
Inequality in Urban Chennai” (Vogel, 2018)2. A variety of everyday practices associa-
ted with modernization shape the domestic workers’ moral topography. In the case of
maids in Chennai, a common definition and shared experiences of injustice – among
others –characterize the moral topography. “Justice” is a significant moral source con-
stituting the framework of domestic worker’s collective identity. From justice, the ideal
2 During 2012 and 2013, around 70 qualitative interviews with domestic workers, middle class em-
ployers and experts have been conducted in Chennai. 30 of these, were conducted with domestic
workers, working as part-time maids in middle class households in Chennai.
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of “equality” is derived.The intrinsic concept of equality is a “strong value” (Taylor, 1989)
that make up the moral topography of domestic workers in Chennai. These workers
have the ideal of attaining an “equal” status to their employers. They position themsel-
ves vis-à-vis their employer in relation to this ideal. Hence, domestic workers evaluate
each action of the employer as well as their own actions in relation to “equality”.
Domestic Workers want to live a decent life under conditions they perceive as fair
and humane. So far, the state has failed to provide domestic workers with these fair
and humane conditions. Domestic service in India have hardly been touched by state
policies (Neetha, 2009: 489). Neetha (2009: 497) argues that approximately 99.9% of do-
mestic workers in India have no formal contract regulating their working arrangement.
The lack of accommodation in national law and the informality of the sector reflect the
domestic workers’ weak position in society. Nevertheless, evidence shows that domestic
workers have been demanding a life under fairer and more humane conditions. They
compare their own lives to that of the middle class and feel that they “deserve” better. As
explained above, domestic workers share a collective moral framework which is mar-
ked by this normative claim of equality and to which they compare their current living
conditions.
One aspect, which demonstrates that domestic workers share a collective sense of
justice is the fact that they expect their employers to think of them not as “servants” –
which they regard as disrespectful and discriminatory – but as “workers”.They expect a
certain intersubjective feeling of recognition, dignity and respect.We adhere to Charles
Taylor’s (1989: 64) understanding of respect, an important dimension of which is “equa-
lity”. Hementions that many people within modern culture consider their highest good
to be the notion that “all humans should be treated equally with respect”. The domestic
workers in Chennai demand this kind of equal respect: “Respect. If you see a servant not
think as a servant but of respect. (…). They should talk with respect” (DW 10/ 372-374).3 This
domestic worker articulates directly, that she will not accept her employer to think of
domestic workers as servants, but demands to be respected as an equal human being.
The next quotation further demonstrates that domestic workers expect their employers
to treat them respectfully: “They should be kind to workers. Should not use disrespectful words.
Should treat workers with respect. If they want us to take anything then they should say it in a
kind manner rather than using harsh words” (DW 11/ 353).
Further quotations from domestic workers show that they expect employers to talk
to them in a calm, soft and respectful manner.This again demonstrates that the workers
have an underlying notion of justice. Fulfilling the ideal of equality deriving from this
notion, means that the employer show respect through her speech with the worker:
“See if you do not talk to me properly, then I will not be interested in doing any work. I would feel
frustrated. It is just not me, everyone will feel the same” (DW 13/ 322).The last three quotations
highlight that domestic workers use equal respect as a criterion in helping them decide
whether or not an employer treats themwell.The statements also show that the workers
do not accept disrespectful and discriminatory treatment or language. The following
3 The full transcription of the empirical data used in the study from Vogel (2018) is accessible online
under: http://www.lit-verlag.de/isbn/3-643-90996-1. DW stands for domestic worker, M for middle
class women (employer) and E for expert.
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citation shows even clearer that feelings of resistance emerge when domestic workers
experience disrespectful treatment:
“They should be calm and soft-spoken. They should not ask me to do something in a
high-handed way. If they understand the work pressure on me and adjust and tell me:
‘Ok, you finish your other house work and come.’ Then I will also be happy that they
understand me. Or if they say: ‘You have to do this. You cannot go anywhere. You have
to come at this time.’ Then I will not feel like going to that house. Some people will be
sitting and when we are doing our work, they will ask me to pick up something. I do
not like it.” (DW 27/ 313)
This worker stated that she would not feel like going to an employer which uses disre-
spectful speech towards her. This feeling and habitus of resistance is another evidence
for a shared feeling of injustice. Domestic workers collectively agree that disrespectful
speech and treatment are not acceptable because a moral feeling of justice and equality
is inherent to their human existence. Comparing their everyday experiences to the ideal
of being respected equally, the workers feel a shared sense of injustice because they are
not treated in the same way as their employers.
A second point demonstrating a shared sense of justice are practices regarding “ea-
ting from the same plates”. One maid reported that nowadays domestic workers could
eat from the same plates as their employers: “Long back, the employers used to give
us separate vessels to drink or eat something! But it’s no longer the same case. We are
allowed to eat food in the same plates they eat. I mean not the plates without washing; I
just mean the same plates and no separate plates” (DW 14/ 136). This statement incorpo-
rates a spatial dimension: domestic workers think that their employers should eat from
the same plate – that is, from the same level – because they are equal human beings.
This spatial manifestation of the logic of equality is a good example showing how fruit-
ful Taylor’s concept of moral topography is in describing the connection among the
spatial, moral and social dimensions.
Another domestic worker was asked about her opinion about an employer who
would provide separate plates for the worker: “For our point it is wrong but for them,
they feel it is right. So what can we say about it? (…) “Because we are all human beings.
Now the problem is some people may be sick, maybe because of that they are doing this. We are
like this. What if they have some illness, why should we use the same thing? Some thoughts come
in our minds about other people. So I do not worry about this. I just go and do the work and come
back” (DW 13/ 253-255). While by using the pronoun “our” the worker demonstrates a
collective sense of justice, she also clearly articulates that, from their perspective, it is
wrong not to eat from the same plates. This domestic views the separation of plates
as an unequal treatment and argues that as both employer and employee are human
beings, there is no need to treat them differently. However, she also thinks this cannot
be stated as such in front of the madams. Her strategy to deal with this inequality is
simply not to think about it. So the underlying ambivalence concerning the unjust equal
positions in a social (and spatial) order becomes visible.
The following quotation demonstrates that when this ambivalence comes up, then
it has to be negotiated. In this case, a worker is negotiating “traditional” roles, by using
her employer’s humiliation as a humiliation towards the employer herself:
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“If I have no time after I send off my children and was in a hurry. I used to go like that
and no other go! And she will scoldme like: ‘Why do you come like a beggar?’ (…) I told:
‘You have kept a beggar only as your servant.’ (…) I told her: ‘This beggar only is doing
all your chores and cleaning works for you!’ She responded: ‘Shut up yourmouth! Don’t
keep answering my questions like this!” (DW 6/ 281-293)
In this instance, the middle class employer called the worker a beggar because she did
not come to work “clean” enough.Themaid openly arguedwith her employer and turned
the humiliation around. In such moments, when the shared sense of injustice surface
and become openly negotiated, self-organisation processes are initiated.
This chapter reflected empirical evidence of an “intuitively given consciousness of
injustice” (Moore, 1978) in the domestic worker which goes in line with Honneth’s (1995)
argumentation. Honneth claims that it is not the orientation towards positively formu-
lated moral principles that form the basis for and motivation of social protest within
the excluded ‘under classes’, but rather, the experience of violation and misrecognition
through their intuitively given consciousness of injustice. The potential of this con-
sciousness of injustice lies in the way in which the excluded can disclose and enforce
possible suggestions for justice. Struggles for recognition indicate distributive injusti-
ces in society often suffered by less-privileged groups (Honneth, 1995).
Unionising processes as forms of self-organisation
based on a shared awareness of human rights and dignity
The empirical data from Johanna Vogel’s (2018) study demonstrates that domestic
workers in Chennai share a common sense of injustice. On this basis, processes of
self-organisation may be triggered and domestic workers may start claiming and
fighting for their rights. Charles Taylor refers as “dignity” to the characteristics by
which humans think of themselves “as commanding (or failing to command) the
respect of those around” them (Taylor, 1989: 15). In other words, for Taylor dignity is the
“sense of ourselves as commanding (attitudinal) respect” (Taylor, 1989: 15). In Chennai,
domestic workers start demanding respect from their middle class female employers
and through the inceptive processes of self-organisation, they fight for a life in dignity.
The following empirical statements highlight this argument.
An interviewed social worker mentions an increased social consciousness among
the middle class resulting from the workers’ and the Dalit movement. She further ex-
plicates that middle class women are forced to treat their workers better because of
high demand of the workers:
“I think the middle class are being forced to pay higher wages and treat them a little
better than they did before. (…). I think one is of course the demand and supply. But I
also think there has been very built up social consciousness, which comes through the
workers movement and the Dalit movement.” (E 03/66- 68)
Here, the social worker also mentions an awakening social consciousness among the
workers. Thus, a higher level of education in line with the extended possibilities of be-
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coming educated resulted in a deeper awareness of labour and human rights among
domestic workers as well as middle class women.
For the workers, the newly gained consciousness of their rights has often led to a
self-confident behaviour. Furthermore, it can be argued that the benefits of globalisa-
tion and liberalisation has had what Ulrich Beck describes as an “elevation effect” (Beck,
2003) on the lives of the lower classes. The living standards of domestic workers have
increased, and this in turn, has made them less dependent on their employers. Thus,
based on the above outlined shared sense of injustice, maids start organising them-
selves.The employers in Chennai report that domestic workers have started to articulate
their rights and change their expectations:
“So they know their rights. They can demand certain things. If they are not happy,
they (have) better opportunities everywhere” (M 27/ 218). Likewise: “Yea they under-
stand. Like they know, like this we can expect only this from them. You can expect
more money, you can’t expect more money. All this they know very well. Even though
some of them are not well educated. By their experience, they know very well, what
they get from where.” (M 25/123)
The collective articulation of injustice is the basis upon which maids claim their rights
for decent working conditions and a decent life – a good life. Domestic workers decla-
re the necessity to fight for their rights: “(…) In Madras only if you protest and struggle you
can survive and work here. Else they will grind chilly on your head” (DW 10/ 103). Meanwhile,
forming domestic workers’ unions has become more common: “Before they used to call
us ‘workers’ in such a degrading way and give us work. Now it is changing. We will fight for our
rights. They will take members for the society and we can talk about our problems in these mee-
tings. I am in one of the societies for (the) past five years” (DW 09/ 141). Therefore, processes
of self-organisation have started to become more institutionalised.The following para-
graphs present three organisations with which the interviewed maids are affiliated and
through which they have started institutionalising/unionising processes in Chennai.
The first of these is the National DomesticWorkersMovement (NDWM)which seeks
to improve the legal situation of domestic workers. Founded in 1985, the NDWM is one
of the biggest and most influential national and statewide organisations (Mattila, 2012:
13). This organisation is registered as an NGO and has strong links to the Catholic Bi-
shops’ Conference of India (Neetha and Palriwala, 2011: 114). It was founded by a Belgian
missionary and is now operating in 23 Indian states (ibid: 113; Footnote 64). In total it
has almost 2.5 million domestic workers as members and in Tamil Nadu the organi-
sation works in 18 districts (United Nations Development Programme, 2012: 20). Its
main objectives are the empowerment of domestic workers, the fixation of a just mi-
nimum wage and the establishment of humane working conditions. They seek to reach
these goals through increased unionisation, networking, capacity building, awareness
and lobbying campaigns as well as formulating policy recommendations and legislati-
ons (Neetha & Palriwala, 2011: 1133; National Domestic Workers Movement, 2007). In
Chennai, 3000 women were registered as members of the NDWM trade union in 2013
(E 02/ 110) and seven of the interviewed workers were part of the NDWM.Most of these
women reported that they take part in union meetings. In a few interviews, an acute
awareness of labour and human rights could be noted among the domestic workers de-
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monstrating that workers who were unionised were more aware of labour rights issues.
The prominence of the NDWM shows that state institutions in charge of labour rights
protection are partly dysfunctional. The informality of the sector resulted in domestic
workers in Chennai not receiving wages according to Indian Labour Wage Regulations
(Neetha and Palriwala, 2011: 111). A minimumwage has only been set in 2018. Even then,
this is much below market standards.4
Another prominent organisation in Chennai is the Centre for Women’s Develop-
ment and Research (CWDR) founded in 1993. According to the 2010 CWDR Impact As-
sessment Report, the organisation is active in 85 slums in Chennai (Azariah & Vani,
2010: 5). Their focus lies on domestic workers, adolescent girls and single women. The
main objectives of the CWDR are to foster domestic worker trade union enrolment, or-
ganise women into self-help groups as well as create and strengthen educational oppor-
tunities (Azariah & Vani, 2010: 5-6). Although 14 of the interviewed domestic workers in
Chennai acknowledged being members of the CWDR Manushi Trade Union, the majo-
rity felt that they had not benefited from their membership. In spite of this, there were
women with a high awareness of labour and human rights among the interviewees.
Even if the impact appears thus far to be modest, the empirical data demonstrates that
at least a certain level of awareness has been reached.
The third organisation is the Centre of Indian Trade Unions (CITU), one of the lar-
gest party-affiliated trade unions. Efforts to increase unionisation in Chennai have been
strengthened by left-leaning political parties and the long-established trade unions as-
sociated with them. The leader of the Chennai Section for Domestic Workers reported
that in general the unionising processes of domestic workers is a difficult task. Due to
the hours and the nature of domestic work, participation in union activities is rather
low and the great majority of workers are not unionised (Mattila, 2012:13; Neetha and
Palriwala, 2011:113). In explaining the low unionisation rates among domestic workers,
CITU cited the fact that union work is not considered female work and that domestic
workers do not recognize themselves as workers (E 04/ 96).
Hence, the above empirical case study of domestic workers in Chennai has shown
that these female workers share a collective sense of injustice. Examples of workers
who expect employers to talk to them respectfully or to treat them equally by using
the same plates for their food show that the domestic workers have a shared moral
source of justice according to which they evaluate these actions as unjust. Furthermore,
this shared moral topography have resulted in domestic workers’ starting to organise
themselves.
Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we intended to shed light on the moral topography and the nature and
conditions that constitute everyday ethics of marginalized citizens in Chennai. Our
attempt to articulate the specific characteristics of the moral topography of domestic
4 Seehttp://www.newindianexpress.com/states/tamil-nadu/2018/sep/19/new-minimum-wage-cap-
will-lead-to-exploitation-of-domestic-workers-1874107.html.
Self-organisation of domestic workers in Chennai, India 103
workers and understand their geographies of “doing ethics” (Lambek, 2010) have pro-
vided a deeper understanding of how moralities are continuously constituted through
social, material and spatial relations.
The moral topography of the everyday lives of domestic workers in Chennai is cha-
racterised by shared experiences of injustice. Justice, as a moral source, begets the ideal
‘equality’. Consequently, domestic workers express their ideal of a relation marked by
‘equity’ to their middle-class employers. This shared sense of justice become evident in
the domestic workers’ claim to a decent and fair life. One aspect of this claim is their
expectation of recognition and respect from their employers. The empirical evidence
demonstrates that domestic workers often do not (any longer) tolerate disrespectful
and discriminatory actions or forms of communication from their employers. Indeed,
the presence of such treatment leads to feelings of rejection and resistance which, in
turn, result in specific collective practices.
Furthermore, examples from the everyday practices of domestic workers show that
the moral dimension also manifests spatially; different levels of respect are attributed
to different societal groups. Especially the topic ‘eating from the same plate’ provides
a good example of the spatial manifestation of morality. The above mentioned logic of
equality in the collective conscious of domestic workers necessitates they eat spatially on
the same level as their middle class employers. A shared sense of injustice and increased
awareness of their rights drive domestic workers to start organising themselves in the
lack of such spatial equality. The National Domestic Workers Movement along with
two other examples of organisations promoting domestic workers’ rights proved that
processes of self-organisation has started to become more and more formalised.
To conclude, the practical and pragmatic knowledge production of marginalised
urban citizens is increasingly important in an urban world evermore complex and po-
larised. Knowledge and practices created and implemented by citizens themselves are
powerful and socially often more legitimate, and therefore, promise to be effective in
everyday life. The project URBANSELF provided a conceptual basis for identifying and
understanding collective practices in the realm of the citizens in order to tackle urban
challenges in the Global South and the Global North.
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Figure 1: Domestic workers in the Canal Bank slum in Mylapore, Chennai (Vo-
gel 2018 )
Figure 2: Domestic worker washing dishes in the kitchen while the employer
(right) is preparing tea (Vogel 2018 )
Self-organisation of domestic workers in Chennai, India 105
Figure 3: Slum area at a river bank in Chennai (Vogel 2018 )
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Mobility, porosity and the peri-urban city in Vietnam
Mirjam Le (Passau)
Introduction
Driving from Đà Nẳng to Tam Kỳ along Highway 1A, one passes endless rice fields,
crosses small rivers and sees water buffalos. However, one can also observe continuous
construction efforts as every town and village along the highway is keen to modernize.
Arriving in Tam Kỳ, provincial capital of Quảng Nam province, these efforts continue as
the city slowly grows into its hinterland. Urban transformations dominate these spaces
in small Vietnamese cities.These transformations include changes to their spatial struc-
tures, the livelihood strategies of local people and the urban identity of the cities. Many
of these transformations follow patterns similar to big urban centres: a changing demo-
graphic due to migration from rural areas, the construction of new infrastructure and
the development of new urban areas. Urban planners and city administrations cause
this homogenization in the urban periphery based on a singular path of development.
They produce visions of a modern urban future for small cities based on “travelling ur-
ban forms” (Söderström, 2013) with large national or international cities as point of
reference. On the surface, urbanization in these small towns is hence only a repetition
of developments already described and analyzed elsewhere. This is supported by rese-
arch focused on large, national cities, like Hà Nội or Hồ Chí Minh City (Ton Nu Quynh
Tran et al., 2012; Fanchette, 2016; Harms, 2011; Harms, 2016). In this paper, I extend
this research on urbanization in Vietnam by looking beyond the national urban centres
towards secondary cities.
I argue that processes of self-organized urbanization and social creativity (Evers
and Korff, 2003) in small urban centres can counter this homogenous process of ur-
ban planning. They create a space of interaction in which urban aspirations are able
to realize a liveable urban future for its citizens. To make this possible two related di-
mensions are relevant: (1) mobility and (2) porosity. Whereas mobility is a main feature
of modern societies, it is especially important for smaller cities, which are located at
the periphery. Practices of mobility allow engaging with the world (Talcoli, 2004). Local
planners import mobile urban forms from outside sources, which they use as a blue-
print to transform the physical, functional and symbolic landscape of the city. However
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mobility also becomes a resource for local people in navigating these changing lands-
capes and thereby a tool to access new opportunities.
Wolfrum (2018) defines porosity as the existence of open,mobile spaces without any
clear function, easy to enter and re-imagine continuously. It is a precondition for the
use of mobility as resource. A multifunctional use of open space, a lack of boundaries
as well as overlapping practices and symbols characterize urban porosity. The spatial
proximity between rural and urban areas and the existence of empty wasteland, newly
developed areas, construction sites and in-migration produce porosity. It can be found
everywhere in small towns in Vietnam from the city centre to the peri-urban areas and
enables mobility for local people. It produces a multilevel landscape of urban planning,
self-organization and negotiation between state and non-state actors.
Mobility and porosity create the peri-urban city, which I define as a fluid space of
transformation, which contains a high level of porosity with an urban level of density.
This provides numerous open, undefined spaces to explore and appropriate. In the set-
ting of small and medium sized towns, not only does the urban space cut into the rural
hinterland, but the rural hinterland also reaches into the heart of the urban centre.
This paper is a by-product of my field research in Tam Kỳ in 2014 and 2015 and
explores the practices of mobility and porosity used by local actors and local state ad-
ministrators, which create the “peri-urban city”. To this end, I use qualitative data from
35 semi-structured interviews of local inhabitants conducted from November 2014 un-
til March 2015 in four wards of Tam Kỳ (Tam Thánh, An Phú, Hòa Thuận and Trường
Xuân). Visual data on urban development, mostly photos, document the use and trans-
formation of space. Furthermore, the study analyses local newspaper articles as well as
official documents of the local administration.
Defining the Peri-urban City
Small town urbanisation as multi-dimensional interface
Looking at urbanization of large national cities in Vietnam, the existing literature de-
scribes a dual process of metropolisation and peri-urbanisation, which combines the
integration of rural space into urban space with the integration of this urban space into
a global network (Ton et al., 2012; Fanchette, 2016; Harms, 2011). The socio-spatial in-
tegration of space and people takes mostly place at the peri-urban edge. Harms (2011)
anthropological study “Saigon’s Edge” describes the emerging new urban areas on the
outskirts of Hồ Chí Minh City, Bousquet (2016) analyses peri-urban space in Hanoi and
the book “Hà Nội: a Metropolis in the Making” edited by Fanchette (2016) focuses on the
integration of villages into the urban fabric of Hà Nội. Here, peri-urban development is
characterized “by low to medium density dispersed urban development with low con-
nectivity and sometimes large areas of vacant or low-level production agricultural land
between settlements” (Roberts, 2016:11 based on Almeida, 2005).This also includes poor
urban services and infrastructure, the prevalence of farming activities on small plots
and family-owned commercial and business activities. With growing urban develop-
ment, the industrial manufacturing increases. (Roberts, 2016)
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However, in the case of small and medium-sized cities like Tam Kỳ, the distinction
between rural and urban and the localization of peri-urban space become more diffi-
cult. The integration of rural areas into urban space takes place at the same time as the
consolidation of the urban core into a homogenous urban space occurs. In the mean-
time, rural and peri-urban processes, activities and spatial characteristics reach into
the urban centre, because the urban centre and the rural hinterland are geographically
close. Markers of rural activities, especially agriculture, are still prevalent in the urban
core, close to modern housing facilities or supermarkets. Contrarily to the idea that the
urban is spreading out into the periphery and transforming rural into urban space, in
small and medium-sized cities, the characteristics of the rural survive and push into
urban space. The whole city is simultaneously rural and urban. Instead of a peri-urban
frontier at the edge of the city like in Hà Nội, the whole city becomes a frontier space,
on the edge between the urban and the rural as well as the local and the global.
I argue that small and medium-sized cities in Vietnam can be perceived as peri-
urban spaces of transformation and hence ‘peri-urban cities’. A mixed spatial use of
rural and urban activities in the surrounding hinterland as well as in the city centre
characterizes these cities. Peri-urbanisation as frame of analysis cannot only help to
understand the transformation processes in the surrounding periphery of these cities,
but also to analyse the distinct functions, characteristics and processes of these cities.
The ambivalence of peri-urban space defies the clear categories of urban or rural
used in the local discourse and by the Vietnamese state during the urban planning pro-
cess (Harms, 2011). Peri-urban space is often defined as a continuum between rural
and urban. This creates a space of transformation changing rural into urban struc-
tures (Brook et al., 2003; Narain, 2010; Simon et al., 2006). Peri-urban space becomes
an interface for people, goods and information, which move through space (Brook et
al., 2003; Narain, 2010; Simon et al., 2006). This in-betweenness also characterizes the
urban in smaller cities in Vietnam that are rapidly transforming due to urbanisation.
Being located in the urban periphery, they provide an interface, which transforms rural
into urban citizens and relocates goods and services between rural and urban space.
(Talcoli, 2004)
Furthermore, Harms (2011) defines peri-urban space by its social edginess.This me-
ans the mutual existence of opportunities and marginalisation created by the position
of local actors at the blurred boundaries of urban and rural space (Harms, 2011). Social
edginess emerges from the ambivalence of peri-urban space that exists as a grey zone
of administrative, social and economic status.This ambivalence and the emerging inse-
curities create a mobile contested space (Narain, 2010) and the need for risk spreading
and the diversification of livelihood strategies. The peri-urban grey zone enables some
actors to take control and adapt their own strategies (Harms, 2011). Others are faced
with marginalisation due to a lack of access to resources in this contested space. Thus,
peri-urban space creates a pattern of inclusion and exclusion based on the access to re-
sources and social creativity, defined by Korff and Evers (2003:14-15) as “the knowledge,
usage and coordination of resources available”, especially concerning social interactions
and networks.
This social edginess, I argue, also characterizes small towns in Vietnam. The influx
of new residents, the re-orientation from the local to the national and global, the mate-
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rial and functional transformation due to urban development plans force local actors in
small towns to constantly renegotiate their position in the urban space. As new resour-
ces and livelihood strategies become available, others are lost. Hybrid social forms and
rural livelihood strategies persist in the urban core of small towns, for example in the
form of the agricultural use of land. Secondary cities become ‘peri-urban’ as a whole.
They are a frontier between the local rural and global urban. They produce spaces of
transformation and globalization. Being neither urban nor rural, they provide an inter-
face for rural and urban goods, people and ideas to interact.They offer opportunities for
newmigrants and old inhabitants but will also marginalize them.They are in a constant
process of transformation, produce new identities, offer open space for new develop-
ments and modern aspirations, and engage in a constant process of negotiation. The
two main dimensions of these peri-urban cities are porosity and mobility.
Porosity as spatial dimension
The urban environment differs from rural space by a higher density of people, buil-
dings and activities (Wirth, 1938). However, this urban density is interrupted by bor-
ders, thresholds, and forgotten empty spaces.These spatial interruptions of the physical
space create porosity in the built environment. Porosity combines the density of urban
space with the existence of voids as empty and open spaces throughout the physical
urban environment. These voids provide openness, accessibility and mobility, as well
as space for innovation, flexibility and negotiation. Whereas porosity exists in every
urban space, it is especially prevalent in peri-urban spaces where transformation pro-
cesses continuously open and close access to space. (Wolfrum, 2018; BypassLab, 2016:
10-14)
Porosity links density to spatial openness and voids. In rural space, density is low.
There exists a high degree of homogeneity combinedwith a high amount of vacant, open
space. In urban space, high density and high heterogeneity of actors and activities do-
minate while spatial voids are smaller and more scatter. Between these two extremes
of rural and urban, in peri-urban space, we can find a high level of porosity, but irre-
gular growing density and increasing social, functional and spatial heterogeneity due
to processes of transformation.
Finally, porosity encourages the mobility of peri-urban people within and between
the urban and peri-urban. Porosity and the subsequent mobility of peri-urban people
enable them to simultaneously access and use different roles, fulfil different functions
and evoke different symbols, similar to the description of social edginess by Harms
(2011). Porosity is leading to fluidity concerning symbols, activities and people (Wol-
frum, 2018).
However, whereas existing thresholds and borders in the physical space encourage
accessibility and mobility that connects spaces, fixed boundaries limit or end move-
ments. They create dead-ends, which interrupt mobility and openness. The result is a
fragmentation of space,which is also amain spatial feature of peri-urban areas. Contra-
ry to porosity, which supports the multifunctional use of space, spatial fragmentation
restricts the use of space. Furthermore, it creates a landscape of fragmented patterns in
which urban and rural spatial patterns exist simultaneously side by side (Harms, 2011).
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Mobility as social dimension
Mobility of people and goods as well as of ideas and discourses has always a spatial and
a social component. The physical movement in space expresses the spatial dimension.
The social construction of its meaning defines the social dimension. Together, they en-
able the interaction with the surrounding world (Cresswell, 2007; Söderström, 2013: 2).
According to Cresswell (2013: 21), underlying power relations determine the access to
mobility, the meanings attached to it, its experience and practice and its regulations.
The existing physical structures are the materialization of these power relations and
they reproduce them at the same time.
Mobility plays a central role in producing ‘peri-urban cities’. It can reduce margina-
lization and enable the adaptation of livelihood strategies in a transforming spatial and
functional landscape. Mobility provides access to resources, networks and interactions.
It enables the diversification of income at the household level. It allows incorporating
global and national ideas into the local discourse. Finally, it also facilitates the estab-
lishment of secondary cities as interface between centre and periphery.
In the urban fabric, the built environment and the regulative framework enhance or
limit mobility. In cities of the Global South, these spatial forms are often mobile urban
forms imported from industrialized countries. They include sets of architecture, infra-
structure, symbols and regulations, which together summarize the expectation of how
a modern urban landscape must look like. They are part of projects of modernization
implemented by urban actors as promise of a modern, civilized life (Söderström, 2013:
2). Söderström (2013) describes these urban forms as urban pedagogies, which incorpo-
rate an educative and disciplinary function. In this function, they educate their users
about modern urban behaviour and help create the modern, urban subject. They also
provide means of control for state agents as they encourage ‘civilized’ behaviour. Howe-
ver, urban forms also manifest an emancipatory function by opening new urban spaces
for urban citizen and their mobility projects (Söderström, 2013).These mobility projects
can include resistance and subversion as well innovative, interactive and integrative ac-
tivities in urban space. This enables local urban citizen to participate in shaping urban
identities, meanings and communities (Söderström, 2013: 2).
Mobile urban forms function as means of control and discipline and as means of
empowerment and contestation.They aremobile imaginations,which attempt to create
a material, functional and symbolic pattern, which influences the everyday mobility in
real locations.
Mobile urban forms: Mobility and urban planning in Tam Kỳ
Urbanization in Vietnam follows a predefined path towards a homogeneous urban
image linked to global discourses of modernity and sustainability (Söderström, 2013).
Urban planning reproduces this global imagination without including a local meaning.
Based on a comprehensive framework of formal urban planning, state actors are the
main developers of urban space. The Vietnamese state aims to regulate the urbanizati-
on process and facilitate the legibility of urban space. The state defines a vision of the
urban as civilized, clean and modern that every urban area under state control should
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implement as prescribed in the Law on Urban Planning. By using amaster plan for each
city, the state controls the urbanization process (Harms, 2011). The implementation of
this orderly urban vision aims to prevent the emergence of an ugly urban image and
maintain urban civility (Harms, 2011; Harms, 2014). Kurfürst (2012) and Labbé (2013)
describe this process, which links modernization, urban planning with civility for Hà
Nội, Kaiser (2014) and Schwenkel (2014) for Vinh. Kaiser (2014) and Schwenkel (2014)
also take the mobility of urban forms (from Eastern Germany to Vietnam) to reproduce
modernity into account.
The Vietnamese state further enforces its control by establishing a representation
of space (Schmid, 2008) in each city, which embodies the state, its symbolisms and its
power relations. This state vision of urban space as modern, clean and orderly is partly
borrowed from a global discourse - and hence already highly mobile. It travels from the
centre to the periphery – a process, which leads to the introduction into local discourses
and the reinterpretation of this vision based on local needs. Furthermore, peripheral
cities nowadays also participate in global networks and discourses. As a result, urban
forms travel from the global directly to the local setting as in the case of TamKỳ (Harms,
2011; Söderström, 2013).
Urban civility (văn minh đô thị) (Harms, 2014), as used by state officials as well
as local residents, expresses this “will to impose order on human beings living in social
groups” (Harms, 2014: .226).This concept works as top-down instrument of government
control as well as a bottom-up critique of a chaotic social order. Many Vietnamese per-
ceive the cities as out of control (Harms, 2014).The urban realities of urban everyday life
do not always align with the image of amodern, civil city. Instead, self-organization is a
strong component of the urban everyday life in Vietnam as local residents adjust regu-
lations to their daily needs and use spatial porosity as a resource.This becomes possible
due to the mediation space located at the interface between state institutions and local
community, which enables negotiation and adaptation of the implementation of sta-
te regulations in local space (Koh, 2006). Consequently, the emerging representational
space as described by Lefebvre, which is rooted in the local environment and counter-
balances state control (Schmid, 2008; Prigge, 2008) is a lived space, a space for local
residents, representing symbols and meanings outside of state control and ideology.
Thus, there coexists a state-led urbanisation process and a process of a self-orga-
nized urbanisation, as well as a state space of representation and a representational
space. The difference between the urban image and the urban practice is prevalent in
urban areas. With regard to mobility, this differentiation happens between the intro-
duction and implementation of mobile ideas of a civilized, sustainable modern city on
the one hand and on the other hand, the practice of mobility in the everyday life as a
coping strategy to adapt to the ever-changing urban realities.
Urban planning in Tam Kỳ: Modernisation, internationalisation
and privatisation
Tam Kỳ has been the provincial capital of the Central Vietnamese province of Quảng
Nam since 1997. It is located 70 km south of Đà Nẵng along the National Highway 1A
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and 30 km north of the Chu Lai Industrial Zone, at the Central Vietnamese coast. It
has an area of 92.82 km2 and over 120,000 inhabitants in nine urban and four rural
wards. Based on the Vietnamese categorization of cities, Tam Kỳ is a Grade 2 City since
2016 (VGNNews, 2016), based on the population, the provision of specific infrastructure
and economic performance (Decree No. 42/2009/ND-CP OF MAY 7, 2009). Agricultu-
re, aquaculture, handicraft, small services and a small industrial sector dominate the
economy (AVC, 2013).
The Nguyễn Dynasty founded Tam Kỳ in 1906 as tax post (AVC, 2013). In the 1960s
and 1970s, an American air base was located in the proximity of the city. The urban
area of Tam Kỳ was concentrated along the highway, which crossed the city (today Phan
Châu Trinh Street), the market and the river.The Communist forces controlled the sur-
rounding rural areas. With the exception of a major battle in 1969 (“Battle of Yui Non
Hill”), Tam Kỳ did not play any important role during the war or after the Communist
conquest on March 24, 1975 until it became the provincial capital in 1997.
As a recent foundation without any historical symbolism and meanings, Tam Kỳ
provides urban planners with the opportunity to realize their urban aspirations. Sur-
rounded by rice fields and empty wasteland, this spatial and symbolic porosity provides
the ideal landscape to build a modern city from scratch.
Embedded into the national urban framework and the Vietnamese concepts of the
city, this vision defines the city as a space of modernity. It is not rooted in a local tra-
dition but in a global imagery of urban modernity, having travelled to Vietnam as mo-
bile urban form (Söderström, 2013). In Tam Kỳ, this means that city officials meet with
other global actors in a global forum to develop and discuss new urban plans.These fo-
rums, meetings and workshops constitute nodes of mobility. In 2014 and 2015, the Tam
Kỳ People’s Committee held two international workshops together with UN-Habitat,
and in one case the Japanese city of Fukuoka and in the second case the Cities Alli-
ance and International Urban Training Centre on green urban development and eco-
tourism (UN-Habitat 2015). Tam Kỳ is also a member of the regional network for local
authorities for the management of human settlement (City-Net). Furthermore, Tam Kỳ
is one of two Vietnamese cities, which will use the urban planning tool “City Develop-
ment Strategy” crafted by the Cities Alliance to coordinate their urban development in
the future (Cities Alliances, 2016). Overall, Tam Kỳ is an active participant in the global
discourse on urban development, using tools provided by the international community
and eager to be perceived as a role model for a green urban future.
Beyond the global discourse, Tam Kỳ also implements the national urban strategy.
Urban Green Growth is the central developmental aim of urban planning in Vietnam. It
is based on the urban green growth development plan to 2030 and follows the shift of
the international discourse on urban growth towards sustainability and climate change
adaption. Tam Kỳ constitutes one of the 23 pilot sites for this plan (Bizhub, 2018).
The state also defines measurable criteria to classify urban centres as cities, towns
and townships (Decree No. 42/2009/ND-CP OF MAY 7, 2009: The state demands that
the local administration formulates plans andmobilizes resources for investment based
on the criteria defined by the decree. Urban centres should aim to move up the grading
scale successively. While the decree states that an “urban development program must
aim to improve the quality of people’s life and make urban architecture and landscape
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civilized, modern and sustainable while preserving the cultural quintessence and traits
of each urban centre.” (Decree No. 42/2009/ND-CP OF MAY 7, 2009), the emphasis is
on quantifiable development goals like infrastructure and population growth. Hence,
in Tam Kỳ, urban development focuses on the construction of infrastructure, like the
planned extension of Điẹn̂ Biên Phủ Street, a new wastewater treatment plant and the
new market. Many of these efforts are part of a cooperation with the ADB Seconda-
ry City Development program and require the resettlement of parts of the population
(ADB, 2013). Since 2016, a new development project financed and supported by Finland
aims at installing a smart power grid in Tam Kỳ (VIR, 2014). These construction pro-
jects reduce the spatial porosity found in the city and its hinterland by defining spatial
functions and erecting new material boundaries in space.
The urban master plan for 2030 with an outlook for 2050 draws the image of Tam
Kỳ as ‘Green Capital’ with a strong focus on green economy, green space and green
infrastructure, including a comprehensive water supply network for all citizens (VAA,
2014; Doan, 2014). This master plan draws heavily on images of a modern, but placeless
architecture. The urban future is not rooted in the local heritage but can be located
anywhere (VAA, 2014). Local urban planners might not implement this plan literally; it
nevertheless represents the urban aspirations of these local state actors. The plan is a
tangible manifestation of the formal image of urban space aspired by state agents in
Tam Kỳ.
Based on the aim of a growing modern city, the development of new urban areas
in the peri-urban region of Tam Kỳ is incorporated into the masterplan, mainly in Tân
Thạnh and An Phú ward and the rural ward of Tam Phú. These constructions of new
urban areas are located along the main roads with easy access to the city centre. They
consist of a grid of streets with street signs and lights, crosswalks, newly planted trees
and lots of open space. Planned as construction sites for future private houses, they
create open, unused space,which can be appropriated by private citizens for their every-
day activities, and thereby increase porosity. This appropriation can be temporarily,
for example when local farmer use these empty lots for their cattle, or permanent, for
example when local residents fence of parts of this space for their gardens or build small
shacks on it. These more permanent structures then reduce porosity, as they erect new
boundaries, limiting access and use for other people (for similar dynamics in Hà Nội
compare: Jacques, Labbé and Musil, 2017).
Economically, urban planning focuses on the development of new economic zones
to attract international companies. In 2015, two Korean-invested garment companies
(Panko Tam Thăng and Duck San Vina) started the construction of their production
plants in the Tam Thang Industrial Zone (VietnamNews, 2015). The plans also involve
the development of tourism infrastructure along the seashore in TamThành, including
the construction of a seaside resort, the Tam Thành Beach Resort and Spa, the Tam
ThànhMural Village as well as better road accessibility. At the same time, in 2015, a new
city hotel complex, the Mường Thanh Grand Quảng Nam, was built in the city centre at
Hùng Vương Street which includes a bar and restaurant area open for locals to visit.
These economic plans advance globalization and mobility as they attract people – as
workers and tourists –, goods and companies from the outside. However, they also
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privatize space that was previously open to local people for recreation and economic
activities like fishing, thence limiting mobility and porosity.
Spaces of everyday mobility
As shown above, urban planning by different state agencies defines a strict development
path for each city and imagines the urban future as civilized, clean and modern. Fur-
thermore, urban planning aims to regulate the urbanisation process, and to bring order
to the perceived urban chaos (Harms, 2014) caused by urban actors moving through the
city. All of them move through urban space without being legible, which makes it more
difficult to control them and install a sense of order. The urban, thus, becomes a space
of everyday mobility. This is especially true for smaller towns and peri-urban spaces
where different spheres of economic and domestic activities intermingle.
Mobility is hence a livelihood decision, which creates new opportunities. As men-
tioned above, small towns function as interfaces for their rural surroundings as well as
the whole region. Spatial proximity and porosity of space characterize these towns. Due
to this spatial proximity and porosity, people living in the rural district of Tam Thành
can earn an income in the city in white-collar jobs in the growing administration, the
university or in hospitals as Tam Kỳ provides many of these services as provincial ca-
pital. However, it also enables informal activities like street vending. Families combine
rural and urban income strategies and look for employment in all three sectors. House-
holds also stay at the fringe of the small urban centre and make their living from those
passing by and crossing the space they live in. Owners of small coffee shop or mecha-
nical workshops and street vendors benefit from the increasing accessibility of peri-
urban space. Most of the late-night entertainment facilities are also located in peri-
urban space. Other activities include smaller waste recycling activities and small-scale
handicraft production, which often uses road space for activities like sorting and dry-
ing (for a similar case of waste traders in Hà Nội, see also Nguyen, 2018).There are thus
constant movements of goods and people between urban and rural space passing peri-
urban areas. Urban, rural and peri-urban space in Tam Kỳ benefits from its proximity
to the urban, administrative centre and market, and the rural, where natural resources
and more empty space are available.
Apart from the mobility immanent to Tam Kỳ, urban planning introduces other
forms of mobility. Due to economic growth and the role as provincial administrative
centre, Tam Kỳ attracts migrants from the more rural districts of Quảng Nam. At the
same time, employment in the administration and at the university brings in new citi-
zens with higher education from larger urban centres, who seek employment in these
facilities. However, due to the geographical proximity to Đà Nẵng,many of those white-
collar workers stay only during the week in Tam Kỳ, so their kids can go to school in
Đà Nẵng (Interviews in Tam Kỳ 2014/2015). Tam Kỳ, thus, forms an interface between
the local and the global, the rural and the urban, engaging in a constant dialogue with
outsiders and the outside world.
This influx of migrants and office workers necessitates the construction of new ur-
ban areas in order to meet the projected population growth. As described above, these
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new urban areas provide basic infrastructure and empty building land for future lan-
downers.These newly developed urban areas also provide open space for alternative ac-
tivities as the land lies idle. House owners construct small wooden structures for their
private gardens next to their houses, along streets and in open areas to plant vegetables
and herbs for consumption and to claim empty space. Farmers are using the same space
to look after their cattle.These activities then move into the more urbanized areas whe-
re small construction sites, sidewalks, streets and empty slots provide space. Porosity
allows sidewalks to become part of a wide array of economic and domestic activities.
Some of these domestic activities are temporary like washing vegetables, drying clothes
or having a family party; others are more lasting like smaller workshops and small gar-
dens in Styrofoam boxes. Porosity also opens space for cattle and chicken in the urban
streets of Tam Kỳ.
The existing porosity and mobility also influence the rhythm and dynamic of ever-
yday life in Tam Kỳ. Cars, trucks and motorbikes speed along, sometimes stopping to
buy something from the sidewalk. Farmers with their cattle, street vendors with their
pushcarts, and schoolkids on bicycles slowly move along the street. Finally, people sit
on the sidewalk to drink coffee, eat noodle soup or to engage in small talk. Other ac-
tivities, like the recycling of waste and the drying of goods, like cinnamon and incense
sticks, spill over into the streets, where they interfere with the flow of traffic, limiting
speed and mobility. This leads to a more ambivalent urban setting and creates a fluid
interface, which people can enter, engage in, and leave.
Self-organization is particularly common in the arena of private water supply in
many households in Tam Kỳ. Instead of engaging with state agencies, residents use
private wells or local surface water and cooperate with neighbours in times of need.
They combine different water sources and use their resources to avoid engaging with
the state.
Porosity and mobility thus create the functional and material pattern of Tam Kỳ,
which make these opportunities available in everyday life. Mobility becomes a valuable
resource for people living at the fringe. Due to mobility and porosity, a space of in-
teraction emerges in which people with different social and spatial backgrounds can
meet. Mobility helps to create reproductive functionality by moving resources, people
as well as goods and services from rural to peri-urban, and to urban space and vice ver-
sa. Mobility is hence central to the everyday livelihood strategies of the people of Tam
Ky.
Urban mobilities as Pedagogies
As we saw, urban planning in Vietnam and in Tam Kỳ is predominantly occupied with
the creation of a modern future. Söderström (2015) talks about the pedagogic compo-
nent of urban planning as the need to transform everyday behaviour. In Vietnam, the
omnipresent slogan of “green, modern, and civilized” represents such idea as a broad
social discourse on adequate social behaviour (Harms, 2014). Being civilized might in-
clude shopping in supermarkets, driving a car, following traffic rules, and recycling.
Hence, at the celebration of Tam Kỳ’s 110th anniversary, the Vietnamese Prime Minister
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Nguyễn Xuân Phúc not only upgraded Tam Kỳ to a grade 2 city, but also urged the city
officials to develop Tam Kỳ into a modern and civilized city. Besides the focus on infra-
structure and economic development, he especially called for the creation of an urban
civilized lifestyle (VGP News, 2016).
Therefore, urban planning needs to engage with the everyday life of local residents
and establish a sense of urban order against the perceived chaos of everyday activities.
Therefore, local state actors need to limit and control the mobilities of everyday life
activities. They engage in politics of mobility and decide which mobility projects can
be explored in urban space (Cresswell, 2010). This control of urban mobility focuses on
the regulated usage of public space. At prominent places, like the sidewalk along the
university or the main square 24-3, official signs remind people passing by of undesi-
red behaviour. This includes advertising, selling of goods, lottery tickets and littering.
Some of the signs also forbid driving on sidewalks and public squares. The stated aim
“Xây dựng tuyến phố văn mịnh đô thị” (translation: “Building civilized urban streets”)
references the pedagogic aim of urban development. Whereas these signs declare clear
rules of conduct in public behaviour, they are often ignored in everyday interactions,
and thus require enforcement. During the winter of 2014, the administration installed
low metal barriers around the square 24-3 to stop people from driving their motorbikes
on the square.However, the installed barriers did not stopmotorbike drivers from ente-
ring the square.Thus, over the period of twomonths, the barriers were regularly broken
down and replaced.While the local administration tried to regulate behaviour and limit
mobility, local residents were less willing to change their behaviour and found ways to
circumvent those barriers.
Also in 2014, the administration implemented a plan with the aim “to turn the ci-
ty into a beggar and homeless person free zone” (Vietnam News, 2014). This included
sending people back to their hometowns or into social services. It defined which kind
of mobility was acceptable in public and by whom. To clean up the city, an effective
waste management was also established. Finally, traffic police controls the public beha-
viour of street vendors. They not only check permits, but they are also concerned with
the obstruction of traffic by sellers sitting or standing along the street (Observations
and interviews October 2014). The fast flow of traffic takes precedent over the everyday
mobility of local residents and their shopping habits.
The conflict concerning the new market in Tam Kỳ in 2014 demonstrates these dif-
ficulties in establishing urban order, regulating mobilities and changing people’s be-
haviour. As part of the urban development plan, a new market was built along Bàn
Thạch River in the city centre, surrounded by small shops in narrow streets. It is also
close to the bridge crossing the Bàn Thạch River, which is one of the big arterial roads
in Tam Kỳ. However, tensions arose, as the old market area was located along Hùng
Vương Street with better accessibility especially for people living east of highway 1 and
the railways. People east of the highway felt already outside of the city and were com-
plaining about a lack of market access (Interviews December 2014). Already during the
construction of the new market, local sellers complained about the management of the
new market building. After the opening, these local market sellers in the new market
also complained about a lack of customers. The municipality took matters into its own
hands. Market operations at the old market in An Sơn were radically reduced, the buil-
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ding partly demolished with only some market stalls left selling fruit and clothes. This
forced residents to use the new market creating new mobility through the city (Obser-
vations; PetroTimes, 2014; Thanh Niên, 2014).
Another way of regulating mobility includes the construction of new streets. The
construction of new arterial roads, including Điẹn̂ Biên Phủ, will create new flows of
traffic and improve access to some of the more secluded areas of Tam Kỳ, like An Xuân
ward and AnMỹ ward and the rural district of TamThành.However, better accessmakes
the area also more interesting for land development. Furthermore, this construction
affects residential and agricultural land and necessitates the resettlement of 345 house-
holds (ADB, 2016).
Finally, this urban pedagogy also references socialist ideology and revolutionary
history in Tam Kỳ. There are propaganda posters announcing the achievements of the
local and national government. Slogans proclaim future goals of development. Loud-
speakers in public areas play music and announce local party news and the local state
holds ceremonies, celebrations of anniversaries and parades in public space.This space
of representation is a part of everyday mobility as people drive past posters, state pa-
rades and loudspeakers. As these activities are common occurrences in public space,
local residents outside of state institutions ignore them. Participation is limited to tho-
se required by the state. Ignoring those state activities is made easier because they are
limited to the administrative area of Tam Kỳ. Everyday mobilities and the state space
of representation in the city centre exist as two different spheres with minimal impact
on each other (Interviews and observation).
Peri-urban and rural space on the other hand provide enough empty space to create
a new public space dedicated to the socialist state ideology, like the Vietnamese Heroic
Mother statue (Mẹ Viẹt̂ Nam Anh Hùng) in the peri-urban ward of An Phú, whose con-
struction cost US$19.27 million.This space of representation integrates the city into the
national discourse on Vietnamese history and the legitimation of the ruling Communist
party (Nhân Dân, 2015).
The inauguration on March 24, 2015 was part of the 40-year celebration of the sei-
zure of Tam Kỳ attracting a huge local crowd. The celebration organized by mass or-
ganizations like the Hồ Chí Minh youth, included dance and music performances and
a firework to celebrate the Vietnamese state. However, there were also street vendors,
photographers and other kind of small business activities involved. Afterwards the park
surrounding the statue became a recreational space for local people as well as a tourist
attraction. Cafés are located around the park and statue. Originally envisioned as space
of representation for the state ideology and as educational space for the younger genera-
tion, everyday mobilities transform the space into a recreational space. Local residents
drive there to take pictures for Facebook, walk around the park, drink coffee and meet
friends. The political space overlaps with a space of local practice shifting the meaning
towards the mundane (Observations, March 2015). Kurfürst (2012) describes this same
process for public spaces in Hà Nội.
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Conclusion: ‘Peri-urban city’ and everyday mobility
Global urban forms introduced from the outside attempt to create a uniform urban
landscape taking inspiration from global skylines without roots in the locality. Espe-
cially smaller urban centres like Tam Kỳ have an incentive to look at successful Asian
cities like Singapore to recreate a modern image and attract private investment. This
process might limit local mobility in the long term and exclude local residents from the
use of urban spaces for recreation, economic activities and their everyday life. Politics
of mobility create new tensions. Struggles about street vendors, the new market and
the flow of traffic demonstrate these tensions in the case of Tam Kỳ.
However, the realities of everyday mobilities also challenge the implementation of
urban development by city planners. Local residents often look for self-organized stra-
tegies instead of engaging with the local state. They self-organize their water supply;
engage in urban gardening and agricultural use of urban land in Tam Kỳ. These chal-
lenges are possible due to the high porosity of urban and peri-urban space. It allows for
the mobility necessary to create a liveable city for the future.
Urban planning might also lead to new opportunities for mobility, as the use of
space in Tam Kỳ is often open to negotiation. An example of the appropriation of newly
developed space for everydaymobilities is the park surrounding the VietnameseMother
Statue, which provides a recreational space while ignoring the underlying ideological
meaning.Combinedwith spatial porosity, this creates alternative identities of the urban
integrated into new urban structures.
As argued in the beginning, urbanization in small cities has many similarities with
peri-urbanization in large national centres like Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City due to
the central function of mobility and porosity. In Tam Kỳ, the rural reaches in to the
city centre, while the peri-urban and rural hinterland become urbanized. This inter-
twined relation between urban core and rural hinterland creates a landscape in which
the implementation of urban development plans and the everyday mobilities of local
residents mutually transform each other and create patterns of opportunities and mar-
ginalization. As secondary city in the periphery, Tam Kỳ provides an interface between
the local and the global, for residents as well as for ideas and goods.Whereas this might
change in the future, for now, the prevalence of porosity in the urban core and the exis-
ting practices of mobility provide means of participation for the people faced with the
transforming landscape.
These processes of porosity and mobility create a ‘peri-urban city’. Finally, I would
like to suggest the following three dimensions of analysis for future research: the po-
rosity of space in small towns, their existence as interface due to spatial proximity, and
the emergence of social edginess based on the ambivalence of space.
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Fertility Decline and the Role of Culture –
Thailand’s Demographic Challenges for the 21st Century
Kwanchit Sasiwonsaroj, Karl Husa, Helmut Wohlschlägl (Vienna & Bangkok)
Changing Demographics, Changing Challenges – Southeast Asia in Transition
Declining birth and death rates, changes in age distribution, in mortality and morbi-
dity, in fertility and marriage behavior, in the average life expectancy and in family and
household structures, as well as a transformation of traditional family life arrangements
and social structures of ever larger sections of the population – these are all scenarios
that only a few years ago were only relevant for countries of the Global North. In the
meantime, however, demographic change has also affected parts of the less developed
world with a vehemence and dynamism that, even in the 1980s, neither demographers
nor politicians considered possible in the affected regions of theworld: the demographic
transition, which is often also graphically illustrated through the well-known demogra-
phic transition model, has taken place much more rapidly in Southeast Asia in recent
decades than in other less developed parts of the world.
Accordingly, as the demographic transition progressed, the focus shifted to the de-
mographic situation in Southeast Asia: Until the mid-20th century, population devel-
opment in this region was still classified as a ‘demographic anomaly’ by many demog-
raphers. Around the middle of the last century, Wilbur Zelinsky (1950: 115), for example,
commented on the demographic situation of Southeast Asia in comparison to that of
India and China as follows:
“[...] it is more than a little startling that side by side with these fearfully overcrowded
regions [meaning India and China] there should be found others, apparently compa-
rable in natural resources, where the actual density is conspicuously low, so much so
that underpopulation is often a serious issue.”
Shortly afterwards – after the end of the Second World War and the withdrawal of the
colonial powers – it was the strong population growth and the high birth rates that were
regarded by Southeast Asian governments as well as international organizations as the
main problems of population development and were the focus of scientific interest and
population policy measures.
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The 1990s and 2000s brought with them a completely different assessment of the
demographic situation in Southeast Asia: the pronounced decline in birth rates in most
states in the region, the equally impressive reduction inmortality rates (above all, infant
mortality rates), and – hence – the sharp rise in life expectancy brought demographic
changes in Southeast Asia (see Table 1) once again into the public eye, but this time with
a new focus. Above all, the rapidly changing age structure and its possible long-term
effects on society and economy have already become the cause of a ‘rhetoric of demo-
graphic crisis’ in some states of the region today – not everywhere did the demographic
revolution of the last decades take place at the same speed –which is increasingly being
paid attention to both on a political level and in the mass media.
Table 1: Selected Indicators of Population Development in Southeast Asia 1950 to 2017
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2017
Population
(inmillions)
165 213 281 357 444 525 597 644
Index
(1950 = 100)






2.59 2.81 2.42 2.20 1.69 1.29 1.09
Population
density (km2)
37.9 49.1 64.6 82.2 102.3 120.9 137.8 148.4
Crudebirth
rate (in‰)
43.7 42.7 37.2 31.8 25.7 21.5 19.3 18.0
Crudedeath
rate (in‰)








156 115 86 68 47 34 24 23
Median age
(years)
20.5 19.6 18.1 19.1 21.3 24.2 27.1 29.1
Life expectancy
at birth (years)
37.0 43.4 49.4 54.8 59.7 64.0 67.9 70.5
Source: Husa and Wohlschlägl 2018: 181, Data calculated from UN-DESA 2017; PRB 2017
* average rates for the 10-years-periods (1950-1960; 1960-1970; 1970-1980, 1980-1990, 1990-2000,
2000-2010) as well as for 2010-2017, each entered in the column marking the end of each period.
Column 1950: average rates for the period 1910 to 1950 based on Hirschman 1994 and Caldwell/Cald-
well 1997
The English-language Thai daily “The Nation”, for example, entitled its editorial
“Grey boom on its way” on the occasion of World Population Day on 11 July 2001. The
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core message of the article was that a number of Southeast and East Asian societies and
governments would be under pressure in the coming decades to take appropriate mea-
sures in good time to effectively counter problems in the labor market, but above all in
health care and care for the elderly, due to the foreseeable changes in the age structure
of their populations.
In the meantime, there is no longer any need for an international event to draw
attention to the challenges posed by rapidly ageing societies in the affected Southeast
Asian states: the issues of ‘lowest low fertility’ and – associated with this – stagnation
or even future shrinkage of the population and above all of the working population
have arrived at the center of society, as the – by now – regular reporting on this topic
with newspaper articles such as “Singapore’s ageing population a ticking ‘time bomb’”
(Business Times, Singapore 7 December 2017) or “Act now on ageing society before it’s
too late” (Bangkok Post, Thailand 5 July 2018) has shown. But also demographers and
family planning experts are already warning of an “aging tsunami” and the transition
from a period of “demographic bonus” to a phase of “demographic disruption” (cf. for
example Prasartkul et al., 2019).
The demographic transition was particularly dynamic in the Kingdom of Thailand,
which – although the country is not among the Asian Tiger Economies – has not only
achieved an impressive performance from an economic point of view and meanwhile
already belongs to the group of LowerMiddle IncomeCountries, but has also undergone
socio-demographic processes of change at a speed that is unparalleled within Southeast
Asia, apart from the developments in the city-state of Singapore.Within only about four
decades,Thailand has undergone the phases of the classic “first demographic transition”
and has faced many challenges posed by ageing population since the early 2000s (Sasi-
wongsaroj and Burasit, 2018). Actually it is about to enter a phase in which constantly
low fertility rates and rapid demographic ageing occur simultaneously (Prasartkul et
al., 2019: 2).
Similar developments have so far only been known from countries of the Global
North (above all from Northern and Western Europe), where it became apparent as
early as the end of the 1970s that the usual explanatory approaches such as the concept
of the First Demographic Transition were not sufficient to adequately explain the conti-
nuing sub-replacement fertility and the emergence of a variety of forms of partnership
and cohabitation instead of traditional family forms, the decoupling of sexuality and re-
production, the rapid demographic ageing, and thus the tendency towards population
shrinkage.
Probably the most comprehensive and well-known attempt to date to remedy the defi-
cits of the First Demographic Transition is found in the concept of the “Second Demo-
graphic Transition” (SDT) formulated by Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa in 1986, in which
the basic assumptions of the classic demographic transition were complemented by
considerations from Maslow’s “theory of shifting needs” and thus by a central cultural
component. Critics, however, consider the Second Demographic Transition as a phe-
nomenon that is typical above all for Northwestern Europe and overseas states charac-
terized by Europe such as the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and do not
believe that it will spread in a similar form to other cultural circles, for example Asia
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or Latin America. Lesthaeghe (2014: 18114) accurately describes this point of criticism,
which was among others held by demographers from Asia, as follows: “The typical reac-
tion was, ‘Not us, we’re different’, and therefore the SDT would describe only ‘Western
idiosyncrasies’.”
Meanwhile, there are increasing signs that the Second Demographic Transition has
also gained a foothold in parts of East Asia since the turn of the millennium: the co-
habitation of young Japanese and Taiwanese couples before marriage and starting a
family is becoming more and more the rule (cf. e.g. Raymo et al., 2008). For example,
signs of far-reaching cultural changes can already be seen in Japan, such as the loss
of significance of traditional authorities, a slow reduction in gender differences, and
a gradual shift away from collective patterns of behavior towards individualism and
Western norms and moral concepts (Lesthaeghe 2010, 2011a,b).
How likely is it that the Second Demographic Transition will quickly spread to coun-
tries in Southeast Asia such as Thailand, which has already largely completed the “clas-
sic” first demographic transition? Are persistent sub-replacement fertility, shrinking
family sizes, and the rapid ageing of the population already precursors of the onset of
the Second Demographic Transition, as already hinted at in some studies (cf. Prasartkul
et al., 2019), or do culturally conditioned norms and values prove to be forces that delay
or modify such processes?
In the following, we will attempt to analyze the extent and course of the major de-
mographic changes in Southeast Asia using the example of the Kingdom of Thailand,
without disregarding the possible influence of deeply rooted cultural patterns of beha-
vior and values and norms.
From Growth to Stagnation? The Dynamics of Population Change in Thailand
According to the results of the National Statistical Office of Thailand, the population
of Thailand in 2018 amounted to about 66.4 million people. A population projection by
the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), which also takes into
account the population groups not included in the register data but very well included
in the 2010 census, shows a population of 68.1 million by 2020 (NESDB, 2013). This
means that the population is likely to be only around two million people higher than
the 65.98 million inhabitants determined at the last census in 2010, which corresponds
to an average annual population growth of only 0.3 percent. After decades of rapid
population growth,Thailand’s population growth has almost come to a standstill within
just two decades (Figure 1).
In the 1950s and 1960s, the country was still one of the fastest growing countries in
the world, with average annual growth rates of between 3 and 4 percent. Up to this time
–with birth rates, which, as estimates and adjustment calculations of Bourgeois-Pichat
(1960) and the UN-ESCAP Population Division (1976) have shown, remained constant
until the 1960s at a level of over 40 per mil – one can speak of an accelerated population
growth in Thailand. The strongest growth phase was in the 1950s; from the first half
of the 1960s a slow and then accelerating decline in fertility set in, which continues to
this day. As a result of this development, the average annual growth rate already fell
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from 1980 to 1990 to just over 2 percent, although it should not be overlooked that such
a figure still amounted to an annual population increase of around one million people
per year at the time.
Figure 1: From Growth to Stagnation: Population Change in Thailand 1947- 2040
Data sources: NSO (Thailand, National Statistical Office), Population Censuses 1947-2010; NESDB
(2013) Population Projection 2020-2040; own design
The official population forecasts of the Working Group on Population Projections
for the Fifth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1982-1986) of the Thai
government (Thailand, NESDB, 1982; Working Group on Population Projections, 1983),
drawn up on the basis of the census results of 1980, assumed that the birth rate would
continue to fall sharply and that the growth rate could thus be reduced to around 1.5
percent by the year 2000. However, the results of the 2000 census already showed that
the decline in the birth rate in Thailand after 1990 had accelerated considerably and
that the original target of 1.5 percent had already been undercut with an average annual
growth rate of only 1.2 percent between 1990 and 2000.
The first decade of the 21st century showed a continuation of the trend: between
2000 and 2010, the average annual growth rate fell further to only 0.8 percent, and as
the latest update results indicate, population growth in Thailand has almost come to
a standstill in the meantime – within a very short period of time, concern about too
rapid a population growth has now turned into concern about the consequences of too
rapidly falling and now too low fertility and about the consequences of an unexpectedly
rapid stagnation of the population.
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Thailand’s Fertility Transition – a Spatio-Temporal Approach
A first glance at the development of birth and death rates since 1950 already shows that
Thailand is the country among the more populous states of Southeast Asia that has
made the most rapid transition from high to low birth and death rates and now has a
similar demographic situation to the states of the Global North – only the city-state of
Singapore experienced a similarly pronounced demographic change within Southeast
Asia during the same period (cf. Fig. 2).
In the mid-1960s, official Thai statistics still showed a continuous increase in the
birth rate up to a value of just over 40 per mil compared to 27.3 per mil in 1951, but this
increase undoubtedly reflects not only an actual increase in the number of live births
per 1,000 inhabitants, but also – primarily – improvements in the registration system,
which cannot accurately be recorded quantitatively (cf. Wohlschlägl, 1986: 365). With a
value of around 48 per mil, 1956 marks the peak of post-war developments in the birth
rate. Between 1956 and 1970, the ESCAP data indicate a slow decline to a level of just
over 40 per mil (1960: 44.3, 1970 with 39.4 for the first time below 40 per mil).
Until the early 1970s, however, the decline in the birth rate was not strong enough
to have an impact on the dynamics of the natural growth rate, which remained at an
annual level of more than three percent between 1965 and 1970, as the mortality rate
was simultaneously decreasing. Only since the early 1970s has there been a marked and
comparatively rapid decline in the birth rate, which led to the fact that in the mid-1980s
the birth rate was already only around 28 per mil, around 20 per mil lower than in 1956
and around 10 per mil lower than in 1970. In the meantime, the value of the crude birth
rate was againmore than halved and in the five years from 2010 to 2015 is only at around
11 per mil (UN-DESA, World Population Prospects, Revision, 2019).
If one only considers the change in the birth rate when estimating the decline in
fertility in Thailand, one must not overlook the fact that this clearly underestimates the
actual extent of this decline.The birth rate also depends on the age and gender structure
of a population, and if – as in many less developed countries – more and more women
born in a period of almost uninterrupted fertility advance into reproductive age over
time, it can theoretically even rise despite declining fertility levels; its decline will at
least be much slower. It makes more sense to use the average number of children per
woman, measured over the total fertility rate (TFR), to analyze the decline in fertility.
According to Prasartkul et al. (2011: 17), the decline in fertility in Thailand can be
roughly divided into four phases:
• high fertility before 1970 (TFR 6 children per woman and more),
• phase of rapid fertility decline from 1970-1990 (drop in TFR from over 6 to just over
2 children per woman),
• further decline of the already low fertility rate to the replacement level of just over
two children per woman 1991-1996, and
• finally, from 1997 onwards, the “lowest low fertility” phase, characterized by a con-
tinuous further drop in fertility below the replacement level to date (decline in TFR
from just over 2 to currently 1.5 to 1.6).
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Figure 2: The Development of Birth and Death Rates in Southeast Asian Coun-
tries 1950- 2015
Source: Husa and Wohlschlägl, 2018: 200. Data: Calculated from UN-DESA (2017)
World Population Prospects Database –The 2017 Revision; own design
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The high level of fertility that prevailed in Thailand in the 1950s and 1960s has been the
subject of little research. For the first half of the 1950s, the United Nations estimated a
gross reproduction rate of 3.2 on average (United Nations, 1965). As can be inferred from
the results of the Survey of Population Change 1964-65, the rate is likely to have remained
fairly stable until the mid-1960s, when this nationwide survey, which did not include
Bangkok-Thonburi however, found a figure of 3.1. The total fertility rate of 6.3 shows
that in the mid-1960s, an average of more than six children were still born alive by a
woman during her entire reproductive period.
The pronounced decline in fertility began around the second half of the 1960s. Due
to the lack of reliable and age-specific birth statistics from the official registration of
natural population movements, it is difficult to determine the exact date. However, the
available figures – most of them estimated or derived from empirical representative
surveys – allow the conclusion that the decline before the mid-1960s was very low and
that it was only between 1965 and 1970 that the process of generative behavioral change
that Knodel and Debavalya (1978) called “Thailand’s reproductive revolution” began.
The total fertility rate is likely to have fallen from 6.3 to 5.6 between 1965 and 1970
alone, i.e. by an average of 0.7 children per woman or 11 percent. According to the Survey
of Population Change 1974-76, a rate of 4.9 can be assumed for the mid-1970s. In summary
and with a cautious interpretation of the available data, it can be stated for this first
phase of fertility decline that the total fertility rate in the first half of the 1960s was
between 6.3 and 6.6, then began to fall significantly, namely to a level of 5.4 to 5.8 around
1970 and 4.5 to 4.9 around 1975 (see also Wohlschlägl, 1986).
The downward trend continued from the second half of the 1970s onwards, possibly
even with increasing acceleration. After all, the first two rounds of the Contraceptive
Prevalence Survey indicate that the total fertility rate at the turn from the 1970s to the
1980s probably only had a value of 3.7 to 3.8, while the calculations from the data of the
third round of this survey as well as the fertility estimates of the Population Division of
the United Nations or the Population Reference Bureau for the mid-1980s only showed
a value of 3.5. By the early 1990s, the TFR had finally fallen to fewer than 2.5 children
per woman.
In the early 1990s (1991-1996), a third, brief intermediate phase of fertility transition
followed, in which the already low fertility rate continued to drop to the replacement
level of just under two children per woman, which was finally reached around 1996.
From 1997, Thailand then entered the “lowest low fertility” phase, in which the TFR fell
further and further below the replacement level and currently oscillates at between 1.4
and 1.5 children per woman in the second half of the 2010s (Jones, 2011: 6).
Within just a third of a century,Thailand has experienced a decline frommore than
6 children per woman in the 1960s to around 1.5 children per woman at the beginning
of the 21st century, a dynamic development that deserves the term revolutionary and is
also internationally unparalleled: even within Southeast Asia, the Kingdom – in terms
of the speed of the fertility transition – is only surpassed by the city-state of Singapore,
which, however, due to the completely different circumstances, cannot be compared
with a populous territorial state with extensive rural areas such as Thailand (Table 2).
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Table 2: The Dynamics of Fertility Decline in Southeast Asian Countries 1960/65 to 2010 /15
Country
Total Fertility Rate (TFR) Percent Change (%)







6.66 3.47 2.02 -47.9 -41,8
Cambodia 6.95 5.99 2.70 -13.8 -54.9
Indonesia 5.62 3.40 2.45 -39,5 -27.9
LaoPDR 5.97 6.27 2.93 +5.0 -53.3
Malaysia 6.36 3.67 2.11 -42.3 -42.5
Myanmar 6.10 3.78 2.25 -38.0 -40.5
Philippines 6.98 4.53 3.05 -35.1 -32.7
Singapore 5.12 1.70 1.23 -66.8 -27.6
Thailand 6.13 2.30 1.53 -62.5 -33.5
Timor-Leste 6.20 5.40 4.40 -12.9 -18.5
Vietnam 6.42 3.85 1.96 -40.0 -50.9
Data source: UN-DESA (2019) World Population Prospects Database –The 2019 Revision; columns 5
and 6: own calculations
The decline in fertility in Thailand – as in most other parts of the world – did not
start in all parts of the country at the same time. In this context, however, it is difficult to
estimate howmuch earlier the fertility decline began in the cities, especially in Bangkok,
than in rural areas – from a similarly high niveau or from a level that was already
lower in the 1950s (?) – because the necessary data are lacking. Unfortunately, the first
Survey of Population Change 1964-65 did not include Bangkok-Thonburi as the only part
of Thailand.
However, the calculation of the total fertility rate for the provincial cities (municipal
areas) from the collected data leads to the conclusion that the fertility level in the capital
at that time must have been well below that of the rural areas, because even in the
municipal areas, which were usually only small rural towns and administrative seats,
the total fertility rate (TFR) was only 4.2 compared with a value of 6.5 for the non-
municipal areas. On the other hand, the data available from the 1970s show that it can
be assumed that the provincial cities had a higher fertility level than Bangkok-Thonburi
(Survey of Population Change 1974-76: TFR values: Bangkok-Thonburi 3.6, municipal
areas 4.5, non-municipal areas 5.3; cf. Thailand, National Statistical Office, 1969, and
1978).
At the beginning of the fertility transition in the first half of the 1970s, the TFR in
rural regions was probably only slightly higher than in urban areas (Table 3). A decade
later, however, the fertility level in the cities, especially in the metropolis of Bangkok,
with a TFR of 1.8 in 1985/86 was already below the replacement level and thus well below
that of the rural areas (TFR 1985/86: 3.0). It was not until the beginning of the 2000s
that the TFR in rural Thailand also fell below the population replacement level and,
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meanwhile, the number of children per woman in rural Thailand is only slightly higher
than in the cities.
Clear differences in fertility levels and in the dynamics of the decline in fertility also
exist between the individual parts of the country: the earliest fertility transition began
in Bangkok, where it fell below the replacement level already in the mid-1980s, followed
by the northern and central regions in the early 1990s (NSO 2017, Survey of Population
Change 2015/16). The rural north-eastern region fell below replacement fertility in the
early 2000s, and the last part of the country to follow was the southern region in the
mid-2000s (Table 3).
Table 3: Fertility Decline in Thailand 1974/76 to 2015 /16, by Urban and Rural Residence and
Regions
Area
Total Fertility Rate (TFR) byYear of Survey
1974/76 1985/86 1995/96 2005/06 2015/16
National Level 4.9 2.73 2.02 1.47 1.61
Municipal Areas
(Urban)
4.5 1.77 1.33 1.03 1.33
Nonmunicipal Areas
(Rural)
5.0 2.96 2.28 1.73 1.87
Bangkok Metropoli-
tanRegion
3.5 1.74 1.26 0.88 0.86
Central Region 4.1 2.49 1.66 1.19 1.33
NorthernRegion 3.7 2.25 1.89 1.57 1.79
NortheasternRegion 6.3 3.10 2.44 2.04 1.78
SouthernRegion 6.1 4.05 2.85 1.52 1.78
Data source: NSO (Thailand, National Statistical Office) (2017) The 2015-16 Survey of Population
Change; Please note: Data on fertility fromThai data sources can slightly differ from the international data of
UN-DESA (2017, 2019) due to different surveys and estimation procedures.
The Role of Family Planning Programs in Fertility Decline
The changes in fertility behavior were accompanied by an extraordinarily strong increa-
se in the use of contraceptives and contraceptive methods and the corresponding level
of knowledge of the Thai population. Whereas in the early 1970s, about half of Thai
women still had practically no information on methods of birth control and could not
even name a single contraceptive method (cf. Wohlschlägl, 1986: 373), today practically
all Thai women between the ages of 15 and 49 are well-informed on this issue, whereby
– corresponding to the lower initial level – the increase in the level of knowledge and
application among the rural population was much greater than in urban areas.
Nationwide, in the forty years from the introduction of Thailand’s first family plan-
ning program in 1970 to the currently last nationwide fertility survey (the Reproductive
andHealth Survey, 2009), the proportion ofmarriedwomen between 15 and 44 or between
15 and 49 who use a method of birth control has increased almost sixfold: from 14 per
Thailand’s Demographic Challenges for the 21st Century 135
cent in 1969/70 to almost 80 per cent in 2009.The initial differences between urban and
rural areas have largely disappeared over time. Regionally, however, there are still signi-
ficant differences between the southern region of Thailand and the rest of the country,
as the data from the “Thailand 14 Provinces Multiple Index Cluster Survey (MICS) 2015-
16”, conducted jointly by the National Statistical Office of Thailand, the National Health
Security Office inThailand andUNICEF, show:While the nationwide Contraceptive Pre-
valence Rate (CPR) 2015-16 was 78.4 percent, the rate for the southern region was only
around 71 percent. In the three Muslim-dominated provinces of Narathiwat, Yala and
Pattani in particular, the CPR was between 35.4 and 55 percent respectively, far below
the values of other regions (NSO/UNICEF, 2017: 12).
As far as the differences in fertility behavior and the contraceptive prevalence rate
between the southern provinces and the rest of the country are concerned, religious
and cultural attitudes also play a role. From a Buddhist point of view based on one
of the Five Precepts, it is fundamentally wrong to kill any living being, for whatever
reason. But according to Buddhist ethics, birth control is acceptable if contraceptives
are to help prevent conception. Contraceptives that stop the development of an already
fertilized egg are frowned upon and should not be used. Behind this is the Buddhist
belief that life begins or consciousness develops with the fertilization of the egg (Payut-
to, 1999). In contrast to most other religions and belief systems, Buddhist teaching does
not advocate for any explicitly family-oriented positions either; conceiving children is
not considered a religious duty. Even sexual activities without the intention of procrea-
tion are not rejected in principle, however acting on one’s sexual (and other) desires
generally stands in the way of the goal of enlightenment.
In contrast to Buddhism, Islam has a strong focus on the family, and children are
basically regarded as a gift from God.There is no uniform ‘Islamic position’ on the issue
of birth control, but eight of the nine classical schools of law advocate for allowing birth
control. This always refers to inner-marital birth control, premarital sex is forbidden.
However, the emergence of fundamentalist currents in recent decades has ledmore and
more conservative preachers to openly campaign against the use of condoms and other
means of birth control, which have undermined state measures for family planning and
birth control in many Islamic areas. The view that the majority of Muslims in the sou-
thern provinces of Thailand tend predominantly towards holding strong conservative
views and regard birth control as “haram” – forbidden – is also confirmed by the re-
sults of a broad-based study on the nexus between religion and reproduction among
Muslims in Buddhist Thailand (Knodel et al., 1999).
In this context, the central role in (as some even believe from today’s perspective,
too) successfully disseminating knowledge on various contraceptive methods to distant
parts of the country, in creating a broad awareness of the necessity of birth control, in
providing psychological and material support to interested persons and in providing
information material, doctors, and contraceptives was held by the tightly organized
state family planning program, which was steered by the Ministry of Public Health.
Following the establishment of a National Committee on the Family Health, the first
systematic measures began in November 1964 in Potharam District, Ratchaburi Provin-
ce, Central Thailand. They were accompanied by a scientific study conducted with the
support of the “Population Council” in New York, the so-called “Potharam Study”, which
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was “Thailand’s first population/family planning field research project” (Prachuabmoh
and Thomlinson, 1971).
In 1968, the Ministry of Health began carrying out family planning activities on
a broad scale throughout the whole country as part of the Family Health Project and
in 1972, with reference to the official proclamation of a government population policy
aimed at family planning in 1970, for the first time in a national five-year economic and
social development plan (namely in the third five-year plan from 1972 to 1976), the aim
was to reduce the annual growth rate of the population to 2.5 percent by the end of 1976.
In fact, this figure was almost reached, while the further reduction in the intensity of
population growth demanded in the fourth five-year plan to an annual growth rate of
2.1 percent in 1981, as well as the reduction to 1.5 per cent provided for in the fifth plan by
1986 (NESDB, 1982: 175, 176), was somewhat too optimistic and was not quite achieved
despite the sharp decline in fertility – partly due to the move towards the reproductive
age of cohorts with large populations.
The success of the program, especially its large presence even in remote rural regi-
ons of Thailand and its acceptance in most of the country (as already mentioned, the
smallest successes were achieved in the southern provinces with a strongMuslim popu-
lation), depended – in addition to the favorable socio-cultural background, which will
be discussed in more detail later – on several factors (Knodel et al., 1980: 9f): the inclu-
sion of specially trained personnel at all levels of state activities for birth control should
be mentioned here, but especially the delegation of various tasks within the framework
of family planning, such as passing on oral contraceptives and advice on their use, to
people who were not doctors, especially midwives and nurses, as well as the free distri-
bution of the pill from 1976 onwards and the establishment of a branched network of
‘family planning outlets’ even in small villages.
From the sixth five-year plan (1987-91) onwards, the emphasis in the area of popu-
lation-related measures was no longer only on reducing fertility and growth rates, but
shifted towards “enhancing the quality of the population” (Jones, 2011: 9). In the eighth
plan (1997-2001), for the first time no target value was set for the reduction of the po-
pulation growth rate, since by the end of the 1990s fertility had already fallen below the
replacement level; from now on other targets such as Human Resource Development
and Sustainable Development were to be promoted.
Explicit fertility-related measures then reappeared in the ninth plan (2002-2006).
However, the new objective was to stabilize fertility at replacement level, with additional
preparatorymeasures to copewith the rapid demographic ageing of theThai population
added in the tenth plan (2007-2011). In the eleventh plan (2012-2016), the measures
proposed in the tenth plan were essentially retained. In the area of population-relevant
measures, the to date last, twelfth plan (2017-2021) also focuses on coping with rapid
demographic ageing, but especially on the risk of a shrinking working population in
the future.
In any case, it is clear that the Thai family planning program – at least as far as its
original intention, namely the rapid reduction of fertility, is concerned – is undoubtedly
one of the most successful in the world (WHO, 2013). Whether the opposite orientation
can be achieved just as effectively from the beginning of the 2000s, namely the sta-
bilization of the already extremely low fertility rates or possibly even their increase,
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can, however, be doubted on the basis of the many years of international experience
which, for example, Western, Northern European and East Asian states have had with
programs for the renewed stimulation of fertility.
With the population policy goals of the last two five-year plans are associated the
hope of some Thai politicians and planners that the often invoked Asian values or the
different cultural backgrounds of the Thai population would ultimately also contribute
to a higher value of children and family and thusmitigate or at least delay a complete sli-
de into Western individualization, self-realization, and the associated shift in personal
priorities. Thailand is thus trying to follow a motto for solving demographic problems
– caused by the rapid decline in fertility and the subsequent demographic aging of so-
ciety – which was already issued in 1997 by the then Singaporean health minister Yeo
Chow Tong at a conference on the demographic situation in the city-state as follows:
“[...] family is still the best approach.” (Husa and Wohlschlägl, 2008: 165).
The following passage from the 12th National Economic and Social Development
Plan addresses the concern that to what extent traditional Thai values and norms are
still upheld by the younger generation:
“[...] the influences of foreign cultures, being absorbed into the Thai societymore easily
in the digital era, can negatively impact social norms, attitudes and the behavior of
some Thai people, especially those who are unable to screen out inadequate cultures.”
(NESDB, 2017: 13)
To what extent the characteristics of demographic change from the low fertility coun-
tries of the Global North, which are commonly summarized under the term ‘Second
Demographic Transition’, are also noticeable in Thailand, will be examined in more de-
tail below.
A “Second Demographic Transition” in Thailand?
The Impact of Culture on Demographic Change
Mortality rates that dropped from around 30 per mil after the Second World War to
only 15 per mil in the mid-1960s and a TFR that fell little later from over six children per
woman around 1960 to below the replacement level towards the end of the millennium
– these are the typical characteristics of a country that underwent the so-called first
demographic transition in record time: Thailand needed only about 30 to 40 years for
the transition from high to low birth and death rates, while this transformation process
took place in those regions of the world where it first began (in northwestern European
countries such as England or Sweden) within a time span of about 200 or 140 years and
took place in Central Europe (Germany, Austria) for about 70 years.
The joy about the great success of Thailand’s family planning program, which con-
tinued until the 1990s, has meanwhile given way to a certain disillusionment, after the
equilibrium postulated in the concept of classical demographic transition has failed to
materialize inThailand as well, as inmost countries of the Global North, and the fertility
rate has dropped to undreamt-of lows.
138 Kwanchit Sasiwonsaroj, Karl Husa & Helmut Wohlschlägl
In order to sufficiently explain such new phenomena as “baby bust” (Lesthaeghe,
2014), “birth dearth” (Pearce, 2011), sub-replacement fertility, the systematic postpone-
ment of marriage and parenthood as well as the emergence of alternative forms of
partnership and cohabitation, the concept of the first demographic transition is not
sufficient, as briefly indicated in the introduction. Although the theory of the ‘Second
Demographic Transition’ continues to build on the classic transitional concept, it at-
tempts to expand its explanatory framework. Lesthaeghe (2014: 18112) writes: “Although
it accepts the major tenets of bounded rational economic choice, it also allows for au-
tonomous preference drift by relying on Maslow’s theory of shifting needs. As such, an
essential cultural component is being added.”
Table 4 gives a comparative overview of the main characteristics and influencing
factors of the First and Second Demographic Transitions using the example of develop-
ments in the countries of the Global North.
Before the question of the extent to which specific Thai cultural components influ-
ence or modify a possible Second Demographic Transition inThailand can be addressed
in the following, a brief clarification of how the often very diffuse term culture is used in
this paper appears necessary. Here, ‘Thai culture’ does not mean the definition wáttáná-
tam, which is based on the three pillars nation, religion, and monarchy, nor the concept
of aThai-ness of any kind recently strained by theThai tourism authority in advertising
campaigns, which can be seen as “[...] an ideology, not a description but a prescrip-
tion, a set of instructions of how to be a well-behaved citizen” (Cornwel-Smith, 2013:
10). Rather, the use of the term “culture” in this work draws on the classical definition
of Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952):
“Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and
transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups,
including their embodiments in artefacts; the essential core of culture consists of tra-
ditional (i.e. historical derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values;
culture systemsmay, on the onehand, be considered as products of action, on the other
as conditioning elements of further action.” (Kroeber and Kluck-Hohn, 1952, cited after
Ehnert, 2004: 8)
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Table 4: The First Demographic Transition and the Second Demographic Transition in Compari-
son – Demographic and Societal Characteristics




• Low or declining incidence of cohabitation
• Low divorce rates
• High remarriage rates after widowhood or
divorce
Marriage
• Fall in proportions married, rising ages at
firstmarriage
• Increasing cohabitation, both pre- and
postmarital
• Rise in divorce, earlier divorce
• Decline in remarriage rates, LAT relation-
ships instead
Fertility
• Declining marital fertility via reductions at
older ages, loweringmean ages at first child-
bearing
• Deficient contraception, parity and timing
failures
• Declining illegitimate fertility
• Lowfinal childlessness amongmarried cou-
ples
Fertility
• Fertility postponement, increasing mean
ages at parenthood, structural subreplace-
ment fertility
• Efficient contraception
• Rising nonmarital fertility, parenthood
outside marriage (among cohabiting cou-
ples, singlemothers)
• Rising definitive childlessness among
woman ever in a union
Societal background
• Preoccupation with basic material needs:
income, work conditions, housing, children
and adult health, schooling, social security;
solidarity a prime value
• Rising membership of political, civic, and
community-oriented networks
• Strong normative regulation by churches
and state, first secularization wave, political
and social “pillarization”
• Segregated sex roles, familistic policies,
“embourgeoisement” of the family with the
breadwinnermodel at its core
• Ordered life-course transitions and domi-
nance of one single nuclear familymodel
Societal background
• Rise of “higher order” needs: individual
autonomy, expressive work and socializa-
tion values, self-actualization, grass-roots
democracy, recognition; tolerance a prime
value
• Disengagement from civic and commu-
nity-oriented networks
• Retreat of the state, second secularization
wave, sexual revolution, refusal of author-
ity, political “depillarization”
• Rising symmetry in sex roles, rising fe-





Thailand’s “Contraceptive Revolution” and its Consequences
According to Lesthaeghe (2010: 216), the Second Demographic Transition will be charac-
terized by three successive “revolutionary” developments,which tend to characterize the
change in demographic behavior. At the beginning, there is the so-called “contraceptive
revolution”. As described in the previous section, this already affected Thailand since
the 1970s and was largely completed with the achievement of the replacement level at
the turn of the millennium. It is also a good example of the shift in personal preferences
postulated by Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa from the fulfilment of basic needs towards
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“higher order needs” such as “individual autonomy, self-actualization” etc.: While at the
beginning, the decline in fertility was mainly influenced by the government’s birth con-
trol programs and economic considerations, in the course of this process birth control
is used less and less for preventive purposes, but more to control the desired number
of children.
This generative change in behavior can also be seen in the attitude of Thai women
towards the desired ideal family size and number of children. A series of empirical sur-
veys since the 1970s, for example, have provided information on the extent to which the
Thai population’s ideas about the desired ideal number of children have changed over
time.The results show that the desired number of children had already fallen consider-
ably in the 1970s and 1980s, both in rural and urban areas. While the total number of
children that a Thai woman between 15 and 44 years of age could expect to give birth
during her life was still an average of 4.5 in 1969/70, this figure had already fallen to 4
children in 1975 and to 3.1 children in 1984 (Wohlschlägl, 1986: 370). According to the re-
sults of the Contraceptive Prevalence Survey 1984, those women who had been married for
less than five years at the time of the survey, i.e. the so-called newlyweds, only expected
to have an average of 2.3 children by the end of their reproduction period, whereby –
and this is particularly emphasized – practically no differences between urban and rural
areas could be proven (Bangkok Metropolis: 2.2, rural areas and provincial towns: 2.3).
Also regarding the duration of the schooling of women, there was no longer any sig-
nificant differentiation in terms of the desired number of children (cf. Kamnuansilpa
and Chamrathritirong 1985).
This indicates that the establishment and awareness of “new” fertility concepts had
already been extraordinarily broad and successful in all parts of the population by the
mid-1980s – with the exception of the provinces with a large Muslim population in
the south of the country. In 1984, for example, around 57 percent of married women
between the ages of 15 and 44 stated two children as the ideal number of children, 26
percent three children and only 10 percent four or more children – an attitude that even
then was not too far removed from that in European states.
Current data from the most recent Reproductive Health Survey 2009 show that the
ideas about the desired number of children only marginally changed between the sur-
veys of 1984 and 2009 (see Table 5): the desired number of children of married women
aged 15-49 was, with an average of 1.9 children, only slightly below the figure from
1984, whereby the differences between urban and rural areas were rather small (muni-
cipal areas: 1.8; non-municipal areas: 2.0). Regionally, the largest difference is between
Bangkok with an average of 1.7 children and the southern region with 2.3 (NSO, 2010,
Key Findings of the RHS 2009).
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Table 5: Average desired number of children, number of living children and “unmet fertility” in
Thailand 2009







Whole Kingdom 1.93 1.67 0.26
Municipal Areas 1.76 1.54 0.22




Central Region 1.72 1.52 0.20
Northern Region 1.75 1.53 0.22
Northeastern Region 2.08 1.78 0.30
Southern Region 2.33 1.94 0.39
Age Group 15-29 1.48 0.90 0.58
Age Group 30-39 1.96 1.74 0.22
Age Group 40-49 2.20 2.10 0.10
Source: NSO (Thailand, National Statistical Office) (2010a) The 2009 Reproductive Health Survey
The differences in the desired number of children among the women surveyed by
age group are also shown in Table 5: In the highest age group over 40 years, a larger
number of children is generally expected than among married women under 30 years
of age. This is hardly surprising, since this characteristic value is generally determined
from the number of living children plus the number of children still desired by the
interviewees and the tendency of older women to have a higher number of children
reflects their more traditional fertility behavior in earlier years (or even at the time of
the survey) (Wohlschlägl, 1986: 370).
However, a comparison of the desired number of children with the ideal number of
children desired at the time of the respective survey shows that the “average number of
living children” is lower than the “average desired number of children” in all cases.While
the women surveyed in the Reproductive Health Survey 2009 wished for 1.93 children on
a national average, their actual number of children at the time of the survey was only
1.67. This is very remarkable, because what prevents women from turning their desired
number of children into reality is not only of great interest to demographers and social
scientists, but also above all to politicians and planners.
Sexual Revolution
The contraceptive revolution was followed by a so-called sexual revolution – first in the
countries of northern and northwestern Europe and a little later also in Central Euro-
pe and in the USA – triggered by the broad availability of the contraceptive pill, which
for the first time made an efficient decoupling of reproduction and sexuality possible.
The younger generation revolted against the traditional moral concepts of the parents’
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generation, premarital sex – not only for the purpose of having children – became the
rule instead of the exception. This phenomenon, which for a long time was considered
typical for Western societies, initially spread to other developed countries in Asia, such
as Japan and South Korea, with a time lag of about two to three decades (Lesthaeghe,
2010: 236ff). Meanwhile, the first signs of an ideational change in terms of sexual free-
dom and decoupling fertility from sexuality can also be observed among the younger
generation in Thailand. Today, the younger generation decides largely autonomously
and independently on their fertility behavior, without being influenced primarily by
traditional social norms.
The resulting sexual behavior, which diametrically opposes traditional Thai norms
and values and considerably weakens the importance of the institution of marriage,
can also be seen from numerous recent surveys on this topic. Premarital sexual activi-
ties that were frowned upon according to current sexual norms are becoming more
and more common among the younger generation. A National Sexual Behaviour Survey,
conducted in 2006, in which more than 6000 people aged 18 to 59 were surveyed, re-
gardless of their marital status, clearly showed the prevalence of premarital sex among
Thai adolescents.The proportion of respondents in the 18-24 age group who had already
had sexual experiences was higher among male adolescents than among young women
(around 99 percent compared to 89 percent).
The survey also showed, however, that female adolescents quickly equal men when
it comes to premarital sex: in the age group of 18-24-year-old young women, the pro-
portion of respondents with premarital sexual experiences was three times higher than
in the age group of 25-29-year-old women (Chamrathritirong et al., 2007; Prasartkul
et al., 2011: 25f). Thus, the traditional gender-related role attributions also seem to
be slowly changing, which had largely tolerated sexual freedom among men, but not
among women:
“Thais distinguish between gender – a public identity to be kept ‘riabroi’ (proper) –
and sexuality, which remains undiscussed, unrestrained. Male urges are regarded as
natural and requiring plentiful, but private outlets [...] with Thai women’s virginity still
a commodity to be guarded [...].” (Cornwel-Smith, 2013: 113f)
The increasing emancipation of young Thai women in terms of sexuality and marriage
behavior is also expressed in themarital age that has been rising continuously for about
50 years (Table 6): While the age of first marriage ofThai women in 1960 was still around
22 years, in 2010 it was already 24.4 years (Prasartkul et al., 2011: 24); at the same time
the male age of first marriage rose from 25 years in 1960 to 28.3 years in 2010 (Peek
et al., 2015: 27). In Thailand, too, the postponement of marriage goes hand in hand
with a general improvement inThai women’s access to higher education and increasing
participation in employment (Jones, 2005).
Table 6: Increases in Singulate Mean Age at First Marriage of Thai Women (SMAM), 1960- 2010
Year 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
SMAM 22.1 22.0 22.8 23.5 24.0 24.4
Source: Prasartkul, et al. 2011: 24.
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In the past, decisions regarding family formation were crucially influenced by tra-
ditional norms and values: not to marry was not an option, most married couples had
children and parents lived with their adult children in the same household. Due to
lifestyle changes of the younger generation, however, traditional family formation pat-
terns are increasingly receding into the background: “[...] decisions regarding family
formation have now become preeminently based upon individual choices surrounding
desired lifestyles, economic opportunities, spatial limitations, educational levels and
the vagaries of the modern marriage market” (Peek et al., 2015: 16).
One indicator of these changes is the increasing proportion of singles among both
Thai men and women in recent decades. Table 7 shows that the proportion of men who
were still unmarried at the age of 45-49 increased fivefold between 1960 and 2000, and
the proportion of unmarried women in the same age group more than tripled.
Table 7: Increases in Percentages of Never-married Thais Aged 30-49, 1960- 2000
AgeGroup
andYear
30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49








8.1 24.1 5.3 15.3 3.9 11.3 3.0 9,5
Source: Soonthorndhada and Khumsuwan (2014: Figures 2, 3, p. 53)
A further indicator of the upheaval in family founding behavior is the increasing
share and acceptance of cohabitation. Starting in Scandinavia, this pattern of family
formation began to displace the traditional family images of the nuclear family or ex-
tended family, which shaped the ‘golden age of marriage and family’, as the 1950s and
1960s are called in European family sociology, and continued to spread to other regions
of the developed world. Undoubtedly the signs of an increase in cohabitation in recent
years are also increasing among youngThais, although the still valid cultural norms are
counteracting or delaying this trend.
Traditionally, premarital cohabitation is against Thai norms as a woman’s virginity
at marriage is of high value and according to Thai custom, a ceremonial marriage re-
presents a social announcement of a couple’s living together. Lately, attitude towards
union patterns amongThai people has changed. According to the Survey on Conditions of
Society, and Culture and Mental Health (NSO, 2010, 2018), within 10 years the acceptance
of cohabitation of respondents aged 13 and over has significantly increased from 26.8
percent in 2008 to 41.2 percent in 2018.
So far, however, there have been few studies on the extent of cohabitation in Thai-
land.The results from one of these surveys show that this is most common in Bangkok,
where 10.2 percent of respondents aged 18-59 said they were unmarried and lived with
their partner. In rural areas, on the other hand, this way of life is obviously still highly
unpopular as it applied to only 1 percent of respondents. Obviously, the inhabitants of
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the capital are much more open to unconventional lifestyles than is the case in small
and medium-sized towns or in rural areas (Jampaklay and Haseen, 2011).
Although no empirical study exists to support an increase in cohabitation in Thai-
land, regular surveys of cultural values among Thai people indicate that its acceptance
is slowly increasing: the percentage of respondents aged 13 and over who considered
premarital cohabitation acceptable increased from 26.8 percent in 2008 to 34.6 percent
in 2011 (NSO, 2008; NSO, 2011), with male respondents more positive than female re-
spondents and – unsurprisingly – the younger generation showing higher acceptance
than the older generation (Prasartkul et al., 2011: 25). In any case, it is clear that the
still relatively low tolerance towards premarital cohabitation has a fertility dampening
effect because it also stigmatizes premarital parenthood.
Gender Revolution in Thailand … Still a Long Way To Go
Finally, the question remains to what extent the third revolution, which contributed to
the Second Demographic Transition in the Western world, also affected Thailand and
strengthened the trend towards “below replacement fertility”. Lesthaeghe (2010: 216)
describes this development for 1960s Europe as follows: “[...] a gender revolution oc-
curred whereby women were no longer subservient to men and husbands, but asserted
the right to regulate their fertility.”
Male dominance has a long history in Thailand and this tradition can also be found
in the so-called “Three Sealed Laws”, a collection of legal texts, mostly from the Ayutt-
haya period, which were collected in 1805 by order of King Rama I (Assavarak, 2007).
The attitude that women generally have a lower status thanmen and are therefore hard-
ly entitled to autonomous action is also expressed in numerous Thai proverbs. One of
them, for example, is “woman is a buffalo while man is a human”, which expresses the
belief that men are generally far superior to women. Another common saying is, “hus-
band is elephant’s front legs, wife is elephant’s hind legs”, which means that the men
lead while the women have to follow.
After women’s rights have becomemore of an issue inThailand in recent years under
the influence of increasing globalization, traditional role clichés are beginning to chan-
ge more and more in the Kingdom as well: Rising levels of education and increasing
labor force participation bring not only more economic independence, but also increa-
sing autonomy in the choice of non-traditional desired lifestyles and above all control
over one’s own fertility.
One consequence of these tendencies is not only a rising age at marriage and an
increasing number of female singles, but also the willingness to end a dissatisfactory
marriage, as the continuously rising number of divorces shows (Figure 3). The general
divorce rate in Thailand in 2016, at 38.5 percent, was only slightly below the level in
European countries (e.g. Austria in 2016: 43 percent).
This trend also runs contrary to the prevailing cultural norm. Conventionally, mar-
ital ties are expected to last a lifetime, and divorce is considered a disgrace, especially
for women. Divorced women are stigmatized and divorce is usually attributed to a wo-
man’s failure or “defect” of some kind. Thai women have therefore traditionally tried
as far as possible to maintain their marriage despite family pressure, or even enduring
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Figure 3: Divorce Rates in Thailand 2004- 2016 (in percent)
Data source: NSO (Thailand, National Statistical Office) 2019; own design
domestic violence in order to avoid stigmatization and the associated loss of face (Ass-
avarak, 2007). The response of modern, well-educated, and economically independent
women to existing traditional norms that work to their disadvantage was inevitable: the
number of divorces filed by women is on the rise, and this has probably also contributed
to the slight increase in single-parent families, the number of which rose from around
970,000 in 1987 to 1.4 million in 2013 (Peek et al., 2015: 72f).
One factor that has also contributed to the gender revolution in Thailand, but is
only mentioned in this article for the sake of completeness, is the increasing femini-
zation of rural-urban migration in all its forms over recent decades. The majority of
migrant women are young and unmarried and migrate to big cities – mostly to Bang-
kok – for educational reasons or to find work. However, the norms and circumstances
under which migration can take place are central to women’s migration decisions. Tra-
ditionally, much more is expected from Thai women than from men. For example, the
care of parents and children is their sole responsibility, without any help from the male
household members. Such ideas, deeply rooted inThai culture, also remain valid in case
a daughter migrates, but the nature of the obligation shifts. Adult children are generally
expected to contribute to the financial well-being of their parents in old age; however,
usually more is expected from daughters, because migrated daughters are usually re-
garded as more reliable than sons when it comes to remitting money to their parents
(cf. e.g. Husa, 1986; Clausen, 2002; Guest et al., 1994).
At the same time, however, after having lived in the city for a while, the family ex-
pectations placed on migrated young women no longer correspond with their urban
reality. Young men inThailand have always been granted a social life outside the family,
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even encouraged to do so, while girls have been taught to stay at home and concentrate
on their family responsibilities. However, after migrating to the city, migrant women
spend much of their youth away from their families, confronted with new views, atti-
tudes, and social practices. Whenever they return to their village of origin for whatever
reason, they also bring with them ideas of urban, modern life with completely different
social norms and values and thus become role models for the young girls and women
who have remained in the village (Clausen, 2002: 61).
The confrontation of the female village youth with the tan sà-mâi (modern) lifestyle
of returned migrant women drives the gender revolution in rural areas as much as the
depiction of images of urban life in socialmedia andmassmedia, since not only abstract
images and ideas are conveyed, but also experienced and lived reality.
Convergent Development – Convergent Problems?
Can the theses of the Second Demographic Transition help to adequately explain recent
demographic developments in Thailand? Yes, all major indicators point to a demogra-
phic convergence of Thailand with the countries of the Global North, albeit with some
delay. On the whole, however, the current demographic reality inThailand suggests that
the Kingdom will face similar demographic problems in the coming years and decades
as has been the case for some time in many countries of the Global North.
However, whether the insistence on strengthening or maintaining culturally deter-
mined traditional values and norms will suffice to solve the problems at hand may be
doubted on the basis of the experiences of southern European countries in recent deca-
des, for example. Traditional family image and decision-making structures, traditional
gender roles and a lack of women’s emancipation, reform-resistant religious instituti-
ons such as the Catholic Church and the associated lack of state support in the creation
of childcare facilities to enable a better compatibility of family and career – we can see
today where this leads from the example of Italy and other European Mediterranean
countries: namely to a society with an ultra-low fertility, where more adult diapers are
sold than baby diapers, where a generation of grandparents “cheated of their grand-
children” spends more money on pets than on their grandchildren. ... Is this the way
that Thailand is about to take in the near future or will the Kingdom, as so often in its
history, find its very special “Thai Way” in this respect?
The renowned Thai demographer, Boonlert Leoprapai, expressed his idea on future
trends of fertility in Thailand with the phrase “the river has no return” (Leoprapai, 2014:
38-39). Policy implications to promoting fertility seem to fail in reversing fertility de-
cline; conversely, estimations indicate that the fertility rate will stay below replacement
level for the next 30 years (until 2050). However, in the last few years, fertility trends in
some highly developed countries have been slightly reversed. Myrskylä et al. (2009) find
a so-called “inverse J-shaped” relationship between the Human Development Index (HDI)
and total fertility rates in developed countries, suggesting a fertility rebound at a HDI
of more than 0.9 which marks the approximate turning point.
Human development in terms of GDP per capita, life expectancy, and school en-
rolment are claimed to provoke a revival of fertility. Applying this concept to Thailand
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(HDI, 2017: 0.755), the country is still a long way from an upswing in fertility (see Table
8).















1990 70.3 8.4 4.6 6,560 0.574 2.40
1995 70.2 9.6 5.0 9,177 0.611 2.20
2000 70.6 11.2 6.1 9,003 0.649 2.00
2005 72.1 12.7 7.0 11,006 0.693 1.81
2010 73.9 13.3 7.7 12,918 0.724 1.81
2015 75.1 13.9 7.6 14,455 0.741 1.60
2016 75.3 14.3 7.6 14,971 0.748 1.60
2017 75.5 14.7 7.6 15,516 0.755 1.59
Sources: Columns 2-6: UNDP 2018: 2; Column 7: Prasartkul et al. 2011: 19, IPSR: Mahidol Population
Gazette 2015, 2016 and 2017.
More recently, Luci and Thevenon (2010) have specified that economic development
is likely to induce a fertility rebound. They have identified female employment as the
main factor impacting fertility, behind GDP variations. The increase in female employ-
ment and fertility rates suggests a key role played by the changes in norms and insti-
tutions supporting the combination of work and family that go along with the process
of economic development. According to studies in the Global North, it implies a signal
for the unwinding of demographic challenges. It is important for Thailand to consider
new economic and social dimensions and attitudes and norms towards fertility, female
education and gender roles to find a ‘Thai Way’ to lift fertility. Norms concerning fer-
tility-related behavior in form of “public campaigns”– “Having many children leads to
poverty”– have had a remarkable influence on the perception of Thai people for several
decades. Reverse norms on having children and changes in norms concerning childbea-
ring, labor market contexts, and policies to support the work-life balance may facilitate
Thailand to “drive” its fertility.
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Rural Access Denied or Difficult: Foreign News
Journalists from Germany Face Obstacles in Reporting
about the “Rohingya” Conflict in Myanmar’s Northern
Rakhine State
Oliver Hahn & Anna Munkler (Passau)
Introduction
In September 2017, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) correspondent Jonathan
Head (2017) and 17 other local and foreign journalists were given the chance to visit Ma-
ungdaw district in Myanmar, just one district of those on the Bangladesh-Myanmar
border from which hundreds of thousands of people had fled in the weeks before. The
journalists were confronted by conflicting realities: the refugees reported that soldiers,
policemen and civilians had murdered, raped and burned houses down, whereas the
Myanmar government alleged that the refugees were terrorists and had burned down
their houses themselves. After his journey to Maungdaw, Head considered himself in
a position to unmask attempts at manipulation by the government, but the final truth
about the mass exodus from Myanmar remained uncertain. Since that unsuccessful
press trip, the attitude of Myanmar’s government towards foreign journalists has chan-
ged, and work has become even more difficult for reporters covering the so-called Roh-
ingya1 conflict—“the fastest-growing refugee emergency in the world today” (UNHCR,
2017).
This chapter explores how foreign news journalists (particularly from Germany) ex-
perience this conflict and what obstacles they face in reporting it. In addition to their
own views on their work, it will examine their work practices, the internal structure of
their media outlets and the external influences on their work in Myanmar and Bangla-
desh.The empirical part of this paper is based on findings drawn from qualitative semi-
1 The use of the term Rohingya is controversial. Whereas a group of Muslims in Rakhine State uses
this term to name their ethnic group, neither the Myanmar government nor the majority of the
population accept the Rohingya as an ethnic group, preferring to call this group of Muslims in
Rakhine State “Bengali”. This chapter does not aim to advance any position in the discussion on
naming. It uses the term Rohingya because it is commonly used and well-known.
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structured in-depth interviews (conducted in 2018) with eight foreign news journalists
working for Germanmedia. After an overview of the conflict and its effect on the media
in Myanmar, the results of the interviews will be discussed.
Historical and Political Background of the Rohingya Conflict
It is impossible to deal with the conflict in Rakhine without considering the complex
history of multi-ethnic Myanmar. Before the first Anglo-BurmeseWar (1824-1826), poli-
tics in the region that is today known as Myanmar were completely different. Although
it is unlikely that all tribes lived peacefully next to each other, as Myanmar history books
oftentimes aver, there was still a stable system of rule and power. Numerous authorities
ruled the area in a complex system of relations, obedience and patronage (Grein, 2015;
Zöllner, 2015).
After their defeat by Great Britain in three wars, the precolonial dynasties were
supplanted not only by new rulers but also by a totally new understanding of politics,
states and nations (Grein, 2015). The area between the Andaman Sea and the Himala-
yas became part of the British Raj from 1886 until it was finally separated from India
and given its own administration in 1937 (Grein, 2015), at which time the British defi-
ned the border that separated the Indian provinces from Burma and today separates
Myanmar from Bangladesh. This demarcation of the border can be seen as one of the
main reasons for the long-lasting conflict in Rakhine State (Zöllner, 2015). Furthermore,
the British administration contributed to a schism in Myanmar society because during
colonial rule several positions were specifically assigned to members of distinct ethnic
communities. This maximised the peoples’ perception of ethnic differences and their
political significance and prevented the growth of a united Myanmar society (Grein,
2015; Kipgen, 2016).
When Burma gained independence from Great Britain in 1948, it was by nomeans a
united nation. During the following tumultuous decades, ethnic tensions led to several
conflicts. The colonial structures left their mark, as did events in World War II, when
the Burma Independence Army (BIA) under General Aung San’s command fought for
the Japanese whilst ethnic minorities from the border regions kept their loyalty with
the British (Grein, 2015).
In 1947, some ethnic groups were pushed by the British to negotiate the Panglong
Agreement (Kipgen, 2016). Actually, the British were surprised by the willingness of eth-
nic groups to accept the agreement (Hellmann-Rajanayagam and Helbardt, 2015). The
Bamar majority led by Aung San promised the minority groups several rights and con-
cessions. However, the fact that the agreement was never completely implemented led
to further mistrust (Kipgen, 2016).There have been several ethnic conflicts in Myanmar
in the past decades, and every conflict has its own origins. The conflict in the Rakhine
State centres on the following questions: Are the Rohingya an ethnic group? If so, are
they entitled to be designated ‘thaingyintha’ (native ethnic race) and are they entitled to
Myanmar citizenship?
Answers to these questions are widely contested. Leider (2014) tracked the history
of Muslims in Rakhine back to the 15th century. At this time, the kingdom of Arakan
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and its capital Mrauk U were strongly influenced by the neighbouring sultanate in sou-
thern Bengal. The kingdom was home to many Muslims in all parts of the society, even
at the Buddhist palace. From the late 17th century the Burmese expanded their rule
and in 1785 they conquered the kingdom of Arakan, extinguished the former elites and
brought some Bengal Brahmans back with them to Burma. When Francis Hamilton
came to Burma in 1795, he was the first one to write down the term ‘Rooinga’ as a desi-
gnation of origin, from the word which Muslims from Arakan used in their own accent
to describe where they came from. Further mentions of Muslims in Rakhine are from
the early 19th century, at which time an estimated ten to 15 per cent of the populati-
on in the region were Muslim (Leider, 2014). However, there is no historical evidence
that this community perceived itself as an ethnically independent Muslim people that
significantly influenced the history of the country, as some of the Rohingya like to state
nowadays (Leider, 2014).
There are very few reliable sources about the population in Rakhine during the co-
lonial era; nevertheless, there is evidence that a large number of Muslims migrated
from Bengal to Burma, and in 1911 more than one third of Rakhine’s population were
Muslims. In 1942 many Indian immigrants fleeing from the Japanese entered Rakhine,
where the first violent clashes between Muslims and Buddhists took place. For the next
two years, Rakhine was virtually divided into a Muslim north and a Buddhist south.
After World War II, the Muslim population of Rakhine hoped that their home would
become part of Pakistan, and when this did not happen, a militant organisation aiming
at autonomy for Rakhine was founded under the name ‘Mujahids’. The ‘Mujahids’ were
outmanoeuvred in 1954 and finally laid down arms in 1961. During their resistance, they
rediscovered the name Rohingya, using it for the first time in 1951 to name an ethnic
group living in Northern Rakhine. Since the 1960s, several militant groups have been
founded to combat the military government using arms and violence (Leider, 2014).
Many scholars place responsibility for the repression of the Rohingya on the 1982
Citizenship Law. The law was passed after a national census and violent suppression
of minority resistance forced about 200,000 Muslims to flee the country (Southwick,
2014).This law,which groups theMyanmar population into four categories (Kyaw, 2017),
is often cited as the main reason for the desperate situation the Rohingya face today
because it denied them citizenship (Crouch, 2016). But a closer look at the text of the
Burma Citizenship Law from October 15th, 1982 shows that, since neither the Rohingya
nor the other commonly cited 135 ethnic groups2 are named, the law does not directly
deny the Rohingya citizenship. The more likely reason for the statelessness of the Roh-
ingya is the fact that this law was never properly implemented. Thus, the statelessness
has to be understood de facto, not de jure (Cheesman, 2017; Kyaw, 2017).
Today, the conflict is mainly a dispute between two opinions. The Rohingya, whom
Leider (2014: 66) refers to as a “political movement”3, insist they are an ethnic group
that has been living in Rakhine for millennia and has shaped the history and culture
2 The origin of this list, which was published by themilitary junta in 1990, is still unknown. Different
population censuses in the 20th century identified very different numbers of ethnic groups. The
lists range from 135 to 160 groups (Cheesman, 2017).
3 All non-English quotes have been translated by the authors.
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of the country. They disregard the wave of Muslim immigration into the region during
the colonial era. In contrast, the Buddhist majority denies the long history of Islam in
Rakhine and is convinced that all Muslim immigration started during the colonial era,
considering most of it to be illegal.
A Timeline of the Recent Conflict
Although the outburst of violence in 2012 turned the eyes of the world on Rakhine, the
region was far from calm and peaceful during the previous decades. As depicted by
Kyaw (2017) and Cheesman (2017), the persecution of the Rohingya since Burma’s inde-
pendence is a story of displacement and resettlement, with the two phases of exodus
and return occurring twice. The first exodus, which began in 1978, was triggered by a
brutal military operation ahead of a national census which aimed to re-establish the
residence status of people in Burma. Between 156,000 to 250,000 people fled to Ban-
gladesh (Cheesman, 2017; Kyaw, 2017). Shortly after, the Burmese government agreed
to take the Muslims back from Bangladesh, and by the end of December 1979 almost
187,000 refugees had been brought back (Kyaw, 2017).
In 1988, the military took power in Burma for the second time4 and a wave of mili-
tarisation followed, causing human rights violations and abuses, especially in the bor-
der regions.This forced Muslims to flee the country again, and by May 1992 Bangladesh
had registered approximately 263,000 refugees fromBurma (Kyaw, 2017).Myanmar and
Bangladesh then agreed on a second resettlement, and between 1992 and 2005 hund-
reds of thousands of people were compelled to return to Myanmar in a resettlement
that was internationally criticised as a forced relocation. However, in 2005 Myanmar
did not renew the agreement, and several thousand Rohingya stayed in Bangladesh,
living in refugee camps or as unregistered illegal immigrants (Kyaw, 2017).
The second resettlement phase was still ongoing when Myanmar entered on a new
political age. Although the military regime did not accept its results, the 1990 election
became the first milestone on Myanmar’s path towards democracy by proving the clear
support of the people for the National League for Democracy (NLD) under the lea-
dership of Aung San Suu Kyi, who in 1991 became a Nobel Peace Prize laureate. In 2008,
themilitary junta passed a new constitution, after which new elections brought in a civil
government led by former general U Thein Sein. In a by-election in 2012 the NLD won
a landslide victory, and in 2015 achieved an absolute majority in the general election,
after which the office of State Counsellor, as de facto leader, was created for Aung San
Suu Kyi—who, as the widow and mother of foreigners (with British citizenship), is not
eligible for the presidency according to the 2008 constitution.
As democracy in Myanmar developed, it brought economic liberalisation and in-
ternationalisation and raised hopes within the international community of peace in
4 There was a successful coup in 1962, which was followed by twelve years of military government.
In 1974, themilitary junta passed a new constitution andNeWin, who until then had ruled as a ge-
neral, became head of the Burma Socialist Programme Party. After the unrest in 1988, he resigned
(?, 2015).
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Myanmar. However, it did not bring peace to Rakhine. In 2012, the Rohingya conflict
attracted the attention of the international media (Leider, 2014). This time, attention
was not triggered by a military operation, but by a cruel crime committed by Rohingya.
In July 2012, in the village Kyaw Ne Maw three men raped and murdered a 28-year-
old woman. One of the three men later committed suicide and two were arrested and
sentenced to death, but this was not the end of the story. When the public learned
that the victim was a Rakhine Buddhist whilst the murderers were Rohingya, hundreds
of Rakhine Buddhists vowed revenge and beat ten Muslim bus passengers to death.
Violence then spread to several townships in Rakhine, in which both Muslims and Bud-
dhists burned houses and killed each other. The security forces did not interfere, some
even joined the Buddhists. In October 2012, many Rohingya settlements were attacked
in what human rights organisations identified as planned and well-coordinated attacks
(Human RightsWatch, 2013). In the clashes between June andOctober 2012, around 200
people died and 150,000more lost their homes. An observation committee set up by the
Myanmar government in August 2012 to analyse the situation in Rakhine and find so-
lutions included not one Rohingya. Nevertheless, the report called for compliance with
human rights and international treaties and recommended that giving Myanmar citi-
zenship to the Rohingya be considered. Furthermore, it demanded a more transparent
handling of information and news from Rakhine (Southwick, 2014).
Towards the end of 2012, tens of thousands of Rohingya were still fleeing to refugee
camps within Myanmar or outside the country. When the government of neighbouring
Bangladesh decided to close its borders, thousands of refugees tried to reach southern
neighbours by crossing the ocean by boat. To keep them out of the country, Thailand
gave them enough food, water and fuel so that they could travel to Malaysia. By the
end of 2012, an estimated 13,000 Rohingya reached Malaysia and another 6,000 were
stranded inThailand. Several hundred probably did not survive the dangerous crossing
(Human Rights Watch, 2013). Throughout 2013, the riots still did not cease.This second
year of fighting forced a further 35,000 Rohingya to leave the country by boat, and at
least 785 drowned (Southwick, 2014).
In the following years, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA)5 attacked several
police stations andmilitary outposts.The country’s response was oppressive and in 2016
unreasonably violent. The last and until now most serious outburst of violence started
in summer 2017, again triggered by an ARSA attack. On August 25th, 2017, eleven people
were killed when ARSA militants attacked 30 police stations and one military post. The
revenge of the military, border police and civilians targeted not only ARSA fighters, but
entire Rohingya villages. Interviews with refugees and satellite images helped human
rights organisations to understand what happened in Rakhine during those days. Ma-
ny interviewees reported that military personnel surrounded their villages, shot down
5 The ARSA was founded under a different name after the outburst of violence in 2012. Members
call it an ethno-nationalist movement. It had started as a small underground organisation with a
few hundred followers, but in 2016 and 2017 it represented thousands of Rohingya, who suppor-
ted the trained fighters with their own means. It is contested whether or not the ARSA also gets
international support (Amnesty International, 2017).
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people who tried to run away, and at the end looted huts in which families and the el-
derly or diseased were hiding. In some places, there were also reports of mass rapes and
soldiers killing toddlers (Amnesty International, 2017; Bouckaert, 2017; Human Rights
Watch, 2013).
According to estimates given by DoctorsWithout Borders, between August 25th and
September 24th, 2017 at least 6,700 people died due to violence; 730 of them were child-
ren under the age of five. The main causes of violence-related deaths were gunshots,
burning, beating to death and sexual violence (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2018). Fur-
thermore, at least 59 men, women and children were killed when ARSA fighters and
militant Rohingya attacked Hindu communities, and 46 Hindus went missing (Amnes-
ty International, 2018).
Myanmar’s government and army refute all accusations against the security forces
and only accept the results of their own investigations. However, the role of (some sec-
tions of) the Myanmar military in the Rohingya conflict remains highly controversial.
By 2018, only the mass execution of ten Rohingya villagers by soldiers, policemen and
civilians had been conceded and penalised, after Reuters journalists presented unde-
niable evidence (Han, 2018). According to the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR, 2018), approximately 900,000 refugees live in camps in Bangladesh,
of whom approximately 700,000 (BBC, 2018) arrived after August 25th, 2017, and people
are still arriving.
Since the end of 2017, Myanmar and Bangladesh have been negotiating a resett-
lement of refugees to Myanmar. In April 2018, the BBC (2018) published an article on
unconfirmed reporting by the Myanmar government that the first Rohingya refugee fa-
mily had returned to Myanmar in full view of the world’s cameras. After a visit by the
UnitedNations (UN) Security Council representatives, theMyanmar government signed
an agreement on the voluntary return of Rohingya. This agreement was concluded by
UNHCR and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), but does not seem to be really
practicable. Experts consider the camps designated as the Rohingya’s future homes in
Myanmar poorly prepared (Siddiqui, 2018). Furthermore, new clashes in Rakhine State
between ARSA and the national military displaced more people from different ethni-
cities in Rakhine and neighbouring Chin State during the first quarter of 2019 (Gerin
et al., 2019), and most of the Rohingya involved hesitate to follow Myanmar’s calls to
return. They are waiting for the promise to provide them with citizenship, freedom
of movement and security (Siddiqui, 2018). Thinking about their homeland fills many
Rohingya with despair.
In the recent Rohingya conflict, several international human rights activists have
accused Myanmar of alleged ‘ethnic cleansings’, ‘systematic human rights abuses’, ‘cri-
mes against humanity’, ‘war crimes’ or even ‘genocide’. The country has always refuted
those accusations. In this context, international human rights activists also have de-
manded that Myanmar’s de facto leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, be divested of her Nobel
Peace Prize.
In November 2019, The Gambia, a predominantly Muslim west African state and a
member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), filed a “Rohingya genocide
case against Myanmar” at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague in the
Netherlands (Bowcott, 2019a).
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In December 2019, after a three-day “ICJ hearing into accusations of genocide” and
“[i]n a defiant closing address to the UN’s highest tribunal, Aung San Suu Kyi […] plea-
ded with its 17 international judges to dismiss allegations that Myanmar has committed
genocide and urged them instead to allow the country’s court martial system to deal
with any human rights abuses“. According to “an American lawyer speaking for [T]he
Gambia” an earlier UN (fact-finding) mission had “warned about genocide and recom-
mended criminal charges” (Bowcott, 2019b).
In January 2020, the ICJ orderedMyanmar “to prevent genocidal violence against its
Rohingya Muslim minority and preserve any evidence of past crimes”. This court’s “un-
animous decision” was reported to be “momentous”: the ICJ “imposed emergency ‘pro-
visional measures’ on the country – intervening in its domestic affairs by instructing
the government of Aung San Suu Kyi to respect the requirements of the 1948 genocide
convention” and said “that there was prima facie evidence of breaches of the conventi-
on”. Moreover: “The ICJ’s orders are binding on Myanmar and create legal obligations
that must be enforced. The provisional measures imposed by the court require the go-
vernment to prevent genocidal acts, ensure military and police forces do not commit
genocide, preserve evidence of genocidal acts and report back on its compliance [...].
The orders are automatically sent to the UN security council, whereMyanmar’s response
will be assessed.” (Bowcott and Ratcliffe, 2020)
Effects of the Conflict on Media Freedom in Myanmar
The Rohingya conflict not only attracted the international media’s attention, it also di-
rectly affected the situation of media inMyanmar.When democratisation started in the
country, media freedom improved and the censorship enforced since 1962 was lifted in
August 2012. In 2013, the government allowed private daily newspapers that had been
banned for 50 years to be published. Mass media of all political stripes, and even popu-
lar exile media such asThe Irrawaddy or Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), were able to
open offices in Myanmar (Amthor, 2015). Although it can be argued that the state is still
able to put media under pressure and encourages self-censorship (Amthor, 2015; Khine,
2015), Myanmar improved its position in the Reporters Without Borders’ (2018) World
Press Freedom Index significantly between 2013 and 2017. However, in 2018 Myanmar
fell again slightly in the ranking.
Reporting on ethnic conflicts in Shan State and Kachin State and especially on the
conflict in Rakhine has become more and more difficult for journalists. Even in 2012,
the conflict in Rakhine put the new media freedom to the test. The riots after the rape
and murder of a young Buddhist woman were not fuelled just by the dynamics of so-
cial media, information published by traditional media also led to overreactions in the
already tense situation in Rakhine (Ismaïl, 2012). Journalists working for international
media reported pressure from Myanmar officials as well as civilians. In several open
protests, media outlets such as the BBC or DVB were accused of deliberately reporting
biased and false stories. DVB was even threatened in an online smear campaign and
was attacked by hackers (Ismaïl, 2012).
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In 2013, approximately 200 enraged Buddhists attacked the car of a UN human
rights expert on his visit to Meiktila. During this time, several journalists were also
threatened and hindered in their work (Southwick, 2014). In 2015, as elections approa-
ched, the number of detentions of media workers increased; the closer the elections
came, the more serious the situation became. Amnesty International (2015) reported
several detentions, massive self-censorship and a climate of fear. In an atmosphere
where Buddhist extremism, nationalism, and the persecution of Rohingya frequently
made headlines, journalists were not able to cover the conflict without endangering
themselves or their informants.
Even before the ARSA attacks in 2017 it was very difficult for journalists to get ad-
mission to enter Rakhine State (Bodewein and Diettrich, 2017; Head, 2017), but after
the attacks it became impossible. When the riots escalated and international media
reported Buddhist mobs, plundering Buddhist monks, brutal military and a passive
government, Aung San Suu Kyi (cit. in Safi, 2017) gave her first public statement on the
issue; she was reported as blaming the media for spreading “a huge iceberg of misin-
formation”. Clear governmental information and a strategic communication policy has
been seriously lacking so far. However, the government invited selected national and
international journalists on a trip to Rakhine to show them the extent of destruction
and the fear of Rakhine people of alleged Muslim ‘terrorists’. In fact, a different scen-
ario unfolded. By accident, the group of journalists passed a burning Rohingya village
and interviewed those who had set fire to it, only to find they were Rakhine Buddhists
(Head, 2017). Since this incident, investigation of international media in the conflict
area is virtually impossible.
Two journalists fromMyanmar became internationally known because they were se-
riously prevented from doing their job for international media. Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe
Oo, two local Reuters journalists, were part of a team of investigative reporters covering
a massacre in the coastal community Inn Din. Together with two other colleagues, they
covered the murder of ten Rohingya, took pictures as evidence and interviewed witnes-
ses and culprits (Lone et al., 2018). But before the article was published, police arrested
the two Reuters reporters in December 2017. On September 3rd, 2018 they were found
guilty of breaching the colonial-era Official Secrets Act and sentenced to seven years
in prison (Chalmers, 2018). However, they were released on May 7th, 2019 after having
received a presidential pardon, after, in April 2019, “[t]he pair were awarded a Pulitzer
Prize for international reporting” (Lewis, 2019).
Besides political restrictions and logistical problems, the strong polarisation in the
Rohingya conflict is an obstacle for journalistic investigation (Brooten and Verbruggen,
2017). There are several aspects that influence how journalists tell the story of the con-
flict; for example, access to certain regions, interviewees and informants, or the use
of translators and interpreters. In this emotionally loaded conflict, ethnic descent can
cause bias.
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Foreign News Journalists (from Germany) in the Conflict
In recent years, the circumstances under which foreign news journalists work in Myan-
mar have changed dramatically. To offer an overview, this chapter presents the results
of explorative qualitative semi-structured in-depth interviews with eight foreign news
journalists working for German media. All interviewees covered the conflict during re-
cent years. They live in South East Asia, South Asia or Germany and work for print
and online media, news wires, radio and/or TV. The interviews were conducted in the
first half of 2018 via video or audio telecommunication. Table 1 provides details of the
interviewees (made anonymous).




Media affiliation andposition Date of interview
R1 South East Asia correspondent (TV) April 3, 2018
R2 Freelance correspondent (newswires, print and online
media)
April 14, 2018
R3 South Asia correspondent (radio) April 16, 2018
R4 South and South East Asia correspondent (print me-
dia)
April 17, 2018
R5 Reporter and ‘parachute’ correspondent (printmedia) June 13, 2018
R6 South East Asia correspondent (TV) June 15, 2018
R7 Freelance correspondent (printmedia) June 18, 2018
R8 South East Asia correspondent (radio) June 27, 2018
Source: table compiled by the authors
The Influence of Internal Structures on Working Practices
With regard to collaboration with their editorial offices in Germany, the respondents
reported a strong fluctuation in interest in the Rohingya. One interviewee dubbed the
Rohingya conflict a topic “that has boiled over very quickly” (R8). Another described
“waves” (R2) of ups and downs in reporting the topic. Following the events of August
2017, newsrooms of all media genres were highly interested in the topic, but previously
there had been only a few flashes of international media interest. Two respondents also
noticed that their editorial offices seemed to follow other national and international
media in their agenda setting (R2; R7).
Interviewees explained that the growing interest of international media in the Roh-
ingya case had different causes: according to some, the reason for the lack of interest in
the conflict before 2017 may have been the huge geographical and cultural distance bet-
ween Germany andMyanmar (R1; R8). Some respondents mentioned the following pos-
sible causes for the suddenly growing interest: surprise about the cruelty of a Buddhist
majority persecuting a Muslim minority (R3); the extreme extent of the mass exodus
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(R4; R7); and the prominence of Aung San Suu Kyi as an “icon of democracy” (R1; R7).
In the time before August 2017, journalists witnessed the strong competition that this
topic faced from other national and international events as well as from news within
their own area of coverage (R1; R2; R4). Foreign news journalists covering the Rohingya
conflict particularly considered the huge regional size of some areas of coverage to be
a tremendous challenge. A public service TV correspondent (R1) reported difficulties in
reacting promptly to unexpected happenings in Myanmar while being, for instance, on
a film tour in Australia or Indonesia. In such a situation, editors in Germany would
have to deal with those events on a simple news level, without in-depth background
information supplied on-site. The huge area of coverage, which included all South East
Asian countries plus sometimes parts of South Asia, Australia, New Zealand and Ocea-
nia, could lead to difficulties for the on-site correspondents.
In the case of the Rohingya conflict, some interviewees faced other challenges ari-
sing from internal structure. The border between Myanmar and Bangladesh is not only
the location of the conflict, but it also separates South East Asia from South Asia, and
thus is the border between two areas of coverage for several media. Although Myanmar
was not in the area of coverage for which he was responsible, one of the respondents
from Bangladesh reported on the conflict as an exception (R6). Another respondent felt
dissatisfied with the fact that he was not able to travel to Myanmar at the right time in
order to collect first-hand information himself (R1). Two journalists—one working in
Myanmar, the other one in Bangladesh—experienced an unforeseen cooperation bet-
ween the radio stations they worked for, to produce a joint feature containing informa-
tion from both sides of the border (R3; R8).
Two of the respondents investigated in Bangladesh only, whilst one did so exclu-
sively in Myanmar. The other five journalists investigated the Rohingya conflict while
based in several countries over the last few years: in Myanmar and Bangladesh, but also
from Thailand and Malaysia.
External Factors that Complicate Reporting
In addition to the obstacles due to internal structure, the respondents also reported
external factors that hindered their work. They named problems typical for the area of
coverage of South Asia and South East Asia, such as time difference to Germany (R1),
travel time and distances (R1; R5), travel costs (R2; R7), visa difficulties and bureaucratic
barriers (R1; R3) and poor infrastructure (R3). With regard to covering the Rohingya
conflict, they stated that it was difficult to plan research trips in advance and to get an
overview of the situation on-site (R6; R7). One TV journalist realised that his on-site
presence changed the situation of his informants and thus also the reality he wanted to
record, because people he filmed were treated differently in front of a camera (R6).
A team of TV and radio journalists even experienced physical threats during their
work in Myanmar (R8). They were attacked by a mob while interviewing people and
eventually needed to take shelter in their hotel. One interviewee mentioned feeling se-
vere emotional strain as a consequence of the impressions received in camps in Ban-
gladesh (R3).
Rural Access Denied or Difficult 163
Other obstacles arose from working together with local stringers. Six respondents
chose local stringers they knew already from previous reporting projects, and two con-
tacted local stringers recommended by colleagues.Themost important criteria for choo-
sing a local stringer were knowledge of the region, local language skills and an existing
network of informants in the area. Some interviewees chose to work with local jour-
nalists or members of human rights organisations (R3; R7). One journalist worked as a
‘parachute’ correspondent and was invited to Bangladesh by a non-governmental orga-
nisation, whose international workers provided stringer services, such as trip organisa-
tion, on-site support, or recruiting interpreters (R5). Stringers working with the other
respondents came from Myanmar or Bangladesh, and in two cases they were former
Rohingya refugees themselves.
Most of the respondents did not fear that the ethnicity of their local stringer influ-
enced the reporting, and several emphasised their trust in the local stringers (R1; R2;
R8). Only one journalist mentioned difficulties in verifying information while working
together. He explained that double-checking information was impossible for economic
reasons (R6). One of the respondents even had to rely completely on information provi-
ded by his local stringers because it was impossible for him to travel to Myanmar in late
summer 2017 (R7). Two interviewees expressed their concern at endangering their local
stringers. They admitted that they postponed some investigation trips and resorted to
using information from social media to protect their local stringers (R2; R8).
Despite their deep trust in local stringers and interpreters, six out of eight inter-
viewees stated that language barriers impeded their work. One journalist compared
the transfer of information from the Rohingya language to Bengali to English and then
to German without the help of professional interpreters to a game of “Chinese whis-
pers” (R3). This journalist remarked that information can get lost in translation and the
process is also very time-consuming (R3). Furthermore, several journalists complained
that some interpreters tended to summarise and explain statements given by infor-
mants instead of translating literally (R3; R5; R6; R8). Several journalists admitted to
having these language difficulties in most countries of their area of coverage (e.g. R3).
Irrespective of the language barrier, journalists experienced very different levels of
access to information and interviewees inMyanmar andBangladesh. Some respondents
stated that, after the opening of the country, Myanmar would accept and support jour-
nalists in their work (R1; R4). Some interviewees described Bangladesh as more difficult
for news coverage in general (R3; R4). According to several respondents, prior to the es-
calation of the Rohingya conflict in 2017 journalists were allowed to visit at least some
internal refugee camps in Sittwe and other areas of Rakhine, but from the summer of
2017, Myanmar closed Rakhine State completely for journalists and started to restrict
their movements more and more; obviously, it became more difficult for journalists to
get a visa to enter Myanmar in general, even when they did not aim to cover the Rohin-
gya conflict (R2; R4). According to some respondents, the government would offer only
very limited information about the Rohingya topic; therefore, some respondents deci-
ded to continue their investigations and reports from neighbouring Bangladesh (R2;
R4; R6).
In Bangladesh, some interviewees experienced an exceptional freedomof reporting.
They got almost unlimited access to refugee camps and were not affected by any con-
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trol or censorship (R3; R5; R6), though for some months access to the direct border area
changed and was partly restricted (R3; R5; R6). They also reported that contacting poli-
ticians in Bangladesh was easy for journalists. However, one South Asia correspondent
experienced a change in behaviour: whereas she always used to have problems getting
statements by politicians in Bangladesh because of complex hierarchies, this changed
within the Rohingya context. Politicians who came to the refugee camps to observe the
situation or to make donations were happy to be interviewed and reported by journa-
lists (R3). Some of the interviewed journalists assumed that the reason for this sudden
openness by Bangladesh is obvious: in the Rohingya conflict, many international me-
dia portrayed Bangladesh predominantly in a positive way so that the country did not
have to fear negative headlines. Furthermore, Bangladesh depended significantly on
international support (R3; R6).
Some respondents assessed their working conditions in Bangladesh as free to find
and talk to their informants directly and spontaneously (R1; R5; R6). In addition, they
named several other sources, especially local and international media reports, huma-
nitarian aid and human rights organisations and UN bodies. Sometimes, they also re-
ferred to official statements issued by the Myanmar government. Only one interviewee
stated using news wires intensely because, by contrast, social media were not reliable
or important sources (R3).
The Difficulty in Finding Reliable Information
Almost all respondents had doubts about the credibility of the information they got,
“because in such conflicts, you cannot trust any of the parties involved” (R1). One re-
spondent did not criticise anyone for purposefully releasing propaganda or even lies
to journalists but stated that uncertainty and rumours might lead to unintended false
statements by the refugees (R6). Another interviewee stated that in refugee camps in
Sittwe and in Bangladesh many traumatised victims gave journalists information that
might not be trustworthy (R4). Some respondents doubted the reliability of information
issued by Myanmar’s government. One respondent stated bluntly that “the government
lies” (R2) and another one added that “government members as well as the military or
Buddhist monks tell you, to be honest, a pack of lies” (R8).
In order to check information coming from refugee camps in the best way possible,
some journalists used the following technique: first, they asked for detailed informati-
on; secondly, they asked whether or not their informants had eye-witnessed what they
described; and thirdly, they compared the statements of several persons with each other
(R3; R4; R5; R6). One respondent checked the plausibility of information with the help
of international aid workers who knew Northern Rakhine State well and another inter-
viewee checked information with the help of her local stringer and other colleagues (R5;
R2).
One respondent mentioned problems in talking with some female refugees. Pro-
bably because they were embarrassed about what had happened to them, some women
used paraphrases to describe that they had been raped. This way of talking was inter-
preted by this respondent as evidence that the women were probably not lying (R3).
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Some respondents agreed that, despite journalistic techniques and knowledge of hu-
man nature, it was impossible to finally check all the information they got. Hence, they
trusted their intuition (R5; R6; R8) or considered the suffering they eye-witnessed on-
site and the behaviour of people they met in Myanmar (R2; R3; R8).
Three respondents insisted on the importance of telling the audience that their news
stories about the Rohingya conflict could not be checked one hundred per cent and that
quotes should be understood as the personal opinion of their informants (R1; R3; R6).
One interviewee added that the audience should also be informed about the difficult
situation for journalists in Myanmar (R3).
Doubtful Neutrality in Reporting the Conflict
The difficulties in gathering and checking information about the Rohingya conflict led
to the question whether or not a balanced news coverage was possible at all, and the
majority of the respondents shared doubts about neutrality in reporting the Rohingya
conflict. Two correspondents conceded that the Rohingya’s situation triggered “strong
compassion” (R1) and that it was not easy to be unbiased when dealing with Myanmar’s
government and in an allegedly hostile environment for journalists (R2). Several jour-
nalists admitted that international news reporting about the Rohingya conflict was not
one hundred per cent balanced and unbiased.They conceded a “Muslim bias” (R2), “har-
dening attitudes in the different parties” (R4) and one-sided reporting by some inter-
national journalists (R6). Nevertheless, all respondents proved to have extensive know-
ledge and sophisticated opinions about the conflict. Some of themquestioned neutrality
against the backdrop of working conditions under which journalistic investigation was
basically limited to refugee camps, and interviews were conducted predominantly with
Rohingya, not with other people affected by the conflict who were living in Rakhine
State (R2; R3; R6). One respondent noted that the common use of the term Rohingya in
international media already showed there was bias in reporting the conflict (R4).
Some respondents said themain reason for the one-sided reportingwas that restric-
tions hindered journalists from investigating in Myanmar and particularly in Rakhine
State (R2; R3; R4). Furthermore, the information provided by Myanmar’s government
and military was allegedly untrustworthy, and additionally the fear of those Burmese
who refused mainstream opinion and hatred towards the Rohingya made it difficult to
interview people who were neither pro nor contra the Rohingya (R2). Some respondents
considered that the difference between what they saw in refugee camps and what they
heard in conversations with radical Buddhist monks inMyanmar was evidence of peop-
le accepting unbalanced and biased news reporting (R3; R8).
The respondents had differing views on the possible influence of their reports on
the conflict. On the one hand, interviewees linked reports by international media with
international political pressure on Myanmar’s government and military (R5; R6), with
Aung San Suu Kyi’s decision to speak out on the conflict (R3; R8) and also with the first
official and juridical investigations of a few crimes that were uncovered by journalists
(R1; R2). One respondent added the episode in which Myanmar’s government told what
he dubbed a “giant PR story” (R8) about the return of a single Rohingya family to Myan-
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mar. On the other hand, one interviewee saw no notable effects at all of international
media reporting on Aung San Suu Kyi’s policies or the military’s attitude (R7).
Some respondents acknowledged that international news coverage even caused re-
sistance to and criticism of the international political pressure on the country and possi-
bly led to a “circle-the-wagons mentality” (R8) within Myanmar’s society. Nevertheless,
they did not hold the reporting journalists responsible for those dynamics (R2; R4). So-
me interviewees wished that media could have a stronger influence on the conflict and
hoped it might lead to an “attitude change in Myanmar” (R1).
Moreover, some respondents would welcome media reports on the Rohingya con-
flict having a stronger influence on their German audience. They hoped to attract the
audience’s attention to the conflict and motivate recipients to make donations to hu-
manitarian organisations active in Rakhine State and refugee camps, or even to push
the German federal government to intervene politically (R2; R4; R6). They were convin-
ced that public awareness of the conflict and a deeper understanding of its complexity
have arisen since they intensified the news coverage (R1; R3; R4). However, according
to some interviewees, readers’ letters to the editor or online comments oftentimes did
not express serious concern about the conflict, but mistakenly equated the conflict with
the situation of refugees in Europe or even with jihadism (R2; R5). Some respondents
remembered readers’ comments which were Islamophobic or criticised journalists for
being too credulous (R2; R3).
Conclusions and Perspectives
To conclude, the doubts shared by many respondents about neutrality in reporting the
Rohingya conflict indicate a serious dilemma in international media reporting; on the
one hand, the respondents tried to adhere to the scheme of balanced and unbiased
reporting, but on the other hand, they admitted there was an inevitable imbalance and
even accepted, to a certain degree, a lack of neutrality due to this conflict’s complexity.
Foreign correspondents from other countries must face the same or similar problems
as their colleagues from Germany.
Ethnicity has been an important factor in social cohesion in Myanmar society, ever
sinceMyanmar’s borders were defined by the colonial power. Especially in the rural bor-
der areas such as Northern Rakhine State, ethnicity has been a source of severe conflict.
In reporting about ethnic minorities or conflicts, foreign correspondents—even those
who live in Myanmar—still depend on the support of local stringers and interpreters.
This is even more true for those foreign correspondents based not in Myanmar but in
neighbouringThailand, India or Singapore.The barriers of culture and language cannot
be denied and cannot be overcome without the help of local stringers and interpreters
who play an important role in the system of international reporting.
According to the journalists interviewed, the climax of violence in 2017 can be also
seen as a turning point in the situation of media workers. Since August 2017, they have
focussed on reporting the mass exodus of the Rohingya to Bangladesh. In parallel with
this exodus, the work of journalists has becomemore andmore restricted byMyanmar’s
government, as respondents stated. Meanwhile, the attitude of parts of the population
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of Myanmar towards international reporters also seems to have dramatically changed
and, as do workers for human rights or aid organisations, many of them face concrete
problems, some even physical threats. Furthermore, access to rural Northern Rakhine
State, which had always difficult for political and infrastructural reasons, has become
nearly impossible.
The conflict that has been unsettling Rakhine State for decades obviously involves
many different truths and the question remains as to who holds the power to define
the truth? The Rohingya conflict is a long-lasting dispute between Myanmar’s central
government and a Muslim population group fighting for recognition as an ethnic mi-
nority. Probably, this conflict will not and cannot be solved in the near future. Due to
the climax of violence and the mass exodus in 2017, this conflict has developed extre-
me dynamics that mean it is impossible to predict when or why the conflict will be the
focus of international media again. But thus far in the field of communications, this
conflict can be considered a textbook example of how limiting the freedom of the me-
dia can lead to unbalanced and biased reporting which, in turn, might lead to positions
hardening even further.
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Thailand’s Flawed 2019 Election Confirms the Country’s
Deep Political Divide
Michael H. Nelson (Bangkok)
The Political Context
After having been postponed a number of times and over a number of years, the Thai
military dictators (the National Council for Peace and Order, or NCPO, in office after
their coup of 22 May 2015) finally allowed elections to be held on 24 March 2019.1 These
numerous delays occurred despite the cost of aborting a newly drafted constitution in
September 2015. Clearly, the military dictators wanted to spend more time in power.
However, it would be a fundamental misperception to consider this election a return
to democracy, or the coup as the beginning and the election as the end of a clearly
demarcated period ofThai politics. Rather, both events represent elements of an era that
began in earnest with the election of telecom-tycoon Thaksin Shinawatra, chairperson
(in fact, owner would be a better description) of the Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thai)
party on 6 January 2001. At that time, Thaksin was threatened with disqualification
from politics altogether having submitted wrong asset declarations when serving as
a minister in a previous government. While all other similar cases did indeed see the
disqualification of the accused by the Constitutional Court, in Thaksin’s case, the court
voted 8:7 in his favour in, what one newspaper called, a ‘murky verdict’ (The Nation, 4
August 2001). Obviously, a very high-ranking member of the Thai traditional elite had
intervened with the judges as the upper echelons of Thai society still hoped Thaksin
would bring a better political-economic future. Moreover, he had out-classed all his
competitors in the elections, and was generally seen as a new-generation, visionary
political leader.
However, these hopes were rapidly overtaken by a very different perspective. As early
as October 2001, another high-ranking member of that elite, former two-times prime
minister Anand Panyarachun, ominously warned, “Danger caused by people with dicta-
torial inclinations has not disappeared from Thailand” (Matichon, 8 October 2001). This
1 In the headline of my chapter, I am relatively polite by using the adjective ‘flawed’. The Econo-
mist, not known for mincing its words, came up with a headline that captured the situation more
accurately: “After an ineptly rigged election, Thailand’s junta will cling to power” (Anon, 2019c).
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was followed, in December 2001, when, in his annual birthday speech, King Bhumibol
himself held Thaksin to account. In an editorial, the Bangkok Post (7 December 2001)
noted
It was nothing short of a slap in the face for Thaksin Shinawatra….[He]wasmade to face
up to reality by the one person who can truly make him listen—His Majesty the King …
He said arrogance, intransigence, disunity, and double standards would be the ruin of
this country. The normally defiant prime minister could only sit and smile [before, as
viewers could watch on TV, his face turned deep-red, M.N.].
These two statements were followed by a long series of actions designed to uproot what
critics called the ‘Thaksin regime’.These actions includedmultiple mass public protests,
the repeated dissolution ofThaksin’s political parties, the confiscation of a big part of his
assets and a dubious court verdict that sent Thaksin into self-exile in order to avoid his
two-year prison sentence.This process culminated in the military coup of 19 September
2006. Yet, in the 2011 elections, Thaksin made what the conservative elite must have
seen as a shock come-back. He nominated his youngest sister, Yingluck, as the Phuea
Thai party’s leading candidate, though she lacked any political experience.Nevertheless,
after only 49 days of the election campaign, she became Thailand’s first female prime
minister. Again, Anand Panyarachun saw the need for issuing a warning. He “called on
all Thais to fight against any move to bring the government, court and legislature under
the control of one person or group,” otherwise, Thailand could encounter ‘tyranny’ (The
Nation, 3 October 2011).
Yingluck’s term was overshadowed by a poorly designed and implemented rice-
pledging scheme that was basically a subsidy policy, in which the state bought farmers’
rice at a much higher rate than themarket price. Furthermore, her termwas dominated
even more by an amnesty scheme that might have brought Thaksin back to Thailand,
something that the conservative elite and people holding strong anti-Thaksin political
views could never accept.2 Initial protests against the amnesty developed—pushed by
Royalist Democrat PartyMembers of Parliament—into amovement to remove Yingluck
and her political party (meaning: Thaksin Shinawatra) from power. She tried to save her
government by dissolving Parliament and calling new elections. These elections were
strongly sabotaged by the Democrat party’s protest leaders, and finally declared invalid
by the Constitutional Court.The People’s Democratic ReformCommittee (PDRC), as the
protest group was known, even attempted a civilian coup d’état (Nelson, 2014). Though
this attempt failed, it prepared the ground for the ‘real thing’— a military coup on 22
May 2014, led by Prayuth Chan-ocha.
Chan-ocha’s group of military officers, making up the junta (NCPO), considered
the coup of their predecessors in 2006 a waste. One of their standard concerns was that
the opportunities for political-legal engineering opened up by their own coup must not
be wasted again. First and foremost, this concerned the eradication of any influence
2 It is somewhat ironic that this particular amnesty aroused the moralistic indignation it did. After
all, the people responsible for military coups routinely have amnesties for themselves included in
the constitutions written under their rule. The NCPO is no exception.
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the Shinawatra clan still wielded in Thai politics. However, they also wanted to prescri-
be the future shape of Thailand by determining a comprehensive policy platform. To
start this process, the so-called ‘Interim Charter,’ in Article 27, established the Natio-
nal Reform Council that was tasked with developing reform proposals in the fields of
politics, administration of state affairs, law and judicial process, local administration,
education, the economy, energy, public health and environment, mass communication,
society and any other areas the council thought needed reform.3 This intention of sha-
ping the future of Thailand found its final expression in the 2017 Constitution, which
was prepared by an NCPO-appointed committee (after, as mentioned above, the jun-
ta had rejected the 2015 version, which had been drafted by another NCPO-appointed
committee). Chapter XVI on ‘National Reform’ expanded the fields mentioned above by
references to law and the judicial process. Moreover, Section 65 mandated the state to
develop a ‘national strategy’, for which a number of legal instruments were devised re-
sulting in a 20-year national strategic planning framework. This strategy, drawn up by
the NCPO in the form of its government, and various expert committees, would have
to be followed by all subsequent governments. The result would thereby reduce even a
fully elected government to some sort of administrative committee that would have to
implement the NCPO’s policy platform for many years to come. A newspaper comment
made in the run-up to the elections described the situation this way,
No matter what policies they [the political parties] campaign on, winning parties
that form the government must enforce the junta-dictated national strategy other-wise
they can be impeached. In this light as an exercise of the people’s will, the election is
meaningless. (The Nation, 30 January 2019)
Moreover, from the beginning, the NCPO had emphasised that elec-tions, meaning
the end of their direct rule, did not signify a return to democracy. Rather, the elec-
tions would usher in what they called a ‘transition period’ of at least five years. Only
afterwards, people could start thinking about moving towards a greater degree of de-
mocracy. To implement this scheme, the NCPO had its constitution drafting commit-
tee add an appointed Senate (250 members) to the elected House (500 members, com-
prising 350 constituency MPs, and 150 party-list MPs) in a mixed-member proportional
system, or MMP, called ‘mixed-member apportionment [MMA] system’ in theThai case,
with a single vote for the constituency MPs, and no threshold. This Senate, handpicked
by the NCPO, was empowered to vote with the House on who would be-come prime
minister. In practical terms, this meant the NCPO-Senate only needed 126 elected MPs
to push through its preferred prime minis-ter, coup leader Prayuth, although as far as
the House was concerned, this would lead to a minority government. And since the Se-
nate term was set at five years, while that of the House was four years, the same Senate
could be used in this way twice, bringing the possible domina-tion of post-electionThai
politics by the NCPO to eight years.There-fore, observers ofThai politics calculated that
the NCPO, in one way or another, would continue to wield substantial power for at least
one more decade after its direct rule of five years (2014 to 2019) had come to an end.
3 Constitution of the Kingdomof Thailand (Interim), B.E. 2557 (2014) (unofficial translation prepared
by the Foreign Law Bureau, Office of the Council of State; this office is the government’s legal
advisory body, it also screens all legislation).
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Consequently, probably the most outstanding phrase of the anti-NCPO forces in
this election was to prevent the NCPO from a ‘prolongation of power’ (kansuebthot am-
nat).Thus, in the election campaign discourse, there was a distinction between political
parties that were in favour of such a prolongation, and those who opposed it. This was
mirrored by the view that this election represented a struggle between two camps, such
as ‘democracy versus NCPO’, or ‘pro or versus NCPO’ (in terms of political ideologies,
‘conservatism versus liberalism’).The liberal mass circulation Khao Sod (7 January, 2019)
summed up a column on the issue by saying, “The question then is whether or not one
wants the ‘NCPO’ (Anon, 2019a). Related distinctions connected with the key goal of
the NCPOmentioned above were ‘Prayuth versusThaksin’, or ‘NCPO versusThaksin’. In
a more general sense, an academic com-mentator observed that the election was not
merely about who will be in government “but (about) the very form of Thailand’s politi-
cal sys-tem,” with the trend suggesting the voting would lead to a “semi-authoritarian
regime” (Prajak, 2019).4
The Political Party Landscape in the 2014 Elections
Obviously, it poses a problem for a military regime if it wants to keep as much of its
power as possible, while also benefiting from the increased local legitimacy and inter-
national recognition that come with elections. Relatively early in the process leading
to the elections, in May 2018, the secretary-general of the Bhumjaithai Party, Supachai
Jaisamut, “believed [that] Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha [who doubled as the chief
of the junta, NCPO] would definitely enter politics. One reason for this, he suggested,
was that the NCPO is now concerned its efforts over the past four years may come to
naught if it is not permitted to keep pulling the strings as a major political player in the
future” (Aekarach and Prasit, 2018).This ‘major political player’ could only take the shape
of a political party. This party was called Phalang Pracharat, which roughly translates
as ‘People-State Force’, ‘Pracharat’ being the name of the NCPO-government’s version
of populist policies, to which all major parties were committed, some more, some less.
Phalang Pracharat Party (PPRP)
In other words, the NCPO established its own electoral vehicle, hoping it would gain
enough MPs in the elections enabling it to become the core party in creating a coali-
tion government (any other kind of government being prevented by the MMP election
system). In doing so, the NCPO followed the example of previous military regimes, the
latest having been the Samakhi Tham Party that was established by the 1991 coup group
that called itself the ‘National Peace Keeping Council’ (NPKC). The aim was to enable
then-coup leader, Suchinda Kraprayoon, to assume the premiership after the election
4 Itmight be noted in this context that the phrase previously in vogue, ‘transition to democ-racy,’ has
all but disappeared from academic writings on Thai politics. In Thailand, the form of government
is sometimes put as ‘semi-authoritarian, or as ‘Thai-style authoritari-anism,’ meaning a ‘hybrid
system’ that combines authoritarianismwith electoral and dem-ocratic elements. Internationally,
one might categorize the country’s political regime as ‘electoral authoritarianism.’
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of 22March 1992.Themethod of assembling such parties was similar, as dictated byThai
political structures.That is, government ministers and former PDRC activists recruited
a number of leaders of regional political cliques that each commanded a good number
of former MPs. Since there were three such leaders, theThai press liked to refer to them
as ‘the three amigos’, or sam mitr, suitably emphasising the entirely informal nature of
this procedure (after the election, the newspaper Prachachart Thurakit, 14 April 2019,
identified ten factions or cliques in the PPRP (Anon, 2019b). The former MPs in the sam
mitr cliques were supposed to command secure networks of vote canvassers (hua kha-
naen) and solid voter banks in their respective local areas that would guarantee their re-
election under the new party banner. At the same time, these cliques would poach MPs
from existing parties to fill up the new party’s ranks of prospective MP candidates with
good to excellent electoral prospects (it might be mentioned in passing that Thaksin
Shinawatra, though not a coup leader, employed a similar method in creating his Thai
Rak Thai electoral juggernaut).
On 30 January 2019, the party officially invited Prayuth Chan-ocha to be its prime
ministerial candidate (the constitution mandated parties to name up to three such can-
didates; they did not need to run as MPs in the election). A columnist commented
“The whole business about the party’s leaders who are his [Prayuth’s] former staff ex-
tending a formal invitation for him to be their prime ministerial nominee appears
overly theatrical. Do these leaders want people to really believe that each of them is
acting independently and never planned it beforehand? This is on the eve of an elec-
tion. They shouldn’t play people for fools.” (Atiya, 2019)
While the four ministers at the core of establishing the PPRP resigned their positions,
Prayuth remained the fully functional (meaning: not merely caretaker) primeminister.5
Partly to avoid legal problems, Prayuth did not join the party’s election campaign, and
he attended none of the numerous election debates among the PM candidates. He con-
ducted his very own campaign, camouflaged as the PM visiting the people or inspecting
government activities. Government budget also kept flowing towards the people, an ac-
tivity that in earlier times (such as during the Thaksin government) would have been
heavily criticised as vote buying. Prayuth only made a brief appearance at the PPRP’s
final big election event in Bangkok.
Phuea Thai Party (also spelt Pheu Thai; PT)
Phuea Thai was the core party of the ‘Thaksin camp’. After previous incarnations—Thai
Rak Thai and Phalang Prachachon—had been dis-solved by the Constitutional Court.
This camp had won all elections that were held since 2001 (2008, 2007, and 2011; they
also won two elections that the Constitutional Court declared invalid, in 2006 and 2014).
5 Prayuth also remained the headof themilitary junta. In this position, hewas the bearer of absolute
sovereignty above the state. As the PM, he occupied a formal position within the state, and below
his position as the chief of the junta. The NCPO-engineered 2017 constitu-tion stipulated that
only a post-election government assuming office wouldmake him lose the position as the PM and
abolish the NCPO. Thus, even after the election had been held, Prayuth still variously used his
absolute power as the junta chief, based on the infamous article 44 of the ‘Interim Charter.’
176 Michael H. Nelson
Phuea Thai’s main competitor, the conservative-royalist Demo-crat Party, were simply
unable to compete in the electoral field. This was one major reason why the traditional
establishment, via the military, used the means of military coups in 2006 and 2014 to
remove a political camp from access to power that they intensely disliked.
With theNCPO-engineered constitution of 2017, an attempt wasmade to reduce the
number of MPs that PT could gain through changes in the electoral system. The pre-
vious mixed-member majoritarian election system (MMM) always provided PT with a
disproportionate number ofMPs. PhueaThai wonmany constituencyMPs, and through
a second party-list vote (PT mostly gained many more party-list votes than its consti-
tuency MPs received combined), they also gained high additional numbers of party-
list MPs. To prevent this from happening again, the NCPO-appointed drafters of the
2017 constitution, changed MMM to MMP. Thereby, a party’s total seat claim would
depend on the number of votes that its constituency MPs received. Consequently, the
party leaders were worried they would not get any party list MPs, because PT’s total
proportional seat claim was anticipated to be lower than the number of its winning
constituency MPs.
In order to circumvent this attempt to reduce its number of MPs by stipulating
MMP,6 Phuea Thai chose to establish one major branch party, Thai Raksa Chart (TRC).
Other parties connected to PT were Phuea Chart, mainly collecting previous Red Shirt
politicians, and Pra-chachart, a group of Muslim politicians who stood in the southern
Ma-lay-Muslim provinces. TRC had the task of bringing in party-list MPs by standing
in constituencies where PT thought its candidate was not strong enough to win. In
practice, this meant that PT fielded candidates only in about 250 of the altogether 350
constituencies. The remaining 100 constituencies were left to TRC. This plan took a
decidedly spectacular turn when TRC registered as its primeministerial candidate none
other than the elder sister of the present king, Ubonratana (this could not have been
done without Thaksin Shinawatra’s leading participation). Technically, she was eligible
since she had married an Ameri-can and had lived in the United States for many years.
Thus, she had lost her royal status, in theory becoming a commoner. After her divorce
many years ago, she returned to Thailand, received a low-status nobili-ty title, took
part in royal activities, was generally seen as a normal member of the royal family and
referred to as Princess Ubonratana. She did not apply in person. Her application form,
with picture, was brought to the registration venue by the TRC leaders. She declared
that she wanted to use her rights as an ordinary citizen.
This happened in the morning of 8 February 2019. It took until the evening when
a unique intervention by the king led to the collapse of this attempt to gain electoral
advantage. RamaX issued a Royal Command (phraratchaongkan), published in the Roy-
al Government Gazette, denouncing the drawing of his sister into politics—when the
monarchy should be above politics—as a ‘highly inappropriate action.’ This prompted
6 Thismight sound as if the author is againstMMP. I amnot. However, I decidedly prefer the German
system with two votes, and a threshold. My critical position here is informed by the fact that this
constitutional engineeringwas not used to arrive at themost appropriate and just election system.
Instead, the system was used as a tool in the political struggle by the military regime against an
electorally superior antagonist.
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the Election Commission (EC) to disqualify the princess. Calls for the dissolution of TRC
followed almost immediately. These calls were based on Article 92 of the Political Party
Act that stipulated, in case the EC had sufficient evidence that a political party acted
in a way that could be seen as “being hostile to the democratic regime of government
headed by the king,” it must petition the Constitutional Court to dissolve that party.The
EC, within a few days, evaluated the TRC’s nomination of the princess in this way and
petitioned the Constitutional Court (CC) to dissolve the party. According to the same
article of the Political Party Act, the CC must investigate the case, and if it found ‘credi-
ble evidence’ of wrongdoing has to dissolve the party and withdraw the rights of the
concerned party leaders to stand as candidates in elections. Unsurprisingly, on 7 March
2019, the CC is-sued its verdict to dissolve TRC (for the central verdict, see Khamwin-
itchai, 2019). However, since no actual harm had been done, since the party executives
involved did not intend to be hostile to the democratic regime and had apologised to
the public, and since they professed to support constitutional monarchy, their rights
to stand in elections were only withdrawn for ten years (it could have been a life-long
disqualification).7
As a result, Phuea Thai lost the possibility of fielding candidates in the constituen-
cies previously given to the TRC, because the registration period had already ended. Of
course, it also lost the votes that TRC candidates were supposed to gain in order to add
to the PT camp’s number of party-list MPs.
The Democrat Party
TheDemocrat Party (DP) is Thailand’s oldest political party. It was founded in 1946 with
the expressed aim to further the interests of the royalist camp after the absolute mon-
archy had been overthrown in 1932. Up until today, the DP has a conservative-royalist
political orientation, but also follows liberal economic approaches.The DP is member of
the Liberal International. The Democrat Party’s leader at the time of the elections was
Abhisit Vejjajiva. In 2010, after having achieved the position of prime minister through
political trickery and military intervention in 2008, he was politically responsible for
using the military to perform a violent crackdown on anti-government (‘Red Shirt’)
protesters, costing the lives of almost one hundred people, mostly unarmed protes-
ters. While his military predecessors, who did the same in 1973 (Thanom Kittikachorn),
and 1992 (Suchinda Kraprayoon), were socially and politically stigmatised as a result of
their actions, it had not been a problem for Abhisit to remain chairperson of the DP.
However, some time before the election, the DP called on all its members to elect a
new chairperson rather than having a much smaller circle of leading politicians make
the decision. Abhisit prevailed over his main competitor, Warong Dechgitvigrom, who
belonged to the PDRC faction of the party. Since this faction was expressly pro-Prayuth,
it did not take it lightly when Abhisit, shortly before the election, started a public rela-
tions drive in which he declared that with him, the Democrats would never support a
7 For an initial interpretation of the verdict, seeMérieau (2019). Interestingly, shementions that the
Thai CC, in arguing its case against the TRC, had also referred to the concept of ‘militant democracy’
(wehrhafte Demokratie), which was included in the German Basic Law in Article 21 (2).
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Prayuth-led government (in fact, this had been his stance since at least November 2018,
when he had declared that he would not join the Phalang Pracharat Party in returning
Prayuth to the position of PM). Months earlier, Abhisit had already declared that he
would never enter into a coalition with the Phuea Thai Party (because, from his per-
spective, it embodied the corrupt and despised ‘Thaksin regime’), and that he expected
the Democrats to win at least 100 MPs. Furthermore, the party would only be part of
a coalition government if it could be its core component. If he could not achieve these
goals, he would step down from the chairpersonship of the party. Obviously, this was
a very tall order. Indeed, this strategy almost necessitated that his party would be in
opposition as he had excluded joining coalition governments with both parties that we-
re expected to gain the highest numbers of MPs, PT and PPRP. The Democrats found
themselves in a role they were not accustomed to: instead of being a major competi-
tor in the electoral race, the DP had become an ‘also ran’, or, as the Thai press called
it, a ‘variable party’ (phak tuaprae), meaning one of those parties needed to fill up the
numbers for forming a coalition government led by a core party.
As if this was not enough to make life difficult for the Democrats, a new and formi-
dable player appeared on the scene—the Future Forward Party.
Future Forward Party
The Future Forward Party (FFP) was launched in March 2018 by the scion of Thailand’s
largest auto-parts manufacturer, Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, a billionaire who
had long been a participant in activities dealing with causes of social and political re-
form. The co-founder was Piyabutr Saengkanokkul, a well-known young critical law-
lecturer at Thammasat University, and a key member of the progressive Nitirat group
(‘Enlightened Jurists’) at the university’s Faculty of Law (McCargo and Peeradej, 2015).
Piyabutr had long campaigned for reforming the country’s harsh lesemajesty law,with-
out, for political reasons, pursuing this issue further in the new party. Using European
standards, the party’s political orientation could perhaps best be described as liberal-
democratic, with a modestly progressive outlook, or somewhat centre-left. The party
appealed to the younger and mostly urban generation of people who were fed up with
the old political options—including PT, the Democrats, certainly PPRP—and that har-
boured feelings of “rising discontentment with the extant political order” (Kasian, 2019).
Future Forward had a decidedly critical policy platform that could not but anger the
powers-that-be, including proposals to abolish conscription, to drastically reduce the
number of generals in the armed forces, to roll back policies initiated by the NCPO,
and to substantively rewrite the NCPO’s constitution. However, it was for even more
fundamental reasons that some observers felt that FFP was a bigger threat to the ruling
establishment than even Thaksin, who they had fought for so long. Voranai Vanijaka, a
well-known columnist, expressed it this way
“Thaksin’s alleged crime was his attempt to change the power dynamic among the
elites. That’s just rich people bickering against each other, while using poor people
in the streets. It’s a tale as old as time. Thanatorn’s alleged crime is fermenting a rev-
olution of the mind that could lead to the changing of social hierarchy and traditional
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status quo. That … is what we called a people’s revolution. As old as time, it’s a tale
most feared by the traditional establishment. … If the people no longer adhere to tra-
ditions, then the generals lose control of the hearts and minds of the people. And if
the generals lose control of the cultural mindset, then the generals lose control of the
country, even if they win the elections.” (Voranai, 2019)
Similarly, columnist Wasant Techawongtham stated,
“Themain point that draws thewrath of the junta loyalists is this: Mr Thanathorn dares
to challenge the military’s historical and present supremacy over Thai society, the bu-
reaucracy’s centralised power and the oligarchy’s dominance over Thai life and econ-
omy. His party’s priority aims to restructure the country’s archaic power structure. It’s
something no political parties, past or present, have dared to vocalise or highlight.”
(Wasant, 2019)
Given this positioning of the FFP, it was unsurprising that, both before and after the
elections, the party came under heavy attack by right-wing forces.The FFP leaders were
accused of being “hostile toward the country’s democratic system in which the King is
revered as the head of state” , the reason for which TRC was dissolved, (Bangkok Post, 6
April 2019), and being “a threat to national security and the monarchy” (Thana, 2019).
Prominent critical journalist Pravit Rojanaphruk felt that things had become so bad
that they resembled “Witch hunt, paranoia and hysteria,” and he warned, “Let’s Not
Succumb to Political Hysteria” (Pravit, 2019).
However, before the FFP could become the target of widespread hate speech on so-
cial media, it had to overcome rather practical electoral problems. In his pre-election
assessment of the party’s electoral prospects, Duncan McCargo pointed out that the
party “lacks local organization, including networks of the vote canvassers (hua khanaen)
who play a crucial role in mobilizing the electorate at the constituency level” (McCargo,
2018). In any event, it seemed that FFP decided to forgo the use of these traditional
means of local voter mobilisation altogether. McCargo also noted that the FFP lacked
people “with enough name recognition” (McCargo, 2018). However, as the election cam-
paign period proceeded, the FFP— and especially Thanathon himself — developed into
such a public sensation that one could speak of a “Thanathon phenomenon,” or even
“Thanathon fever” (Matichon, 24 February 2019). The party, especially Thanathon, gained
such an extremely high public media presence that it could mainly rely on it in order to
gain votes.
These were the four political parties that received the most public attention during
the election campaign, and that were thought to win the biggest portion of MPs. Howe-
ver, there were a number of other, mostly regional or personality-centred parties that
were supposed to gain more modest numbers of representatives, such as Bhumjaithai,
Chart Thai Pattana, Chart Pattana, Seree Ruam Thai, and New Economy. Some special
interest was given to the Action Coalition for Thailand Party, because it was informally
led by the former leader of the PDRC, SuthepThaugsuban and because its main areas of
contestation overlapped with the main stronghold of the Democrat Party in the (non-
Muslim) South of Thailand. Altogether, a record number of 81 political parties stood
in this election, of which 77 received votes (number 77 received 183 votes nationwide).
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This high number can be attributed to the new MMP system without threshold. Most
of these groups could not really be called political parties. They did not represent any
aggregated societal interests beyond the desire of an individual (mostly male) person to
be called and treated as a party leader for a few months. These types of parties did not
have noticeable political activities before or after the elections.
The election results
From the perspective of democracy idealists, the Thai voters should have been happy
to shake off the yoke of five long years of military dictatorship and decisively reject the
candidates running under the banner of theNCPOparty, Phalang Pracharat,which pro-
moted military dictator Prayuth Chan-ocha as the future parliament-backed prime mi-
nister. However, we knew that, in Thailand, authoritarian political culture did not only
have a long history, but also the backing of a large sector of the population.This included
a considerable number of civilian experts, who were only too willing to help to actively
push the NCPO’s ‘reform agenda’ as members of the junta’s various committees, among
them, what they pretentiously called the ‘National Legislative Assembly’. Nevertheless,
it was a bit surprising that PPRP gained the highest number of votes (8,433,137), followed
by PT (7,920,630), FFP (6,265,950), Democrats (3,947,726), and Bhumjaithai (3,732,883).
The other parties received fewer than one million votes each, with Seree RuamThai ha-
ving the highest number at 826,530 votes (preliminary figures according to an untitled
Election Commission PDF file, dated 28 March 2019). The numbers looked somewhat
different when we turn to the constituency MPs that the parties won. Here, Phuea Thai
won by far the highest number of seats with 137 seats (but down from 204 in the 2011
election), followed by Phalang Pracharat with 97, Bhumjaithai with 39 (up from 29 in
2011), and the Democrats with 33 MPs (down from 115 in 2011). The surprisingly high
30 constituency seats for Future Forward were, in part, due to vote transfers from the
disbanded TRC. Since Phuea Thai did not stand in these constituencies, FFP was the
next best option for followers of PT/TRC. After these parties, there was a big gap to
Chart Thai Pattana and Prachachat that each won six seats, and the Action Coalition
and Chart Pattana with one MP each. Since an MMP/MMA system was in operation,
these constituency MPs were still to be complemented by party-list MPs.8
As a result, things became problematic, compounded by the fact that, in terms of
electoral camps, and seats given to ‘variable parties’, the election did not produce a clear
winner. Since PhueaThai won the highest number of MPs,Thai parliamentary tradition
prescribed that it had the first shot at forming a coalition government (although PPRP
tried to argue that its highest ‘popular vote’ should give it this right). To pre-empt any
moves by PPRP, PT pressed ahead, and, on 27 March 2019, called a press conference to
8 For some analytical remarks on how the parties fared in Thailand’s regions, includingmaps, see the
website https://www.thaidatapoints.com, which was operated by Joel Selway and Allen Hicken.
At the time of writing (23 April 2019), they have pieces on Phuea Thai, Future Forward, and the
Democrats. They also planned to do a simulation of how many votes/seats PT could have gained,
had it not established TRC as a separate entity.
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present its coalition of six ‘pro-democracy’ parties to the public, including the signing of
a formal accord among those parties (Jintamas and Asaree, 2019). Besides Phuea Thai,
these parties included Future Forward, Seree Ruam Thai, Prachachart, Phuea Chart,
Phalang Puangchon Thai, and New Economy. This coalition had a paper-thin majori-
ty of 253 seats (importantly, this number included the party-list MPs) in the 500-seat
House. The PPRP-camp in the narrow sense had only 123 seats, while the ‘variable par-
ties’ thought to tend towards joining PPRP commanded 70 seats. Consequently, the
Democrat Party, with 54 seats, held the key for this camp. If the DP MPs decided to join
the opposition in the House, the PPRP could never hope to form a coalition government
that had a majority in the House. Yet, the Democrats were divided. Reportedly, perhaps
as many as 35 MPs, belonging to the PDRC faction, were prepared to join a Prayuth-
led coalition government whereas, after the resignation of party-leader Abhisit, the re-
maining MPs preferred to regenerate the party while serving in the opposition. At the
same time, the New Economy Party’s six MPs also showed signs of doubt as to whether
they should really be in the PT-led coalition.
As if this situation was not already complicated enough, it was made worse by the
unexpected weeks-long debate about how to correctly (with respect to both the consti-
tution and the election law) calculate the party-list MPs that parties should be allocated.
This was far from being amerely technical issue. Rather, how it would be resolved would
decide if the PT camp still had a majority or would lose it. At the centre of this question
were the party-list MPs of the Future Forward Party. In the initial calculation, the FFP
had received 57 such MPs, adding to the 30 it had won in the constituency contests.The
recalculation obviously favoured by the Election Commission would reduce the FFP’s
number of party-list MPs by seven to only 50, instead giving those seats to single-MP
parties, which would have made the House comprising 26 or 27 political parties, of
which eleven would only have had a single party-list MP.
Nonetheless, this would have deprived the PT camp of its majority. At this point,
it needs to be added this majority, in any case, would have been largely, but not only,
symbolic. As mentioned above, the 250 junta-appointed senators were empowered to
take part in the vote for prime minister. And they would certainly have voted for the
Phalang Pracharat camp. Since the total number of members of the National Assembly
was 750, any House majority that wanted to be sure of forming the government would
have needed at least 376 MPs. Phuea Thai and the parties allied with it were very far
from reaching this goal. Thus, the main purpose of achieving a House majority was to
claim popular legitimacy to form the government. After all, the MPs were elected by the
people, while the senators (whose names, at the time of writing on 25 April 2019, had
not yet been made public) were products of a closed selection by the junta, basically by a
handful of its most influential members, among them Prayuth. So, how could millions
of votes cast for a majority of MPs in the House simply be invalidated by such a handful
of junta power holders via their senators? Such a situation could only confirm the elec-
tion was ‘rigged’, as described inThe Economist article quoted above (Anon, 2019c). The
House majority could argue that the election was ‘stolen’ by the junta, meaning by its
Phalang Pracharat Party, in conjunction with its very own 250 senators (some newspa-
pers had referred to them as the NCPO party). In a political sense, the question would
then be whether the people, who had voted for the House majority, could accept being
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cast aside by the powers-that-be, making it appear as if they had taken part in a fake
election. In a legislative sense, relying on the senators would have created a minority
government as far as the House was concerned.This would havemade it difficult for the
government to pass the national budget (to the point of being unable to pass it at all),
as well as ordinary laws, because in these cases senators were not empowered to join
the voting. It was for these two reasons that the Phalang Pracharat camp also wanted
to have a majority in the House. It would provide its government under Prayuth Chan-
ocha as the prime minister with at least a certain appearance of democratic legitimacy,
and it would make it possible to handle the legislative process more easily.
Yet, the Election Commission was unable, or unwilling, to come to a conclusion
about how the party-list MPs should be correctly calculated9. Although a number of
academics had presented the commission with what seemed to be calculations that
conformed to both constitutional and election law, the commission insisted that its cal-
culation did comply with the election law. However, in so doing, the EC perhaps con-
tradicted the constitution (Section 91 of the constitution stipulated how the calculation
had to be done; Article 128 of the election law repeated this Section, though it added one
more paragraph). In order to solve this problem (or pseudo problem, as many observers
believed), the EC petitioned the Constitutional Court for a decision about this matter.
The EC argued that the CC was empowered to do so based on the constitution’s Section
210, paragraphs 1 and 2.This is not the place to go into detail about the interpretation of
these two paragraphs. Suffice to say, neither seemed to have obvious applicability to the
EC’s problem (for the EC’s position on this case, see Khao samnakngan khanakammakan
kanlueaktang, 2019).
On 24 April 2019, the Constitutional Court rejected the Election Commission’s pe-
tition. First, the nine CC judges unanimously decided that regarding the question of
whether the Organic Law on Elections contradicted the Constitution, the EC could not
petition their court directly, but had to go through either the courts of justice or the
Ombudsmen. Second, regarding the problem of calculating the party-list MPs, in a vo-
te of seven to two, the judges were of the opinion that this issue belonged to the duties
and responsibilities of the EC. However, its petition did not show that the agency had
already acted on its duties, and therefore, a problem in the exercise of the EC’s powers
and duties had not yet occurred (Khao samnakngan san ratthathammanun, 2019). Needless
to say, these decisions by the CC threw a bad light on the EC’s legal competence. Fur-
thermore, the decisions also meant that the EC was on its own in deciding which of the
formulas for calculating the party-list MPs it should use, and it would have to deal with
any political, public, and academic repercussions. Meanwhile in some constituencies,
the EC worked on electoral complaints, the re-counting of votes, re-runs, or even re-
elections. Due to these circumstances, even four weeks after the election had been held
on 24 March 2019, the final result remained unknown, and therefore it could not yet be
said which camp had, in fact, won the election, and how the first post-coup government
could be formed, and by whom.
9 For a critical assessment of the EC’s performance in the election, see Khemthong (2019).
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Conclusion
With its five years in power and with the elections, did the NCPO achieve its raison
d’être to eliminate Thaksin Shinawatra’s influence on Thai politics? Prominent colum-
nistThitinan Pongsudhirak seemed convinced it did, with an article headline declaring,
“Election augurs end of the Thaksin era” (Thitinan, 2019a). Moreover, he repeated this
in a later piece, headlining it, “Thaksin era fading, but Thailand’s troubles linger” (Thiti-
nan, 2019b). Obviously, the PhueaThai Party did not fare as well as in previous elections.
This was partly because of the gamble in establishing the Thai Raksa Chart Party, and
the nomination of Princess Ubonratana as prime ministerial candidate having badly
misfired. In addition, with the junta’s Phalang Pracharat, and with the Future Forward
parties, PT had new electoral competitors to whom it certainly lost votes. Thaksin him-
self made the situation much worse by the fact that the princess attended the wedding
of one of his daughters in Hong Kong on 22 March 2019 and was pictured in a very close
embrace with Thaksin. The reactions followed swiftly. On 28 March 2019, the military’s
top brass lined up in a rather theatrical fashion (though some found it to be threaten-
ing) to declare that Thaksin “did not know his place,” and had “disrespected the high
institution [the monarchy, M.N.] and failed to maintain his honour and was deservedly
stripped of his armed forces alumni awards” (Wassana, 2019). On 30 March, a royal
announcement was published in the Government Gazette: “His Majesty the King has
recalled the royal decorations bestowed on former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra”
(Bangkok Post, 30 March 2019). As Thitinan remarked, “The withdrawal of royal deco-
rations is tantamount to being disowned, a pariah, or persona non grata” (Thitinan,
2019a). Therefore, Phuea Thai could be forced to try and stand on its own feet. A long
time before the elections, prominent historian and columnist, Nidhi Eoseewong, had
urged Phuea Thai to loosen its bond with Thaksin, and stated,
“The obligation of a party that received such overwhelming political success can be
nothing else but the commitment it has to the enormous number of people supporting
the party, and because of that theymust be the frontline in the battle for the rights and
freedoms of the people.” (Nidhi, 2018)
Under the prevailing conditions in April 2019, a less than ‘overwhelming political suc-
cess’ in the elections, a lack of fresh and attractive faces at leadership level, and a small
membership basis meant that the repositioning and institutionalisation of the party
looked like being an uphill struggle. This would not become any easier if the NCPO
managed to put together a government with a majority in the House and stay in that
position for a full four-year term.Certainly, thememory and influence ofThaksin would
decrease even more.
The othermajor anti-NCPOparty, Future Forward, had a problem that was of amore
fundamental kind. As mentioned above, the military probably considered Future For-
ward a bigger threat to the given political order than Phuea Thai as it presented a new
model of political culture to the electorate. However, it was not really a new model. One
needs to keep in mind that the Thai political order had long been characterised by two
competing models of how this order should be structured. In terms of Weberian ideal
types, the hegemonic model had been promoted by the traditional power elite, with the
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key components of the monarchy and the bureaucracy in both its military and civilian
branches. The highest value of the hegemonic model was the official state ideology of
‘Nation, Religion, King’. This model had a collective and paternalistic understanding of
the ‘national good’, emphasising an elite-controlled national unity based on obedient
and conformist people. This model had been challenged by an understanding that put
the people on top, with the key component of equal citizens, and the highest value
attributed to the constitution. This model’s key claim to legitimacy was not the elite-
defined ‘national good’, but popular sovereignty determined by individual, pluralistic,
and diverse independent citizens in a liberal democracy (for details, see Nelson, 2012,
2016). It was this model that the Future Forward Party emphatically, and with youthful
vigour, embodied and promoted. In contrast, the NCPO strictly adhered to the traditio-
nal model in its present version of an expansive monarchy in alliance with a military-
led state apparatus. In this sense, one could certainly say that the NCPO had failed “to
induce political obedience from [a large part of] the people” (Kasian, 2019), although it
had certainly been successful in its sustained suppression of open dissent.
From this perspective, the FFP represented a bigger threat to the status quo than did
the Phuea Thai Party that represented a mix of loyalty to Thaksin, to personalised con-
stituency-level networks of influence and to democratic values.The FFP were more of a
threat because, as Voranai put it above, the party stood for “fermenting a revolution of
the mind that could lead to the changing of social hierarchy and traditional status quo”
(Voranai, 2019). Its electoral success, especially among the young generation of “voters
awakened by forces of political populism” (Kasian, 2019), was certainly a cause for se-
rious concern for the NCPO. Shortly after the election, the junta (that still existed with
full arbitrary powers, even after the election had been held) brought charges of ‘sedition’
(which had languished in its files since 2015) against FFP leader Thanathon.These char-
ges stemmed from perfectly legitimate protests against the military coup. The NCPO
action was called in an editorial inThe Nation, “A military assault on a political enemy”
(The Nation, 16 April 2019). Shortly afterwards, the NCPO also brought charges of “con-
tempt of court and importing information that may undermine national security or
public order into a computer system, which is a violation of the Computer Crimes Act”
(BangkokPost, 17 April 2019) against Piyabutr Saengkanokkul, the FFP’s secretary general.
These charges stemmed from a statement on the occasion of the Constitutional Court’s
verdict to dissolve TRC, which Piyabutr had read and distributed as a video clip. Ang-
khana Neelapaijit, a member of Thailand’s National Human Rights Commission, was
in attendance when Piyabutr reported to the police and noted, “those campaigning for
democracy are [not] above the law, but the authority should ensure that the treatment
was not judicial harassment or a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP)”
(Kas, 2019). Both Thanathon and Piyabutr demonstrated what they thought of the NC-
PO’s charges by raising their arms in the, ‘three finger salute’ − a gesture used to protest
against the Thai military junta.
The political divide mentioned in the title of this chapter was therefore about the-
se two ideal types of political order that competed in Thailand: the hierarchical, top-
down rule by the traditional power elite, and the equality-based, bottom-up rule by the
people in a democratic system of government. In the words of Seksarn Prasertkun, a
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prominent member of the Octobrists10, there was a ‘contested area’ in Thai society with
two currents of thought, the conservatives and the progressives. Both camps tried to
convince the people that their respective political worldviews were correct. The conser-
vatives needed to instil thoughts, beliefs, and values from the past in a society that had
changed.The progressives, on the other hand, experienced that bringing ideas from the
outside world to Thailand was not an easy task at all (Seksarn, 2018). Unsurprisingly,
the election of 24 March 2019 demonstrated that the societal forces representing each
of these two models, ideal types, currents of thought, or political cultures—that had
previously been involved in the protests of the ‘yellow shirts’ (on the traditional, con-
servative side) and the ‘red shirts’ (on the democratic, progressive side) —still existed.
These societal forces had produced an electoral outcome in which neither side could
claim to be the clear winner, though an advantage was given to the side of ‘Thai-style’
or ‘electoral’ authoritarianism.
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Building integration platforms in multiethnic Malaysia:
A tribute to ideas and contributions
of Professor Ruediger Korff
Shamsul AB (Kuala Lumpur)
A tribute: In lieu of an introduction
Professor Ruediger Korff was Professor for Development Sciences from 1998-2000 at
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM, or The National University of Malaysia). Howe-
ver, I have known him and his work from way back in 1988, when I was briefly a Volks-
wagen Stiftung post-doctoral fellow at Bielefeld University, Germany. Then, Professor
Korff was completing his PhD field research on urbanization in Bangkok,Thailand. We
share an outstanding mentor, the renown German sociologist Professor Hans-Dieter
Evers, who remains until today the sifu he is to many others and indeed a permanent
academic patron to us researchers at UKM.
It is, should I say, the ‘Evers Network’ that forms the umbrella within and under
which numerous influential ideas, concepts, and analytical tools have been generated
in the last 40 years or so, led by Professor Evers and expanded and elaborated by his
student researchers and colleagues. Ideas such as social reproduction, strategic groups,
urbanism and social space, knowledge governance, and many more have emerged from
this network since the 1970s. They have been influential as analytical tools in making
sense of the ‘society, state, and market nexus’ – a sociological nexus I developed as a
heuristic teaching device – in particular applied to the societies of South Asia, Southeast
Asia, and East Asia. The publications resulting from the 40 years of effort by the ‘Evers
Network’ are too many to list here. Nonetheless, a quick googling of the CVs of both
Professor Hans-Dieter Evers and Professor Ruediger Korff would reveal the richness,
breadth, and depth of the academic endeavour of the ‘Evers Network’.
I am fortunate to be associated with academics who belonged to a ‘strategic group’
academic study that has scholars fromEurope, Asia, and Latin America, and I benefitted
greatly from their commitment in an intellectual endeavour that has produced many
fruitful contributions. Being an anthropologist, I share many interests with Professor
Korff, for example, his ‘local and global continuum’ interest, in particular his article
“Local Enclosures of Globalization: The Power of Locality” (Dialectical Anthropology, 27(1)
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2003: 1-18). My work has always been about ‘Malaysia in the village, simultaneously
the village in Malaysia’, that is, how the global and local become socially woven, in the
context of the ‘Society, State and Market Nexus.’
I have learnt about and experimented with ideas and concepts developed by the Ger-
many-based ‘strategic group’ academic study in the last thirty years. I have used them
to try to make sense of the complex, inter-ethnic, Malaysian society and its ability to
build and sustain a resilient cohesive whole, which, despite imperfections, has mana-
ged to thrive over the last seventy years. I contend that it is less challenging to explain
why conflict has occurred and violence has broken out in Malaysia; the harder task is
actually explaining why it hasn’t happened for 50 years, when most observers, local and
foreign, have predicted that the ‘ethnic time bomb’ shall explode anytime.
The brief essay that follows is an attempt to explain how Malaysia has sustained
an admirable level of peace and stability for a long time and, indeed, with improved
economic conditions has enabled the people to reject violence altogether. Socialmobility
has improved and poverty considerably declined. Social safety nets are contributing to
this harmonious state of existence in Malaysia. I present this essay to a colleague and
friend who has my utmost respect, Professor Ruediger Korff.
Introduction
Of the many, Malaysia is the only emerging country that had a general election in 2018
without violence and bloodshed. It had one 50 years ago on 13th May 1969. Since then,
among the developing countries, Malaysia has been perceived by the World Bank and
IMF as a model of peace and stability due to its relatively democratic practice, positive
economic growth, improved quality of life, and increased social mobility opportunities.
The question often asked by observers is how Malaysia has been able to manage its
multiculturalism, to be more exact, its complex multi-ethnicity.What is the integration
approach it has successfully adopted and implemented for the last 50 years? This is a
conceptual question of policy, implementation, and practice as well as an empirical
one. This essay narrates and analyses the evolution of Malaysian society from the end
of the SecondWorldWar until recently – from social conflict, to stable tension, to social
cohesion.
It begins with a brief historical account of why Malaysia chose integration and not
assimilation, as in Indonesia, in managing its diversity. There are historical and demo-
graphic reasons for making the choice, but it has rarely been explained and has often
been taken for granted by scholars and researchers. Then the essay elaborates on the
different stages of this evolution and the content of each stage, with empirical evidence.
Integration platforms are the key, whereby the efforts involved in building integration
platforms are implemented top-down and bottom-up as well as horizontally among the
grassroots.
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Building ‘integration to platforms’ to deal with diversity
The central sociological instrument that has heldMalaysia together so far is known as an
integration platform. It is an abstract and physical space where differences among the
complex multiethnic community find spaces of convergence at various levels of society.
Integration platforms have been created in the political, economic, social, and educati-
on spheres, all intricately linked through Malaysia’s development planning, consisting
of five-year development plans, a policy document, and a governance framework for
budget and implementation purposes. In a sense, ideologically, economic development
was given priority over nation building. This development had a tremendous all-round
impact: on poverty eradication, on the increase of general literacy and education per-
formance, on basic infrastructure improvement, and on providing new opportunities
to improve the quality of life and subsequently the chances of social mobility. However,
not all is rosy and sweet in Malaysia.
The most challenging task over the years has been building viable integration plat-
forms in the nation-building sphere. In other words, sustaining unity in diversity is
most challenging because full national unity is yet to be achieved; the country swings
between moments of unit and moments of difference. What has been achieved so far,
however, is a strong overall national cohesion. Nevertheless, a number of social deficits
have yet to be overcome. What is needed is a thorough multi-level national reconcilia-
tion guided by the principles of bargaining.
The evolutionary path: From social conflicts to stable tension
to social cohesion
Since 1969, Malaysia has been predicted as having the potential to suffer from serious,
bloody, ethnic conflicts every time an economic crisis occurs in Asia. This viewpoint
waswidely entertained by local and foreign analysts afterMalaysia experienced an open,
bloody, ethnic conflict onMay 13, 1969; a conflict that was attributed, officially and unof-
ficially, to unresolved economic problems within the country. Indeed, the introduction
of the New Economic Policy, 1971-1990, to redress the economic roots of the inter-ethnic
problem only reaffirmed this viewpoint.
However, to the surprise of many, especially to the ‘prophets of dooms’, after expe-
riencing a series of economic crises in the last five decades, namely, the 1986-87, the
1997-98 and the recent 2009-10 economic crises, Malaysia remains politically stable and
indeed is enjoying a positive economic growth. Admittedly, localized skirmishes, so-
me inter-ethnic and others between social groups, have occurred during this period.
However, they have not led to major bloody conflict outbreaks of a proportion com-
parable those experienced in Sri Lanka or in some Central African countries, where
countrywide violent conflicts have dominated the everyday life of the whole populati-
on. In short, the general population in those countries lives in constant fear because of
the frequency of the perpetrated violence.
However, this relative peace didn’t stop Malaysia’s own political prophet of doom,
Mr. Lim Kit Siang, from republishing his book ten years ago entitled Time Bombs in Ma-
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laysia: 30th Anniversary Edition (2009, original 1978) as if Malaysia had just had its 30th
bloody ethnic riot of the May 13th 1969 magnitude. What many have failed to realize
is that all the predictions of the prophets of doom, based on a conflict approach, have
not come about. Instead, since the major ethnic riot in May 13th 1969, there has been a
consistent, long, peaceful period, punctuated once or twice by ethnic skirmishes. Ins-
tead, all the riots and conflict, recently, have been happening in the North, in the once
famous peaceful Thailand. This year, Malaysia remembers the 13th May 1969 incident
after 50 years in a sober and peaceful manner.
Why hasn’t the expected conflict taken place in Malaysia? This has also to be explai-
ned.
Perhaps, I wish to argue, it is useful to approach this issue sociologically from a
cohesion approach with the assumption that the Malaysian plural society has been, ge-
nerally, in a state of stable tension; it has been surviving in a situation dominated by
major societal contradictions but, nonetheless, longitudinally, remains generally cohe-
sive. In other words, there is some level of social cohesion within these societies, but
the journey has not been plain sailing. Often the social cohesion has been punctuated
by skirmishes, which were resolved quickly.
In other words, if we were to emphasize the negative aspects of the diversity, which
usually involve a small percentage of the population, we are then giving a disproportio-
nate focus to one aspect of social reality. As a result, we miss the larger portion of the
positive aspect of diversity that the general population is enjoying. The moot question
is how we shall redress this analytical myopia. Perhaps we should study the experience
and empirical evidence from Malaysia.
The evolution: A brief outline
I wish to present a brief evolution of Malaysia’s socio-political experience, in general,
and its inter-ethnic relations, in particular since after the Second World War (SWW),
which ended in 1945. In short, Malaysia’s experience of unity in diversity.
The conflict-ridden era in Malaysia (1948-1960)
It is inevitable to begin looking at Malaysia from the conflict perspective. The first de-
cade after the SWW was a turbulent period. This critical period was characterized by
two opposing trends.
On the one side, there was a near anarchy situation as a result of the war-torn
conditions and other negative consequences that developed in turn. On the other, the
British colonial state was feverishly trying to rebuild the economy and society through
various means, some of which were coercive. Finding a middle path between anarchy
and harmony was indeed the most difficult task during this period.
What were the major challenges during this period? What were the solutions? Ans-
wers to both questions provide us with some ideas of attempts made to weld some
form of multiethnic integration as constructed and maintained in Malaysia. Some of
the institutional structures are still here today.
Building integration platforms in multiethnic Malaysia 193
The four major challenges
The four major challenges to multiethnic integration that the British colonial go-
vernment and the newmultiethnic self-government had to deal with in the first decade
after the war (1945-55) were the following: ethnic strife, labour unrest, insurgency and
terrorism, opposition to a new system of governance.
Ethnic strife was bloody and tragic, as one could imagine. It went on throughout
almost the whole of the first decade after the war, occurring sporadically in different
parts of the country. The most severe of the ethnic clashes took place just after the war
ended, in August 1945, hardly a week after the Japanese had officially surrendered, and
the senseless killing went on non-stop for about twoweeks inmany parts of the country.
Initially, it was between the Malays, who sided with the Japanese, and the Chinese,
who fought against the Japanese. Later, the ethnic clashes spread to involve Malays and
Chinese who neither supported nor opposed the Japanese.However, subsequent clashes
were not as severe and widespread, albeit enough to create similar destabilising effects
within the country.
Labour unrest, in the form of strikes and rallies, became a common event, too, af-
ter the war, particularly in the first half of 1946. The height of the protests was in early
1947 when there was a countrywide strike and demonstration by the rubber plantati-
on workers union, which was demanding better wages. Increasing violence, especially
against European planters, was worrying the colonial government to the extent that it
had to impose rules that substantially curbed trade union activities in the country. The
protesters were mainly Chinese and Indian workers because they formed the majority
of the working class in Malaysia then, with the Malays mostly in the peasant sector.
Insurgency and terrorismwere behind the labour protests, led by the illegalMalayan
Communist Party (MCP), a largely Chinese-dominated organisation. It had a strong in-
fluence within the trade union but changed its political strategy when the unions were
reduced almost to welfare associations by the colonial government. The MCP then en-
couraged the unions to lead the workers “to the road of violent action”. Murders and
attacks on European estate managers and pro-management workers increased alar-
mingly such that the colonial government was forced to proclaim a State of Emergency
throughout Malaya on 18 June 1948.The Emergency lasted for 12 years, until 31 July 1960.
Needless to say, the economy was badly affected during the initial Emergency period,
especially the modern rural agricultural sector, namely, the large rubber plantations
and numerous tin mines all over the country.The ethnic harmony, especially the Malay-
Chinese relationship, was tested to breaking point. Sanity prevailed when the majority
of the Chinese decided to support the government anti-terrorism campaign. That is
why the claim can be made that fighting terrorism is not new in Malaysia, especially in
the context of the September 11 event.
The new governance option, unitary vs. federalism: In 1946, the colonial government
introduced the idea of a Malayan Union, a constitutional union on the Malay Peninsula,
excluding Singapore, which proposed to confer a common citizenship on her peoples,
irrespective of race and origin. This political project was opposed by the indigenous
peoples, especially Malays, as a program that would have benefited the immigrant po-
pulation. Malaysia was threatened yet again by a political conflict. The unitary-state
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concept of the Malayan Union project was aborted. It was replaced, in February 1948,
by a federalism-based governance called the Federation of Malaya scheme.
In short, for more than a decade just after the war, Malaysia had its share of ethnic
strife, near anarchy situations, and socio-political instability. This strife was not dissi-
milar to the situation experienced by Sri Lanka or Bosnia-Herzegovina.
What was done to bring back the stability and how has it been maintained until
today? I offer here my opinions in the form of an explanation about the “three pillars of
multiethnic integration” that have successfully held Malaysia together until today.
The three pillars of development & growth
The British efforts at reconstructing the economy and restoring stability could be cate-
gorized into three types: to restore peace and security, to create an environment suita-
ble for ethnic relations, to introduce planned change through a five-year plan program.
Integration platforms became the instrument that allowed these three pillars to be con-
solidated and bring about positive impacts.
These initiatives necessitated establishing new administrative instrumentalities. To
operationalize most of these efforts, the British felt it was necessary to introduce a
number of legislations, not only as bureaucratic guidelines but also to regulate society
and defuse any opposition that could destabilise the country. Let us examine each of
these efforts in turn beginning with those carried out to create peace and security in
the country.
Security was of primary importance because the period immediately after the war
was rather unstable in both Malaysia and the region. Indeed, in Malaysia, there was
racial strife, labour unrest, and insurgency. A number of draconian regulations were
introduced to maintain ‘law and order’ and hence ‘peace and stability’, such as the In-
ternal Security Act (ISA) and the introduction of a ‘pin number’-like a system known
more simply as the ‘identity card’. The whole ‘security’ effort and paraphernalia were
built around and anchored in the Emergency of 1948-60. It is significant that Malay-
sia achieved its independence during the Emergency, that is, in 1957. Instead of the
military, it was the police force (uniformed and non-uniformed) that was the central
instrument in the overall ‘security’ strategy.
Ethnic bargaining was critical to maintaining some measure of socio-political sta-
bility within themultiethnic society.This was conductedmainly through amodern elec-
toral process using an umbrella-like coalition model. We have ethnic-based parties, but
from day one the British ensured that the major ethnic parties got together to form
a team, hence the birth of the UMNO-MCA Alliance party, which was later joined by
MIC.The Alliance, later known as the National Front, has been ruling the country since
1955. This coalition model was also adopted by the opposition political parties, such as
by the non-Malay-dominated Labour Party and the Malay-dominated Socialist Party,
which formed the Socialist Front in the 1960s. Other loosely-organised political party
coalitions emerged in the 1980s.
Development planning, a kind of planned change or social engineering strategy,
not unlike the Marshall Plan, was introduced by the British mainly then for the purpo-
se of economic reconstruction and management of war-torn Malaysia. It began with
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the Draft Development Plan, 1950-55. Since then, ‘development planning’ through im-
plementing a series of five-year plans has become a permanent feature in Malaysia’s
attempt to achieve economic development and create a nation. So, we have had ni-
ne five-year plans since 1955. The effort to create each of these five-year plans became
an important platform for the ‘economic bargain’ amongst the different ethnic groups,
hence the allocation of resources. Most of the plans were financed by the World Bank
and the IMF plus funds borrowed from other sources.
It has been the successful combination of these three important elements that has
helpedMalaysia tremendously to achieve what it has realized so far in itsmodernization
push, but not without its problems.We are aware of the problems and have to work hard
continuously to solve all of them amicably.
Malaysia, a nation in the state of ‘stable tension’ (1969-2008)
On May 13, 1969, an open and bloody ethnic conflict broke out in Kuala Lumpur, the ca-
pital of Malaysia. Ethnic violence also occurred in a few other locations but away from
Kuala Lumpur. Although the conflict was localized and successfully contained, the af-
termath was felt throughout the country. It was the severest test of ethnic relations in
post-Merdeka (post-Independence) Malaysia. It became a watershed event in the politi-
cal and sociological analyses ofMalaysian society, and in the consciousness of individual
Malaysians, because it was so traumatic. It conscientized people and most importantly,
it redefined the perceptions of our ethnic relations in our country and changed their
dynamics.
Ordinary Malaysians were rudely awakened to the fact that the ethnic harmony they
had enjoyed since Merdeka could no longer be taken for granted. The government was
quick to mobilize all its resources to find immediate remedies and long-term solutions,
both economic and political.
The government declared a national Emergency, and democracy was suspended.
A National Consultative Council was set up to seek solutions palatable to all the eth-
nic groups, especially the Malays. The country was governed by a National Operations
Council. A Department of National Unity was established in 1969 as a bureaucratic in-
strument to keep watch over the state of ethnic relations in Malaysia; in 1972, it became
a full Ministry of National Unity.
The New Economic Policy was introduced in 1971 to address, in the short and long
term, the intra- and inter-ethnic socio-economic differences resulting from the com-
plex of diversities in the country – ethnic, cultural, religious, regional, political ori-
entation, and economic activity. The Rukunegara (National Charter) was created as an
ideology to be embraced by Malaysians from all walks of life.The fact remains, however,
that ethnic diversity is significantly complicated by other forms of diversities, namely,
cultural, religious, regional, political orientation, and economic activity.
Malaysia has since been in a state of stable tension, which means that we have been
living in a society dominated by many contradictions but have managed to solve most
of them through a continuous process of consensus-seeking, negotiation, bargaining,
and mediation. Sometimes the process itself became a solution.
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The downside of these on-going negotiation between ethnic interest groups in Ma-
laysia is that the potentially negative and divisive ethnic fault lines, based on signifi-
cant differences in religion, language, dress, and diet, have become highlighted more
so than ever before. To the prophets of doom, notably foreign journalists, Malaysia has
been perceived as a society facing an imminent break down for the slightest of reasons.
In general, Malaysians remain more optimistic and believe that they have learnt the
bitter lesson that nobody gains from an open ethnic conflict manifesting in violence.
But they remain sociologically vigilant and chose consensus, not conflict, as the path
for the future. Even though each ethnic group espouses a particular form of ‘nation-
of-intent’, the overwhelming majority seems to have accepted Vision 2020, introduced
by Mahathir in 1991, with its aim of establishing a ‘united Malaysian nation’ or Bangsa
Malaysia by the year 2020. This remains the main official nation-of-intent.
Nevertheless, Malaysians also realize that sweeping things under the carpet is not
the solution. Indeed, they have become acutely aware that contestation between the
different ethnic groups will not simply disappear and cannot be ignored.
So, instead of choosing street violence as a solution to settle their differences, they
decided that the only rational and reasonable avenue left for them was in the realm of
public discourse. Nonetheless,Malaysians do sometimes engage themselves in peaceful
street demonstrations. Whenever the authorities have felt that the public discourse on
ethnic differences, articulated at times in the form of street demonstrations, was slowly
getting out-of-hand, they have been swift to dampen the tinder before it breaks into a
fire.
As a result, the public discourse on ethnic differences amongst Malaysians since
the burst of public demonstrations in the 2008 and 2013 general elections has become
highly sensible and has been handled with great sensitivity. The discourse thus far has
been a healthy one, whether it is through traditional mass media platforms or through
the channels of the more recent electronic media, such as the internet, blogs, SMS,
WhatsApps or Instagram.
Social cohesion: The only option for Malaysia and Malaysians
(2008 onwards)
The result of the 12thMalaysian General Elections inMarch 2008was another watershed
in Malaysian post-independence history. The ruling coalition, the National Front (NF)
suffered its worst result in the history of Malaysia’s general elections. It lost most of
its support, losing for the first time ever its two-third’s majority in the Lower House
of Parliament. This defeat was partly owed to the NF’s decision to unlock the door to
openness. It was initiated by the Prime Minister of the time, Abdullah Badawi.
Malaysians rushed out in huge waves to the new-founded openness. In the process,
Abdullah got trampled and the NF mangled. If the UMNO, the dominant Malay party
within the NF, had just now been released from the emergency ward, then the MCA and
MIC would still be in intensive care.The new PrimeMinister, Najib Razak, had only two
years 11 months left to climb the proverbial perpendicular and slippery political wall in
order to reach the victorious top in the 13th General Election in March 2013. For him,
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failure was not an option. Pragmatism was the only vehicle available to him to ascend
to the top.
Najib introduced the ‘1Malaysia concept’ and the Government Transformation Pro-
gramme (GTP) in April 2009.The samemonth he took the nation’s helm and announced,
in July 2009, six National Key Result Areas (NKRAs), in efforts to tackle matters of con-
cern to the people. These were integration platforms he saw fit to be introduced and
implemented for the country.
‘1Malaysia’ was eventually elaborated as a concept in a booklet distributed to the
public and alsomade available on-line.Though similar in spirit and intentionwithmany
of the previous top-down concepts, informed by the reality of unity in diversity, this one,
in the Malaysian context, is truly Najib’s choice. Like other ‘1Something’ slogan around
the world, its application in Malaysia fits into and certainly provides the much-needed
rhetorical umbrella for the overall pragmatic approach he adopted to survive pastMarch
2013.
Literally, everyone could relate to 1Malaysia,many with hope, some with scepticism,
others with cynicism; a few reject it totally, and one or two are just happy to ridicule it.
In short, 1Malaysia is a contested concept. As a much-needed PR exercise, 1Malaysia,
despite being a contested concept, has successfully occupied the national mass media
space, almost daily, hence the all-important rakyat’s mind, too. Later, the appearance
of slogans such as ‘Middle Malaysia’, said to have been introduced to rival ‘1Malaysia’,
has given further political mileage to the latter.
In January 2010, to give substance to his pragmatic approach based on the 1Malaysia
slogan, Najib finally launched the GTP with each of the six NKRAs elaborated.
The NKRAs were reducing crime, combating corruption, improving academic per-
formance, raising the living standards of low-income households, upgrading rural basic
infrastructure, and improving urban public transportation. Although, in the long term,
the GTP was aimed at realising the Vision 2020 set by Mahathir, everybody knew that
the short-term and pragmatic objective was to deliver victory to the Barisan Nasional
government in the next general election, due in 2013, and ensure that Najib’s position
was secure.
However, what was absent in the GTP launch exhibition was the elaboration of the
7th NKRA – ‘1Malaysia and Unity’ – which should have been the outcome of the delibe-
ration conducted non-stop for six weeks in Lab No. 7. Perhaps the issue of ‘1Malaysia
and Unity’ was not, in the first instance, seen by the Malaysian public as a problem like
crime or corruption or urban public transportation.
Malaysians probably should be happy that ‘1Malaysia and Unity’ is not a problem
but a concern, of a broader and deeper kind, ever present in our daily existence.
It clearly endorses the fact that Malaysian society, in general, has enjoyed cross-
cutting social ties and existed in a state of social cohesion, sharing values, norms, and
many other things for many decades.
But rational Malaysians also recognised that, while we enjoy a certain positive level
of social cohesion, it is not all plain sailing. It has been punctuated by problems, con-
tradictions, and conflicts of various kinds while being held together by the willingness
to negotiate continuously to maintain consensus, peace, and stability. We know well
that Malaysians have many grievances and are not afraid to air them publicly, whether
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they originate from ethnic, class, religious, or many more roots. This publicity gives
outsiders the impression that we are in a state of constant conflict.
But when we have moved around the country at any time of the day, everday and
every year over the last 40 years, we could not help but notice that conflict is missing
because everyone continues to conduct their everyday life, even in times of fierce compe-
tition, in a socially-cohesive manner, without being threatened by open ethnic conflict.
Malaysians therefore “talk conflict, walk cohesion.”
In this context, the ‘1Malaysia’ concept views and accepts differences and grievan-
ces among Malaysians, especially its ‘talk conflict’ behaviour, as something based on a
rational choice and not an emotional one.The same rational choice underpins the ‘walk
cohesion’ behaviour pattern. Indeed, 1Malaysia is a reminder of sorts to all Malaysians
that we are different in so many ways but had lived, crossed various social boundaries,
and survived in a socially cohesive and unity mould much respected and admired by
other countries.
The 14th General Election in May 2018 brought the biggest change in Malaysian
political history when the NF, the ruling party for more than six decades, lost to Pakatan
Harapan, a coalition opposition party led by Tun Mahathir, the 4th Prime Minister who
helmed the NF government for 22 years. The loss surprised everyone in Malaysia and
around the world. What was significant was the fact that the political transition was
smooth without any sign of violence or open conflict. A credit to all Malaysians who
saw that their future existence was based on bargaining, negotiation, and mediation
with integration platforms continuing to be the vehicle.
It is now one year since the change of government.We have a strong open debate in
the press and social media about the performance of the new government, which has
been judged by many as failing in its promise to fulfil what was listed in its election
manifesto. The public is becoming more critical of the government’s performance as
the cost of living rises and old problems remain unresolved. It is obvious not much
could be achieved by a relatively new government in one year. But the advent of rising
expectations before the election has become the rise of frustration afterwards.However,
the ruling government is managing things, if with difficulty, reasonably well.
Conclusion
Through the case study of Malaysia, we could clearly see how the conflict situation
of post-SWW has been transformed to one of a stable tension and, eventually, to a
sustainable state of social cohesion. Theoretically, therefore, we have to be vigilant of
the internal changes that have taken place over the years within Malaysian society. To
make sense of the whole post-SWWMalaysia, it is not sufficient to remain theoretical-
ly conservative, indeed lazy, to apply only the conflict approach or worse still the time
bomb perspective employed by the Malaysian opposition politician Mr. Lim Kit Siang.
The conflict approach is too simplistic and distorts the empirical reality of Malaysia and
renders the ethnically diverse Malaysian population an unthinking lot.
It is imperative for us, therefore, to be more analytically sensitive to the ontological
circumstances and recognise that Malaysians can think and decide for themselves, de-
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mocratically, what they prefer and the kind of political choices they are ready to make,
as the 12th General Election of 8 March 2008 results began to show and the peaceful
opposition takeover in the 14th General Election of 8 May 2018 have shown.The old and
the new government seem to survive on building new integration platforms for macro
and specific purposes.
There is always a need for analysts on Malaysia to adopt a theoretically and con-
ceptually rigorous and up-to-date approach to provide true-to-the-situation analyses
of Malaysia’s unity in diversity experience. The danger facing scholars studying plural
societies, such as the one in Malaysia, is the risk of the ethnicization of knowledge, me-
aning the promotion of a particular knowledge perspective not motivated by seeking
truth but rather by the agenda of a particular ethnic group.
The imminent danger facing scholars studying plural societies, such as the one Ma-
laysia, is the risk of the ethnicization of knowledge, meaning the promotion of a par-
ticular knowledge perspective not motivated by seeking truth but rather by the agenda
of a particular ethnic group.
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Community Development: A Case Study from Tamil Nadu
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Abstract
In recent years, there has been a marked increase in the literature on engaged or public
anthropology. Moreover, definitions of engagement have opened up to include a multi-
ple number of ways and forms that anthropological work can be engage in community
development—ranging from direct activism and critical deconstructions of dominant
categories, to teaching. The scope of engagement in socio-cultural, economic and poli-
tical issues dealt with by anthropologists has increased relatively in pluralistic societies
such as India. The extent of what counts as engaged scholarship, moving towards an
epistemic understanding that leads to relationships between subject knowledge and
action/application, could be inherently politico-legal most of the time.
In India, attention is drawn to such engaged scholarship of cultural anthropologists.
They contribute through their ethnographic writings about the communities and their
contemporary changing identities. Such alternative realities, open-ended epistemology
and theoretical practical interpretation of ethnographies about marginalized commu-
nities, social identities and the claims made by those realities were jeopardizing Indian
hierarchical society. The communities and their self-organizations protested against
the government and sought privileges that could be provided constitutionally. Most of
the time, the issue revolved around their claim about the ‘community name’ and no-
menclature. The requests submitted to the authorities were negotiated, contested and
ultimately required legal interventions. Since the issue is all about culture and social
identity, the court regularly seeks anthropological inputs such as theoretical practices,
reflexive discourse and more subtle or virtual form of intervention.
This article attempts to shed light on the need for rejuvenating our understanding
of the concept engaged or public anthropology, application of the basic ethnographic ap-
proach at the empirical level and other related concepts. The analytical interpretations
were arrived at by taking the cases brought to the District Vigilance Committee and
State Level Scrutiny Committee of Tamil Nadu constituted by the appellant judiciary
intervention at the national level.
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Introduction
In recent years, there has been a marked increase in the literature on engaged or public
anthropology; moreover, definitions of engagement have been opened up to include a
multiplicity of ways and forms that anthropological work can be seen to be engaged in,
ranging from direct activism, to critical deconstructions of dominant categories and
teaching (Checker et al., 2010; Brondo, 2010; Mullins, 2011; Lamphere, 2004; Lassiter et
al., 2005; Peacock, 1997; Hale, 2008; Speed, 2008).
Anthropology of Development is a broader category than the applied term Deve-
lopment Anthropology. It includes work on the ethnography of developmental organi-
zations and institutions, as well as critical work on development as a system of ideas.
Most importantly, the new anthropology of development needs to move beyond narrow
definitions of development and its specialized institutions to encompass a new vision
of development as the wider struggle by people and governments to combat poverty
and inequality (Gardner and Lewis, 2015).
The stronghold of this universal statement and its acknowledgement by many theo-
reticians means that the scope of engagement in socio-cultural, economic and political
issues dealt with by anthropologist has increased in pluralistic societies such as India.
The scope of what counts as engaged scholarship, moving towards an epistemic under-
standing that leads to a relationship between subject knowledge and action/applicati-
on, could be inherently politico-legal most of the time. This definition means moving
beyond an intellectual recognition of the political nature of the relationship between
knowledge and action to a more thorough and practical understanding of the ways in
which critical, intellectual and theoretical work, including analysis, deconstruction and
critique, are themselves material and potentially politico-legal practices.
The contribution of cultural anthropologists through ethnographic writings about
the communities and their contemporary changing identities draws attention to such
engaged scholarship in India. Such ethnographic output should be perceived beyond in-
tellectual understanding. The empirical understanding reflected in Michal Osterweil’s
article (2013) published in the journal The Society for Cultural Anthropology made an ar-
gument drawing on ethnographic research with activist networks of the Italian alter-
globalization movement with the 300,000-person strong 2001 protest against the G8 in
Genoa, often known as ‘Movimento die Movimenti’ (MoM). Central to this movement
were a series of material practices involving analysis, deliberation, research, investiga-
tion, questioning, thinking and theorizing what Osterweil called “theoretical practices”
done through the production of texts, reflexive discourse and more subtle or virtual
forms of intervention. A great deal of contemporary activism is constituted by expe-
rimental, reflexive and critical knowledge practices, all of which are meant to reflexi-
vely, and even recursively, develop better or more effective politics. This development
is achieved largely through producing subjectivities that know, think and do different-
ly (Osterweil, 2013; Casas-Cortés et al., 2008), often through what might be thought
of as a non-dual or open-ended epistemology in which process and resonance are as
important as, if not more important than, truth, objectivity and end-points.
Such alternative realities, open-ended epistemology and theoretical practical in-
terpretations of ethnographies about marginalized communities’ social identities and
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their claims were jeopardizing traditional Indian hierarchical society.The communities
and their self-organizations protested against the government and sought privileges
provided for them constitutionally. Most of the time, the issue revolved around their
claim about a community name and its nomenclature. The current nomenclature used
for tribals in India is either Scheduled Caste (SC)1 or Scheduled Tribe (ST)2. Sometimes
people are placed in one category when they, according to their traditions and social
identity, belong in another category. Since government-provided aid is dependent on
nomenclature, correct identity is essential.
The requests submitted to the authorities for proper identification were negotia-
ted, contested and ultimately required legal interventions. Since the issue is all about
culture and social identity, the court sought anthropological inputs such as theoretical
practices, reflexive discourse, andmore subtle or virtual forms of intervention. Such en-
gaged activities of anthropology are becoming more crucial and recursively developing
‘better’ or ‘just’ society.
Such community studies often follow a stereotypic review of literature. More speci-
fically the monographs, gazetteers, ethnographic profile of the marginalized commu-
nities and their identities as understood by academicians have been put into reflexive
discourses in contemporarily changing societies, and more so in developing countries.
There is an increasing recognition of the need to understand systems of oppression and
colonization that were unintentionally harming the marginalized communities’ within
which anthropologists are working (Hale, 2006, 2008; Speed, 2008a, 2008b; Scheper-
Hughes, 1995). Ethnography matters for contemporary societies; it matters for demo-
cracy. Such a claim derives from the very activity of the ethnographer—a presence both
involved and detached, inscribed in the instant and over time, allowing precise descrip-
tions andmultiple perspectives, thus providing a distinctive understanding of the world
that deserves to be shared (Fassin, 2013: 462-63). Such ethnographic studies about the
vulnerable communities were periodically conducted and published in India.These do-
cuments were used by the researchers and administrators for references, and their in-
terpretations about the community identity where applied according to the professional
perception. Variations in such interpretation based on theoretical practice sometimes
led to confrontation not only at the academic level but also at the politico-legal level,
although an anthropologist’s role in engagement demanded objectivism. The call for
engagement has enlisted anthropologists with varied understandings: from those ar-
guing that anthropology requires a rethinking of its methods and modes of writing to
create a postcolonial relationship to its subject, to those committed to finding a non-
imperialist political stance and, even further to those working to formulate a new way
to work collaboratively rather than hierarchically with communities. All of these forms
of engagement contribute to a rich panorama of anthropological work in the public.
Today, as anthropologists are still engaged in justifying the centrality of locally detailed
1 Scheduled Caste (SC) – The untouchables who constitute the lowest segment of Hindu social hier-
archy have been grouped as ‘Schedule Caste’ in caste-based Indian society.
2 Scheduled Tribe (ST) – A different India term for Tribes (Aadivasi, Vana-jati, Primitive Society,
Simple Society, Indigenous People etc.). The term Tribe is commonly used as an administrative
term in India.
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ethnography, and even in debating the legitimacy of the discipline itself, ethnography’s
exact definition and its relationship to the history of colonial power and its contem-
porary permutations remain unresolved (Clarke, 2013).
The present article attempts to shed light on the need for rejuvenating our under-
standing of the concept engaged or public anthropology and how applying the basic
ethnographic approach and other related methods has led to some positive outcomes
and some outright errors in the process of identifying the community.The analytical in-
terpretation is based on the empirical understanding of the anthropologists (member)
of the District Vigilance Committee and State Level Scrutiny Committee constituted by
the Government of Tamil Nadu with the result of appellant judiciary intervention, in a
specific judgment (Kumari Madhuri Patil Vs-Additional Commissioner, Tribal Welfare
Department, Maharashtra Government).
The role of anthropologists and their expertise in the scientific understanding of
culture and contemporary community identity has become recognized by the admi-
nistrative, legal and applied development field. The anthropologist’s intervention and
knowledge have been considered crucial in interpreting community identity, more spe-
cifically for the SC and ST who had obtained or possessed the community certificates
and were claiming their ‘genuine’ identity status. The basic theoretical understanding
is challenged by the variation in empirical understanding, by different anthropologists
providing an ethnographic detail about the same community and the same cultural pat-
tern and by variation in interpretation.These differences allowed for mistakes in proper
community identification. Hence, an open healthy debate on these issues for specific
practical/epistemic purposes is required. Our major concern in this paper is to point
out what we take to be some of the insights and errors, and to me, most of the errors
resulted from some crucial ambiguities in ethnography and interpretation; until these
are distinguished, it is impossible to its evaluate intellectual recognition or move on.
Theoretical and Methodological Impression of Anthropology
Anthropology is a relative late-comer in the process of growth as a scientific discipline.
When anthropologists started studying people using qualitative tools, they were loo-
king for patterns in the day-to-day life and way of living of those they were studying.
The emphasis was on the enormity of cultural variability while at the same time loo-
king at universal similarities among the cultures of the world. This research resulted
in anthropological theories. While analyzing the anthropological theory, Manners and
Kaplan (1968) confirmed that anthropologists use the term theory in a variety of ways
almost whimsically—as a synonym for a concept, or as a synonym for inductive gene-
ralization or as one for a model (often itself a term used in a number of different ways)
and sometimes merely to lend tone or dignity to the obvious.
Anthropologists also believed that part of the reason for this widely different usage
was paucity of ‘authentic’ anthropological theory, as well as the uncertainties about the
use andmeaning of the term itself.These came about, ironically enough, from the disci-
pline’s emphasis on field work. Field work is not only the device used by anthropologists
to provide the discipline with its empirical materials; it has become much more than
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that. It is a kind of touchstone of adequacy, a rite de passage prerequisite to membership
in the profession.Thus, fieldwork has become a slogan, and the focus of anthropological
research is to rush to relatively isolated communities and start applying the anthropo-
logical tools in an attempt to understand the culture of simple communities, following
an ethnographic approach. The tribe or relatively isolated communities and the related
writing ethnographies have been the special interest of anthropology right from the
beginning.
Contemporary anthropology explores the interface of anthropology and develop-
ment with a particular focus on how anthropologists working in the field use, apply and
merge theory and practice. With the recent transformations of development coopera-
tion in line with the Paris Declaration and anthropology’s decreasing influence within
the development sector, it has become particularly important to describe, analyze and
reflect upon anthropologists’ experiences of being practically involved in development
work; anthropological knowledge and perspectives continue to be critical in improved
development practice (Hagberg and Quattara 2012). The fact remains that the fluidity
of the anthropological concepts is justified as we are dealing with the dynamic aspects
of culture.
Anthropology of South-East Asian communities addresses the issues of social and
cultural life, and the change in development more in regional terms, and, like Burling’s
Hill Farms and Paddy Fields: Life inMainland South-East Asia (1995), has claimed that South-
East Asian communities demonstrate certain region-wide cultural themes and have
adopted regional parameters in drawing ethnographies (King and Wilder, 2003).
While setting out the agenda for Public Anthropology, (Griffith et al., 2013: 125-31)
said that “it moves beyond the proliferation of terms (applied, activist, feminist, enga-
ged, critical medical, community archaeology) to lift up the best of each, dealing with
social problems and issues of interest to a broader public or non-academic collabora-
tors yet still relevant to academic discourses and debate”. Anthropologists have been
involved in public affairs and development co-operation using anthropological theo-
ries, methods and ethnography.They have extensively taken part as major stakeholders
in mega development projects. Their major contribution was more that of contributing
qualitative data in understanding the local people, their cognitive perspectives and their
culture as a whole or of involving themselves using participatory approaches in social-
assessment studies. At the same time, the basic anthropological concepts, particular-
ly the ethnographic approach that has been taken as a basic premise by contemporary
practicing/applying anthropologist, require both a certain consensus in application and
regional variations. As a result, such engagement by the anthropologist may not reflect
paradoxical viewpoints.
Ethnographic Practice in the Development Process
The major contribution of an anthropologist is in providing an ethnographic descripti-
on of various tribes/simple communities of the world. Geertz’s (1973) characterization
of “inscription” as the core of ethnographic “thick description” and Gusfield’s (1976) dis-
section of the rhetorical underpinning of science provided seminal statements in the
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1970s. Subsequently, Clifford and Marcus’s edited collection, Writing Culture: The poetic
and Politics of Ethnography (1986), Van Mannen’s ‘Tale of the Field’ (1988) and Atkinson’s
The Ethnographic Imagination (1990) have advanced the considerations of ethnographic
writings.
Further work has been influential in this area. While exploring the issues related to
ethnography, Hammersly (1992) suggested that social and cultural anthropology of the
Chicago School follows the predominant model of ethnography and treats it as a pure
rather than an applied research area. As result, the impression was created, and it was
taken for granted, that there could be variations in ethnographic results. Anthropology
went to the extent of not claiming to produce an objective or fruitful account of reality
but aiming to offer versions of an ethnographer’s/ practitioner’s experience of reality
through ethnography. Sarana (1989) used the term ‘reinterpretation’ instead of ‘restudy’
and clarified the rules of ethnography. He further emphasized that, in ethnographic
reinterpretation, the anthropologist does not deal with the items of a living culture
directly but is concerned with searching for and assigning new meanings to cultural
data recorded in particular ethnographies. Geertz (1973) also maintains that the aim of
‘interpretivism’ is consistent with science—to understand the function of meaning in
human culture in a systematic manner based on particular ethnographic experiences.
As anthropology became more enamoured of postmodern literary approaches to ana-
lyzing ethnographies and cultures, the text became the sole focus of its work. Since all
text is conceived and written and therefore made up by someone, reality has become
more and more tenuous because anything can be written (Kuznar, 1997). In light of the-
se theoretical understandings, it is clear that there is nothing called ‘the ethnography’;
it is only possible to be ethnography’.
Understanding the interface between the three components, namely theory,method
and ethnography, in the context of applied anthropological experience in contempora-
ry development practice is crucial.The problematic relationship between academia and
applied anthropology has been debated for a long time (Pink, 2006), and the status of
applied anthropology seems to vary in different national contexts (Baba and Hill, 2008).
Evans’ Pritchard (1946) had labelled such anthropological contributions as “the non-sci-
entific field of administration”. But still the conventional classifications of ‘anthropology
of development’ and ‘development anthropology’ have given certain theoretical clarifi-
cation to all the stakeholders involved in the process of development.
The idea that applied research is atheoretical – either does not use theory or does
not lead to theory-weakens the discipline of anthropology. Yet the infertile dichotomy
remains of an anthropology of development that aims at understanding development
as a set of power principles and practices to be subjected to anthropological scrutiny on
the one hand and ‘development anthropology’ that aims at applying theoretical andme-
thodological concepts and tools to actively promote social change on the other (Hagberg
and Quattara, 2012).
The pristine region-specific, socio-cultural and legal issues require scientific anthro-
pological contributions in a more holistic, comprehensive and multifaceted perspective
in a bridge between the dichotomy of anthropology of development and development
anthropology. As Jean-Pierre Oliver de Sardan (2005) diagnosed, certainly the anthro-
pologists are expected to deliver report and recommendations in a much more rapid
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and accessible manner. Furthermore, that manner can be scientific but still simple and
communicable. Hence the purpose of anthropological intervention would be more re-
levant, problem solving and less criticized.
Charles Hale’s (2006) term ‘activist research’ perceived anthropological research as
a method through which we affirm a political alignment with an organized group of
people in struggle and allow dialogue with them to shape each phase of the process and
dissemination of the result (2006: 97). To explicate these points, Osterweil (2013) further
discussed the “activist research vs. cultural critique” debate on engagement. He says a
good deal of work done by social movements can be considered theoretical, analytical
and critical—mirroring many academic practices and values—and the divide between
academia and activism blurs, creating a novel space for rethinking the boundaries of
engaged or political or public anthropology, in turn broadening our views of efficacious
political action.
Plurality of Culture and Ethnography
The most legendary Indian historian Romila Thapar (2014), while exploring the society
in ancient India during the formative period, identified two sets of concrete evidence,
namely archaeological and literary. She mentions Pre-Harappan cultures, Harappan
cultures, Post-Harappan cultures, Sothi culture, Gandhara Grave culture, Banas cul-
ture, Copper Hoard culture, Northern Black Polished Ware culture and so on. While
understanding the variation in culture, she further analyzes the Indian social structure
and postulates the importance of redefining the existing social relationships among the
communities and the need for alternative interpretations. She rightly perceived,
“[t]o see caste only in terms of the four-fold varna does not take us very far. One would
like to know how tribes and social groups were adjusted into the caste hierarchy and
assigned a caste status. The theory that the caste structure was initially flexible, but
gradually become rigid and allowed little mobility, is now open to question. There is
enough evidence to suggest that, in all periods, there have been deviations from the
theoretical concept of caste. We also know there was a continual emergence of new
castes for a variety of reasons” (Thapar 2014).
These historical realities prove the cultural variability and the emergence of various
communities in India and caste/tribe predicament in India. It has been estimated that
there are over five thousand different cultures in the world today. The Anthropological
Survey of India has identified 4635 communities and documented their brief ethnogra-
phy in India.With such enormous cultural variability in the world, particularly in India,
understanding culture using a holistic, ethnographic and anthropological approach has
been severely criticized and underestimated particularly in the fields of development
anthropology, anthropology of development and public anthropology. Redefining and
rethinking the existing ethnographic profile of communities has become much nee-
ded in the process of public anthropology as it has a direct impact on the community
identity in the process of utilizing the benefits of the Positive Discrimination Policy in
India.
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Ethnography is an approach to experiencing, interpreting and representing culture
and society. It has been practiced for a long time by anthropologists. Many ethnograph-
ers have emphasized the central place of writing ethnography in recent times too. The
major contribution of anthropologists in India is in providing ethnographical descrip-
tions about various communities. As a result, the variations in ethnographic results
have been accepted as pure and less pure. There is no claim to produce an objective
or fruitful account of reality but instead an attempt to offer versions of ethnograph-
ers’/practitioners’ experiences of reality through ethnography.Themore recent trend in
engaged anthropology also requires sufficient investigation of the alternative narrati-
ves and such thinking may bring more information about the spiritual characteristics
of Indian communities.
Clarification of the Term Tribe/Community
Anthropologists have been studying the concept of race since the beginning of the field
back in the eighteenth century. In the nineteenth century, a focus began on evolutio-
nary theory and looking for the origin of the species. In the twentieth century, the
focus changed to debunking racial heritability theory (that is biological) and promoting
population genetics, clines and genetics. The most significant accomplishment of an-
thropology in the first half of the twentieth century as Kroeber has said, “has been the
extension and clarification of the concept of culture” (Manners and Kaplan, 1968).
The evolutionary school of thought looked for cultural survival in these primitive
societies, which helps them understand their own society, defined by territorial state,
monogamous family and private property. It was the discipline’s main subject matter
until 1956 when Redfield broke this monotony by studying peasant societies. The term
tribe has been defined by many anthropologists and contested by even more.They have
been referred to by different names by different people – autochthons, indigenous peop-
le/communities, tribes, aboriginals and Adivasis – these communities, which practiced
and are still trying to practice an alternate way of life and had, and still have a different
and distinct world view, are under serious threat to their identity/survival.
In 1998, the World Bank decided to re-examine its policy on indigenous peoples
issued in 1991 as Operational Directive (OD 4.20). One of the objectives of this process
of revisiting the policy was to gather a much wider set of views from governments, civil
society, academics and indigenous people themselves about what should be the rules
of the game for interaction between indigenous groups and the World Bank’s assisted
development interventions.
In India, the study of tribes began with the establishment of the Asiatic Society of
Bengal in 1874. From then on, scholar-administrators wrote general works on the land
and people of different regions, in which references were made to caste and tribes (Xa-
xa, 2003). Various criteria have been taken into consideration namely, racial, language,
ecological habitat, size, mode of livelihood, degree of incorporation into Hindu society
and many combinations of one and all of the above criteria (Xaxa, 2003). These variati-
ons emphasized diversity within these groups and also the cultural understanding and
interpretations by the anthropologist.
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India has the second largest concentration of tribal populations, after the continent
of Africa. The Anthropological Survey of India has enumerated 461 tribal communities,
of which 174 have been identified as subgroups (Singh, 1994). The ST population in In-
dia stated in the 2001 Census was about 8.08% of the total population of 1,028,610,328
in the country. “Etymologically, the term tribe derives its origin from the word ‘tribes’
meaning three divisions” (Verma, 1996). For Romans, the tribe was a political division.
In the western world, as in India, the term tribe had totally different connotations than
what is prevalent now (Verma, 1996). In India, the term has been used in day-to-day life,
and special privileges have been given to them in the name of ‘Positive Discrimination
Privileges’.The beneficiaries were issued ST caste certificates to show their identity and
gain benefits in education, employment and political participation. Still the term tribe
has not been defined anywhere in the Indian constitution. That constitution states in
Article 342 that the ST is tribes or the tribal communities or part of the groupswithin tri-
bes or tribal communities, which the President may specify from time to time by public
notification. As these communities are presumed to constitute the oldest ethnological
segment of Indian society, the term ‘Adivasi’ is used to designate them. The Interna-
tional Labor Organization Convention 107, held at Geneva on 5th June 1957, classified
them as indigenous.The term “indigenous” is a misnomer and bound to be problematic
in India if attempts are made at defining it.This debate or terminology is not necessary
as the Indian constitution has already scheduled communities/groups of people as ST.
However, the constitution gives no clear definition of a tribe. Although certain criteria
are prescribed for communities to categorize them as “tribes”, the criteria for inclusion
and exclusion of such a group have not been prescribed.Moreover, the term has evolved
over time from animist religion to forest dwellers to tribe to ST. It is recognized that
some tribal groups/communities in all Indian states have not been included in the list
of ST categories, while some non-tribal groups have made it into the ST category. In
spite of these anomalies, the term tribe (ST) is appropriate in the Indian context for the
application of Positive Discrimination Policy. However, application in any given context
should involve local consultation and expert assessment, with importance given to the
criterion of self-identification.
Each state in India has its own ST list besides the central list, and the states issue ST
certificates to these people. There is inconsistency between both lists. In addition, the
civil society of India have comforting and amazing myths about the tribes such as the
tribes being primitive, simple, cheerful, colorful, having exotic dance, music, free sex
and youth dormitories. Heart-breaking poverty, ignorance, disease, exploitation, land
alienation identity crisis etc. are the bitter realities that stand silently behind these
myths.
Community is the term which is more familiar in the development discourse. With
the growth of participatory research approaches, the effect of participation on commu-
nitymembers and the involvement of communitymembers in the ongoing development
project or action-oriented project becomes a subject of theoretical and of empirical im-
portance as it gives space for testing and helping the stakeholders to move into reality.
According to Govinda and Diwan (2003), community is obviously not a homogenous no-
tion. It is either various communities unequally and differently placed within a society
or various groups in a community unequally placed. Community could be viewed in two
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different perspectives: (1) local class-caste composition and (2) elected representatives,
where their class composition influences the nature of involvement as well as the natu-
re of conflict arising from such involvement. By implication, community participation
has also to be viewed in a localized manner (2003, 14). It is acutely important to note
that often what is considered a community is composed of hierarchically placed une-
qual groups. Special provisions and safeguards for SCs and STs have been guaranteed
constitutionally using the word community liberally in all the constitution’s articles.The
certificate issued to the individuals who belong to these communities is also known as
the community certificate in administrative records.These certificates are important to
avail of government programmes and benefits.
Community Nomenclature and Legal Implications
Attempts were made over a period of time by certain persons belonging to nontribal
communities to claim tribal status, on the assertion that their community is synony-
mous with a tribal group specified in the notification or that their tribe is subsumed in
a tribe specifically notified. The nomenclatures of the communities of such applicants
were similar to those of designated STs, often with a tribal prefix or suffix. Decisions
of the Supreme Court, in this regard, laid down that the entries contained in the SC or
the ST order have to be taken as they stand and no evidence can be put forward either
to interpret or to explain those entries.
A community not specifically listed as an ST cannot lay claim to inclusion, either on
the basis of a similarity of nomenclature or by contending that the tribe in question is
subsumedwithin a designated ST. In the State ofMaharashtra, the State Legislature en-
acted theMaharashtra Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), Denotified Tribes,
(VimuktaJatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes (OBC) and Special Backward
Category (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of) Caste Certificate Act, 2000. The
act has now made statutory provisions for the verification and scrutiny of caste claims
by competent authorities and subsequently by Caste Scrutiny Committees. It creates
offences and provides for disqualifications and for the withdrawal of benefits granted
on the basis of false caste certificates.
The Supreme Court issued directions in Madhuri Patil’s case, laying down the pro-
cedure that must be followed for the issuance of caste certificates for their scrutiny and
approval. The Supreme Court directed the constitution of a committee and included
an anthropologist who has an intimate knowledge in identifying tribes and tribal com-
munities. The Supreme Court further provided for the constitution of a Vigilance Cell.
The vigilance inquiry entails a visit by the Inspector of Police attached to the Cell to the
original place fromwhich the candidate hails for the collection of all relevant data along
with the anthropologist. When a section of the society has started asserting themselves
as tribes and tried to earn the concession and facilities reserved for the STs, the tricks
are common, and inclusion, therefore,must be judged on a legal and ethnological basis.
Spurious tribes have become a threat to the genuine tribes.
The Cell should also examine the parent, guardian or the candidate in relation to
their caste etc. or such other persons who have knowledge of the social status of the
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candidate and then submit a report to the Directorate together with all particulars as
envisaged in the pro forma, in particular, of the STs relating to anthropological and
ethnological traits, kinship structure, deity, rituals, customs, mode of marriage, life
cycle ceremonies, method of burial of dead bodies etc. by the castes or tribes or tribal
communities concerned etc. These directions clearly establish that the nature of the
inquiry in regard to the claim of a candidate to belong to a ST is not merely to be
confined to an examination of the birth and the school records and of documentary
evidence but would involve an investigation of the affinity of the candidate with a tribe,
or as the case may be, tribal community.
Thus, the process of verification of caste and tribe claims governed by the judgment
of the Supreme Court in Madhuri Patil involved an inquiry not merely into the docu-
mentary materials on the basis of which the caste claim is founded but equally on veri-
fying the claim with reference to the affinity of the candidate with a designated ST.The
inquiry would comprehend within its purview anthropological and ethnological traits.
The Committee would be entitled to inquire into whether the applicant has established
an affinity with the tribe. The affinity test that comprehends all these aspects is, the-
refore, not extraneous to the process of identifying whether the applicant is a genuine
member of a tribe or an impostor fraudulently claiming the benefits of a reservation to
which s/he is not entitled. Benefits secured on the basis of a false Caste Certificate are
to be withdrawn.
The Caste Scrutiny Committee is a quasi-judicial body. It has been set up for a spe-
cific purpose. It serves a social and constitutional purpose. It is constituted to prevent
fraud on the constitution. It may not be bound by the provisions of Indian Evidence Act,
but it would not be correct for the Superior Court to issue directions as to how it should
appreciate evidence. Evidence to be adduced in a matter before a quasi-judicial body
cannot be restricted to admission of documentary evidence only. It may be necessary
to take oral evidence. Moreover, the nature of evidence to be adduced would vary from
case to case. The right of a party to adduce evidence cannot be curtailed. It is one thing
to say how a quasi-judicial body should appreciate evidence adduced before it in law
but it is another thing to say that it must not allow adduction of oral evidence at all.
In the compilation that has been placed on record by the state government, reliance
is placed on the written work of anthropologists in support of the submission that the
application of the affinity test is an invaluable aid in determining whether an applicant
belongs to a ST. A monograph by Prof. R. K.Mutatkar (2019), Honorary Professor of An-
thropology at the University of Pune, entitled ‘Tribal Identity: Policy Issues’ is instructive.
The monograph states that government of India has recommended that the following







VII. Shyness of nature; and
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VIII. Backwardness. In socio-economic terms. This is defined by poverty, social status
and access to resources.
The monograph notes that due to contact with the outside world and the effort to draw
tribal communities into the democratic political process, movements towards accultur-
ations have been taking place. However, the author states that “acculturation does not
destroy the hard core of culture which is manifested in their rituals, beliefs, ceremonies
and festivals, in the dialect, and in music and dance.” Prof. Mutatkar says,
“When a nontribal group or a caste group with similar nomenclature or with tribal suf-
fix or prefix to their name claim tribal status, they are not only harming the interest of a
tribal groupwithwhom they are trying to identify by putting up a tribal claim, but they
are also harming the interest of all tribes in the State and the country, since the ben-
efits of Scheduled Tribe are bestowed according to the generic category of Scheduled
Tribe and not according to a specific tribal group. The pseudo tribal group, therefore,
nullifies the constitutional guarantees of all the Scheduled Tribes in a State and the
country.”
Though the legal intervention proposed theoretical practices done through the produc-
tion of texts and reflexive discourse, a great deal of contemporary activism is constituted
by experimental, reflexive, critical knowledge practices, but application at the ground
level has not percolated in this direction. Monotony has set in, keeping the above tradi-
tional anthropological approach.The contemporary tribal issues need application done
largely through producing subjectivities that know, think and do differently.
State Level Scrutiny Committee and District Vigilance Committee
in Tamil Nadu: A Case Study
Pursuant to the orders issued in Civil Appeal No.5854/94 dated 2.9.94 of the Supreme
Court of India in KumariMadhuri Patil and another –Vs-Additional Commissioner, Tri-
bal development and others, all the State Governments have constituted District Level
Vigilance Committees and State Level Scrutiny Committees to verify the genuineness
of the Community Certificates issued to SC/ST and Other Backward Class and issued
guidelines for the functioning of those committees.
In order to protect the welfare of the genuine SC/ST people from the false claimants,
the governments have been examining the matter to frame suitable guidelines based
on the guidelines issued by Supreme Court of India to suit the conditions prevailing in
Tamil Nadu, so that it couldwork in a systematicmannerwithout facing any difficulty in
its implementation. In supersession of the orders and guidelines issued on the subject,
the government decided and ordered a modification the constitution of the above two
committees as well as their functions periodically through many Government Orders
(G.O.s).
Keeping the Supreme Court direction, the state government coordinated with the
then Head of the Department of Anthropology, University of Madras and requested it
nominate an anthropologist to function as a member in the committees. Expertise in
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the subject and the anthropologist residing within the state were taken as major crite-
ria, and names were recommended to the government. To begin with, it was considered
a great privilege for the anthropologist, and it was considered an honour to the sub-
ject as a whole, but the amount of work or pending cases was underestimated by the
academician. No doubt it provided great space for engaged anthropology by providing
theoretical practical knowledge.
Anthropologists were using their understanding about the culture of various com-
munities of Tamil Nadu and played a crucial role in determining the community iden-
tity. The entire process of work also required some strong basic knowledge on Positive
Discrimination Policy, caste structure and stratification principles, constitutional cate-
gorization of communities and cultural understanding of the local people.
The chairman of the committee mostly depended on anthropologists and provided
a great space to them in the process of identifying genuine beneficiary. However, at the
same time, the traditional anthropologist who believed in intensive field work objected
to the process and wanted to convert the work to project mode. The enormity of the
pending files in all the districts and cases before the court of law for its final judgments,
caste politics and ultimately the administrative pressure forced the authorities to clear
the files at a maximum speed.
To begin with, the District Vigilance Committee (DVC), consisting of the District
Collector as a Chairman, the Adi-Dravidar Welfare Officer as a member secretary, and
the anthropologist as a member, was authorized to take up both SC and ST cases at the
district level. The State Level Scrutiny Committee (SLSC) has been kept as the appellant
committee and given some space for the aggrieved and those classified as not genui-
ne members to lean to before seeking legal help. Later, due to intervention of Madras
High Court, the G.O. was modified and laid down new classifications to avoid certain
problems. All the SC cases were dealt with by the DVC), but court cases coming to go-
vernment before the 9th month, 2007 were asked to clear by the DVC.The G.O. has been
interpreted differently and created some confusion at the district level. Once again, new
G.O.s clarified everything, and this clarification activated the DVC to finish all the pen-
ding cases. These two committees created greater impact in state affairs and discussed
its modalities with high level administrative committees all the time. Importance was
raised, and the state government wanted to update the process and constantly assess
it. This pressure ultimately led to more opportunity for anthropologists to intervene in
the process of identity through culture patterns.
The Supreme Court of India found in Kumari MadhuriPatil and another –Vs- Ad-
ditional Commissioner case that there were no guidelines for issuance and verification
of community certificates. The Supreme Court has therefore given 15 guidelines for
issuance and verification of community certificates. In those guidelines, all the state
governments should formulate State Level Scrutiny Committee (SLSC) and District Vi-
gilance Level Cell (DVLC). The government of Tamil Nadu formulated SLSC to verify
the genuineness of issued community certificates from the revenue authorities to the
ST community. Similarly, DVLCs in all districts should verify the genuineness of issued
community certificates from the revenue authorities to the SC and OBC communities.
In both committees, the chairman and the member secretary verify the documents and
the anthropologist verifies the cultural aspect of the community claim.
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Anthropologists were nominated by the then professor and head of the Department
of Anthropology,University ofMadras, in 2005, as amember toDVC. Later during 2008,
I was nominated to the SLSC as a member by the state government and a government
order was passed. Participating in the committee and interviewing the respondent had
given me a great understanding about existing community problems, their cognitive
perception about identity and the attitude of our administrators, particularly the com-
munity certificate issuing authorities in Tamil Nadu. The total SC cases so far handled
by the committee throughout the districts of Tamil Nadu were nearly 3000 from its in-
ception in the year 2005. Similarly, the total ST cases would be not less than 2500. The
qualitative data received from the interviewees helped me to draw some broad inter-
pretations.
The major complaints or complications for the SC communities were conversion
and inter caste marriages. In Tamil Nadu, Dalit convert to Christianity or Muslims are
treated only as Backward Class (BC) and are not allowed to enjoy the reservation be-
nefits assigned to Hindu SCs. Coming to the most crucial aspect of the paper was the
problem of STs. The Tamil Nadu government has identified some of the ST commu-
nities as ‘Controversial Communities’ as their cultural identity has not been justified
with the existing documental evidence. On the other hand, their identities have hard-
ly been documented either administratively or academically. The nomenclatures were
wrongly documented in the administrative records. The anthropological interventions
were given at two levels. One is at the individual level where the anthropologist sits in
the committee and facilitates the committee in supplementing cultural factors in iden-
tifying the person as ‘genuine’. The second one is asking the anthropologist to do a spot
enquiry after receiving an ethnographic profile of a community. Such reports played a
major role at both the administrative level and the legal level. At the same time, slowly,
they were subject to criticisms due to variations in writing and the final decisions.
Case
The community by the name “Kurumans” and the association fought for about two de-
cades to prove their identity. The name is included in the state list of STs. The task has
been assigned tomany anthropologists whowere playing a role as amember inDVC and
SLSC. Some categorised them as a tribe and some as a caste. Different interpretations
reflected an impact on the community and forced the people to seek legal and adminis-
trative intervention. Finally, the following empirical interpretations substantiated the
argument to prove the community as an ST.
• It is to be noted that a community KURUMBA is included in the list of Backward
Class (BC) throughout the state of Tamil Nadu and KURUMBAR in the list of Most
Backward Classes (MBC) throughout the state of Tamil Nadu and the KURUMANS
in the list of Scheduled Tribes of Tamil Nadu are one and the same.
• Again, it is also to be noted that popular ethnographer Thurston and Rangachari
(1909) stated that advanced KURUMBAS are usually shepherds and weavers
of coarse woolen blankets (from the hair of sheep). Further, E. Thurston also
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mentioned that the KURUMANS were originally identical with the shepherds
KURUMBAS and their present separation is merely the result of their isolation in
the vastnesses of the Western Ghats, to which their ancestors fled, or gradually
retreated after the downfall of the KURUMBA dynasty.
• The above-mentioned statements and arguments reveal the truth that KURUMBA
or KURUMBAR are the synonym names of the KURUMANS. Throughout Tamil-
nadu, as Dr. Jakka Parthasarathy, Director Tribal Research Centre, Government of
Tamil Nadu (31st December, 2001) observed, there are no separate communities in
the names of KURUMBAR or KURUMBA. He further stressed the important obser-
vation that the KURUMBAS/KURUMBA (S) of Nilgiris District are ethnographically
different from KURUMBA, KURUMBAR and KURUMANS.
• Some of the male members of the KURUMANS in the districts of Vellore, Dharma-
puri, Krishnagiri, Salem and also in the taluk of Thirupattur had the habit of suffix-
ing the title, GOUNDER to their names. K. S. Singh (1994: 662) has aptly mentioned
that ‘the term KURUMAN means one who tends sheep. Gounder is an honorific ti-
tle which they have adapted in recent years’. For this reason, the Kurumans are also
referred to by others as KURUMAN GOUNDER.
• KURUMBAGOUNDERS are different when comparedwith KURUMANGOUNDER.
KURUMBA GOUNDERS are Tamil speaking cultivators, usually found in the Kongu
Nadu districts of Tamil Nadu such as Erode, Coimbatore, Karur and Tirupur in
Tamil Nadu. They do not have any marital relationship with KURUMANS of Tamil
Nadu. KURUMBA GOUNDARS have affiliation with KONGU VELLALAR Commu-
nity, categorized in ‘OTHER BACKWARD CLASS (OBC)’ of Tamil Nadu State.
• The ethnographic study on the community names such as KURUMBAN and KU-
RUMBAR cannot do separately because they are synonym names to KURUMANS.
Hence that KURUMA, KURUMBA, KURUMBAR, KURUMAN GOUNDAR are the
synonym names of KURUMAN or KURUMANS (No. 18 of ST list of Tamil Nadu)
a Scheduled Tribe in Tamil Nadu.
The following anthropological interpretations were accepted by the SLSC and the pro-
cess of identity took place accordingly. The Kurumbar and Kurumanare one and the
same and their culture is very much tribal in nature. The above experience is evidence
that anthropologists are involved in different forms of engagements. They seek to play
a normative role by following basic anthropological thinking and not crossing basic
boundaries that understands the culture holistically, using the appropriate methodolo-
gical tools and analytical approaches.
Thus, what we see is the expansiveness of these processes of reclassification becom-
ing increasingly aligned with new domains of neoliberal power, requiring us to develop
innovative approaches towards understanding the complexities through which various
modalities continue to be negotiated within domains of personhood (academician) and
power (administrators). Anthropologists are expected to deliver reports and recommen-
dations in a much more rapid and accessible manner. Furthermore, those could be
scientific but still simple and communicable. As a result, anthropological interventi-
on could be more relevant, problem solving and receive less criticism. Such engaged
anthropology creates an obligation of a particularly pressing sort of on the spot decisi-
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ons and could be termed as beyond an intellectual recognition in the process of identity
claim. The process expects to deliver the outcome on a genuine or not genuine claim
and is of open-ended epistemology.
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Continuity and change: Transformations in the urban
history of Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Thomas Kolnberger (Luxembourg)
In simple terms, transformation is the process that occurs when something changes
from one state to another. Irrespective of the definitional nuances in urban and rural
research, there is consensus that such events are complex and ongoing. To disentangle
the factors and drivers from the outcomes and features, this paper’s conceptual ap-
proach differentiates between the transitional process, or the “flow”, and the “status”,
which refers to the existing state of affairs at a specific time in the past. My histori-
cal analysis, however, in the guise of snapshots, presents several in-between stages in
Phnom Penh’s urban development status with particular reference to its urban mor-
phology.
This angle prioritizes long-term historical and slowly evolving structures as longue
durée over a big leap forward into Modernity. This priority also seeks to counter the
identification of continuity rather than change − a widespread occupational hazard to
which historians are prone. Empirical evidence mostly points to persistency and resi-
lience; consequently, if changes do occur, they do not necessarily reflect progress but
modifications at best. Implicitly, however, “transformation” is still associated with pro-
gress (development, growth, evolution, improvement or forward-movement), which is
the paradigm ofmodernization as a model of an advancing transition from “pre-modern”
or traditional to “modern societies” (Knöbl, 2003).
The path Phnom Penh − Cambodia’s current capital − took to modernity, understood
here as our contemporary (hyper)modern times, was neither a history of progress nor
straight forward (Eisenstadt, 2003; Chandler, 2000). Events, whose scope was unpre-
cedented, triggered profound changes, altering both the urban landscape (the physi-
cal side) and the urbanity (the urban life) of the Lower Mekong metropole. Not only
the vicissitudes of Phnom Penh’s relatively short 150-year history, but also Cambodia’s
general settlement history raises the question: What is rural and what is urban? This
question is especially relevant for one of this collective volume’s guidelines, namely pro-
viding a regional framework. “Western” scholarly concepts of “the city,” particularly the
sharp contrast between urban and rural areas, are often not appropriate for Southe-
ast Asia.Historically, this academic binarity is used in terms of rural transitions, which
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are repeatedly compared to the economic transformation from agricultural to indus-
trial economies as witnessed in many parts of nineteenth century Europe and across
Asia and Latin America in the twentieth century. In view of the ever-intensifying links
between urban and rural areas in contemporary Southeast Asia, the question needs to
be raised whether a centrifugal, outward-bound urbanization sprawl or a centripetal
inward-bound “ruralization to semi-urban space” is at work – or even both trajectories
simultaneously. To understand the region’s complexities and long-term evolutions, one
needs to take a step back to the heydays of the Khmer Empire.
Before Phnom Penh: Angkor and wandering residential towns
Recent comparative archaeological research revealed that “Greater Angkor, at its peak,
was […] the world’s most extensive preindustrial low-density urban complex” (Evans et
al., 2007: 14280). Between the ninth and fifteenth centuries AD, a vast cumulative sett-
lement landscape emerged north-east of the Tonle Sap, the great nutrition-rich inland
lake in the Cambodian lowlands.
Two concomitant changes gave rise to a polynuclear settlement pattern covering
approximately 1,000 square kilometers: the largescale rice agriculture and the imple-
mentation of a sacral kingdom as the realm’s political frame. Canals crisscrossed this
landscape dotted with water reservoirs, which also had intensifying and extending sett-
lement areas. Greater Angkor was a hydraulic city designed to attract as many settlers
as possible through its wide-ranging irrigation works that allowed stable agrarian pro-
duction around residential complexes containing palaces and a temple mountain as the
spiritual center. Angkor Thom (literally the “Great City”), with its central, late twelfth
century temple district of AngkorWat, was the last and most enduring walled capital in
the history of the Khmer empire (Higham, 2001; Coe, 2003). Time and again, the great
kings relocated their royal residence to renew their symbolic power and to expand their
network of local temples, ponds, and durable agricultural space with symmetrical moat-
and-mound complexes as the distinctive spatial structure. Despite all these man-made
irrigation efforts, the local agriculture’s backbone is still to this day low-density, rain-
fed rice growing in small bunded fields (paddy-rice without irrigation), with dry rice
(or upland rice) used as a supplement, as well as flood-retreat and floating rice farming
(Delvert, 1961; Martin, 1981; Grubauer and Golzio, 2008). The design and construction
of this kind of extensive (agri)cultural environment did not – and still does not – re-
quire centralized planning under the guidance of a masterplan that an elite-appointed
authority implements. By adapting to the microgeographical conditions and involving
the local traditions, Cambodia’s rural-urban agro-landscape evolved bottom-up and at
a local level rather than top-down. This persistent structure of small-scale farmers and
labor-intensive production made modernization difficult. Today, high investment cost
and the abundance of “industrious hands” are impeding mechanization while the tra-
ditional practice of planting gluten-rich paddy rice prevails. Most Cambodian farmers
are smallholders with less than two hectares per household, of which 75% is devoted to
rice. A slow transformation only takes place in fertilization and diversifying crops (high-
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yield rice varieties or vegetables, see Eliste and Zorya, 2015). Technically speaking, little
has changed in the rice farming communities since the days of Angkor.
Whatever caused the demise or collapse of the old Khmer empire (there is as yet
no ultimate explanation), the reasons were definitely not monocausal. It is generally
accepted that, in the sixteenth century, the Khmer kings left the Angkor region due to
political and socio-economic reasons. Their motives included the cyclical rise and fall
of competing regional overlords and grandee families, who vied with the central king-
dom to control the labor and the ongoing conflicts with neighboring powers (i.e. Siam,
Champa, and Dai Viet). Ecological impact and shifts in global trade are also frequently
mentioned. New capitals were founded farther south-east: Basan/Bashan (in Chinese
sources) was the capital between 1431/34 and 1525/30, followed by Longvek (1525/30-1593),
Srei Santhor (1594-1620), Udong, twice (1620-58 and 1794-1863/65), and other short-lived
ones like Bà Phnom (Caturmukh – literally the “four faces” in Khmer), including a brief
return to Angkor. Phnom Penh (from 1865) was the last in this series of capitals (Khin,
1991; Golzio, 2007, 2011; Wolters, 1966).
When the Khmer court moved to the south-western part of the lowland, the king’s
residence also reproduced the cosmic geography, but on a much smaller scale. Its loca-
tion at the confluence of four rivers and the associated phenomenon of the Tonle Sap
River’s annual reversed flow made the place a holy site. While it is difficult to always
reconstruct the exact location and timeframe, historical records (some of which are fic-
titious) point to at least four royal residences located around this exceptional site: Lovea
Em, Koh Slaket, Koh Khlok (whose position wasmore upstream along theMekong), and
Phnom Penh (Mak, 1995). After each of these relocations, the royal capital needed to be
re-rooted.The palace and royalwat (Buddhist temple) were placed at the crossing of two
visual axes,which determined the world’s symbolic focus,with a third, the spiritual cos-
mic axis, raised to connect Heaven and Earth. Similar to a village headman leading his
clan to establish a new settlement, the king too had to delineate the royal domain and
erect his palace. Topographical considerations and ceremonies performed by the divine
monarch (devaraja) and by commoners influenced the location of the built environment
at sites with good practical and spiritual energy. On these grounds, the perfect spot for
a royal residence, which a ritual specialist determined, could become the entire state’s
political gravitation point. This galactic or solar polity represented the geometric con-
nection between the microcosm (city, temple, home) and the macrocosm (the eternal)
in cardinal orthogonality. Space, especially the urban form, was designed to mimic the
cosmos as a hierarchical example of the secular order on earth (see Figure 1).
These royal towns were river-port polities, similar to other land-locked port ci-
ties of peninsular Southeast Asia, such as Ayutthaya and early Thonburi/Bangkok
(Kathirithamby-Wells and Villiers, 1990). Like these cities, the Cambodian post-
Angkorian emporia were created to secure more effective control of local and long-
distance trading patterns, small-scale production, monopolies, and taxes. The si-
gnificance of the single Central Place (the royal residence) as the political, cultural,
economic, and military center of the kingdom remained unchanged, but the port
cities lacked a wider rural hinterland and the old Khmer empire’s centripetal force.
There is also evidence that both the central and the local plans continued to shape
the residential areas’ building activities and the hard infrastructure, which refers to
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Figure 1: Locating the right spot for the royal capital; Left side: Location and approx. outline of
the early post-Angkorian capitals (O)Udong and Longvek North-West of Phnom Penh. The Holy
Mountain represents the spiritual navel of the world.Right side:Phnom Penh in the 1860s at the
Les Quatre Bras (Caturmukh), the confluence of four river arms. The monsoon regime causes the
annual flow reversal of the Tonle Sap River.
Source: Author’s own draft based on Mikaelian (2009) and plans of the National Archives of Cam-
bodia
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the fundamental facilities that allowed these capitals to function. If Angkor’s urban
complex could be said to feature the “designs of kings and farmers” (Hawken, 2013),
then Phnom Penh tells the construction history of kings and farmers, colonial officers
and “colonized” city dwellers, “irrealsocialist de-urbanizers,” and, more recently, of
politically well-connected developers, squatters, and urban newcomers (Kolnberger,
2014a, 2015a; cf. Mikaelian, 2009; Tambiah, 1977; Malville and Gujral, 2000; Népote,
1973).
Phnom Penh and French rule
In 1863, the kingdom became a protectorate of France. After the court’s move from
Udong to the “quatre bras” (four arms in French) in 1865/66, Phnom Penh became the
king’s (re)new(ed) royal seat. In general, royal Khmer cities of the post-Angkorian time
had two distinct major morphological districts: the palace quarter and the civil town.
In and around the palace, the king’s extensive family and his retainers formed a royal
household and royal administration housed in a compact and concentric arrangement
of buildings. In contrast, the commoners settled in linear-type “civil lines.” In Phnom
Penh, the civil town stretched mainly along the banks of the Tonle Sap River. Various
social mechanisms and the physical characteristics of the plots of land buttressed the
royal town’s dual character. Royal rule and sovereignty were based on a physical inner
circle, with the king as the pater familias: one could gain – or lose – everything by being
close to the king.
To create an appropriate space, ditches, drainage canals, and retention basins ensu-
red that the palatial-sacral complex’s location was flood-proof, which provided valuable
building lots. The “civil town” housed the commercial district – “Cambodia’s bazaar,” as
visitors disparagingly described it. A compact formation, similar to that of the palace,
emerged around the main market. In this perennial town concept, there was no strict
division between the urban and the rural. Agricultural production surrounded radial-
ly the small urban core and most houses along the river front(s) had kitchen gardens
and smaller (horticultural) provision grounds (chamcar) (see Figure 2). They provided
the local markets with victuals and other goods (e.g. silk or spices). Cambodia’s once
single urban area not only serves, but also relies on its proximity to rural production.
This pattern of cultivation in concentric rings or belts around a single city center recalls
a tropical version of von Thünen’s model, which is based on agricultural land use and
transportation cost. As was typical of a royal residence and its function as a center of
consumption and redistribution, the workshops of craftsmen, who were purveyors to
the court, were concentrated here, close to a high density of regular customers.
In the 1860s to 1880s, the town remained a very modest settlement, despite being
the Protectorate’s capital and royal residence, consisting mainly of two long rows of
wooden dwellings (the Grand Rue) along one of the two parallel NE-SW-routes, which
merchants and the king’s followers mostly used. Phnom Penh’s urban landscape had
a pronounced elongated layout with liminal-aquatic characteristics. The houses, most
on stilts, were lined up on natural or artificial elevations and causeways, surrounded
by flowing or standing (or stagnant) water. Annual changes in the monsoon climate
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were responsible for an extreme hydraulic regime, causing the periodically rising or
falling profile of a typical tidal town and its urban wetlands (Kolnberger, 2014a: 49, 92f.;
Molyvann, 2003).
Figure 2: House plot and rice fields: topographical land use map and terrain profile
(ideal-typical)
Source: Author’s own draft
Legend:
(A) the phum or village, a Khmer expression which designates any inhabited land re-
gardless of size, form or ethnic composition, is aligned along an all-weather road with
ditches. Houses are not to be sited on the centre of the plot (i.e. the “navel of the land” or
phchet phum) for (a) ritual precaution and for (b) practical reasons because construc-
tions need to be above the seasonal high flood of running and standing waters. The
linear drainage of the road provides some additional protection.
(B) the wat (the Buddhist temple and monastery) with a beng (pond, natural or artifi-
cial) and its sacral enclosure.
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(1)   the rice fields (sre) along a prek riverbed that seasonally fills and flows after suffici-
ent rain fall and/or after overflow water has entered from the main riverbed. Here, the
village people have extended this prek with cut-off canals for better irrigation.
(2)   the house plot east of the road offers terrain for riparian market gardens (cham-
car), eventually, or small rice fields (flood-retreat farming). Hand-irrigation during dry
season (monsoon low tide) is facile. For this reason, the plots west of the road are dis-
advantaged during that season.
(3)   secondary dirt roads and foot trails
(4)   the all-weather road bordered by ditches for drainage. Rural road networks are the
life-lines for the country side. To border on a segment of it is like having a shop window
for displaying goods and services (often an extra vendor hut is set up beside the road).
(5)   a prek is in most cases a human-made canal, having been dug by locals (here with
high and low watermarks) to extend the annual inundation in a controlled manner.
(6)   the river with high water and low water level and flooding zone.
 
Over the next decades until the years between the World Wars, the kernel of a compact
city with a denser and more rectilinear layout began to emerge (see Figure 3).The river-
banks were stabilized to secure the waterfront, thus creating a straight-lined building
frontage, a main causeway, and a river harbor site, while land reclamations progres-
sively formed a flat, artificial platform, used as a site to build a tropical French town.
“Polderization” – the complete drainage of square-shaped fields, unusual in the Khmer
building tradition, provided more building sites. This land was porous enough to ab-
sorb heavy precipitation, which the paved surfaces that the colonial power had started
constructing, could not (Pierdet, 2008). From the mid-1880s, the French colonial admi-
nistration planned and executed hydraulic modernization by digging a U-shaped canal
(the “Canal de P[h]nom-Penh” or “Canal intérieur” completed in 1894, but, like most of
the inner-city watercourses, only filled later) around the northern part to demarcate
the “white” colonial city. Most of the colonial administration’s buildings and the civil
ones were concentrated here. This quarter also housed the “respectable” part of the Eu-
ropean colonial society. Typical of Western colonialism, Phnom Penh became a dual city
with two urban foci: the palace and the “white” administrative town. In between, a third
center emerged − the market area.
To the south, a trench separated the well-designed central market area. Fueled by
capital and investment from Indochina and other parts of Asia, this market became
the pulsating economic heart of the city and of the Protectorate. Inhabitants with a
Chinese background dominated in this quarter, whereas, further south, a mixed court
society of – in the ethnic nomenclatura of the period – “Cambodians” (meaning eth-
nic Khmer; “Cambodia” is an anglicization of the French “Cambodge,” which in turn is
the French transliteration of the Khmer-word “Kampuchea”), Sino-Khmers, Europeans,
Chinese (all southern Chinese dialect groups), Vietnamese (“Annamites”), Siamese, Fi-
lipinos, Laotians, and Cham-Malays built their settlements around the king’s palace.
The percentage of Europeans never surpassed 1.5% of the urban population. Phnom
Penh, with its approximately 30,000 inhabitants during last two decades of the nine-
teenth century, represented a somewhat plural society by encompassing different com-
munities with unrelated cultural backgrounds in a dual colonial city, whosemarketplace
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Figure 3: The “rectification” of a Khmer royal city
Source: Author’s draft based on National Archives of Cambodia (NAC), Résident Supérieur du
Cambodge (RSC): Projet d’alignement de la Ville de Pnum Penh, NAC/RSC 24126, 1898 and Avant-
projet de protection des berges du Tonlé Sap – Défense de la rive droite au droit du Palais du Roi,
NAC/RSC 10246/2-4, 1876.
grew into the dominant organizing force for the division of labor (Furnivall, 1980; Mul-
ler, 2006: 59). Notwithstanding this diversity, common bonds did exist and the French
began a process of social engineering by restructuring the Khmer regime’s urban foun-
dation as a new French colonial one. In keeping with the zoning plans, Phnom Penh
and the other sub-central places of colonial Cambodia (residences of the district admi-
nistration) were planned as compact cities with an orthogonal layout, a high residential
density, and mixed land uses (Sreang, 2004). Nations can be “imagined”, states cannot;
the state had to be materially engineered. To improve the colonial presence, a city-cum-
roads scheme was launched in Phnom Penh and later expanded to impose a physical
French presence on the entire Protectorate (Edwards, 2006; Del Testa, 1999).
The equifinal layout of the colonial capital
On paper, French municipal authorities planned as they did in France. In Cambodia,
the French urbanization process was Janus-faced. On the one hand, the colonial go-
vernment turned a blind eye to some spontaneous, “illegal” settlements, also deliber-
ately refraining from developing specific spaces. On the other hand, other areas – es-
pecially the inner-city parts – were closely monitored. Two planning agendas were at
work: (1) spontaneous building, which aggregated into a morphological order similar
to the (2) French officials’ mapped city planning. Together, these agendas formed an
orthogonal city tissue. However, the spontaneous (indigenous) building activity “from
below” excluded, directed, and partially impeded the (French) plans “from above”. Capi-
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tal-intensive engineering (e.g. canals, large-scale landfills, and drainage) that the very
same town authority had provided, ensured an attractive building site for spontaneous
settlements.
Development costs played a major role, because construction work was difficult and
expensive in swampy areas; however, the people who had lived there for years or deca-
des greatly facilitated the city’s official extension.The French authorities could not forgo
these half-ready prepared grounds and decided to specifically develop these areas in or-
der to save infrastructural costs and to demonstrate order by rebuilding quarters that
had originally been considered out of reach. The reality of Phnom Penh’s street mor-
phology emerged from two contingent practices in an equifinal way to form a slightly
irregular checker-board composite.
By establishing zones of higher or lower control, the French reproduced their patch-
work of direct and indirect rule over the colony on a smaller scale in Phnom Penh.
Their colonial government only shared overlord-ship with the Khmer king at the very
beginning, before mounting a colonial coup d’état by threating military action in 1884
(Osborne, 1997). The timing of this coup was no coincidence, as France – the coloni-
al homeland – witnessed a concurrent shift to even more direct state rule, also using
land registration to achieve this. Before the French intervention, land had formally be-
longed to the king as the “lord of all the lands and water”. However, the people could
enjoy the right of possession if they publicly demonstrated that they were cultivating
the adjacent land, building houses, fencing off plots, and generally occupying the land
continuously and peacefully. In contrast, in the French period, all immovable property
had to be registered in the cadastre in order to be legal (Kleinpeter, 1937; Land Law of
Cambodia, 2003; Hel, 2008). Spatial micromanagement became a key factor in the en-
forcement of government power while land and concessions became the key-resource in
the colony’s urban economy (Slocomb, 2010) – and part of the kingdom’s contradictory
modernization (Korff, 2010a).
“Perle de l’Extrême-Orient”: Independence and the reign of Sihanouk
(1953-1970)
In colonial times, Phnom Penh was unquestionably the Protectorate’s primary city, alt-
hough the town only ranked as a secondary metropole within French Indochina’s urban
hierarchy. On becoming the capital of an independent nation-state in 1953/54, Phnom
Penh’s domestic position as the disproportionately largest and most important muni-
cipality in the kingdom increased rapidly. Typical of newly decolonized metropoles, the
city’s (regular) population peaked after a sharp upswing at more than half a million
just 20 years later. During the 60-year French colonial era, the population growth had
been slow and only very gradual as Phnom Penh’s population was around 42,000 in
1904, rising to approximately 100,000 in the last years before independence in 1953/54.
In the 1950s and 1960s, Phnom Penh also became more khmerized, due to the growing
share of native Cambodians − mainly the influx of newcomers from the countryside −
which increased from 46% in 1912 to 62% in 1959. The 20% Chinese (28% in 1912) and
17% Vietnamese (24% in 1912) formed the next two largest ethnic urban groups (Koln-
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berger, 2014a: 534; CAS, 2009). Phnom Penh’s expansion was, however, an indicator of
the continuous imbalance in the country’s development; in other words, the persisten-
cy of a single, progressive/privileged urban core and a lagging rural periphery. Over 90
percent of Cambodia’s total population (5.7 million in 1962) lived in the countryside. A
similar persistence also applied to the urbanization:The resumption of the French grand
scheme characterized the urban planning “polderization”, especially the waterfronts of
the Tonle Sap and Bassac Rivers, on one hand, and the spontaneous and planned buil-
ding activities that extended the existing street grid, on the other hand. During the first
Sihanouk (1955 to 1970) administration decades, known as Sangkum, Phnom Penh chan-
ged its appearance significantly from a “vegetal” to a “mineral” city. Reinforced concrete
(a French invention) became the construction material of choice, while the Cambodi-
an version of the Chinese shophouse (narrow, multi-storied buildings, facing the main
streets with a single multifunctional room for business on the ground floor) became the
center’s dominant residential building type.
The building-obsessed king Norodom, abdicating the throne and his sacral office to
become the politically more active prince Sihanouk and flamboyant head of state (1955-
70), improved and beautified his capital with representative edifices and monuments
such as administrative buildings, a new palace (the extensive Chamkar Mon Compound),
and a landmark-building at the river crossing C(h)aturmukh.This catch-up development
of a self-determining state gave rise to a particular modernist-vernacular style, curr-
ently called New Khmer Architecture (Grant Ross and Collins, 2006), as the tangible part
of Cambodia’s Cultures of Independence (Daravuth and Muan, 2001).
With some justification, it can be argued that the French cultivation of a Cambodian
nation in the long shadow of Angkor’s unique heritage and in ethno-political demarcati-
on from their Thai, Vietnamese, and Laotian neighbors, continued as a nation-building
exercise under the aegis of a charismatic leader. After a hopeful start, however, things
turned sour. Despite notable achievements, particularly in respect of infrastructures –
225 km of streets in Phnom Penh alone (Uk, 1975) – and education, the Sihanouk go-
vernment failed in one sensitive key-area: providing sustainable economic growth for
the broader redistribution of income and wealth. As in other postcolonial administrati-
ons in Southeast Asia, Sihanouk had to rally as many retainers behind him as possible,
which inevitably provoked conflicts between rent-seekers and modernist technocrats
(Korff, 2010b). In this crisis, a nepotistic crony socialism (Khatri et al., 2005) emerged,
and Sihanouk rewarded his most loyal retainers with privileges and income, especially
from the pool of lucrative state monopolies. Vann Molyvann’s famous housing projects
at the Bassac River Front, for example, were primarily earmarked for state and city em-
ployees. This socio-political drift was an eerily similar historical déjà-vu of the merging
of state, bureaucracy, and economy under one umbrella − the precolonial palace econo-
my. The unanswered question is still whether this development, if it had overcome the
structural and financial, fiscal and commercial calamity, could have led to a Cambodia
as a newly industrialized country. In retrospect, Sangkum-Cambodia was running out
time − the Vietnam War was increasingly dragging the kingdom into its destructive
orbit.
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The besieged city and refugee camp (1970-1975)
TheFirst IndochinaWar (1946-1954) spared Cambodia.Thiswar of independence against
the French colonial power was mainly fought in Vietnam and decided in the northern
part of the country. The Second Indochina War (Vietnam War, 1955-1975) was different.
Its main theatre of war and insurgency moved to the south and closer to Cambodia –
too close for a non-aligned country to maintain a sideshow position (Shawcross, 1979).
Ultimately, Sihanouk’s seesaw policy between “pro-US” and “pro-Viet Cong” forces with-
in his country and in foreign politics was unable to keep Cambodia out of the conflict.
In 1963, the Prince – now head of state, after abdicating the crown in 1955 – cut the con-
siderable American subsidies (USAID) − the last financial lifeline − which worsened the
political and economic crisis. A palace revolution-cum-military putsch was launched,
which deposed Sihanouk, who left the country. The new self-proclaimed Khmer Repu-
blic (1970-75), realigned with the United States, was short-lived and ruled over an ever-
shrinking territory. In the end, it only held Phnom Penh, which fell on April 17, 1975 to
the Khmer Rouge. During this time, the urban population of Phnom Penh had more
than doubled from around 630,000 in 1969 to around two million in 1975. The city had
become a large refugee site. The only government-initiated construction measure of
this time worth mentioning was a circum-urban dam and causeway, which defined the
municipality’s new outer periphery. It also served as a trench and military demarcation
line. The space within its perimeter soon filled up with refugees from the countryside
fleeing the advancing Khmer Rouge and the US carpet bombing devastation. Parado-
xically, bomber fleets designed to turn cities into rubble now turned the flat agrarian
countryside virtually upside down (the total payload dropped over Cambodia in order
to stop the advance of the Khmer Rouge-guerilla, made Cambodia the probably most
heavily bombed country in history). In the capital’s deceptive safety, the evacuees and
displaced persons practiced dispersed urban self-settlement in open spaces and, in the
center, used the built-up area’s interstices. These people also set up self-settled camps
or formed grouped settlements in concentric densities within the urban fringe, repli-
cating an entire support system in a makeshift economy. Nevertheless, this last island
was finally over-run by the Khmer Rouge, led by the general secretary of the Communist
party of Kampuchea (Cambodia), Pol Pot.
The end of the “city of parasites”
Contrary to the commonly held belief, the Khmer Rouge were neither anti-urban per se,
nor did they practice urbicide, which “entails the destruction of buildings as the consti-
tutive elements of urbanity” (Coward, 2008: 43). Phnom Penh’s physical substance (and
that of the other towns taken) remained untouched with two exceptions: the Catholic
cathedral destroyed as an ideological and anti-colonial statement, while the explosive
charge used to provide entry into the National Bank vault was poorly calculated, dama-
ging the building beyond repair. On the other hand, urbanity, urban life, was brutally
halted. Within days, two million refugees and original residents were forcefully evic-
ted and systematically dispersed over the countryside for the following two reasons.
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First, the relatively small guerrilla force could neither control nor provide for a million-
strong group of people concentrated in one place. Second, besides such practical and se-
curity-related considerations, ideological motives justified the “evacuation”.The Khmer
Rouge leadership thought of this urban population as parasites and the enemy of the
real people. After the final “reboot” of the society, the Khmer Rouge aimed to re-inhabit
the towns with ideologically purified people. “Let’s turn the countryside into a town […
and] he who has rice possesses all” (Locard, 2004: 96; 227) are the two Khmer Rouge
mottos that, besides echoing thoughts of Mao Zedong, encapsulate the crux of their
plans: forced ruralization and the abrupt modernization of agriculture to create a so-
lid base for the extra great leap forward to socialism, industrialization, and unimpeded
progress.The “irrealsocialist planned economy” with collectivization, dam, and irrigati-
on projects failed miserably. People starved, died from diseases, and exhaustion, which
aggravated and intensified the ongoing Khmer Rouge politicide (Clavero, 2008: 113ff; see
Kolnberger, 2014a: 305ff; cf. Locard, 2004; Kiernan, 1996; Bultmann, 2015; 2017).
As for Phnom Penh, following the occupation the urban territory was divided into
zones of influence under various Khmer Rouge fractions, which was never as tight and
streamlined an organization as the Viet Minh/Viet Cong.This initial division was short-
lived, perhaps only existing on paper, and the guerilla movement’s most brutal dog of
war, TaMok, and his “Nirdey” (the group of the North-West Zone) took full control.They
protected Pol Pot and the inner circle of the new regime’s residence and headquarters.
Phnom Penh as capital of Democratic Kampuchea – the new official state name – was
never completely abandoned, but heavily extensified. According to various estimations,
between five and 20 thousand people remained to maintain the basic infrastructure,
form a garrison, and work at some of the production sites (Martin, 1983). The regime’s
most infamous and important “interrogation center”, the Tuol Sleng-Security Prison
(S-21), a transit station to death for more than 18,000 “convicts”, was located in the
southern part of the city and was another reason for people remaining (Chandler, 1999).
Finally, the town functioned as a Potemkin village, the representative stage of the regime
for its very limited diplomatic exchange and carefully selected visitors.
The garrisoned town
The poor supply situation and paranoid purges ravaged the Khmer Rouge’s own rank
and file.Their hypernationalistic ethnic cleansings, particularly against “Vietnamese co-
lonizers”, and their plans to reconquer the Khmer Krom’s historical settlement area, alt-
hough they were then living in the south-western part of Vietnam (Cochinchina), led to a
complete political break with Hanoi. After multiple border skirmishes, troops of the So-
cialist Republic of Vietnam (since 1976) launched an invasion against the Pol Pot regime.
They liberated and occupied most of Cambodia in a swift military operation during the
dry winter monsoon of 1978/79 and pushed the Khmer Rouge, and the population still
under its control, into the highlands. The proclaimed People’s Republic of Kampuchea
(PRK, 1979-1991) became a protectorate of communist Vietnam, while the Khmer Rouge
reverted its tactics to guerrilla warfare once again (during the Cambodian-Vietnamese
War as part of the Third Indochina War, 1975-1989). Following the Vietnamese occupa-
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tion, a half-crescent semi-urbanized ribbon of refugees and military camps formed
along theThai border. During the 1980 and 1990s, the population of these sites, perhaps
300,000 people, constituted the power base of the various civil war parties opposing the
new regime in Phnom Penh (Thibault, 2005). Hostility to the PRK-government, protec-
ted by Vietnam and sponsored by the Soviet Union, was the only common denominator
of the probably weirdest coalition at the end of the Cold War, including the genocidal
Khmer Rouge siding with the imperialistic USA and ‘the West’.
Selected urban spaces and their initially hand-picked population were also themain
resources of the nascent PRK government in Phnom Penh. In support of this original
accumulation of political power, the supreme administrative authorities of the People’s
Republic established their headquarters in the former government district close to the
riverside. Some of the reasons for this move are obvious: the buildings were originally
constructed for such a purpose and the site was also the former prestigious heart of
the city as it included the adjacent National Museum, Palace, and Silver Pagoda (Wat
Preah Keo). It is no coincidence that the most influential figure in present-day Cambo-
dia and the longest-serving head of government, Hun Sen, picked a house facing the
much-admired Independence Monument. Other motives for the choice may be linked
to exception and martial law governing the state. First, the district offered ample scope
for gated communities, which could support each other during a siege or Khmer Rouge
counteroffensive. Second, short distances facilitated communications and minimized
the leaders’ risk of exposure during their meetings. Third, the rest of the slowly resett-
ling city formed a security buffer against the outside, while the inner kernel of political
power became a high-security zone –which is currently still in place.The variousminis-
terial compounds became trading grounds for loyalty, which turned them into gravity
fields for socio-political networks. Initially, the government monitored the repopulati-
on closely, but the process could not be hindered and the capital’s population increased
exponentially from several thousands in 1979 to about half a million in 1988.
With the end of the Cold War, the support for the anti-communist coalition, inclu-
ding the Khmer Rouge, vanished. The Vietnamese left in September 1989. With peace
in sight, and after a transitional phase supervised by the United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC, 1992-1993), the communist economic system was dis-
mantled in favor of the principles of a free market economy in progress. The monarchy
was restored in 1993 (second reign of Norodom Sihanouk), however as a ceremonial
kingdom only. The concentration of power in the office of the king was confined and
all authority remained in the hands of the government established after the UNTAC
sponsored elections. The early 1990s became a period of strategic exploitation and va-
lorization for reasons of profit, and all social strata, from the smallest to the largest
businesses, became involved in the capitalization of landed property. As the direct suc-
cessor of the Communist Party, the CPP (Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party) was the
big winner, particularly after the political clashes in 1997. Its property, initially all its
urban real estate, was officially “privatized” and the party’s capital has surpassed that
of all its political contenders ever since (Kolnberger 2014a: 325ff.; 2015b; Luciolli, 1988;
Gottesman, 2002; Slocomb, 2002; Carrier, 2007).
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Developer playground and the return of the infamous “One Percent”
Cambodia’s endless international and internal armed conflicts had an exceptional so-
cial levelling effect with the state failure, mass mobilization, civil warfare, the Khmer
Rouge’s transformative revolution, the abolition of private property, the Khmer Rouge’s
politicide, ethnic cleansings, and mass starvation effectively deurbanizing the popula-
tion and degrading education. These events made the surviving population more ho-
mogeneous and khmerized than ever before. Income inequality was specifically reduced
(Scheidel, 2017: 231f.). With the need to “camp-in” and share billeted living space gra-
dually diminishing, the Socialist moral economymutated into quick money politics and
political family business, ensuring the hegemonic status of the very few. In the early
1990s, the (re)privatization of property and profits from collective resources separated
the wheat from the chaff in terms of political connections. State and town authorities
had already undertaken a first wave of eviction in the late 1980s, which resumed in wa-
ves in the 1990s and 2000s. According to the UN World Urbanization Prospects (2017),
urban space has become ever scarcer andmore valuable, with the population increasing
fourfold from the 1990s to reach 1.9 million in 2018.
The considerable damage to the infrastructure (especially flood control on the ri-
ver embankments) and housing, due to neglect and small-scale vandalism during the
Khmer Rouge era and subsequently during the first years following their reign of ter-
ror,was repaired and upgraded,mainly during and after the UN-peacekeepingmission.
Since then, the face of the city has changed considerably. Capital has visibly returned to
Phnom Penh. As in other Southeast Asian capitals, small was, architecturally speaking,
replaced with big, timber with cement, tiles with glass; the vernacular style with va-
rious khmerized interpretation of post-modern architecture. Topographically speaking,
the flat town gained height when skyscraping started in the mid-2000s, superelevating
the (four-faced) tower of the throne hall in the royal palace compound, the unwritten
benchmark for building height since French colonial times. Morphologically speaking,
the gridiron concept has been extended. However, an increasing number of satellite
cities with mixed residential and business use are being constructed around the histo-
rical kernel, giving Phnom Penh’s urban agglomeration a more polynuclear character.
Economically speaking, Phnom Penh has a low-density industrialization, with garment
(manu)factories mushrooming on the periphery (since 2006 the Special Economic Zo-
ne). In 2017, Phnom Penh’s bicycle assembling-industry, fueled by Cambodia’s duty-free
access to Europe, surpassed Taiwan as the EU’s top bike supplier. Investors, predomi-
nantly of Chinese origin and owning 90% of the foreign capital, take advantage of the
low wages and social standards, as well as the favorable terms of trade with preferential
market access to the EU and the US markets. As the kingdom’s largest export earner
(78% of the merchandise in 2016), the textiles and shoe sector is the main non-agrarian
employer with over 600,000 workers in more than 600 factories.
Hydrologically speaking, the city is now drained, and nearly all inner-city swamps,
wetlands, and (ephemeral) watercourses have disappeared, providing terrain for
housing and industrial estates. As a kind of urban micro water management, tradi-
tional Khmer planning needed to be loose and open, a concept that Vann Molyvann,
Cambodia’s foremost architect and planner of the Sangkum-era (1953-70), adapted
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successfully to create the first modern Phnom Penh. In terms of the human capital,
the universities and colleges of various standards established for a young generation of
city dwellers are booming. Regarding the material culture and consumption, Phnom
Penh is now definitely part of the modern world, having been transformed from a city
of pedestrians, bikers, and motorized two-wheelers into a city that favors four wheels
and has to deal with congested traffic in public spaces (Shatkin, 1998; Kelly and McGee,
2003; Osborne, 2008; Nam, 2011; Paling, 2012; Kolnberger, 2012a, 2012b; Percival and
Waley, 2012; Fauveaud, 2014).
Conclusion
Since French colonial times, Phnom Penh has been the pivot of Cambodia’s history. Asi-
de from its disproportional size and its political and economic influence, its role as the
country’s primary city has taken precedence in respect of all other aspects too, such as
it being a media, culture, education, and internal migration center.There was a change
from a galactic to a more centralized polity: from a core and a loose enclosing space ar-
ranged around a center (mandala pattern) to a more centripetal pattern. In Cambodia,
this development was initiated by the colonial authorities, nationwide infrastructure
initiatives and the hard border-policy of the French. Sihanouk continued to implement
modern state-principles. In one way, Cambodia’s nation-building project was very suc-
cessful. The Khmer-Cambodian national identity (around 98% of the population of 16.5
million in 2019) became firmly rooted in the minds of elites and ordinary citizens alike.
Linguistic and religious homogeneity and the experience of enduring a troublesome
past are further favorable conditions for the potential “take off” to become a modern
state. However, the current government’s prestige of bringing peace to the country as
the once most desired public good is running out: the promise of political participation
and equal access to resources is broken. Today, there is also a clear bias in public goods
provision between city and countryside, which was hampered not only by the lack of
institutional capacity but also by the resurgence of clientelism. Phnom Penh has also
remained the unchallenged main trading ground for patronage, as well as for a “culture
of corruption and impunity” (Osborne, 2008: 195). This is the dark side and the price
that apparently needs to be paid for peace and stability after the recent nightmarish
past. Corruption is also the consequence of the city’s social (dis)organization, which
resulted from the struggle for scarce urban resources, particularly housing. The role of
location, the socio-spatial organizing of the city into preferred neighborhoods close to
orbits of political power cannot be understated nor underestimated. However, the city’s
unchallenged command and control function, and, therefore, that of the country’s elite,
is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain given the growing and diversifying young
population and their expectations for a fair future.
Cambodia’s urbanization rate of 23% (2018) is still comparatively low (e.g., Laos 35%,
Vietnam 36%, and Thailand 50% according to The World Bank). Currently, only four
other municipalities surpass the population mark of 200,000 by contrast with the mo-
re than two million in the capital. Urban economic growth stimulated by a population
increase and foreign capital, cannot, however, endure indefinitely. The development of
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Phnom Penh’s urban growth has attracted capital, some of it of very dubious origins,
looking for short-term profit – and a reserve army of labor to fill the factories. This
influx and tourism stimulated the demand for construction, while the poverty-ridden
countryside has to struggle with inadequate basic infrastructure. So far,most of the for-
eign aid and NGO investments and projects have been concentrated on Phnom Penh.
These diverging trends recall the old urban studies question: Is the primate city para-
sitic? (London, 1977; Gottdiener et al., 2016).
Phnom Penh’s generative function in terms of the rest of the country is and was low.
The heralded benefits of modern urbanization, such as the agglomeration of human
capital and economic benefits have coincided with higher housing costs, marked dis-
parities in living conditions, a widening gap between rich and poor, and higher risks of
crime or congestion. From a historical perspective, it is clear that two rural transforma-
tions reinforced this development. First, the French colonial intervention put an end to
the overlapping margins of sovereignty that characterized traditional rule in Southeast
Asia (Matras-Guin and Taillard, 1992). Hard borders and less soft boundaries began to
define the making of the Cambodian territoriality, both externally (in relation to the
neighboring polities) and internally (in relation to the political administration and land
property rights). Today, Cambodia’s foreign policy focuses on establishing friendly bor-
ders with its neighbors, while remaining very rigid in terms of domestic real estate
issues. Second, Cambodia is in the middle of a transition from a land of abundance to
a land scarcity (Rigg, 2003, 2013). The land no longer belongs to its tiller as traditional
occupational rights were lost. In other words, the country has lost a historical “social
safety valve”. This second factor leaves much of the rural population with, more or less,
just one option – migration either to Phnom Penh or abroad in search for work.
As Stanley Tambiah (1977) once commented the change in Thailand “from a galactic to a
more centralized radial polity that is by no means modern in the Western sense”, this
could also be said of Cambodia’s more recent history, which is an example for a genuine
path intoModernity as a multiple phenomenon. Phnom Penh’s morphological trajectory
and urban development proves the case.
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2020 marks the centenary of the foundation of Yangon University. It is expected to be
celebrated in grand style, as much or more than the 50th and 75th anniversaries in 1970
and 1995. For the 50th anniversary a huge 3-volume Memorial edition of memories and
reminiscences by former teachers and students was published, and the Diamond Jubilee
in 1995 was marked with the construction of Diamond Jubilee Hall in the University
campus (Yen Saning, 2013). The university has a turbulent history, not only because of
many years’ closure under the military government and strictly limited access to the
premises, but because the very month of its foundation provoked conflicts in the shape
of student protests and a lasting boycott that are seen as defining for the struggle for
national self-determination.
In this article, I look at the early days of colonial education planning and preparati-
ons for the establishment of the university which tell us much about colonial ideology
and education objectives as well as how these were negotiated and undermined by the
ruled.
RangoonUniversity was established fairly late, in the twilight of empire, so to speak.
Universities in India - Calcutta and Madras - had been founded already in 1857, at the
height of British imperial power and national self-confidence: The ‘Indian Mutiny’ had
been successfully crushed, the British government had taken over from the EIC, and
the British Raj was born. 1877 Queen Victoria became Empress of India. Educational
institutions in Rangoon were affiliated to Calcutta university from the 1880s.
By 1920 the situation had changed decisively. In contrast to the decades before, a se-
parate university for Rangoon was now thought advisable, detached from Calcutta and
particularly Bengal, which were seen as a hotbed of anti-British rebellion and sedition
(Nyi Nyi, 1964: 12).
It was not altogether easy to find literature on the development of the university.
Student activism and student protests, both in pre- and post-colonial times are compa-
ratively better covered, less so the events that led to the foundation of the university. But
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these are particularly interesting to analyse British colonial and education policy.There
are the felicitation volumes, some short studies and a few publications from the 30s
(Pearn, 1939; Peacock, 1934: 283-284; Aye Kyaw, 1993). Maung Htin Aung, the first rector
of Rangoon University after independence, has some remarks about the student boy-
cott of 1920 in his History of Burma (Maung Htin Aung, 1967), and Alicia Turner (2014)
looks at the significance of the student boycott. Boshier (2018) discusses the connec-
tions between BRS and Rangoon University. After the university reopened in 2012/2013,
a number of articles about it appeared in Myanmar newspapers and on the web (Maung
Thet Pyin, 2018).
I shall look not so much at the Yangon University of the present, but at its antece-
dents to trace the pre-history of the University. Efforts by both English and Burmese
intellectuals combined to bring it into existence, an event welcomed by students and
educated citizens, but at the same time leading straightaway to conflict and boycott,
a defining event for the anti-colonial struggle. I look at the significance of education
both generally and in a colonial context. But first, a short description of the campus as
it presents itself nowadays, still much the same as that constructed between the wars.
In lieu of a frontispiece: The campus (Yangon University 2019)1
“Maung Thet Pyin, who now has passed his mid 60s, would love to see his Alma Mater
turn 100 in 2020, which is just a couple of years away. May be he would be one of the
more fortunate alumni to be able to participate both the 50th and 100th anniversaries.
But that would be moving too much ahead.” (Maung Thet Pyin, 2019)
“Yangon University is one of the most complex and contested spaces in Yangon, one
of immeasurable political importance for the history of the city. It is where successive
generations of the country’s brightest minds have come together to imagine a better
future for themselves and their peers. For that reason, it was also the theatre of ma-
ny moments of upheaval during Myanmar’s fraught 20th century.” (Yangon University,
2019)
The campus is typical for British-built university campuses from the late 19th and
early 20th centuries: It resembles the British red brick universities, less the small uni-
versity towns in England or the earlier Indian (1857) universities which had imposing
grounds, but were - and are - dispersed over a larger area.UniversityMadras, e.g. domi-
nates a large stretch of the waterfront in Chepauk, Chennai. In a way, these universities
may be compared to ‘total institutions’ or a ‘gated community’, secluded and secure, but
also isolated. This shows clearly in the guard houses and barriers at the main entrance,
1 Information for this and the following paras is also taken from personal observations.
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with the difference that entrance and exit are less controlled.2 Certainly nowadays no-
body checks who enters and leaves the campus, but until 2012 this was quite different.3
The campus was constructed from 1922-1932, the Convocation Hall was inaugurated
in 1927 (Pearn, 1939: 281; SawMra Aung, 2019: 8-9). In 1931 the whole campuswas official-
ly opened (Peacock, 1934: 283-84). It is a kind of quarter circle between the southwestern
bank of Inya Lake (formerly Victoria Lake) and a long stretch of Pyay Road, situated in
the Kamayut township, immediately north of Golden Valley, a residential area north of
the former cantonment and developed from 1907 for the colonial civil service and well-
to-do Burmese (Pearn, 1939: 276). It is nowadays a prime piece of real estate just about
eight kilometres north of downtown Yangon. A former student has described the lively
time during the construction of the Inya Lake campus when students shuttled between
campus and lecture halls (Nyi Nyi, 1970: 2). Teaching was conducted in town,where Uni-
versity College and Judson College were located, viz. on Commissioner (today Bogyoke
Aung San) Rd. and Kyemendine Rd. At that time, the campus was still located on the
fringes of the settled area, very much removed from the hustle and bustle of the town, a
place of retreat, but also of isolation, near the town, but not of the town. In fact, it was
largely still a jungle teeming with wild life and mosquitoes and filled with fruit trees
(Saw Mra Aung, 2019). As late as 1927 and 1928, wild boar and hog deer were said to be
encountered and killed (MNN, 1955-57: 181). Halls of Residence (student hostels) were
only opened from 1925-26, until that time, students were housed in dormitories down-
town (Saw Mra Aung, 2019).4 The gravest danger apart from man-eating mosquitoes
were thieves from Kamayut village who at night would steal the students’ belongings.
University Avenue and Inya Road were sandy footpaths or waterlogged ditches at most,
made into proper roads only from 1928 onwards (Saw Mra Aung, 2019). Nowadays, the
campus is still a place of retreat, but certainly no longer isolated. All around traffic roars
through the intersection of Insein and Pyay roads, and the hustle and noise of nearby
Hledan market, the favourite shopping place for university teachers and staff, is ever
present.
The main entrance to the campus is on University Avenue. From other roads of
the quarter circle - Pyay Road, Inya Road, mostly forbidding walls, fences, and much
greenery are visible, but the initiated know the many side and back entrances and the
secret paths into and out of the campus. Judson chapel, an integral part of the university,
yet apart from it in its own grounds (again, the initiated know the shortcut from there
into the campus) is accessible from Pyay Road.
2 Something themilitary government tried to change in the 60swhen it (re-)introduced strict curfew
times for students in the hostels and even had the doors locked after 6 p.m. (Yen Saning, 2013).
The article claims this contributed to further student protests.
3 I remember vividly how in 2012 our colleague celebrated in this volume and I innocently walked
into the campus in search of the rector’s officewith the explicit permission of theDirector ofHigher
Education. We were harshly stopped by an individual on a bicycle barking at us where we were
thinking we were going. Only after the pro-rector had been called and ascertained from the DHEL
that we were there legitimately, were we allowed to proceed instead of being unceremoniously
marched off the premises.
4 The warden of one of them, Pyay Hall was B.R. Pearn, who in the late 40s became a trustee of the
university and was the author of the very comprehensive History of Rangoon.
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The campus is - like much of Yangon - still green and pleasant even in the heat of
the day with huge trees lining Adipati street and the side roads and lawns.
An alumnus of the university, Maung Thet Pyin (nom de plume of U Thiha Saw,
executive editor of the Myanmar Times) called his alma mater Mya Kyun Nyo Nyo in a
recent article in the Myanmar Times.
Literally, Mya Kyun, in Myanmar, is an emerald island, or rather a green island. Nyo
Nyo, could mean many things, including, a grove of trees. Indeed, it is still a very green
campus and the university itself is old enough, much older than Maung Thet Pyin, to
witness historical events and upheavals the country underwent in the last 140 years
(Maung Thet Pyin, 2018).
As a residential university, the campus contains not only the convocation hall and
lecture halls, but also a number of dormitories and sports facilities (Yangon University,
2019). Pegu Hall, where reportedly Aung San stayed during his study course, still stands
nearly unchanged and untouched from the 1930s as well as Taungoo Hall and several
hostels for female students, who were admitted to the University from the start, though
in much smaller numbers than males. Besides, faculty and staff also were provided free
accommodation on the campus in the shape of spacious and comfortable bungalows.
Only the space of the former student Union building on the right just after the entrance
and dynamited in the 60s lies still empty and overgrown.
It was on this spot that RASU students built a tomb for U Thant, Secretary-General
of the United Nations until 1971, to honour him, but the tombwas destroyed by themili-
tary troops and local authorities on December 10, 1974. The impressive Central Library5
is on the right just beyond the hostels.
The most iconic building on the campus is certainly the Convocation Hall, which
since its completion (Yangon Time Machine, 2018) has hosted the annual graduation
ceremonies and many important speeches. It is the first building one sees when ente-
ring through the main gate, since Adipati Road runs straight towards it. It has hosted
visiting world leaders for speeches, notably former US President Barack Obama in 2012
and in the Diamond Jubilee Hall in 2014 (Yangon Time Machine, 2018).
Judson Chapel was built in the early 1930s. Its tall tower is the university’s other
main landmark. It is named after Burma’s first Baptist missionary, Adoniram Judson
(Yangon Time Machine, 2018).6
If one ventures into the side streets away from Adipati Road one reaches more hos-
tels and residential buildings, but also little open-air canteens dotted round the campus
and the lecture halls and offices of the Arts and Humanities faculties: Taunggoo Hall,
Vaisali Hall, Ramanna Hall, surrounded by trees and with easy access to Pyay Road. A
brand newmess for the Arts Faculty has been donated by the Koreans, the KIS building.
Staff, students and alumni are very proud of their campus and are happy to see it
filled with life again since 2012 after so many years of enforced silence.
5 The funds for which were donated by Raja Reddiar in the 20s (Peacock, 1934: 284).
6 John D Rockefeller, Jr. donated 100,000 rupees for the chapel’s construction.
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The Significance of Education
In ancient times, education was the leisure pursuit of an elite that had no need to work
with its hands for its livelihood, that could indulge in ‘unproductive’ activities like rea-
ding, writing, philosophy,mathematics, and religion, in other words, speculation about
the origin andmeaning of life. It was possible only when there was a productive surplus
that could sustain unproductive parts of society like religious specialists and the idle
educated. Education for a long time had no meaning for ‘real life’, but was nevertheless
thought to be part of a rounded personality. Universities that were established in Eu-
rope in the early middle ages were places for religious and theological instruction. In
mediaeval Europe, learning was imparted by religious specialists, learning that was
eventually put to use also for the administration of (church) property, or pronouncing
on legal and administrative questions. In Myanmar, like in most Buddhist countries it
was the monks who not only meditated on the meaning of life and on matters of reli-
gion, but also provided education for the bulk of the population, education that went
beyond training for survival. Till today, the Myanma term for university is Tekkatho, a
word harking back to ancient Takshashila (whose ruins can be seen outside the borders
of Islamabad till today), reputedly the earliest seat of Buddhist learning.
With the start of industrialisation the function of education in Europe and later in
the colonies changed. Education became a filter that divided the mass from the selec-
ted few (Rothermund and Simon, 1986: 1-12). It sorted people according to social status,
ability and economic need. To operate machines (whether looms or weapons) and for
many other activities in industry one needed more than labourers performing stereo-
typical functions. Education became necessary to keep the country and the economy
running, and thus streamed people into their social, but crucially into their economic
places in life: Basic three Rs (Reading, Writing, Arithmetic) for the masses, secondary
education for specialised workers and technicians, higher education for the thinkers,
inventors and the leisured class. Modernity required everybody to read, write and do
arithmetic. And in some contexts practical knowledge acquired a prestige it had not
had earlier. Education became a necessity to be able to work and earn one’s livelihood.
This made more acute a problem that had existed before, but now became threatening:
Formerly, the educated elite could be relied upon to affirm, confirm and legitimate the
ruling elite and to work hand in hand. People questioning the existing conditions were
quickly eliminated, though their ideas often lived after them (Socrates, Galilei, Coper-
nicus). Education was a double-edged sword, but since few people had access, it could
be controlled and a certain amount of academic liberty and freethinking retained.
With the spread of literacy after the reformation in Europe this kind of control beca-
memore difficult, and once general schooling became compulsory, the ‘great unwashed’
could not so easily be kept in their ordained place.The government tried to ordain what
was taught and how much, in order to prevent protest: school curricula were fashioned
according to the specifications of governments. In higher education, this control was
less strict, there the freedom of science was supposed to apply, but only up to a certain
limit: education should create obedient subjects at all levels. And the subjects with hig-
her education were expected to justify the political and social status quo to the lower
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orders and teach them their place. Gramsci (1932) called these intellectuals organic: they
were part of the elite and supported its interests.
Again, there was a problem here: the organic intellectuals did not always conform to
their assumed task, and the masses rebelled. Friction at the edges led to changes, and
even only basic education did not always create obedient subjects. Knowledge itself
created doubts, and people who asked questions. So one had to balance the amount
of education provided with the danger that it could spin out of control. Even if the
government limited the content of education, a literate public could access information
beyond it. In other words: educated people and especially students are a dangerous
social group.
Education in a Colonial Context
How did the role and filter function of education play themselves out in a colonial set-
ting? The problem posed itself even more acutely here. Once the colonial rulers had
conquered a region or a country, they had to make it pay, and that meant they had
to administer it with as little expense as possible. And for that they needed personnel
and staff, preferably from the region, because personnel from the motherland would be
too costly. And even if they ruled with people of their own country, they had to com-
municate with the local people somehow and get them to cooperate in a rudimentary
fashion to prevent unrest and revolt. Colonial education had to be geared to a limited
objective, viz. to raise loyal staff on the lower administrative levels from among the local
population.
Monastic education that had always been there to provide people religious know-
ledge and a rudiment of literacy, was initially sought to fulfil that function, but quickly
turned out neither willing, suitable nor sufficient.TheBritish relied on another religious
corporation, the Christianmissionaries.The big advantage was that they had been there
even before the conquest of Burma was begun and/or completed.They had been coming
since the 17th century and set up schools for the newly converted.The British employed
the products of these schools for their administration before eventually setting up their
own.
Themissionaries had realised an important fact very early: if you want to work with
the local people and create loyalty, you must know something about their culture and
society first. The famous American Baptist Adoniram Judson had been in Burma since
1813, trying to convert people fromMoulmein toMandalay with very indeterminate suc-
cess. Still, he managed to create a small Baptist congregation in Rangoon and founded
a school in 1830. More significantly, he was the first to translate the Bible into Burmese
and edited a Myanma-English dictionary still in use today. Missionaries were not ne-
cessarily the servants or knight-errants of the colonial powers. Often it was quite the
opposite: they tried to learn the people’s language (admittedly in order the better to
convert them with). And they got acquainted with the people’s literature in order to
better argue against it. But this gave them a much more equivocal view of the colony
than the rulers and often an appreciation of local culture which the government lacked.
They were the first to provide modern secular instruction both in the people’s language
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and in English. The rulers, while often denigrating the missionaries’ effort, still drew
on this and often left education in the hands of the clergy, because it was cheaper. The-
re were civil servants (the ‘Orientalists’) that went along with the missionaries’ views
advocating a study of local culture and conditions and teaching in the local language,
but from about 1835, a view propounded by Macauley (1835) became more influential:
he thought little of indigenous languages and literature, and wanted instead to make
all the ruled into little ‘brown’ Britishers.
Yet even the Macauleyists could not completely ignore local culture and traditions.
The late 19th century was the height of Imperialism and of the alleged civilising mission
of the British. But it was not so easy to claim barbarity for a people that had ruled
mainland Southeast Asia for many centuries and boasted a culture and religion much
older than thewestern one.The solutionwas to proclaim local culture and historymerely
an inferior forerunner of Western, i.e. British history and culture, or claiming that the
present condition of the country was a decline from ancient greatness. The aspect of
interpretation was here important: who had the power to interpret history had also the
power to control the past and by extension present and future. As an Indian colleague of
mine put it many years ago: today it is not the future that has become unpredictable, but
the past. Collecting ‘historical texts’ and editing them thus became a means to achieve
this control of the past. To stand in a line of legitimate rulers conferred power and the
right to rule, which showed most clearly in India where the British took on the role of
the legal successors of the Moguls.7
Knowledge and control of the past had been always important for indigenous rulers
as well in the shape of inscription and chronicles. Under Myanmar’s Konbaung dynasty
this attained new heights: the rulers collected chronicles and tales of Myanmar’s past
from all over the country and had them brought to the capital in order to streamline
and unify them to get a ‘correct’ picture of the country’s history and commissioned new
chronicles. This was done to find some defence against the onslaught of the colonising
powers.
Though this proved futile in the end, because it could not prevent the conquest of
Burma, the colonial government likewise started to collect information about the peop-
le’s history, often in the shape of commissioned chronicles, e.g. the Portuguese and the
Dutch in Ceylon. In Burma, civil servants and academic amateurs with an ‘Orienta-
list’ bend founded the Burma Research Society in 1910 accompanied by a journal in
which European and Burmese scientists wrote about and translated Burmese history
and philology, inscriptions and chronicles.The journal survived until 1980 and was then
superseded by the Bulletin of the Burma Historical Research Commission founded in
1955. Like the missionaries, the BRS did not always conform to the expectations of the
rulers either, they were impressed with the high civilisation and impressive history of
Burma (Boshier, 2018: 236-237), which sometimes countervailed the Imperial Idea (see
below).
7 One of the reasons for the eternal problems between India and Pakistan is one of legitimacy. At
independence India took on the role of the legal successor of the British Raj and thus of theMoguls.
Pakistan has never forgiven India for this, because it considered this role its natural right.
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This constellation highlights the ambivalent function of education in a colonial set-
ting most clearly: The British needed docile subjects to work in their administration,
but these subjects should at the same time be qualified and able to act autonomously
within limits. To some extent they could achieve this with personnel imported from
India, but this did not work indefinitely. By the start of the 20th century, one needed
Burmese personnel on a near equal level with the British. So in this very idea of local
education, the anti-colonial protest was already contained, because once people were
educated like the British, they wanted to be treated like the British.
Universities as places of control and protest
What then is so important about a university, both as a physical place and an institu-
tion of learning as compared to a school? There is no better place to control the past
and legitimate the present than institutions of education and learning. Universities are
crucial places where information about the past is collected, controlled, and imparted.
While a university is a place of education, it is also one of discussion, debate and
analysis. In other words, it is not only a place of learning, but also of thinking. But
secondly, it is for this reason also a place a step away from ‘real’ life, a place of freedom
and even experiment. Being ‘a step removed’ may give one a clearer view of things and
an incentive to act. At the same time, ‘a step removed‘ means also place of isolation,
never more so than when it is constructed as a total institution. It is a place to create
organic intellectuals. Again, this is more stark in a colonial setting.
The British established institutions of higher learning in their new possessions with
the intention to teach the subjects the right topics and the right history, viz. that of
the rulers, of England and Empire and that of the subjects according to the view of
the rulers: a history of former greatness and current decline. They wanted to present
themselves as the bringers of a new civilisation. People were supposed to learn their
own history through the eyes of the rulers. In this way, the British hoped to legitimate
their rule and to create acquiescent subjects who worked in its service.
For a while, the subject people accepted the new system and the new language,
because it seemed to provide away to jobs, upwardmobility and eventually equality with
the rulers.They sent their children to missionary or government schools teaching in the
rulers’ language and acquired the new knowledge. The government tried to keep this
development under control by limiting access to educational institutions: there was the
eternal fear of a ‘glut’ of unemployed English-educatedwhomight create unrest (PRHM,
1934: 65-66; Aye Kyaw, 1993: 8-9). The objectives of education were rather different for
rulers and ruled, but even in the government they were often vague and paradoxical.
These were objectives difficult, if not impossible, to achieve, as much later the military
government ofMyanmar realised to its - and the students’ - dismay: if you train qualified
people, they might easily qualify against you.
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Antecedents of Rangoon University
Rangoon University illustrates this paradox in an exemplary fashion, not least because
it emerged as discussed above, in the twilight of empire. As Jan Morris (1983: 104) puts
it in Stones of Empire: The Buildings of the Raj:
The greater universities established by the British in India, notably those in the Pres-
idency towns, deliberately set out to transfer British ideas and values to the Indian
middle classes, if only to create a useful client caste. Their curricula were altogether
divorced from Indian tradition—no more of those thirty-foot kings—and their origi-
nal buildings were all tinged somehow or other with architectural suggestions of Cam
or Isis [these are rivers flowing through Cambridge and Oxford, respectively; the au-
thors].
This notion easily applies to Rangoon University too.
Schools onMacauley’s principles were established very soon after the second Anglo-
Burman war 1852/53 for English and mixed children. Missionary schools served the
same children and children of Burmese converts. Some Buddhist parents sent their
children to these schools as well (Aye Kyaw, 1993: 8-9). A department of education was
founded in Rangoon in 1868, and entrance examinations to the University of Calcutta
could be held there (Aung Kin, 1970: 51), but until 1874, only elementary schools existed.
The better ones of these were then converted into high schools (Aye Kyaw, 1993: 9).
In the same year, the Government High School in Rangoon opened (Aung Kin, 1970:
51). In 1876, this High School began to offer secondary courses. Until then, pupils had
only been able to finish Middle School. From now on, they could sit for the entrance
exam of Calcutta University at the school. Since 1878 college level instruction was offe-
red at the Government High School (Aye Kyaw, 1993: 9). Some sources therefore date the
opening of Rangoon College in this year. However, the college department proper was
only opened in 1880. Students were able to sit for the F.A. (First Arts) exam of Calcutta
University. In 1881, an Education Syndicate was formed to represent the educational
interests of Burma. It was an autonomous body looking after curricula and standards
of examination. In 1883, Rangoon College was affiliated to Calcutta University and stu-
dents could study up to the B.A, degree. However, until 1889, only very few students
graduated from this and other colleges, mostly in Law (Aung Kin, 1970: 53). From that
time onwards, however, both the number of students and that of Burmese students
increased considerably until 1912. They could take English, Maths, Chemistry, Pali, Phi-
losophy, Physics, Logic and Law for the F.A. or B.A. and B.Sc. exams (though the latter
was intermittently discontinued) (Aung Kin, 1970: 54; Nyi Nyi, 1970: 12).
Alongside the secular establishments, the Baptist CushingHigh School was founded
in 1872, which opened a college department in 1894. It was also affiliated to Calcutta
University up the First Arts standard and was called Baptist College, renamed Judson
College in 1918 (Aye Kyaw, 1993: 9). The idea of a University for Burma was mooted by
the syndicate already in 1892 (Lu Pe Win, 1970: 58; Aung Kin, 1970) and again in 1901,
though nothing came of it at the time (Aye Kyaw, 1993: 10), because the government of
India did not favour it. Instead, in 1904, the Government retook control of Rangoon
College, which had been under the syndicate since 1885, and renamed it Government
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College. It was hampered in its development because it was affiliated to Calcutta only
for English, Vernacular Composition, Maths, Chemistry, Physics, and Baptist College
for English, Vernacular Composition in Burmese, History, Philosophy and Pali (Aung
Kin, 1970: 54).
But the idea of a university was pursued regardless, both by British educators and
leading Burmese citizens, who wanted to end the affiliation to Calcutta University and
have an establishment of their own, rather than just a college. A preliminary Act for es-
tablishing a university was drafted by government and reviewed by the syndicate 1909-
10. A meeting was called by the syndicate in 1910 with a few Burmese members also
attending and which discussed the university question in a lively manner. It was finally
decided that the two colleges, Rangoon and Judson College should be combined to a
teaching university with a network of hostels. The proposal was submitted to the go-
vernment, but until 1912, there was no reaction.This was actually the year of the visit of
King Edward to Burma, and the YMBA (Young Men’s Buddhist Association)8 took the
opportunity to demand a university in their felicitation address to him (Aye Kyaw 1993:
11). In the same year, the Indian government allotted a budget for the establishment of
the university (Aye Kyaw, 1993: 12-13).
Again it took several years until the plans took shape. For some years controversy
raged over the location of the university - at that time still planned in today’s down-
town area. But already then, alternative plans to house the university in a campus and
buildings of its own were put forward (Aung Kin, 1970: 56). However, with the outbreak
of WWI, all plans were more or less suspended and only resumed in 1917.
By this time, not only local citizens, but also the colonial government were firmly in
favour of a local university; however, the reasons for this demand and the ideas about
the shape of the institution differed widely.The war had brought forth clearly the desire
of the colonised peoples for self-government and independence, and the British, while
conceding some of these demands, at the same time tried to hold on to their rule (Aye
Kyaw, 1993: 16). The affiliation to Calcutta now seemed distinctly disadvantageous (Nyi
Nyi, 1970: 12).
The local citizens, on the other hand, and particularly the college students had their
own reasons for desiring a university for Burma. They wanted more from it than just
a good education and good job prospects. While not yet actively clamouring for in-
dependence, their educational aspirations were mixed with political ones. They were
in favour of a local university teaching in English, separate from Calcutta and impli-
citly, with more Burmese instead of Indian teachers. The young students, moreover,
had been influenced by liberal and anti-colonial thinking that spilled over from India
and were well-informed about the political reforms (Montague-Chelmsford reforms) in
preparation there. They were angry that Burma was not granted similar reforms. This
constellation was prone to conflicts. This was not the middle of the 19th century, when
universities in India were a demonstration of British superiority, but the sunset of em-
pire.The YMBA again came to the fore regarding the university, when its General Coun-
cil visited Calcutta to meet Montague and Chelmsford in 1917 and put the demand for
a university before them. Finally, in 1918 a committee made up of English government
8 An organisation founded in 1906 on the model of the Young Men’s Christian Association.
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officers and academics and a number of Burmese members from the Burma Education
Society, Burma Reform League and later also the YMBA (Aung Kin, 1970: 56), was tas-
ked to formulate a plan for the establishment of Rangoon University and to draw up
study courses. The committee’s recommendations were based on the report of Calcutta
University (Aye Kyaw, 1993: 16). It was planned as a self-governing academic body under
the protection of the government. However, in early 1919 leading Burmese citizens and
scholars strongly criticised the plan, pointing out several defects in the University Draft
Bill (Maung Htin Aung, 1967). The British favoured a unitary university, the Burmese a
federal one - with affiliated colleges. It became quasi-federal only on the pressure of
Washington which wanted to keep the American founded Judson College autonomous
(Nyi Nyi, 1970: 13). A major complaint was the compulsion for the students to stay on
campus which would be very expensive,9 another, that no affiliation of colleges outside
Rangoon was planned (according to the Boycotters’ memorial of 17 December 1920 as
related by Lu Pe Win (1970: 7, 43). The biggest complaint which was also widely discus-
sed in the papers was that regarding entry qualifications. Honours students who had
passed their matriculation must show proficiency in English and one other subject in
the entrance exam. If they failed in this, they were required to undergo another year
preparatory coursework before entering the university (Aye Kyaw, 1993: 17).This was se-
en as a requirement primarily affecting Burmese students and thus discriminatory (Lu
Pe Win, 1970: 7).10 In fact, it was a measure to limit the number of Burmese entering
the university (Maung Htin Aung, 1967). Other criticised clauses concerning the time
allowed for an Honours Bachelor’s or Masters’s etc. (Lu PeWin, 1970: 8) The demands to
abolish these clauses were mixed up with political ones clamouring for reforms similar
to the Montague-Chelmsford measures in India.
The government disregarded the criticisms and went ahead with its plans. There-
fore, in early 1920 a meeting was held by Burmese demanding the postponement of
the University Bill until the critical points had been remedied. An additional point this
time was that the governing bodies of the planned University had only very few Burme-
se members and were thus not representative (Lu Pe Win, 1970: 18). Despite Burmese
opposition, the bill was approved by the legislative council and became the University
Act in mid-1920. It came into effect on 1st December 1920, and thus the University was
constituted with Rangoon - now University - College and Judson College as constituent
members.The Inauguration was planned for December 7, but that plan came to naught
because the students boycotted the inauguration.
While the colleges had only offered a limited range of subjects (see above), the uni-
versity in addition offered Oriental Studies (Pali and Burmese), history, (especially Far
Eastern history and History of Burma) (Peacock 1934: 284), Biology, Economics, Geogra-
phy, Geology, Forestry, Education and Engineering (Nyi Nyi 1970: 14). Luminaries like
9 Peacock (1934: 284), gives a sum of £ 2/month for board and lodging in 1932.
10 What was not clearly spelt out here and elsewhere, but was themain point of the criticismwas the
fact that the British demanded a high standard of knowledge of English to enter the university. So
students who had passed all their exams, but not the English one, had to go to remedial classes.
This was severely resented. Lu Pe Win claims that even the High School Exam had a success rate
of only 15%.
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D.G.E. Hall, Gordon Luce, C. Duroiselle, and John Furnivall were teachers at the uni-
versity (Anon, 1970: 20).11 A medical college was attached in 1924.The university offered
degrees up to B.A., M.A., , B.L. and MBBS (MNN 1970: 113).
Only in 1941, the department of Oriental Studies was renamed Department of Bur-
mese language and literature, with the father of current President U Htin Kyaw as
principal. The 75th anniversary of the department was celebrated in December 2016
with the President as chief guest (New Light of Myanmar, 2016).
All subsequent institutions of higher learning founded by the British were under
Rangoon University’s administration until 1958, when Mandalay College became an in-
dependent university (University of Yangon, 2018). In spite of the early boycott Rangoon
University became one of themost prestigious universities in Southeast Asia, attracting
students from across the region.
Imperial Objectives of Colonial Education
By opening the university, the government hoped to provide education oriented to the
West and geared to English requirements (Boshier, 2018: 237). In the 1920s, this did not
mean any longer just to train loyal government servants, but it was meant to inculcate
in them an active consent to and affirmation of, the Imperial Idea (Aye Kyaw, 1993: 13;
Boshier, 2018: 239-241); of the greatness of empire, the superiority of British civilisation
and thus the legitimacy of British rule. University education demanded that the stu-
dents subscribe to the idea that the fate of their country and their success in life were
tied to British rule. The Imperial idea was to be spread with songs, flags, articles, and
through university education (Aye Kyaw, 1993: 14-15). The Imperial idea also showed in
the discussion about the university when it was declared a British gift to the Burmese
people (Lu Pe Win, 1970: 9).
The University Act provided control over the University and to some extent acade-
mic content to the government (the Governor was ex officio the chancellor like in India
until today), contradicting the claims that it would be self-governing and academically
autonomous, and it limited access to the university through fees and tight entrance re-
gulations. Its curriculum gave rise to protest because it provided education gearedmore
towards interests than Burmese requirements: knowledge about British and Western
history and literature (and by implication, British greatness), was privileged over local
history and literature. To be sure, Pali was taught in colleges and university because
it was considered a classical language (Turner 2018: 129), yet there existed government
high schools where Latin and Greek were still compulsory subjects.
The location of the new campus was geared towards isolating the students, with
tight regulations for appearance and behaviour that could serve to alienate them from
the rest of the population. Simultaneously these regulations should create a feeling of
belonging to a separate class, being part of an elite. In exchange, one belonged in the
11 This source claims that the boycott in total lasted about four years. Aye Kyaw (1993) gives the title
as First and last years. He claims the author was the well-known Indian lawyer N.C. Sen.
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select few and even was granted a certain amount of academic freedom and behavioural
licence.
The imperial idea immediately encountered the nascent or no longer so nascent na-
tionalism and the demand for independence. The students rejected and counteracted
its implicit assumptions. They retreated into their Burmese and Buddhist identity and
self-image and from there drew the confidence to challenge the educational authorities.
Once the boycott was decided upon, they withdrew to religious premises, the Shweda-
gon and adjacent monasteries, to continue their struggle (Boshier, 2018: 240-41).
Not even all of the English teachers and members of the BRS subscribed to the
Imperial idea. They endeavoured to give Burmese history and literature its due place
in education. Gordon Luce, D.G.E. Hall and John Furnivall belong prominently in this
category. Luce, moreover, was a rather unsuitable model for the Imperial idea: he was
ostracised by the British community and denied the position of Head of the History
Department until the late 20s, because he had the impudence to marry a Burmese wife,
succumbing to ‘Burmanisation’, something that was simply ‘not done’ among English
teachers and civil servants (Boshier, 2018: 235). This reaction showed the sheer meretri-
ciousness of the Imperial Idea’s claim to justice and equality. The local people, however
assimilated, would forever remain the house elves of the ruling magicians.
The Boycott of 1920
So, no sooner the University was established than the students who had newly been
admitted to enter the university started to protest. They had attended Government or
Judson College while still affiliated to Calcutta and were thus well-informed about the
issues surrounding the birth of the university and the foregoing discussions. And they
were very much against the University Act. Therefore, on 3rd December, they decided
to boycott classes, the exams on 5th December and the inauguration planned for 7th
December. In a meeting deciding on the boycott, an Indian student, N.C. Sen, - later
a famous lawyer - advised to send a memorial to Reginald Craddock, the governor and
chancellor, before taking any action, but this suggestion was rejected. Such amemorial,
it was argued, would vanish forever in some drawer and never be answered one way or
the other. The Principal of Rangoon college, Matthew Hunter, begged the students to
return to classes. The answer was that they did not object to their teachers, but to the
University Act (Aye Kyaw, 1993: 22, 24; Lu Pe Win, 1970: 3-4, 44).12 They referred to the
discussions and criticisms of the university committee which had not been remedied,
and demanded the annulment of the University Act, nothing less. One sore point was
the prohibition for external students (from colleges outside Rangoon and vernacular
schools) to take the entrance exam, another one that the vice-chancellor was chosen
unilaterally by the governor, and not, as originally assured, from among a number of
12 In fact, students seemed to respect and like their English teachers and principals, some criticisms
notwithstanding, which still comes through in the article by Saw Mra Aung (2019), which does
not mention the boycott at all, but with a certain nostalgia describes the early years of the ‘infant
university’.
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individuals suggested by the university members (Aye Kyaw, 1993: 23). The language
of instruction being English did not provoke protests at all at this time, it was rather
the standard of English required, which was seen - rightly - as limiting the number of
students allowed to enter university. To sum up, it was not the establishment of the
university that was resented, but rather the way it was constituted and the regulations
governing it.13Thedemandswere eventually laid down in a publicmemorial to Governor
Craddock on 19th December 1920 demanding the annulment of the University Act.
The university authorities threatened expulsion of the students for the rest of the
term if they did not return by 23rd December, which the students countered with wi-
thdrawal notices. The deadline was extended to January 5, 1921 (Aye Kyaw, 1993: 29).
A Boycotters’ Conference subsequently took place at the end of December with lively
participation of the women students. It passed 15 resolutions, some of which differed
somewhat in their thrust from the demands in the memorial of 19th December: one of
these confirmed that the students would not rejoin government schools, that the rules
for European and Anglo-Vernacular schools were not suitable for Burmese, that Bur-
mese students should be allowed to wear Burmese footwear and that they should be
allowed to read newspapers on campus (Aye Kyaw, 1993: 31). The demands might seem
only relevant for education - the requirements for English competence, the compulsion
to live on campus, the cost of education - and sometimes even banal - the rules about
footwear and the prohibition to read newspapers on campus. But these were issues that
determined life chances and the chance for an autonomous life. And particularly the last
two demands are illuminating. They concerned issues that defined Burmese identity:
slippers were the normal footwear of the Burmese, and of course much more suited to
the climate than shoes. Questions of footwear had been sensitive,moreover, at least sin-
ce the de-shoeing controversy of 1906 (Turner, 2014: 139; Thant Myint-U, 2008: 205; Aye
Kyaw, 1993: 20, 28). The prohibition to read newspapers on campus, on the other hand,
interfered with the claimed academic freedom of the university: was knowledge and in-
formation only to be provided in the classroom? These rules show the tight control the
authorities tried to exercise over the Burmese students both physically and mentally,
and to make them conform to British norms of appearance and demeanour.
TheBurmese public supported the rather esoteric and elite boycott to an astonishing
degree. They sent food and other necessities to the students encamped in the Shweda-
gon. Governor Craddock tried to dismiss the boycott as the action of young boys and
girls who had been seduced by agitators and politicians. He claimed that for the stu-
dents the whole thingwas nothingmore than a big prank.TheEnglish press followed his
argument and denounced the boycott as manipulated by interested circles (Lu Pe Win,
1970: 8).14 The Anglo-Indian students and the Anglo-Indian press joined the chorus, but
MP Colonel Wedgwood, from the far left wing of the Labour Party (and grandfather of
Tony Benn) who visited Burma at the time cautiously supported the boycott in a public
address on 12th December (Aye Kyaw, 1993: 27).15
13 The resolutions and demands are listed in Nyi Nyi (1970: 51-52).
14 He states a bit later, (Lu Pe Win, 1970: 17), however, that in his report to the viceroy, Craddock
termed the students’ movement a ‘terrible threat to the authority of the British crown in Burma.’
15 Lu PeWin (1970: 13-15, 31), from 1923 Lecturer in Oriental Studies, puts the matter a bit differently.
He says in themeeting withWedgwood, the latter asked the students if they would return to clas-
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The issues at stake might have appeared insignificant and purely educational, but
they had political repercussions of identity and respect beyond that.This showed in the
simultaneous establishment - or renaming - of vernacular schools into national schools,
and eventually the foundation of a national university. Some of these schools were ear-
lier run by the YMBA, which now opened their doors to the strikers and even offered
them teaching assignments. These schools taught in Burmese and on Burmese issues
and were considered to be more attuned to Burmese requirements (Lu Pe Win, 1970:
24).16 The emergence of these schools was not at all liked by the government, and it
accordingly tried to hamper their functioning by centralising high schools and school
policy.This was eventually unsuccessful because once dyarchy was introduced in Burma
as well education came under the purview of a Burmese Minister of Education. There-
fore, after U Maung Gyi had been appointed Minister of Education in 1923, he had the
University Act amended in 1924. Students from external and national schools were now
allowed to take the entrance examination (Lu Pe Win, 1970: 59). Vicariously the boycott
also led to endeavours to read and translate foreign literature into Burmese and thus
to the famous Nagani club.
The protest of 1920 more or less petered out, by January a third of students had
returned on the pressure of parents (who often were civil servants) and teachers (Lu Pe
Win, 1970: 17). But the rest continued and were even publicly supported by the All Indian
Congress Committee (Aye Kyaw, 1993: 32).The boycott went on until April 1921 with even
High School students joining. Examinations were held in March 1921 regardless (Anon,
1970: 19). After six months, most of the boycotters had returned to school and college,
even those who had started to teach in the national schools, though remnants of the
boycotters held out until 1924 (Lu Pe Win, 1970a: 58).
The boycott still counts as the first big national protest movement in Burma, a
forerunner of the more political boycotts of 1936 and 1938 (Nyi Nyi, 1970: 19; Aye Kyaw,
1993: 67-68). In the late 1920s and 1930s a large number of future political and intellec-
tual leaders of Burma until the 80s and 90s were educated at Rangoon University: Aung
San (father of current State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi), U Nu first Prime Minister,
Dr. Ba Maw (Prime Minister under Dyarchy and during World War II), U Kyaw Nyein
(member of APFL and minister under U Nu), U Thant (the first ever Asian who became
the Secretary General of the United Nations in the 60s), U Thein Pe Myint (renowned
author and journalist) and dozens or perhaps hundreds more as detailed by Lu Pe Win
(1970a).
Conclusion
“They focused on discipline. They didn’t give the students freedom,” said Khin Zaw.
“Freedom comes first in a democratic system, and then discipline follows. So they con-
trolled [the students].” (Yen Saning, 2013)
ses if he accompanied them and endeavoured to redress their grievances. The students rejected
this, to which he said that a boycott would only be successful if they all stood firm till the end.
16 He claims Burmese was taught in University College only from 1924.
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This is not a quote regarding colonial administration, but the military government
of Burma after 1962. It clearly demonstrates the ambivalence and the risks for colonial
and/or authoritarian governments of providing education.The knowledge and expertise
and, most importantly, the support of an educated class are needed for the functioning
of the administration, but it is this very class also that poses the greatest danger, because
they so easily can get out of control.Their loyalty is always fragile, never guaranteed; they
can simply refuse to accept the ideology of the rulers.The aims of education under these
circumstances are not only contradictory, but irreconcilable. The fate of the Imperial
Idea could serve here as a dreadful warning: As already Alice in Wonderland realised:
two into one won’t go. Rangoon University with its protest and struggle right at its birth
is a prime example for this dilemma: it was meant as a gift to the ruled, but the subjects
refused to accept this sign of generosity of a benevolent government. They saw it for
what it was: a Trojan horse.
The remedy sought for this dilemma was twofold: one, construct a secluded and
circumscribed space to prevent too much communication with the outside and thus
prevent protests. Yet the spatial isolation in a ‘total institution’ intended to keep the stu-
dents apart from the people in the end enabled resistance. Students could get together,
communicate and plan. And the isolation was never as total as desired. The university
eventually became the centre of a web or network of connections formed by parents,
BRS teachers, politicians, workers, and students which spurred the latter to action (Bo-
shier, 2018: 233). The military junta many years later seems to have realised this fact: it
gave up the isolation of the campus (by closing it for years on end) for the segregation
and even atomisation of students in far away new universities or by forcing them in-
to distance education. Precisely the communication the physical presence on campus
enabled was thus cut off and made student action so much more difficult.
The second part of the programme was a variation of the Imperial Idea: create a
group (client caste) that perceives itself as belonging in an elite: if you join the uni-
versity, you may eventually join the heaven-born, the select few who joined the ICS.
You will be part of an elite, removed from the mass of the people, an elite endowed
with privileges and liberties. But being part of this elite carried a price: you had to con-
form to strict rules and regulations of appearance and behaviour. You had to assimilate
eventually giving up your identity and accepting British superiority and dominance. It
was expected that parents, who wanted jobs for the boys, would exert this pressure to
conform. Except that the boys refused:
An English education was accepted as necessary to get a job and earn one’s live-
lihood (Anderson, 2006: 20-21, 41-49). It was at most a working language, not more
(though most of the products of Rangoon University wrote and spoke a standard of
English that one can only weep over with envy in the face of the English proficiency of
today’s graduates). Only the required standard of English was questioned as a limiting
device for educated Burmese (Aye Kyaw, 1993: 20; Nyi Nyi, 1970: 15; Lu Pe Win, 1970: 10).
Similarly, the opening of the university was welcomed: had Burmese intellectuals not
clamoured for it for years? But they wanted it not as a gift, but on their own terms.The
students wanted more from an education than being made fit for subaltern jobs, an
education geared towards Burmese requirements, instruction in their own history and
literature, an affirmation of their own identity. The researchers of the BRS supported
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and confirmed them in this objective emphasising the importance not only of Pali, but
of Burmese language and history, something that would give them not only knowledge
of the past, but control of their present and future (Boshier, 2018: 238). Once the pro-
mise of Macauley that if people became little Britishers they would attain equality had
been shown as fraudulent eventually even the dominance of the English language was
questioned: the national schools taught in Burmese. The junta later ordained instruc-
tion exclusively in the mother tongue with no English at all.17 Whereas the British had
hesitated to sacrifice quality to control and had limited access to education instead, the
military junta did the opposite: if one could not reconcile quality and control, quality
would be sacrificed because quantity, the number of students in higher education, was
considered a sign of success.
The boycott of 1920 highlighted the paradoxes of education in a colonial setting in
an exemplary fashion.When the university was founded British power was waning, the
civilisatory mission had lost its shine and was recognised for the lie it was.The students
realised they would never fully belong in the elite and even for a partial belonging, the
cost was too heavy. Equality was a promise never fulfilled.This made the boycott of 1920
more than an educational protest and created a legacy of politically aware and active
students. Students, as mentioned in general are an extremely dangerous social group.
They challenge the powers that be by their mere existence despite or because of the
powers’ need for them.
TheBritish knew this and accordingly tried to denigrate the boycott as either a prank
or as an attempt to get good jobs (though what would be damnable in striking for better
jobs?). But it was more than that, it was a political and anti-colonial beginning. The
public realised that issues beyond just education and jobs were involved and supported
the strikers, and Myanmar National Day still commemorates the event (University of
Yangon, 2019). The significance still connected to the boycott shows clearly in the fact
that a monument commemorating the 11 students who started it was erected on the
terrace of the Shwedagon after independence (Aye Kyaw, 1993: 49). It can now be visited
again after having been blocked off by the junta after the protests of 2007. The British
were unable to enforce the rules, and so was - eventually - the military.
Before ending, one last consideration: while the boycott of 1920 was the start of a
national and political campaign, questioning of British educational policies and stan-
dards had occurred long before that: when in 1882/83 Rangoon College was affiliated to
Calcutta University, that was precisely when demands for a local university were voiced
for the first time (Aye Kyaw, 1993: 10).18 This university should be able to teach, set and
conduct exams independently from outside agencies, be they Oxford and Cambridge
17 And then with an ingenious twist: if you did not have teaching material in the native language,
you just abolished the discipline, as happened to IR in the 60s.
18 In the same year the government for the first time conducted official examinations in Pali in an
attempt to create sympathies for its rule among important Buddhists. These examinations subse-
quently turned out very popular, though they did notmuch to enhance the prestige of the colonial
government (Turner, 2018: 129).
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or Calcutta.19 Burmese educated and intellectuals voiced these demand requesting the
upgrading of the College to a University independent of Calcutta.
By providing wider access to education for Burmese and by ‘donating’ a university,
the British hoped to blunt the edge of the protests, but achieved exactly the opposite.
That then is the paradox of education: if you start teaching people to think, they will
think, and that might lead to quite unforeseen consequences.
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The Changing Social and Religious Role of Buddhist Nuns
in Myanmar: A case study of two nunneries (1948-2010)
Mo Mo Thant (Yangon)
Abstract
Communities of nuns have been a feature of life in Buddhist societies since early times.
The nuns in present-day Myanmar consider themselves descendants of Nuns Mei Kin
andMei Nat Pay who were royal teachers during King Mindon (1853-1878), who held the
Fifth Buddhist Council. In this paper, I discuss how the religious and social standing of
nuns in Myanmar has helped to empower women by the pioneer work of the respected
nun Daw Nyanacari. She established a Buddhist nunnery in 1947 that has developed an
outstanding reputation for theological academic excellence and acts as a role model for
other nunneries. The monastic community is pivotal for the socio-religious life of the
Buddhist population, operating through a network of monks, nuns and lay supporters
extending to the remotest villages. Nuns are looked upon as actors who do Buddhist
missionary work as well following the legacy of Daw Nyanacari.
From the time of the State Peace andDevelopment Council (1997-2010) and evenmo-
re since the transition of 2011/12 a major change has occurred in that nuns increasingly
turned to social welfare types of activities for the underprivileged in the community
whereas before, they mostly taught Buddhist scripture to nuns and a Buddhist lifestyle
and meditation to women. These new activities are quite unique, and in some ways
resemble convent or missionary schools run by Christian establishments. I argue that
social welfare activities conducted by nuns in Myanmar can enhance their social and
religious capital and are thought to bring religious merit. I examine this change with
the example of the Shwemyintzu nunnery founded in 1993 in the legacy of Daw Nyana-
cari, but taking a somewhat new path by venturing into more secular and educational
social work.
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Introduction
Nuns, commonly referred to as thila-shin, meaning “owners of virtue”, were addressed
by several names in late 20th century Myanmar history. A thila-shin is regarded as a
daughter of Buddha in Myanmar. Their lifestyles are a shaved head, monastic robes,
and codes of ethical discipline. They dress in pink and brown cotton robes, live on alms
food donated by the lay community, and refrain from taking solid food after midday.
The central ethical principles they live by are the precepts common to all Buddhists: to
refrain from taking life, stealing, lying, sexual misconduct, and intoxicants. In contrast
to lay Buddhists, however, Buddhist nuns take a vow of celibacy.This voluntary decision
frees them from many of the typical responsibilities of household life. Some Buddhist
nuns focus on solitary meditation practice, while others run busy temples or keep inter-
national teaching schedules. Unlike most monks, not all nuns receive a formal Buddhist
education; some, however, hold PhDs. According to the Ministry for Religious Affairs
there are around 6,000 thila-shin in Myanmar. But their actual number is several times
higher since many women join the religious life for a short period, most preferably
during the summer holidays between March and May.
Buddhist nuns hold an ambiguous position in Myanmar society. They are not reco-
gnized as śramanerika (novice nuns), due to the lack of bhikṣunis (full female equivalents
of the monks) to ordain them.
During the period from the ninth to the eleventh century AD Theravada Buddhism
was introduced by the Pyus to the Mons and by the Mons to the Bamars of Bagan.
Female members of the Order, descendants of the Pyu Period, were probably equally
engaged in the promotion and propagation of Buddhism in the Bagan Period. But only
the significant monks’ names are found in the Bagan stone inscriptions. Yet the term
Samgha means an aggregate and denotes both bhikkhu (ordained monk) and bhikkhuni
(ordained female members of the Order).Therefore, going by the stone inscriptions, we
can assume that bhikkhunis al-so existed in the Bagan period between the 11th and 13th
centuries (U Ni Tut, 2003).
In the Inwa period, female members of the Order were calledThadin Thone (U Kala,
2006: 313). Thadin Thone (Thiddin The) means a female spending her days observing the
precepts.They came to be known asThila in the Nyaungyan period (U Tin, 1976: 226). In
the Konbaung period they were referred to as thila-shin (Nuns).
The organisation of thila-shin in Myanmar was acknowledged by both the kings and
the people under the reign of King Mindon (1853 to 1878). King Mindon had requested
the nuns Mei Kin and Mei Nat Pay to come to the capital city Mandalay and instruct
his queens into the monastic order as thila-shin after meeting Nun Mei Kin (Yawei Tun,
1998: 82-85). It seems to me that the female members of the Order were most respected
during the rule of King Mindon.
In the monastic hierarchy in Myanmar, there is a clear status difference between
those who engage in Pariyatti (teaching, learning) and those who engage in Patipatti
(practicing meditation) (Yawei Tun, 1998: 42). Nuns, like monks and novices, engage in
the learning and teaching processes of Pariyatti (teaching) and Patipatti (practicing). So-
me nuns established education centres (nunneries) for nuns where they teach Pariyatti
literature. They aimed at propagating and promoting the Sasana (teaching of Buddha).
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Therefore, nuns’ involvement in teaching was considered to have higher importance
than their practicing meditation. The first independent nunnery school was founded
by the above-mentioned Nun Mei Kin in Gutalon Gyaung in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury. Nun Mei Kin taught Myanmar language and Buddhist scripture to village girls
who had little opportunity to access any form of education. Her nunnery school produ-
ced many prominent disciples who later continued her lineage through their academic
achievements (Saw Mon Nyin, 1999: 308). This went in parallel with a general shift -
furthered by the actions of King Mindon - that took place in the social attitudes of
Myanmar people who no longer subscribed to the view that women do not need edu-
cation (Hiroko, 2013: 163). In the colonial period, (1886-1947) new nunneries emerged
especially in the Sagaing hills. Nuns of the Sagaing Hills have played important roles in
the Pariyatti education of nuns during the colonial period1 (Yawai Tun, 1998: 240-265).
In spite of this nuns faced many challenges in their Pariyatti education which they
had to receive from monks. For example, some abbots laid down a rule at their monas-
teries that monks should not teach Pariyatti to nuns and women in general. U Nanda,
Shankalaykyun Sayadaw (1810-1858), did not even teach Buddhist scripture to his youn-
ger sis-ter, Nun Mei Kin. U Devinda, Taung-bi-lu Sayadaw in Sagaing, did not refuse
to teach nuns and laywomen, but he always kept a curtain between himself and the
students (Daw Kusalavati, 2008: 114-115). Therefore, it was not as easy for nuns to learn
Pariyatti as it was for monks. Those who have excellent knowledge in Pariyatti literatu-
re have usually been monks. However, only few of them2 thought that nuns should be
educated in Pariyatti up to the highest level. But with some educated monks suppor-
ting nuns and the nuns themselves persevering in their attempts to acquire a religious
education, finally the educational standard improved (Myanmar.cm, 2016) since 1945.
Short overview: historical and legal positions of nuns
Nuns engaged exclusively in two religious activities: Pariyatti and Patipatti. They did not
get involved in secular activities or establish any secular association or organisations,
but neither did monks before 1954. This created difficulties when the 1953 Land Natio-
nalisation Act was enacted. The nun community needed to get particular recognition
from the State as a religious organisation with a claim to religious lands. In 1954, legal
1 Some significant nunneries of Myanmar in the Colonial Period were; Ambaramra Nunnery (Shwe-
daung), AriyaMaggin Chaung (Mingun), Ate TawyaNunnery (Yangon), AyeMyoChaung (Sagaing),
AyeNein YeikthaMalaramaNunnery (Yangon), andAyeNyein Chaung (Sagaing), DhammikaNun-
nery (Pyay), Gugalay Chaung (Religious Retreat) (Mingun), Guni Chaung (Sagaing), IngyinMyaung
Nunnery (Pyay), Khemarthaka Thikshin Taik Nunnery (Mawlamying), Khemesakka Nunnery (Mo-
nywa), LediDhammaMedani Nunnery (Monywa), LediDhammeSaka Nunnery (Monywa), Maggin
Nunnery (Pyay), Myan AungNunnery (Monywa), Nibbanda Chaung (Sagaing), NibbandaNunnery
(Pyay), Samiddodaya Teaching Nunnery (Sagaing), Shamin Chaung (Mingun).
2 Htootkhaung Sayadaw (1798-1880) was one of the firstmonkswho supported higher Pariyatti edu-
cation for nuns.Masoeyein Sayadaw (1879-1975) supported the idea that higher Pariyatti education
was a necessity for nuns.Mahagandayon Sayadaw (1900-1977) accepted the nuns to teach Pariyatti
Literature. At present time, Pali University is teaching both monks and nuns Pariyatti in the same
classroom only keeping a curtain between two groups.
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disputes arose over the nationalisation of religious lands (burmalibrary.org, 2016). The
Land Nationalisation Act stipulated that areas that were known to have been donated
by Burmese kings for religious purposes were exempted from nationalisation. Monks
were officially recognised as religious personnel but nuns were not officially recognis-
ed as religious members of the Order (Samgha), so the nunnery premises were claimed
not to be exempted. This came to light in the legal disputes in 1954. Here the argument
was put forward that nuns were not members of the Order. The nuns were much more
indignant about the claim that they were not members of the Samgha than about the
prospect of the nationalisation of their religious lands.They argued that, since they we-
re not engaged in lay affairs, they were members of the Samgha. As religious personnel
both monks and nuns had no right to cast their votes in the Parliamentary Elections,
but monks were recognised as religious members whereas the state regarded nuns as
non-religious members.
In the light of these developments, nuns established their own associations to en-
gage in Government and social affairs when their religious interests demanded it. The
first of these associations, Myanmar Nun League of Sagaing Hill Ranges was formed in
1954. Some years later, in 1961, Sasana Hitakari, Nun League of Myanmar, was formed
in Yangon (Yawei Tun, 1998: 271-274).
In the early 1980s, an organisational framework for the monastic community was
implemented nationwide. The National Committee of Supreme Samgha Council was
created. Meanwhile, registration for both monks and nuns was made compulsory in
1981, essentially requiring them to possess a monastic address. Since then, Myanmar
Buddhist nuns are no longer entitled to holdNational RegistrationCards like laywomen.
They are given thila-shin ID cards which are neither like a laywoman’s nor like a monk’s.
The membership cards are to be issued only to permanent nuns aged twelve and above.
The leader nun must endorse the academic career in the records whenever a nun moves
from one nunnery to another.
Myanmar nuns initially became incorporated into the State Samgha Organisation3
when the Council for Buddhist Nuns was established in 1982. The State Samgha Orga-
nisation became the highest decision-making body for the Samgha in discussing and
making decisions on monastic affairs. This was meant to consolidate the state organi-
sation and also stipulate a legal framework for nuns, operating as the highest repre-
sentative body for Buddhist nuns in Myanmar (Thilashin Ahpwe-asi Achekhan Simyin,
1981: 3) In the structure of the Samgha organisation the highest organisation for nuns is
at the state and division level.They have permanent organisations only at the divisional
or regional levels. Nuns like monks are subjected to civil laws as well as regulations set
up by the State Samgha Committee. Township and divisional executive nuns’ organi-
sation committees settle disputes among nuns. In case of any dispute, nuns can turn
to the nun organisation in the respective township. If one of the sides is not satisfied
with the decision made by the organisation, they can move the case to the township or
divisional Samganayaka committee to solve the problem. The respective Samganayaka
committee examines the cases forwarded by the two sides. Then, they hand the case
back to the nun organisation with guidelines and suggestions on how to proceed. If the
3 It was established in 1974 led by monks and the State. It is called Samghanayaka.
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case concerns or involves secular authorities, for example if the disputed persons need
to be arrested, the nun organisation has to cooperate with the local authorities (Inter-
view with Ma Kusalanyani, 2016). In the State Samgha Organisation the top position is
occupied by monks. Nuns have decision making power only at the divisional level.
Nuns and voluntary social work
Since the majority of Myanmar citizens are Buddhist, they abide by the moral codes
taught by the Lord Buddha. These moral codes oblige society to show empathy, and
provide charity towards their elderly parents as well as to old people and disabled per-
sons, in general. According to the law of kamma in Theravada (an impersonal, natural
law that operates in accordance with our actions) present deeds determine the future
life of each individual. Therefore, Myanmar people including the ancient kings perfor-
med meritorious deeds in the hope to get a better life in the future. In this context,
social service is considered meritorious.
Although the members of the Buddhist monastic community have renounced the
worldly life, they still have an important contribution to make to the welfare of the
society, since the rule of kamma and merit applies to them as well. Traditionally both
monks and nuns have inter-acted with society in ways similar to those of social workers
and counsellors. Myanmar nuns actively engage in domestic activities such as cooking
for alms-giving occasions, organising catering services at religious occasions, and ba-
sic services for the community.These activities are thought to bring meritorious return
(InterviewwithMa Kusalanyani, 2016). Nowadays, in the Buddhist religious community
in Myanmar nuns are increasingly recognised as ritual specialists, educators and pro-
pagators of Buddhism.They have detailed knowledge on every ceremonial procedure so
that they complement the monks in Buddhist ceremonies.
On the other hand, and somewhat contradicting the above, Buddhists in Myanmar
commonly upheld a view that monastic members should not intervene in secular life,
which often involved wasting time filling forms and dealing with corrupt officials. In
their view social work is actually a poor diversion fromwhatmonasteries and nunneries
should work for and, for that reason, it has become disputed, as if it was a disruption
for monks and nuns (Hiroko, 2013: 47)
Monastic Education
Since the colonial period and before, social work was to a large extent in the purview
of Buddhist missionaries, monasteries and Buddhist lay voluntary organisations. Af-
ter independence, the state took over welfare tasks to some extent in cooperation with
religious bodies. The Ministry of Social Welfares established in 1953 with the advice
of United Nations should carry out social services more effectively. Alongside, the go-
vernment established a Mass Education Council under the Ministry of Social Welfare
with the intention to educate the people in rural areas. This was considered one of the
most relevant sectors. Since the time of AFPFL (1948-1962) government joined hands
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together with monks and nuns to provide primary education. The objective of the Mo-
nastic Education Plan (medg.org, 2016) was to provide primary level education to the
children of rural areas4 before implementing the Act of Primary Compulsory Educa-
tion System in 1950 (Than Htut, 1980). Under this system, monasteries and nunneries
taught from kindergarten to fourth standard in remote regions where there were no
state schools. Nuns worked on this primary education plan as part of their religious
work.
After the military coup of 1962, welfare and social services by religious bodies were
curtailed. Only from 1997 onwards was it again possible to work in this direction (see
below). Some nunneries then took up social welfare for underprivileged girls. Since
these nunneries were considered secular charity organisations and not religious bodies,
they had to register with the Ministry of Social Welfare Relief and Resettlement.
Today some Nunnery Education Schools still follow the model of Monastic Educa-
tion Schools. Nunnery Education School called Zambu Ushaung Thilashin Sarthintaik
in Yangon Division. Nunnery Education School Shwe Sin Min Thilashin Women Para-
hita Pannyaye School in Pyin Oo Lwin, Mandalay Division under the headship of Daw
Nandasingi, and Aye Yeik Mon Nunnery in Mandalay all provide free education for stu-
dents from primary level to grade eleven. The first mentioned school accommodates
nuns who belong to different ethnic backgrounds such as Rakhaing, Pa-O, Palaung,
Shan and Mon. All also serve as orphanages where orphans and especially underprivi-
leged girls from these ethnic regions receive education and vocational training (Htay
Hla Aung, 2013: 39). The nunnery organises short-term meditation retreats in the sum-
mer holidays as well (Kyaw Zin, 2012: 17).
The nuns of the last-mentioned school are struggling hard to feed more than two
hundred orphans and send them to school. It would be imperative to introduce innova-
tive practices such as environmental work and new teacher training techniques to make
progress and improve Myanmar’s educational standards. Some nunneries also work as
Learning Centers for nuns and girls, providing cultural and academic education for
children and adults to improve their lives until they return to their home (mandalay-
projects.net, 2016).
Missionary Activities
Buddhist nuns focus on teaching lay people moral lessons as taught by the Buddha.
Their most important duty is to encourage people to understand the teaching correc-
tly. They also go to remote areas and de-liver the messages of the Buddha to people
living there. One special component of nuns social work is therefore missionary work
which has become popular and developed vigorously in the image of Christian missio-
nary establishments.Therefore,Missionary work is an important task of Buddhist nuns
in Myanmar. The efforts of Daw Nyanacari disciples (see below), frontiers missionary
worker Daw Dhammacaryi, Daw Weijesi (B.A), and Daw Pannacari of the Mawlamyine
4 To assist in providing basic education needs of the country especially for children from needy fa-
milies and orphans — filling the significant gap in the education system.
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Khema-rama nunnery are worth mentioning here. Daw Dhammacaryi, a native of My-
eik in the southernmost part of the country went as far north as Putao, Kachin state
to carry out missionary work there. Except for some Buddhists, Putao and its surroun-
ding area was inhabited by Ka-chins, Shans, Rawans, Lisu and Danu indigenous races
who profess Christianity or Spirits worship. The ethnic minority Buddhist community
there had founded a Dhamma Centre and a religious propagation group, which needed
a missionary nun.
Daw Dhammacaryi, accompanied by another nun, went to Putao in 1964 to fill the
gap. She explained the vippassana in a simplemanner tomale and female yogis, i.e. those
practicing religious meditation. At the same time, school education up to the seventh
standard from primary to middle school levels was provided for these people, just as
the Christian missionaries did. In a similar manner, nun Ma Weijesi, at the Sasana
Beikman on the SagaingHill range, had Palaungs, Shans, Kayins, and Kadu girls trained
for the nunhood along with Myanmar novices. Daw Weijesi had even more ambitious
plans for the propagation of the Buddhist faith which included the opening of Buddhist
missionary schools where lay youths as well as nuns could get a modern education.The
ultimate aim was to educate nuns in both secular and religious studies to enable them
to head Buddhist missionary schools in the near future.The success of such endeavours
as that by DawWeijesi would enhance the missionary work by Myanmar Buddhist nuns
in general.
To further this aim, the Sasana Hitakatari League of Nuns opened aThalashin Teka-
tho (Advanced Study Centre for Nuns) in 1969 at theMawlamyine Nunnery, on Boundary
Road in Yangon. Nuns who had passed the pahtamapyan (senior standard exam), and
those who held the dhammacariya (Teacher of the Dhamma) Pali paragu title, were accep-
ted at the centre. The subject components included both religious and secular subjects,
e.g. Mathematics, and History, Geography etc. as minor subjects. Some controversies
arose over the teaching of secular subjects like English to women who were supposed to
have left the worldly life behind, and consequently, teaching of secular subjects ended
after four years in favour of teaching Buddhist treatises. Nevertheless, the nuns who
graduated from theThilashin Thekatho were well qualified for missionary work.
Contemporary Changes
In the wake of nationalisation policies of the military government in 1964,5 social ser-
vice was monopolized by the Ministry of Social Welfare. From 1962 to 1988, Myanmar
practiced socialist policies and the state did not encourage and even hinder private
volunteer work including nuns’ missionary work. After the army-staged coup of 1988
and the formation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in 1989
internationally enforced sanctions affected Myanmar people’s social and economic life
negatively. To lessen the country’s economic and social hardship, the State Peace and
5 The military government took power in 1962. It wanted to move the country forward according to
the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’. So in 1964 all private sector enterprises were nationalized by the
Burma Socialist Programme Party.
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Development Council (SPDC, 1997-2010) loosened some of the central controls on the
economy and made attempts to encourage foreign investment and foreign organisati-
ons to enter the country. Subsequently, the state recognised social organisations as local
volunteer service and permitted them to function again.The Ministry of Social Welfare
issued permits to these social welfare bodies such as Home for the Aged, missionary
work etc. by registering them as organisations.
The year 1990 was a turning point for nuns in Myanmar in another respect. Sin-
ce the early 1990s, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) (1988-1997)
government realised the value of Buddhism as an effective political instrument and
actively appropriated the notion of Sasana (the community of believers) to consolida-
te political legitimacy (Saw Mon Nyin, 1999: 110). In particular, nuns engaged in social
work have come to play an important role in this new direction and they increasingly
took an active role to support the state as dutiful guardians of Sasana. Thus, Buddhist
nuns are no longer seen as merely pious laywomen, though they are still not accepted
as full members of the Order. Dr. Hiroko Kawanami evidenced this by pointing at the
frequent usage of honorific and deferential terms by the Myanmar public in addressing
thila-shins as great monastic members (Saw Mon Nyin, 1999: 110).
In the light of an improving religious and social standing, most nuns now are in-
creasingly aware of the importance of religious education. They study the Buddhist
scriptures and even can take part in competitions for academic excellence together with
monks. This has enhanced their status and provided them with increased donations
from both government and private donors.
With the new opportunities since the late 90s Buddhist nuns became increasingly
active in the public welfare sector and included also in their missionary efforts activities
such as providing education and daily expenses at their nunneries to under-privileged
girls as well as those of Kachin, Wa and Shan ethnic minorities in the border areas of
Northern and North Eastern part of Myanmar where a civil war was raging. At these
nunneries, nuns took care of orphans and children from poor families. Parents were
willing to send their girls to a nunnery because they could not feed their children well
and support their education.
In a parallel development, several nunneries in Myanmar sought to enhance their
social and religious capital through various kinds of social work. Though by religious
convention, nuns should stay away from secular activities, they have now reconsidered
this concept in the light of changing conditions in the country and society. They adopt
a new attitude towards social work, especially education and can count it as a merit-
generating activity.
Since Buddhist tradition demands to help those who need assistance, private soci-
al service organisations have developed that are often more effective and efficient than
state welfare institutions.These private institutions established by rich individuals con-
tinue to emerge. After the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC, 1997-2010) ope-
ned the door to a Market Oriented Economy in 1997 the economy of the country stabi-
lised and gradually developed as a result. This enabled private individuals to financially
support religious functions and infrastructure.
Simultaneously, public opinion in Myanmar increasingly accepts the idea of nuns
taking on a more active religious role and Buddhist nuns themselves are responding
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to new demands placed upon them by society. Nuns’ institutions are acknowledged as
part of the social welfare type of institutions in Myanmar. We look now at two of these
institutions a bitmore closely, the Samiddhodaya SukhitaramaMyanaungNunnery and
the Shwemynitzu Nunnery School.
Samiddhodaya Sukhitarama Myanaung nunnery (Daw Nyanacari sarthintike)
An outstanding example of furthering religious education for nuns is the mentioned
Daw Nyanacari Myanaung Kyaung. Founded in 1947 by the late Daw Nyanacari, until
today a highly revered nun, the nunnery with its 45 branches countrywide is one of the
most prestigious schools for nuns in Myanmar. Its reputation for pariyatti (teaching,
learning) and patipatti (practicing) attracts even nuns from other countries like Nepal,
Vietnam and Germany. At the moment about 300 thila-shin are living permanently the-
re to undergo their studies which include Buddhist literature, Pali, Abhidhamma, and
other scriptures. Around 50 of them are attending the course for dhamma-ariyas (Tea-
cher of the Dhamma),which is currently the highest educational title thila-shin can gain.
This course takes around three years and allows the graduates to teach in other nunne-
ries. Only religious scholars teach at this school which is administered by an Executive
Committee of fifteen members under the leadership of Daw Zayawadi. The nunnery
inspires girls from across Myanmar to get a religious education and/or to take up a
religious life.
Short Biography of Daw Nyanacari
Daw Nyanacari (1897-1976) was born in Tanthonpin village, which is in Myang Aung,
Ayeyarwady region in lower Myanmar. Her father, U Ingyin was a village headman. Her
parents were pious and brought her up in a religious environment where listening to
monks’ sermons was almost a weekly ritual. Once her nun friends took her to their nun
teacher and it made her realize the possibility of not only learning the scriptures, but
taking up amonastic life as a woman as well.When she told her parents that she wanted
to become a nun, they did not allow her to enter the nunhood. As the youngest daughter
she was expected to look after her parents when they got old. Therefore, she escaped
from her home three times in succession. Eventually her parents accepted her decision
and her argument that she would benefit them more by being a thila-shin. With her
highly regarded knowledge Daw Nyanacari became later a respected Buddhist scholar,
known as ‘teacher for 500 thi-la-shin and more.’
Like other nunneries the Daw Nyanacari nunnery receives its main support from
generous lay Buddhist persons and the families of the thila-shin. The Government do-
nates only 200 sacks of rice each year. Twice a week the nuns go out to the markets and
streets for receiving alms. The strictly organised day is filled with periods of studies,
meditation and manual activities. A high-quality Buddhist education and meditation
practice is the major concern of the nunnery. In addition, the nunnery has long tradi-
tion for admitting Buddhist girls between five and ten years of age during the summer
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vacation. They don the nun costume and follow the novice routine. They are trained in
basic Buddhist deportment and duties, such as presentation and offering of alms food,
of votive water, of flowers, as well as the asking for precepts, taking of precepts, prayers
and suttas. This not only provides them with religious knowledge, it is also intended as
a training in graceful manners and elegant speech. Thus, Daw Nyanacari can be called
the master of thila-shin Sasana in the post-independence period.
Foundation and Development of the Nunnery
The SecondWorldWar spread to Yangon in December 1941 and the Japanese army orde-
red the people to evacuate Yangon. DawNyanacari’s nunnery which she had established
in 1939 in Yangon, was destroyed during the invasion, and she thus returned to Mya-
naung. Rather than living with her parents she stayed at Bhavana nunnery with her
disciples and continued religious propagation (Tin Shwe, 1989: 78-80). During the Japa-
nese occupation some people in Myanaung took refuge at Bhavana nunnery and Daw
Nyanacari accommodated these refugees. She also took the responsibility to feed them.
Daw Nyanacari was not satisfied to just propagate the Buddhist religion fromMya-
naung with her then seventy disciples. Therefore, she attempted to extend the nunnery
to Yangon. U Chit Maung, the donor who had helped her already with her first nunnery
in Yangon, donated 1.636 acres of land situated on Kyuntaw Road, Sanchaung Township
in April 1948 in place of the destroyed nunnery site.
When construction of nunnery was about to be finished in 1949, Daw Nyanacari
moved to the new place. Food supply and accommodation were not as convenient as in
Myanaung. But DawNyanacari persevered with teaching and preaching. After indepen-
dence Prime Minister U Nu came to know about the nunnery and visited it personally.
He donated a three-storied brick building to the nunnery in 1962.
In order to provide medical care to the student nuns and novices Daw Nyanacari
desired to open a western-style dispensary, to which Lay donors U Pu and Daw Saw Kyi
donated the requisite tools, equipment and medicine (Western dispensary). So Daw
Nyanacari was able to open both a traditional and a western dispensary in the same
year on campus for student nuns. After Daw Nyanacari died in 1975, the dispensary
continued under the administration of the abess.The dispensary was closed temporarily
by the military government, but could reopen in 1983 with the help of unpaid assistant
doctors. Besides this, the nunnery also provided dental treatment from its foundation
until today. In this way, the nunnery was able to provide not only for the spiritual, but
also for the bodily needs of the nuns and their disciples (Interview with Daw Vimala,
2015).
Shwemyintzu Nunnery School
While the Samiddhodaya Sukhitarama Myanaung nunnery concentrates primarily on
religious education for novices and temporary student nuns, the Shwemyintzu nunnery
in Yangon, though operating in the tradition of Daw Nyanacari, has a different focus.
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It has been active in social work since 1993. The school is contributing significantly to
the growth of civil society in Myanmar, which is undergoing a process of opening and
reform that began in 2010. In this period the school has provided a public venue for
Myanmar people to meet and participate in religious activities, and even to discuss
politics and social affairs in a safe environment, because the political authorities regard
Buddhist nuns as non-political in contrast to monks who have led politics in Myanmar
since the colonial period. Thus, the school is contributing to the process of creating a
public sphere free of government control. Since its founding, Shwemyintzu nunnery
has functioned as a centre for education, boarding and fulfilling the needs of young
girls from remote areas and orphans.
Among the many nunnery schools, which give support to education in Myanmar,
Shwemyintzu is one of the most successful ones. It sees itself in the tradition of Daw
Nyanacari, but goes beyond the activities and aims of the Samiddhodaya nunnery school
which focuses exclusively on religion and religious issues to serve the extended needs
of society. Shwemyintzu Nunnery school was founded by Head Nun Daw Sandar Thiri.
It is situated at 31/10 North ward, Tharkayta Township, Yangon Region. In 2003, Head
Nun Daw Ootra Nyani took over this responsibility. The aim of this school is to provide
meals and lodging in addition to education to orphans and helpless young girls from
remote places inMyanmar’s border areas with China andThailand.Most of the students
studying at this school are from Shan State as well as Chin, Palaung, Pa O, Shan and
Bamar (Interview with Daw Oottra Nyarni, 2015).
The vision of Shwemyintzu Nunnery school is “to raise children who can build their
life to become highly developed and will become the bright star of the country” (Inter-
view with Sayagyi Daw Oottra Nyarni, 2015). To be able to implement and achieve these
objectives, the school provides education for students at primary and middle school le-
vels. Besides education for the boarders, the school also serves as a day school for poor
children and orphans from the vicinity.
The number of students has increased from only 30 in 2000-2001 to 152 students
in the 2005-2006 academic year. This is because Shwemyintzu school not only provides
free education, but also free exercise books, pencils and text books. It assists needy stu-
dents and encourages and helps the parents whose children are working to earn money
to let the children study at the school. Moreover, teachers teach extra time with the
intention of not only helping students to pass exams but also to enhance their overall
qualifications and competences. In addition, the school is conveniently located for the
students’ food and boarding for girls and boys who came from backgrounds of ethnic
conflict (Interview with Daw Thida, 2015). The curriculum and syllabus from kinder-
garten to the 4th grade is the same as the government scheme. The school takes the
responsibility of question setting and exam result issuing from kindergarten to the 4th
grade.
Sixty hours of Reading, Writing, and Critical thinking training are taught by tea-
chers in Shwemyintzu School. The health care group gives lectures on health education
to both teachers and students together with providing nutritious food once a month.
The library group gives courses on library science to the two teachers from Shwemyint-
zu School and the group donated books for the school library. This group also holds a
story telling competition, and debate once a year, so that students can acquire the abi-
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lity being prepared and confident. The three teachers from Gitameit music group give
painting training, drama training and music training (Interview with Daw Nyein San-
da Khine, 2015). Moreover, with the support given by other NGOs such as the Myanmar
Medical Association and Pyinnya Tazaung Association (Light of Education), students’
education and health conditions have been developed and teachers’ qualities have been
upgraded. Still, Shwemyintzu School provides students not only with formal education
but also religious knowledge.
Nunnery schools havemore financial burdens thanmonastic schools for they cannot
get as many donations as monastic schools. Funds for Shwemyintzu School are raised
inmany ways, by collecting donations by nuns, and from local and foreign well-wishers.
Still the most crucial challenge faced by this school is inadequate funds (Interview with
Daw Aye AyeThant, 2015). Although the abbess, head mistress and teachers try to make
efforts to help education for helpless girls and orphans from the remote and border
areas, they face great difficulties; still the nunnery has overcome any difficulties until
now and has achieved public acclaim.
Discussion and Conclusion
The monastic community is pivotal for the socio-religious life of the Buddhist popula-
tion, operating through a network of monks, nuns and lay supporters. The status and
social standing of nuns have been hampered by their lower status compared to monks,
which has assigned nuns a half-way position between pious laywoman and religious
mendicant. Improving nuns’ religious knowledge and scriptural education can enhan-
ce their social and religious capital. An improved religious and social status of nuns in
Myanmar since the 1990s has simultaneously helped to empower women and improve
their status in Myanmar in general. This was mainly due to the guiding work of the
Daw Nyanacari nunnery and Shwemyintzu nunnery. By raising the standing of nuns in
Myanmar, the Daw Nyanacari nunnery has, at the same time, broadened opportunities
for the country’s women and girls. This nunnery has become a role model for Buddhist
nuns in Myanmar. It has developed an outstanding reputation for academic excellence.
With many lay donors coming to see the beneficial outcomes, the nunnery is now self-
sustaining, entirely supported by lay donations within Myanmar. The nunnery’s gra-
duate students have opened branch nunneries and the school is affiliated with mission
activities and social work for orphans and poor girls. Daw Nyanacari nunnery school
offers a safe single-sex environment for women to study the scriptures, pursue a reli-
gious vocation and affiliate with lay supporters. Furthermore, their spiritual standing
and so also financial and social support have been enhanced by the reputation, growth
and financial success of the nunnery.The achievements of Daw Nyanacari‘s nunnery as
well as her success in her personal life had a powerful influence on the religious and
social work of nuns.The disciples of Daw Nyanacari set up their own nunneries in their
home towns and villages after they had finished their educational levels and obtained
their degrees. They follow in the steps of their pioneer Daw Nyanacari, but also, as we
saw, sometimes go beyond her activities to serve wider society in a secular fashion as
in the Shwemyintzu nunnery school.
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This situation creates perfect conditions also for social work defined as missionary
work. Nuns achievements in social work also gain them a higher position in society in
return. After 1990 it was learning by doing. Nuns’ social work concentrated on primary
education, but alongside they also provided healthcare, shelter, food, and clothes for
needy people. The nunneries founded since the 1990s have become well known for the
social services they provide. This is particularly true for Shwemyintzu nunnery, which
has operated as a school taking care not only of education but also boarding and lodging
for orphans and young girls from remote areas.
These two nunneries can serve as examples how the work of nuns extended and
broadened from teaching the scriptures - initially to girls and women from the upper
strata of society, then to poor and underprivileged girls as well - down to basic social
services for poor women and people in general. This is the most crucial change in the
profile of nuns in present-day Myanmar. By looking at this development process, we
can also see how the broadening of nuns’ tasks and activities has enhanced mutual
understanding and respect between nuns, the people and even the state.
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Since the 1960s, many studies have been carried out on urbanisation and its diverse
phenomena with sociological, ethnological and historical approaches. For a long time,
a contrast between the development of cities and megacities in Southeast Asia with
villages and other rural settlements has been proposed, with the former being a visual
sign of the success of modernity, while the latter shows the backwardness of peasant
societies and rural regions (Korff, 1999: 140). Southeast Asian cities were interpreted
as places of institutions and people deemed necessary for any modernisation process,
of essential infrastructure such as ports, harbours, airports, railways or roads and of
the concentration for required capital, in colonial Indonesia that was mainly in Dutch,
Chinese and Arab hands. Furthermore, Southeast Asian megacities also provided the
framework for new nationalist elites after independence where the territorial control
of the new states was,more or less successfully secured, institutions of the new national
administration were established, and symbols of national unity and pride such as natio-
nal museums or independence memorials were erected (Anderson, 1988: 18; Kurfürst,
2018: 166-7).
Modern urbanisation processes and its results were often viewed by social scien-
tists and others with a certain ambivalence. Immediately after decolonisation, cities
of the new developing nation states of Asia and Africa were interpreted as a path to
modernisation and a bright future. However, just a generation later, a number of ne-
gative aspects could not be overlooked. Slums, high crime rates and an extremely high
social polarisation caused cities to be viewed as parasites. This perception rather ham-
pered the economic and social development of the former colonies. Large portions of
inhabitants of colonial and postcolonial Southeast Asian cities were not integrated in
their modern economies, nor could they participate in the new ways of communication
(newspapers, radio, television etc.) available in urban areas (Korff, 1999: 141).
Since the Second World War, Southeast Asian megacities became a focus in socio-
logical or geographical studies. In addition, villages and rural development have also
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been quite well researched. However, small and middle-sized towns have, so far, been
relatively understudied, in particular by historians.1This humble essay in honour of Rü-
diger Korff tries to show how the first small towns in Far Eastern Indonesia developed
out of trading places, missionary stations and administrative posts in the Moluccas and
West New Guinea. While indigenous states have been connected with the development
and growth of cities and towns in Southeast Asia (Evers and Korff, 2000: 29), the histo-
rical situation in the Indonesian Far East differs somewhat from the rest of Indonesia
and other parts of Southeast Asia as indigenous states did not develop except for a few
areas of this region.
Examples of town development in Eastern Indonesia:
Larantuka (East Flores) and Dobo (Aru)
As highlighted by, among others, Evers and Korff (2000: 29ff), urbanisation is not a
foreign element to Southeast Asia and was crucial factor in the formation of pre-co-
lonial states in the region. However, although connected through trade relations for
centuries, or perhaps even millennia, with western Indonesia, the Philippines or Chi-
na, indigenous states in Far Eastern Indonesia are rather the exception than the rule.
Sultanates in eastern Indonesia were strongly dependent on maritime trade relations
with the outside world. Spices such as nutmeg, mace and cloves from the northern and
central Moluccas were only the most valuable items circulating inside the various Sou-
theast Asian trade networks and beyond to theWest (India, Arabia, Europe) or the North
(China, Korea, Japan). Other products on offer included: sandalwood, massoy bark, sea
cucumbers (trepang), wild nutmeg, plumes and feathers of birds of paradise, crowned
pigeons and parrots, living cassowaries, sago, tortoise shells, wax, camphor, dammar
and other resins, mother-of-pearl, and last but not least, slaves.2 In return, Papuan
and eastern Moluccan societies received rice, salt, betel, tobacco, silk textiles, Chinese
and Vietnamese trade porcelain, earthenware, Chinese copper and silver coins, Indian
cloth, glass and other pearls, metal tools and weapons such as axes, knives and mache-
tes, and since the mid-19th century, more and more fire arms and gunpowder. Rifles
and old muzzle loaders, often locally named in Indonesia as donderbus (‘Blunderbuss’),
were not so much in demand for warfare or slave raids, but rather for hunting birds of
paradise and other beautifully coloured rainforest birds. These birds were in demand
as their plumes and feathers were used as female accessories for hats and other clothes
in 19th century Europe and America. Following World War I, female fashion completely
changed, thus destroying the market for bird plumes and feathers in New Guinea and
the Aru Islands, but saving the birds from complete extinction (Swadling, 1996). Alt-
hough little is known about this period in terms of trading relations, its century-long
1 A noteable exception is “In Search of Middle Indonesia” edited by van Klinken and Berenschot
(2014).
2 Although slavery was officially forbidden in Indonesia since the 1860s, slave raids in coastal New
Guinea stopped only at the end of the 19th century, while the trade in slaves was locally carried
out until well into the first decades of the 20th century.
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existence is proved by at least three large bronze drums in the Bird’s Head Peninsula of
the Vietnamese Dong Son Culture (5th century BC) as well as the excavations of several
Dong Son bronze axes as far east as the vicinities of present day Jayapura and beyond
(Moore, 2003: 48). This is a good example that the term ‘isolation’ should be used with
care and in a rather relative way.
States based on societies that spoke Papuan languages such as Ternate, Tidore or
Jailolo in the northern Moluccas are rather untypical for Indonesia. Contact with the
wider world since the age of commerce from the 15th century onwards (Reid, 1988) in-
troduced Islam and Christianity into Indonesia’s Far East, as well as new concepts of
political organisation. Eastern Indonesian sultanates such as Buton in Southeast Su-
lawesi, Ternate, Tidore, Jailolo or Bacan in the Northern Moluccas, or the Portuguese-
influenced state Larantuka in Eastern Flores, or the several domains and petty states on
the islands of Roti, Sumba or Timor (Fox, 1977) had developed small towns as residences
of their rulers. Besides these sultanates and the spice trading ports of Ambon and Ban-
da, no pre-colonial cities or towns seemed to have existed in the Far East of Indonesia.3
Trade networks in the eastern Moluccas and New Guinea functioned rather differ-
ently from those inwestern Indonesia or Southeast Asia. First, different trade languages
had been locally in use, which reached a considerable scale of geographical extension.
Languages such as Biak were spoken until the early 20th century throughout Cendera-
wasih Bay, the coasts of the Birds’ Head Peninsula, the Raja Ampat Islands and south to
the Onin Peninsula. Malay as a lingua franca in coastal New Guinea was comparatively
a latecomer, perhaps a side effect of the expansion of economic activities of Chine-
se traders into Cenderawasih Bay in the 18th century.4 However, due to the impact of
often Ambonese mission school teachers, and the spread of Dutch colonial control in
New Guinea, Biak was completely replaced as a lingua franca throughout the coastal
New Guinea region after World War I (Warnk, 2010: 117-8).5 Besides dialects such as
Ambonese Malay, Larantuka Malay or Northern Moluccan Malay, other, smaller trade
languages such as Wolio (Butonese) or the Tukang Besi language, were in use locally in
eastern Indonesia.
The absence of monetary trade in the eastern Moluccas and coastal New Guinea
led historians and social anthropologists to look for different models of economic tran-
sactions. Although integrated in the world system in Wallerstein’s sense, the region’s
economy is better understood if trade procedures are analysed with models presented
in classical anthropological studies of Melanesia by Bronislaw Malinowski, or Thomas
Harding among others, and general surveys such as Marshall Sahlins well-known Stone
Age Economics (1972). Using these models, Roy Ellen has delivered an excellent study
on the dynamics of a Moluccan trading network that extended well into coastal New
3 To be fair, this assumption might also result from the lack of archaeological research in the region
so far.
4 When the English country trader Thomas Forrest visitedDore in January 1775 hemet several Chine-
se traders with Dutch passports issued in Tidore (Forrest, 1780: 106) and a local Biak-Malay trans-
lator (Forrest, 1780: 100).
5 Biak now has the status of an endangered language with c. 20,000 mother tongue speakers only
(van den Heuvel, 2006).
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Guinea, but was also connected to European, Indian and East Asian markets (Ellen,
2003).
The introduction of the new religions Islam and Christianity resulted in the deve-
lopment of sultanates in the Northern Moluccas. These sultanates were rather limited
in their range of power before their contacts with Portuguese, Spanish, English and
particularly Dutch colonial traders and administrators, and of small states in the wi-
der Timor region, which were heavily influenced by Portuguese Catholicism and Dutch
Calvinist colonial symbolism. When the Norwegian traveller Johan Adrian Jacobsen vi-
sited Larantuka in Eastern Flores in January 1888, he witnessed the appointment of the
new raja, Don Lorenzo, by the “Governor of Timor”. This account seems to be an error
by Jacobsen, as there never was a Dutch governor of Timor, perhaps the Resident of
Kupang in West Timor is what was meant here. Raja Don Lorenzo had to swear an oath
of loyalty on a Dutch charter of appointment, a bar with a golden knob and a Royal
Dutch emblem (Jacobsen, 1896: 72). Jacobsen described Larantuka as a “village” with a
Jesuit mission station (established by the Portuguese in the 17th century), with a “grea-
ter church than in Maumeri” (a town on Flores, about 100 km west of Larantuka), a
convent with a school for 160 girls, a safe port where he met a Chinese sailing ship from
Singapore, a considerable market place and a Dutch administrative station (Jacobsen,
1896: 72-74; Beccari, 1924: 28). As a consequence, Larantuka could already be called a
small town in comparison to the other settlements in Eastern Flores, Adonara, Solor, or
Lembata, and in contrast to Jacobsen’s statement, Larantuka was the most important
urban space in that region. However, the town developed around the Portuguese (colo-
nial) presence in the eastern Lesser Sunda Islands even though the Larantuka raja could
develop a considerable grade of independence as, before 1900, direct Dutch control in
the region was somewhat weak.6 In the eyes of the colonial administration, Don Loren-
zo became too arbitrary in his leadership, disobedient towards Dutch rule and misused
his autonomous power in local petty wars. Finally, in 1904 he was discharged and exiled
and Larantuka became the town with the largest Dutch garrison in Eastern Flores. Don
Lorenzo’s activities very much reflect a pattern of political behaviour analysed by social
anthropologist James C. Scott as the “art of not being governed” (Scott, 2009). Scott de-
scribed the manoeuvring of mountainous ethnic groups on the fringes of the spheres of
power of mainland Southeast Asia as strategies of avoiding direct political control from
powerful states based on wet rice cultivation.The principalities and domains of eastern
Indonesia acted similarly to avoid direct interference from the Dutch colonial state and
after independence from the Indonesian central administration, as was shown by Kohl
in his description of traditional rituals and soccer games in the East Flores Regency on
occasion of the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of Indonesian independence (Kohl,
2000: 105-9).
The opening ofMacassar in 1847 and Ambon in 1854 as free ports secured continuing
economic development in Eastern Indonesia, which led finally to the development of
the first small towns in the eastern Moluccas and coastal New Guinea. Perhaps most
numerous documents and sources we have on the Aru Archipelago in the south eas-
tern Moluccas are where Dobo seems to have been a small entrepôt for centuries before
6 For a description of the political structure in the Larantuka principality see Dietrich (1989: 34-36).
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the first Europeans set foot on these islands (O’Connor et al., 2005: 308). According
to accounts by European naturalists and travellers, such as Alfred Russell Wallace and
Hermann von Rosenberg, Dobo was populated quite densely during the trading season
from January to June, depending on the monsoon winds. Before the 16th century, com-
mercial items from Aru seemed to have been forest products such as resins or massoy
bark7, but most important had been the trade in precious live birds and their plumes
and feathers. The markets for the birds were the Middle East, India and, in particular,
China. Birds of paradise, parrots, cockatoos or crowned pigeons had beenmentioned in
Chinese texts quite often, although the different species are difficult to identify. Howe-
ver, all of the species that can be determined, are species from eastern Indonesia, with
habitats east of the biological Wallace Line (Ptak, 2006: 21). In fact, when the first plu-
mes of birds of paradise reached Europe in the 16th century, their origin was assumed
to be the Aru Islands, e.g., by the famous Dutch botanist Charles de l’Écluse (i.e., Ca-
rolus Clusius) (Clusius, 1605: Book 1, 360). Johann Otto Hellwig, a German pharmacist
and alchemist in service of the Dutch East India Company after 1676, delivered in his
observations on the natural history on “several Indian things” (De rebus variis Indicis)
a short essay on birds of paradise, which according to his account, he received himself
from Aru. He also mentioned a Malay nomenclature Burung Aru (“Birds from Aru”),
which clearly shows the importance the Aru bird trade already had for a long period
(Helbigii, 1680: 458).8
The development of Dobo from a rather temporary trading post to a permanent
village and then to a small town started in the second half of the 19th century. The
Dutch scientific draughtsman Adrianus Johannes Bik, who visited the Aru Islands in
April 1824, referred to an active trade in sea cucumbers and pearl fishery. However, he
did not make any mention of any greater settlement with more than 1,000 inhabitants
on the islands (Bik, 1928). About three decades later, the British naturalist Alfred Russell
Wallace stayed in Dobo for two months to collect all kinds of specimens, and delivered
the first more detailed description of the place. When Wallace visited Aru in 1857, he
found there a livingmaritime trade: Dobo was not only frequented yearly by ten to twel-
ve big sailing boats (perahu) owned by Macassar or Bugis traders, but also by hundreds
of smaller boats fromGoram, Eastern Ceram, Banda, Ambon, Kei, Tanimbar and Babar.
This showed a vivid local trade in the Eastern Moluccan region including the coasts of
New Guinea with products intended for an overseas market.9 He also mentioned the
first shops being established by Chinese from Macassar (Wallace, 1862a: 131).
Indeed, the presence of traders and merchants from South Sulawesi was so consi-
derable, it led Wallace to call Dobo a “Bugis trading settlement” (Wallace, 1862b: 154). As
the centre of trade of the Aru Archipelago, Wallace estimated that Dobo, at the height
of the trading season, had about 1,000 residents. Besides staple food, metal wares of
all kind, and other trade items already mentioned above, Dobo was already a place for
7 On the economic importance of massoy bark in the Moluccas and New Guinea see Zieck (1973).
8 Clusius, although never been to Indonesia, also knew aMalay term for the birds of paradise:Manu-
codiata, derived fromMalay Manuk Dewata (“Birds of the Gods”) (Clusius, 1605: Book 1, 360).
9 On the various boat types used for long distance trade in Eastern Indonesia see Horridge (1978).
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Figure 1: Dobbo in the Trading Season
Source: Wallace 1869
“European luxuries” such as sugar, biscuits, preserved fruits or wine10, which could be
obtained in small quantities. Dobo, at the time of his visit, consisted of three crowded
streets of “rude thatched houses” (Wallace, 1862a: 131), which had not changed when
German naturalist Hermann von Rosenberg was in Dobo in 1865 (von Rosenberg, 1878:
327). As evening entertainment, Wallace witnessed among the Bugis residents of Do-
bo, plenty of cock-fighting and football-playing in the streets almost every evening.11 A
similar account is given by Italian naturalist Odoardo Beccari, who stayed on Aru from
February to June 1873: Dobo was a bustling trading port which many people entered
during the western monsoon season between January and June (Beccari, 1924: 200). In
particular, Beccari mentioned the presence of Muslims from Macassar. Their presence
for centuries from the late 17th century and more intensively from the 1850s onwards,
lead to the spread of Islam in Dobo and the Aru Islands (Wellfelt and Djonler, 2019: 166).
In 1848, the Dutch government raised the claim on the territory in Eastern Indone-
sia up to 141° latitude. As a consequence, the spread of Dutch imperialism and colonial
administration was also felt in the Eastern Moluccas. In 1882, a Dutch post was estab-
lished in Aru together with a coal depot at the port, leading to further growth of Dobo.
The colonial administrator, Gerrit WilhelmWolter Baron van Hoëvell, who visited Dobo
10 About fifty years later Hugo Merton also observed that “plenty of boxes of red wine” were loaded
in Macassar with destination Dobo to his great astonishment, as he could not explain why and
how so much quantities of alcohol could be consumed on Aru (Merton, 1911: 9).
11 This perhaps refers rather to the traditional game of sepak takraw / sepak raga rather than to mo-
dern soccer.
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in March 1888 to investigate the trade of Aru, observed the arrival of steamships that
broke the de facto monopoly of Bugis and Macassar traders (van Hoëvell, 1890: 94). Mo-
re and more Chinese traders were coming to Dobo via Macassar, most being originally
from Singapore (van Hoëvell, 1890: 100). After Dobo was reduced to ashes by a great
fire on 1 June 1887, it was completely rebuilt by van Hoëvell’s arrival the following year.
The Chinese then inhabited a separate quarter, which started directly in front of the
Dutch administrator’s building. The Bugis quarter was located to the south of the Chi-
nese houses. Both neighbourhoods had their own administration by a Dutch appointed
official (Kapitan China / Kapitan Bugis). Dobo at that time already consisted of two par-
allel streets with more than 60 wooden houses, mostly inhabited by Chinese, Bugis and
Macassar people (van Hoëvell, 1890: 63). Van Hoëvell estimated more than 80 Chinese
and 360 Bugis and Macassar permanent residents were present in Dobo in addition to
the local population (van Hoëvell, 1890: 72).
The development of Dobo into a small town was already completed when German
zoologist Hugo Merton stayed at Aru from January to May 1908. Steamships then we-
re a regular sight. Besides other steamships, the Royal Dutch company Koninklijke
Paketvaart-Maatschappij ran a regular service every four weeks at the harbour of Dobo
and had an agent in the town since 1906. In the harbour,Merton noticed several custom
sheds where mostly Chinese people were active in selling their products (Merton, 1911:
16). The town progressed further: the Dutch colonial controlleur lived in a lovely house
with a veranda and the town already had a small hospital with an able Japanese doctor
(Merton, 1911: 17). Australian pearl fishers kept the only two-storied houses close to the
port, while behind these, the quarters of the Chinese, Arabs, Bugis, and other residents
and traders were located. In the Bugis quarter, there was now a small mosque and even
barracks had been erected for a small band of the Dutch colonial army consisting of
one European sergeant, two corporals and 20 Javanese and Ambonese soldiers. Fur-
thermore, two Ambonese policemen and an Ambonese post office clerk were stationed
in Dobo (Merton, 1911: 19). Merton also mentioned the only building in Dobo built with
brick walls: the jailhouse (Merton, 1911: 20). The population became even more multi-
ethnic than already was the case in the 19th century. Merton observed that besides the
tiny European group, the town was populated not only by plenty of Chinese, Bugis and
Macassarese, but also by Bandanese, Timorese, Arabs, Ambonese Protestant missiona-
ry teachers and Japanese women, who were most likely pearl divers (Merton, 1911: 14).12
The evening entertainment also changed considerably since Wallace’s time: the noise of
an out-of-tune gramophone robbed Merton of sleep more than once (Merton, 1911: 15).
The decline of trade in bird-of-paradise plumes after World War I was compensa-
ted, as already observed by Merton, by pearl diving. The most profitable of the pearl
diving companies was the Australian-run, but Macassar-based, Celebes Trading Com-
pany, which was joined by the Bandanese Arab Syeikh Said Baadilla, who subsequently
became the most successful pearl trader of Eastern Indonesia and nicknamed the pearl
king (raja mutiara) of the Moluccas (Martinez and Vickers, 2015: 59). In 1908, when Hu-
go Merton was in Aru, his company ran a fleet of more than 150 pearl fishing boats that
12 The Arab Syeikh Said Baadilla established a pearl diving station in Dobo in 1897 (Broersma, 1934:
325).
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also transported Merton during some of his several expeditions starting out from Dobo
(Merton 1911: 168). The population became even more cosmopolitan: besides Chinese,
Arabs, Bugis, Europeans and local Arunese, now also dozens of Japanese and Filipinos
(“Manilamen”) dwelt at Dobo (v.S., 1916: 299-300).13 The pearl business blossomed until
the late 1920s, when, during the Great Depression, the global pearl trade collapsed. Fi-
nally, in 1933 Baadilla had to declare bankruptcy, and sold most of his pearling fleet to a
certain Chiu, a Chinese wharf master from Dobo (Alwi, 2008: 18). The pearl industry in
Aru saw a short recovery before World War II, which led to a further growth of Dobo.
However, as in other parts of Indonesia, the Pacific War interrupted development. Do-
bo was bombed during World War II where the Japanese maintained a seaplane base.
Following the Indonesian revolution and independence, Dobo remained a small town in
Eastern Indonesia, never regaining its former status as a centre for trade withMoluccan
and New Guinean trade products. In the early 1990s, Dobo had about 3,500 mostly non-
Papuan inhabitants: Chinese, Bugis and Macassarese, with a few Arab merchants and
Javanese civil servants (Muller, 1993: 163). Dobo is now the capital of the Aru Islands
district (Pulau-Pulau Aru) comprising perhaps far more than 10,000 residents.
The first towns in Dutch New Guinea 1900-1941
The first small towns on the coast of Western New Guinea show parallel developments
to those in the Aru Archipelago. Indigenous acephalous societies based on big-men,
and not on hierarchical state structures, did not lead to the creation of local cities or
towns.14 Although Fakfak, Sorong and Manokwari-Dore were small entrepôts for the
trade in birds of paradise for centuries (Warnk, 2010), it was only at the beginning of
the 20th century that greater settlements grew out of villages inhabited by Chinese,
Bugis and Arab traders – quite similar to Dobo on Aru. In addition to growing colo-
nial control, Fak-Fak and Dore were also stations for Christian missions. In Dore, the
Berlin-based Gossener Mission had already established a mission post in 1855, which
was continued by the Utrechtsche Zendingsvereeninging in 1863 (van Hasselt, 1888). In
Fakfak, a Catholic mission station was opened in 1894. In 1898, Dutch officials were sta-
tioned in Fakfak and Dore, with Merauke in South New Guinea following in 1902 and
finally Hollandia (present-day Jayapura) in 1910.15 Dutch control before World War II,
however, remained weak: in 1937 still only 15 Dutch administrators and 50 native clerks
were based in New Guinea, all of them on posts close to the coast (Hastings, 1984: 131).
Alfred RusselWallace and Hermann von Rosenberg visited Dore in 1857 shortly after
the foundation of the mission there. Dore was a village where the houses were stan-
ding completely on poles in the water (Wallace, 1869: 378; de Bruijn Kops, 1850: 174),
13 One cannot but wonder how the communication in Aru functioned at that time as an anonymous
observer stated that Japanese pearl divers and prostitutes in Dobo were neither able to speak or
to understand Pidgin Malay nor Pidgin English (v.S., 1916: 311).
14 For a description of societies based on big men see Godelier (1987).
15 A good overview on the Dutch administration in New Guinea is given in Drooglever (2009: 12-34),
for a detailed study see Sinaga (2013).
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similar to Sorong (Beccari, 1874: 653) and Fakfak (Beccari, 1924: 72). All three places ne-
vertheless were vivid trade ports were Bugis, Arab and Chinese traders were present and
bought live birds and plumes,massoy bark, pearls, sea cucumbers, sago or wild nutmeg
(Wallace, 1862a). Besides trade goods such as glass pearls, rice, knives and axes, Bugis
sarongs and Indian cotton ware, Chinese porcelain and ceramics, silver dollars and to-
bacco, these traders also brought a new language (Malay), and a new religion (Islam) to
coastal New Guinea (Warnk, 2010). However, modern buildings and fixed streets only
appeared in the aftermath of the mission station in Dore and governmental posts after
1900. Visitors to Fakfak in the first decade of the 20th century were surprised about
the hustle and bustle less than 10 years after its foundation: at the roadstead was a
street with several Chinese and Arab shop houses. Besides this, a garrison of 48 Indo-
nesian soldiers and a Dutch sergeant was stationed close-by, a Javanese doctor named
Suhirman (Sudirman?) was practicing, and a Dutch assistant resident, a postal clerk
and an agent of the Dutch Nieuw-Guinea Handelsmaatschappij were living in Fakfak
(vanWeede, 1908: 212ff; Haga, 1911).When Swedish zoologist Sten Bergman visited Fak-
fak in 1948, he noticed the presence of Papuas, “Malays” (Indonesians, perhaps mostly
Ambonese) and hundreds of Chinese (Bergman, 1950: 81).
Figure 2: Eastern Indonesia: colonial towns.
Source: Author’s own draft
Manokwari-Dore, in the eastern Bird’s Head Peninsula, became the District of New
Guinea’s administration centre in 1898, which included the northern Bird’s Head and
northern New Guinea up to Hollandia (Jayapura) in the remote east. Parallel develop-
ments to Fakfak andDobo do appear: a former small entrepôt surrounded by acephalous
Papuan societies was included into a greater economic world. Former local traders be-
came largely replaced by outsiders such as Chinese and Arabmerchants.This was partly
due to a change in trade items.The formerly dominant trade in bird-of-paradise plumes
became obsolete after World War I due to the global change in female fashion. In ad-
dition, there was strong competition and a lack of direct access to the world’s markets
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(e.g. the marketing of oyster pearls). Less than 20 years after the arrival of the Dutch,
the then well-known journalist Alma Karlin visited Manokwari in 1926. She described
it as a small town with nice streets, a fish market, quite a number of Chinese shops
and a hospital (Karlin, 1930: 193; Anonymous, 28 May 1926). Already two years earlier,
an anonymous observer witnessed the first plantations around Manokwari, run by a
Japanese together with a son of Dutch missionary (Anonymous, 21 February 1924). Un-
fortunately, this observer did not mention the workforce for these plantations, which
perhaps were either Chinese or Javanese, and must have arrived via the port of Man-
okwari, thus creating economic possibilities for Chinese and Arab traders in the town.
Manokwari had progressed further when American ornithologist Dillon Ripley reached
New Guinea in 1938. At that time, in the town, plenty of Chinese shop houses existed
on the main street, followed by several smaller houses for Indonesian native colonial
clerks. Furthermore, army barracks, a jail, a radio station and a small generator exis-
ted, but Ripley explicitly mentioned the absence of any cars in Manokwari (Ripley, 1942:
80). Further down on a hill, were a number of comfortable bungalows for the Dutch
officials, the largest one reserved for the Assistant Resident.
Even remote Hollandia (Jayapura) developed into a small town after World War I.
Alma Karlin saw in 1926 a main street, a second mountainous street as well as two
lanes with Chinese shops and “Malay houses” (Karlin, 1930: 173). There was also by now
a mosque, barracks for 30-40 colonial soldiers, a post office, an official building for
jurisdiction and a private house for the Dutch judge (Karlin, 1930: 173).The local trade in
the town was completely in the hands of Chinese and “Ternatese” (Arabs and/or Bugis?)
(Anonymous, 21 February 1924). In addition, at the end of World War I, the first Dutch
and German planters arrived in Hollandia, accompanied by the plantation workers,
although these again are not mentioned in any of the travel accounts and other sources
(Haffer, 2008: 63).16 In 1937 Hollandia had a radio station, a jail for 20-30 inmates, a
hospital with 20 beds, a soccer field and a tennis court (Galis and van Doornik, 1960:
14).
Perhaps the most spectacular development in economic and demographic chan-
ge in Dutch New Guinea before, and directly after World War II, happened in Sorong
on the western cape of the Birds’ Head Peninsula. Contacts to the Northern Moluccan
sultanates, to Ambon and Ceram had been established at least since the 17th centu-
ry and brought the spread of Islam to the coastal areas of New Guinea. The Italian
naturalist Luigi Maria d’Albertis, who visited Sorong in April 1872, described its 200 in-
habitants as “nearly all” (“quasi tutti”) being Muslims (Santini, 1937: 16; d’Albertis, 1874:
312). A colonial post was established in Sorong in 1906 which developed into a city in
the late 20th century. Sorong was still a village in 1924, with a few Chinese, Bugis and
Arab traders (Anonymous, 21 February 1924), but this changed as soon as oil fields were
discovered close-by. The exploitation of the oil fields started in 1935 and brought dra-
matic changes. Already in 1938, several white bungalows for European expats had been
16 Although the existence of copra and other plantations in New Guinea after 1920 most have invol-
ved a considerable workforce, not much is known on plantation workers in Dutch New Guinea and
where they came from. An anonymous newspaper article mentioned the lack of workers as the
major difficulty for plantations in the Far East (Anonymous, 20 February 1924).
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built as well as barracks for 10 policemen (Ripley, 1942: 162). A local Chinese doctor was
practicing in town, a Dutch magistrate and the well-known Dutch-Frisian missionary
Freerk Kamma were based in Sorong (Ripley, 1924: 84).17 Many of the servants for the
European communities were Malay-speaking Ambonese, while the few shops were in
Chinese hands. It is no surprise that Sorong was among the first targets of the Japane-
se in New Guinea in World War II and was taken in early April 1942. After the return
of the Dutch following the war, the Nederlandsche Nieuw Guinea Petroleum Maatsch-
appij enlarged the port and built large administrative buildings, impressive residences
for the administrators, a large hospital and plenty of new roads (Bergman, 1950: 34-5).
In 1948, Sorong already had a population of more than 5,000 people and was crowded
with traffic including hundreds of trucks of all kinds, busses, shovel diggers, jeeps and
the latest American luxury cars (Bergman, 1950: 35-6). Chinese and native Indonesians
lived mostly in a kampong bahru (“new quarter”), separated from European-American
expats. Besides the already mentioned infrastructure and buildings of Sorong, there
was also a telegraph station, a school, a church, an army barrack and a small radio
station, which broadcasted music and news from the outside world every evening for
the European community (Bergman, 1950). As further evening entertainment, Bergman
mentioned the bi-weekly open-air cinema with free entry, depending, of course, on the
weather conditions (Bergman, 1950: 36). The economic development was carried on by
the Indonesian government after its occupation of West Papua in 1963. Today Sorong
is the largest city of the Indonesian province Papua Barat (West Papua) with more than
220,000 residents, whileManokwari as provincial capital (since 2003), with a university,
now has about 216,000 inhabitants.
Conclusion
To sum up, comparatively less studies have been carried out on middle sized towns,
especially in regions with stateless societies organised in domains or petty states in
the eastern Lesser Sunda Islands (Fox, 1977) or even acephalous societies such as New
Guinea organised around big men (Godelier, 1987). In the Far East of Indonesia, ur-
banisation did develop, but only after contact with the outside, in particular with the
European world in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Traditional trade patterns
were replaced by the colonial monetary economy with the region becoming more de-
pendent on the world economy. A point in case is the trade in precious birds and their
plumes: a highly profitable business faced a complete breakdown with the change of
female fashion and the prohibition of hunting in the Dutch East Indies and Australian
administrated eastern New Guinea after World War I (Ellen, 2003: 136).
The new towns such as Sorong, Dobo, Hollandia or Manokwari were rather Indone-
sian-cosmopolitan than locally Papuan in character. An anonymous observer even went
so far to claim that in 1915 “Dobo actually had no native population at all” (v.S., 1916:
300). The position of Chinese traders and the evident economic presence of a very tiny
17 Ornithologist Ripley to his great surprise first met Magistrate Kern while he was playing soccer
outside with some boys (Ripley, 1942: 84).
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group of Arab-Hadhramimerchants is particularly striking. Until around 1900, the Arab
community was very active in the Moluccas until they faced strong economic rivalry by
Chinese businessmen. Following the war, they also faced competition from Japanese
companies (Clarence-Smith, 1998: 41). This development is also confirmed by German
geologist Johannes Wanner who observed in December 1902 that the local trade in Eas-
tern Ceram and the Geser-Goram islands was nearly completely under the control of
Chinese and Arabs who replaced local Moluccan-Papuan as well as Bugis traders (Wan-
ner, 2009: 31; Ellen, 2003: 237). Similar accounts had been alreadymentioned for Sorong
or Dobo. In this respect, the first urban environments in Indonesia’s Far East followed
a pattern famously considered as plural societies by former colonial administrator John
S. Furnivall. In Furnivall’s opinion, colonialism was the impetus for the development
of such plural societies, where different ethnic groups or races only interact for econo-
mic reasons at particular places such as markets. They live side by side in the colonial
state without mingling and are not able to express one common social will (Furnivall,
1944: 446-7). Yet, although Furnivall was heavily criticised for creating a Southeast Asian
homo oeconomicus, his general description fits rather well for the new towns in New
Guinea and Eastern Indonesia.
In the vicinity of colonial expansion, new religions found their way to the south
eastern Moluccas and coastal New Guinea. Although Islam was present in the region
at least since the 1850s and Christian mission stations had been established around
the same time (Warnk, 2010), colonial expansion facilitated their further spread. Oral
traditions about Islamic migrants and holy men from Mecca still circulate in the Aru
Islands (Wellfelt and Djonler, 2019: 170-171). Perhaps it is justified to say, the introduc-
tion of the new religions of Islam and Christianity can be interpreted as much as being
a catalyst of town development as well as a result of it. The first colonial administrative
posts in the region were established at exactly those places with either a strong presence
of Muslim and Chinese traders (such as Dobo or Fakfak), or with an already existing
Christian mission station (Dore-Manokwari, Larantuka).
On the other hand, in the wake of colonial expansion, new possibilities also emer-
ged. First, the emergence of small towns led to the creation of completely new social
and economic patterns in the informal sector. New competitors replaced others and lo-
cal traders lost their former status in coastal trading ports. Furthermore, the first towns
became not only centres of colonial rule and economy, but also of education. Educati-
on at Christian mission schools and to a lesser extent also at the often informal Islamic
teachings, following the presence of rather wealthy Arab traders, was a pattern of urban
development, modernity and change (Korff, 1999: 140). In particular, Christian educati-
on brought the region new languages such as Dutch and, more importantly, Malay via
mostly Ambonese, and to a lesser extent, Manadonese school teachers. With the intro-
duction of Malay, they paved the way for further integration into the Dutch East Indies
(Anderson, 1988: 132-133). Finally, school education in eastern Indonesian towns gave
its pupils and their families access to modern media and entertainment. Radio stations
were set up in places such as Sorong, and radio sets could be bought easily if you had
enough money as soon the colonial authorities had established electricity and genera-
tors. The common education also enabled locals to travel to other parts of Indonesia
and created a sense of more comprehensive identity which shortly before World War
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II resulted in the growth of an Indonesian nationalism also in New Guinea and other
remote areas.
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